United States v. Charlie Terry ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4729
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLIE O’BRYANT TERRY, a/k/a Breezy,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 19-4730
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLIE O’BRYANT TERRY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (5:17-cr-00153-BR-1; 5:07-cr-00055-BR-
1)
Submitted: October 22, 2020 Decided: October 28, 2020
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Jude Darrow, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United
States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Evan M.
Rikhye, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
In 2018, Charlie O’Bryant Terry was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment for
obstruction of justice and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, as well as a
consecutive 24-month prison term for violating his supervised release. On appeal, we
determined that the district court neglected to address Terry’s nonfrivolous sentencing
arguments and, consequently, vacated both sentences. United States v. Terry, 771 F. App’x
277, 278-79 (4th Cir. 2019). At resentencing, the district court reimposed the same terms
of imprisonment, and Terry now appeals, contesting both the adequacy of the court’s
sentencing explanations and the substantive reasonableness of each sentence. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In evaluating the procedural
reasonableness of a sentence, we must consider whether the district court adequately
explained its chosen sentence. United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2017).
Moreover, “where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing
a different sentence than that set forth in the advisory [Sentencing] Guidelines, a district
judge should address the party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected those
arguments.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). “A sentencing court’s explanation is sufficient if it,
although somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular history and characteristics
not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and
in response to defense counsel’s arguments for a downward departure.” Blue, 877 F.3d at
3
519 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, a court’s failure to
address a defendant’s nonfrivolous sentencing arguments renders the resulting sentence
procedurally unreasonable. Id.
Our review of the record confirms that the district court meaningfully addressed
each of the sentencing arguments at issue. And although, as Terry highlights on appeal,
the court’s 240-month sentence exceeded the sentence recommended by the Government,
the court fully explained that Terry’s inability to stop unlawfully possessing firearms
necessitated a lengthy prison sentence. Moreover, this proclivity for unlawful firearm
possession—the central basis for the court’s sentencing decision—extended well beyond
his teenage years, thus undermining Terry’s assertion that the court focused too heavily on
crimes committed in his youth. Thus, we discern no error in the court’s explanation of
Terry’s 240-month sentence.
Next, Terry maintains that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, a claim we
consider by looking at “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The
sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals
of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range,
we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Here, the district court indicated that the statutory maximum sentence was necessary
to fulfill several different sentencing goals, including deterrence, incapacitation, and just
punishment. And in reaching this conclusion, the court underscored Terry’s troubling
4
history with firearms. On appeal, Terry simply points to other factors that, in his view, the
court should have accorded more weight. However, Terry’s mere disagreement with the
manner in which the court weighed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors is insufficient to
establish an inappropriate exercise of the court’s sentencing discretion. See United States
v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 2012).
Turning to Terry’s revocation sentence, “[a] district court has broad . . . discretion
in fashioning a sentence upon revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.”
United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). “We will affirm a revocation
sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 207
(internal quotation marks omitted). “To consider whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first must determine whether the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable.” Id. Even if a revocation sentence is unreasonable, we will
reverse only if it is “plainly so.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A district court imposes a procedurally reasonable sentence by “considering the
Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” “adequately explain[ing] the chosen sentence,” and
“meaningfully respond[ing] to the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments” for a different
sentence. Id. (footnote omitted). And a court complies with substantive reasonableness
requirements by “sufficiently stat[ing] a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
Terry contends that the district court both failed to adequately explain the revocation
sentence and overemphasized the seriousness of the supervision violations. 1 As relevant
here, a revocation sentence “‘should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust,
while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation
and the criminal history of the violator.’” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th
Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b), p.s.). Here,
although the court made reference to the number and seriousness of Terry’s supervision
violations, the court focused its decision on “the egregious breach of trust” occasioned by
Terry’s failure to abide by the terms of his supervised release. (J.A. 2 233). We conclude
that the court did not base its decision on improper factors and, moreover, that the court’s
explanation, “though brief, was legally sufficient.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
356 (2007). Finally, because the court adequately justified its sentencing decision, we
reject Terry’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of this sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm both sentences. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
1
Terry also claims that the district court neglected to consider his nonfrivolous
sentencing arguments; however, Terry did not present any arguments specifically
addressed to his revocation sentence, and, as noted above, the court amply considered the
sentencing claims made in connection with his obstruction and firearm charges.
2
“J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
6