United States v. Veto Martin ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4156
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VETO OMAR MARTIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Asheville. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (1:19-cr-00048-MOC-WCM-1)
Submitted: December 29, 2020 Decided: January 26, 2021
Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew B. Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BANZHOFF, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellant. R. Andrew Murray, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Veto Omar Martin entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to
distribute heroin and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced
to 168 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Martin challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during the execution of a search
warrant. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
When considering a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, “we review
factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo.” United States v.
Wharton, 840 F.3d 163, 168 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, as the prevailing
party. United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2015). The Fourth
Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches” and provides that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. An affidavit supporting a warrant that authorizes a search “must
provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable
cause” in light of the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239
(1983). This court affords “great deference” to factual determinations made by a
magistrate judge regarding probable cause. United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 150
(4th Cir. 2016). In deciding whether probable cause exists, “a judicial officer must simply
make ‘a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
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found in a particular place.’” United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 172 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).
In an effort to deter police misconduct, “evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule.” United States v.
Andrews, 577 F.3d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2009). However, under the good faith exception,
“evidence will not be suppressed if it is obtained by police officers in objectively
reasonable reliance on a search warrant, even if that warrant later is determined to be
invalid.” United States v. Blakeney, 949 F.3d 851, 861 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)). Thus, “evidence obtained from an
invalidated search warrant will be suppressed only if the officers were dishonest or reckless
in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in
the existence of probable cause.” United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1583 (4th Cir.
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116,
122 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the Leon good-faith exception does not apply in the case
of a bare bones affidavit”).
When a defendant challenges both a probable cause finding and the applicability of
the good faith exception, this court may proceed directly to the good faith analysis without
first deciding whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. United States v. Legg,
18 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994). Ordinarily, “searches conducted pursuant to a warrant
will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a
magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good
faith in conducting the search.” United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004)
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(internal quotation marks omitted). There are, however, four circumstances in which the
good faith exception will not apply:
(1) when the affiant based his application on knowing or reckless falsity;
(2) when the judicial officer wholly abandoned his role as a neutral and
detached decision maker and served merely as a “rubber stamp” for the
police; (3) when the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant was so facially deficient that the
executing officers could not reasonably have presumed that the warrant was
valid.
United States v. Wellman, 663 F.3d 224, 228-29 (4th Cir. 2011). If any of these
circumstances are present, evidence gathered pursuant to that warrant must be excluded.
See Andrews, 577 F.3d at 236. In assessing whether the exception applies, “our . . . inquiry
is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained
officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s
authorization” in light of “all of the circumstances.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.
Martin argues that the good faith exception does not apply because the affidavit
lacked any indicia of probable cause and, therefore, the evidence obtained during the search
must be excluded under the exclusionary rule. Because our review of the record
demonstrates that the affidavit in this case bears sufficient indicia of probable cause to
support the search, we find no reversible error in the district court’s denial of Martin’s
motion to suppress. The affidavit detailed the training on which the officer relied,
including his experience and knowledge relating to the drug trade and the locations where
individuals selling drugs often conceal their caches. The affiant attested to his significant
training and experience in narcotics investigations, executions of search warrants,
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surveillance, undercover operations, arrests, and property seizure. The affiant provided
firsthand knowledge that a confidential informant was able to purchase drugs from the
target residence and then detailed corroborating information of two controlled buys that
took place at the residence, including one within 48 hours of requesting the warrant, and
the validity of those controlled buys. Considering the totality of this information, the
affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance on the warrant
entirely unreasonable. See Wellman, 663 F.3d at 229; United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d
460, 471 (4th Cir. 2011).
Martin also argues the affidavit failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the
residence and criminal activity, and between his vehicle, which was parked in the
residence’s driveway, and criminal activity. A sufficient nexus between a defendant’s
criminal conduct and his residence can exist “even when the affidavit supporting the
warrant contains no factual assertions directly linking the items sought to the defendant’s
residence.” United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Courts may rely on officers’ “assertion[s] of training-and-
experience-based knowledge” to support the nexus between criminal activity and a
defendant’s residence. Williams, 548 F.3d at 319-20. Here, a direct link existed for the
sale of drugs at the residence where the confidential source of information (CSI) conducted
two controlled buys at the premises, the officer had knowledge that illegal drugs are often
concealed around the residence by those involved in the sale of illegal drugs, and an
inference can be reasonably made that a car parked in the driveway of the target residence
may be a place where drugs are located. We discern no basis to conclude that “a reasonably
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well trained officer would have known that the search [of the vehicle] was illegal despite
the magistrate’s authorization.” United States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 317 (4th Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Martin further argues that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant and that the
warrant was stale. However, the search warrant explicitly included a search of the
residence, its curtilage, and any vehicles within the curtilage. Further, the warrant was
executed within a reasonable amount of time considering all the facts and circumstances
of the case. See United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010). Over the
span of two months, the Asheville Police Department became aware of suspected drug
activity at the premises through a CSI, and this information was corroborated through
controlled buys a month before the warrant was issued and, again, within 72 hours of the
warrant’s issuance, which speaks to an ongoing presence of drug-dealing at the residence.
The officers executed the warrant within 48 hours of its issuance. Thus, we find the warrant
was timely executed and the search of Martin’s car within the scope of the warrant.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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