Richard Boggs v. United States ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-1672
RICHARD E. BOGGS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
PETER RAE,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Columbia. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (3:19-cv-00551-MGL)
Submitted: November 6, 2020 Decided: November 17, 2020
Before DIAZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard E. Boggs, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Joel Branman, Arthur Thomas Catterall, Tax
Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Richard E. Boggs appeals from the district court’s orders adopting the report and
recommendation of the district court, granting the United States’ motion to dismiss, and
denying Boggs’ motion for reconsideration. The United States has filed a motion for
sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. Regarding the district court’s grant of the motion
to dismiss and the denial of Boggs’ motion for reconsideration, we have reviewed the
record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the
district court. Boggs v. United States, No. 3:19-cv-00551-MGL (D.S.C. Jan. 16 & Apr. 24,
2020).
Under Fed. R. App. P. 38, we are authorized to impose sanctions for the filing of a
frivolous appeal. Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 954 (4th Cir. 1997). Our power to
impose sanctions applies equally to pro se litigants. Kyler v. Everson, 442 F.3d 1251, 1253
(10th Cir. 2006) (“[P]ro se litigants are subject to the same minimum litigation
requirements that bind all litigants and counsel before all federal courts.”). Sanction
awards for frivolous tax appeals “are to be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Wheeler v.
C.I.R., 528 F.3d 773, 783 (10th Cir. 2008). In addition to providing “an effective sanction
for the bringing of a frivolous appeal,” sanction awards “serve as an effective deterrent to
the bringing of future frivolous appeals, and . . . recompense the government for at least
the direct costs of the appeal.” Id. (quoting Casper v. C.I.R., 805 F.2d 902, 906–07 (10th
Cir. 1986)). When a taxpayer repeatedly engages in frivolous litigation to avoid paying
lawful income taxes, courts have adopted the general practice of awarding a lump-sum
sanction. See Veal-Hill v. C.I.R., 976 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2020) (setting presumptive
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sanction for frivolous tax appeal at $5,000); Wheeler, 528 F.3d at 784-85 (imposing
lump-sum sanction of $4,000); Gary Boggs v. Commissioner, 569 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir.
2009) (granting motion for $8,000 in sanctions against taxpayer); Trowbridge v. C.I.R.,
378 F.3d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (lump sum sanction of $6,000 for frivolous tax appeal).
Here, Boggs’ legal theories have been repeatedly and summarily rejected, and we
find his appeal manifestly frivolous. In its motion, the Government requests a lump sum
award of $8,000. In response, while Boggs asserts that his arguments are not frivolous, he
does not challenge the computation of the lump sum award. In light of Boggs’ repeatedly
frivolous litigation, we grant the United States’ motion for sanctions. However, given that
the litigation below and on appeal was fairly focused and not protracted and that Boggs has
not been previously sanctioned, we impose sanctions in the amount of $5,000. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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