United States v. Jamar Woody ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4868
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAR BERNARD WOODY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
Roanoke. Elizabeth Kay Dillon, District Judge. (7:05-cr-00110-EKD-JCH-1)
Submitted: November 17, 2020 Decided: November 19, 2020
Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles M. Henter, HENTERLAW, PLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas
T. Cullen, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Bernard Woody appeals the sentence imposed following the revocation of
his supervised release. Based on Woody’s 2017 Virginia conviction for malicious
wounding, the district court revoked his federal term of supervised release and sentenced
him to 36 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive to the 8-year sentence imposed
by the state court. On appeal, Woody contends that the district court abused its discretion
by imposing the revocation sentence to run consecutive to the sentence imposed by the
state court. He also argues that the district court failed to adequately weigh his mental
health history and to explain the decision to impose a consecutive sentence. We affirm. *
District courts have “broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). In light of
this discretion, “[w]e will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum
and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e first
consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id.
Only when the sentence is unreasonable will we determine whether the sentence “is plainly
so.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
*
To the extent that Woody asserts that he lacked the requisite mens rea to violate
his supervised release, he waived this argument by admitting to the violation.
2
States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (footnote omitted); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (listing relevant factors). “[A] revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the court sufficiently states a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted). We presume that a sentence within the applicable policy statement range
is reasonable. United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015).
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, “the court should sanction primarily the
defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness
of the underlying violation and the history of the violator.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2018); see Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. “A court need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court “must address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in
favor of a particular sentence, and if the court rejects those arguments, it must explain why
in a detailed-enough manner that [we] can meaningfully consider the procedural
reasonableness of the revocation sentence.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208. An explanation is
sufficient if we can determine “that the sentencing court considered the applicable
sentencing factors with regard to the particular defendant before it and also considered any
potentially meritorious arguments raised by the parties with regard to sentencing.” United
States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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After review of the record, we conclude that the sentence imposed was reasonable
and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the revocation sentence
consecutive to the state court sentence. The district court appropriately considered the
applicable 46- to 57-month policy statement sentencing range and considered the § 3553(a)
factors relevant to revocation proceedings, noting specifically the nature and circumstances
of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need to provide
adequate deterrence and to protect the public from further crimes. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a), 3583(e).
The court also considered Woody’s arguments concerning his mental health and his
request for a concurrent sentence. The district court explained that a consecutive sentence
was necessary to punish Woody’s violation of the terms of his supervision separate from
the sentence imposed for the state malicious wounding offense. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f),
p.s. In consideration of Woody’s “significant history of mental illness,” the district court
imposed a downward variance sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment, explaining that this
sentence was an appropriate sanction for Woody’s violation of the conditions of supervised
release, but also took into account his mental health concerns. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its considerable discretion by determining that the revocation sentence
should be served consecutive to Woody’s state court sentence. See Slappy, 872 F.3d at 206
(providing standard); see also United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“‘[T]he sentence imposed upon revocation is intended to sanction the violator for failing
to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.’” (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt.
A3(b)) (brackets omitted)).
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The district court adequately addressed Woody’s arguments for a lesser, concurrent
sentence and determined that a consecutive sentence was appropriate. We conclude that
Woody’s sentence was not unreasonable, much less plainly unreasonable. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5