Brian Stoltie v. County of Lexington ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-7754
BRIAN JOSEPH STOLTIE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF LEXINGTON; LEXINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT;
WELLPATH, sued in their official capacities; KEVIN JONES; LONA STARKS;
MR. DARBY; MS. BETTY; MS. JESSICA; MS. HARE; MR. KEYS; DAVID OR;
MR. J. MURPHY, sued in their official and individual capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock
Hill. Sherri A. Lydon, District Judge. (0:19-cv-00387-SAL)
Submitted: March 23, 2021 Decided: March 29, 2021
Before THACKER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian Joseph Stoltie, Appellant Pro Se. David Allan DeMasters, DAVIDSON, WREN &
PLYLER, PA, Columbia, South Carolina; Mark Victor Gende, William Alexander
Neinast, SWEENY, WINGATE & BARROW, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brian Joseph Stoltie seeks to appeal the district court’s orders adopting the
magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing Stoltie’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and denying relief on his motion to
reconsider, which the district court construed as filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). We
dismiss in part and affirm in part.
Regarding the dismissal of his complaint, Stoltie’s notice of appeal was due no more
than 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extended the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5), or reopened the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing
of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement,” Bowles v. Russell, 551
U.S. 205, 214 (2007), and “an appeal from denial of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 60(b) relief does not
bring up the underlying judgment for review,” Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court’s order
dismissing Stoltie’s complaint was entered on March 27, 2020. The notice of appeal was
filed on November 24, 2020. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 267 (1988) (establishing
prison mailbox rule). Because Stoltie’s appeal from the dismissal of his complaint is
untimely and he did not obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss
this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Stoltie also appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration.
We review the denial of motions for reconsideration filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule
60(b) for abuse of discretion. Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 750
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(4th Cir. 2018) (Rule 59(e) motion); Aikens, 652 F.3d at 501 (Rule 60(b) motion). Because
Stoltie’s motion was not filed within 28 days after the entry of the district court’s order
dismissing the action, the motion is properly construed as filed pursuant to Rule 60(b). See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (providing 28-day filing period); MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines,
532 F.3d 269, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining postjudgment motions should be
construed based on time period within which they are filed). Nevertheless, “we may affirm
on any grounds supported by the record, notwithstanding the reasoning of the district
court.” Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 75 n.13 (4th Cir. 2016).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Stoltie’s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
order denying that motion.
We deny Stoltie’s motion for appointment of counsel and deny as moot his motion
to compel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART
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