United States v. James Daniel, Jr. ( 2020 )


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  •                                      UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 19-4891
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JAMES MICHAEL DANIEL, JR., a/k/a Mike D,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
    Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:18-cr-00214-1)
    Submitted: October 26, 2020                                   Decided: October 30, 2020
    Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Assistant Federal Public
    Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West
    Virginia, for Appellant. Stephanie S. Taylor, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    James Michael Daniel, Jr., pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a
    quantity of heroin, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), and the district court sentenced
    him to 51 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Daniel’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant
    to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting there are no meritorious grounds
    for appeal, but questioning whether the district court accurately calculated Daniel’s drug
    quantity in determining his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Although notified of
    his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Daniel has not done so. 1 We affirm.
    We review a sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
    Guidelines range[,] under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”                Gall v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the
    procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 
    Id. at 51
    . In determining
    procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly calculated the
    defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, considered the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors,
    analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected
    sentence. 
    Id.
     “Regardless of whether the district court imposes an above, below, or within-
    Guidelines sentence, it must place on the record an individualized assessment based on the
    particular facts of the case before it.”    United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 330
    (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    1
    Because the Government has not moved to enforce the appellate waiver in Daniel’s
    plea agreement, we conduct a full review pursuant to Anders. See United States v.
    Poindexter, 
    492 F.3d 263
    , 271 (4th Cir. 2007).
    2
    Daniel’s counsel questions whether the district court correctly included money
    seized in the execution of a search warrant as drug distribution proceeds in calculating the
    drug quantity attributable to Daniel. We review “the district court’s calculation of the
    quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes for clear error.”
    United States v. Slade, 
    631 F.3d 185
    , 188 (4th Cir. 2011). “For sentencing purposes, the
    government must prove the drug quantity attributable to a particular defendant by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Bell, 
    667 F.3d 431
    , 441 (4th Cir. 2011).
    Daniel admitted under oath at his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and in the signed
    stipulation of facts that the money belonged to him and constituted proceeds from dealing
    heroin.    He presented no evidence at sentencing to contradict these admissions.
    Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the money could be
    attributed to Daniel as drug distribution proceeds. See United States v. Lemaster, 
    403 F.3d 216
    , 221 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A defendant’s solemn declarations in open court . . . carry a
    strong presumption of verity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the district
    court correctly calculated Daniel’s advisory Guidelines range, 2 responded to counsel’s
    nonfrivolous arguments, and provided an individualized assessment of the facts, Daniel’s
    sentence is procedurally reasonable.
    2
    To the extent the district court misspoke in announcing the advisory Guidelines
    range as 41 to 57 months’ imprisonment, rather than 41 to 51 months, the error is harmless.
    See United States v. Boulware, 
    604 F.3d 832
    , 838 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining harmless
    error doctrine). Later statements by the court make clear that the court was aware of the
    proper Sentencing Guidelines range when it imposed sentence.
    3
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found
    no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
    This court requires that counsel inform Daniel, in writing, of the right to petition the
    Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Daniel requests that a petition be
    filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
    in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
    a copy thereof was served on Daniel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4