United States v. Sonya Skinner ( 2023 )

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4001
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SONYA SKINNER,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 22-4013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SONYA SKINNER,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (2:16-cr-00017-RCY-LRL-1; 2:21-cr- 00062-RCY-
RJK-1)
Submitted: February 17, 2023 Decided: April 4, 2023
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Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Rodolfo Cejas, II, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney,
Richmond, Virginia, Joseph Kosky, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Sonya Skinner appeals from her convictions for four counts of bankruptcy fraud
following a bench trial and her resulting 12-month within-Guidelines sentence. She also
appeals the 18-month upward variance sentence imposed for violation of her supervised
release. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of her specific intent and
the district court’s explanation for her aggregate sentence. We vacate Skinner’s revocation
sentence and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the remainder of the district court’s
judgments.
Skinner first argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence of her
specific intent. While Skinner moved for a judgment of acquittal after the close of the
Government’s case raising this issue, she did not renew her motion after trial. Accordingly,
this argument is forfeited absent a manifest miscarriage of justice. United States v.
Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 n.2 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 374
(4th Cir. 2020). “[T]he ‘manifest miscarriage’ language [is] simply a formulation of the
plain-error test’s application to insufficiency claims.” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d
320, 331 n.9 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also United States v. Norris, 21 F.4th 188, 199
(1st Cir. 2021) (when insufficient evidence claim was not raised in Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 motion,
claim is reviewed for plain error); United States v. Chaparro, 956 F.3d 462, 468 (7th Cir.
2020)(explaining that, because defendant did not renew Rule 29 motion, he “forfeited his
sufficiency challenge,” and court “reviews for a manifest miscarriage of justice” or “plain
error” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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For a defendant to prevail under the plain-error standard, we must find that: “(1) an
error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Comer, 5 F.4th 535, 548 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n
appellate court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire record—not just the
record from the particular proceeding where the error occurred.” Greer v. United States,
141 S. Ct. 2090, 2098 (2021) (emphasis in the original).
Bankruptcy fraud involves filing a bankruptcy petition with an intent to execute,
conceal, or attempt to execute or conceal “a scheme or artifice to defraud.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 157. To obtain a conviction on this offense, the Government must prove that Skinner acted
with the specific intent to defraud. See United States v. Yurek, 925 F.3d 423, 439 (10th Cir.
2019). Specific intent to defraud requires the intent “to deprive one of something of value
through a misrepresentation or other similar dishonest method, which indeed would cause
him harm.” United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (mail/wire fraud).
Therefore, “to convict a person of defrauding another, more must be shown than simply an
intent to lie to the victim or to make a false statement to him.” Id. As the Supreme Court
has explained, a scheme to defraud “must be one to deceive the [victim] and deprive [him
or her] of something of value.” Shaw v. United States, 580 U.S. 63, 72 (2016) (bank fraud)
(emphasis in original). However, specific intent may be “inferred from the totality of the
circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.” United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d
659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001).
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Skinner avers that her false statements on various documents in her bankruptcy
petition were due to misunderstandings and that the lack of motive evidence boosted the
credibility of her testimony. This argument heavily relies upon Skinner’s testimony that she
did not understand the scope of the questions in the bankruptcy petition and made reasonable
mistakes therein. However, the district court did not find Skinner to be a credible witness
and, in fact, imposed an obstruction of justice enhancement based on her perjured testimony.
Credibility determinations made by the district court are rarely reviewable on appeal. United
States v. Cates, 613 F.3d 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Witness credibility is quintessentially a
judgment call and virtually unassailable on appeal.”); United States v. Oquendo-Rivera, 586
F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he reviewing court must interpret the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, . . . and credibility is largely a matter for the fact-finder.”).
We afford the district court’s credibility finding great deference and, thus, determine that
Skinner has failed to show error, much less plain error.
Moreover, Skinner does not dispute that plain error is the appropriate standard of
review, and yet she fails to address the plain error standard. Our review of the record does
not reveal any plain error with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we
affirm Skinner’s convictions.
Turning to Skinner’s sentence, for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “a
district court must conduct an individualized assessment of the facts and arguments
presented.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A “district court’s sentencing explanation need not be exhaustive or
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robotically tick through [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors. But the court’s explanation must be
sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that the district court has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.”
United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 142 S.
Ct. 724 (2021). “The explanation is sufficient if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the
defendant’s particular history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but
as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and in response to defense counsel’s arguments
. . . .” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 782 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
While “it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s rationale from the
context surrounding its decision,” we “may not guess at the district court’s rationale,
searching the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other
clues that might explain a sentence.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 745 (4th Cir.
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “in a routine case, where the district
court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the explanation need not be elaborate or
lengthy.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Ultimately, “[t]he adequacy of the sentencing court’s explanation depends
on the complexity of each case and the facts and arguments presented.” United States v.
Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We find that the district court’s explanation for Skinner’s bankruptcy fraud
within-Guidelines sentence sufficiently demonstrated that it considered the parties’
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arguments and the relevant statutory factors. The court explicitly stated that it considered
the parties’ positions on sentencing and the arguments of counsel and noted that counsel
contended that Skinner was not a danger to the community. The court expressed concern
about the serious nature of Skinner’s bankruptcy fraud, especially in light of prior court
orders limiting Skinner’s ability to file bankruptcy petitions. The court noted Skinner’s
normal childhood and considered that she had a master’s degree and no history of drug
abuse or mental health issues. The court further determined that Skinner’s conduct was
repetitive, even after prior punishments, and showed a “blatant disregard” for the court
system. The court explicitly listed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors that it considered and found
both an upward and a downward variance inappropriate. We hold that the court’s
explanation of Skinner’s within-Guidelines sentence was sufficient and that Skinner’s 12-
month sentence was procedurally reasonable.
Skinner also argues that her sentence imposed upon the revocation of her supervised
release was procedurally unreasonable due to the lack of a sufficient explanation by the
district court. Skinner’s revocation Guidelines range was 4 to 10 months, and she was
sentenced to an upward variance sentence of 18 months. “A district court has broad
discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is
within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy,
872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining
whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether the
sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. Only if we find the sentence
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procedurally and or substantively unreasonable, must we decide whether it is “plainly” so.
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that a plainly
unreasonable sentence is one in which the error is clear and obvious). In doing so, this court is
guided by “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide [its] review of
original sentences,” but it takes “a more deferential appellate posture than [it] do[es] when
reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015)
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing sentencing factors applicable to revocation proceedings). “[A]
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as
it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). An explanation is adequate if it permits this
Court to determine “that the sentencing court considered the applicable sentencing factors
with regard to the particular defendant before it and also considered any potentially
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meritorious arguments raised by the parties with regard to sentencing.” United States v.
Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Skinner adopted the arguments made at her sentencing for her fraud
convictions, which was held the same day. There, she argued that she was not a risk to
society and that, despite her lapses in judgment, she corrected her errors when they were
pointed out. These were certainly not extensive arguments, and the district court stated that
it considered the arguments of counsel and the relevant statutory factors.
However, the only individualized statement made by the district court in its
explanation for the revocation sentence was factually incorrect. The court stated that
Skinner filed “four fraudulent bankruptcy petitions while on a term of supervised release
for filing fraudulent bankruptcy petitions.” J.A. 95. However, Skinner was not on
supervised release for filing fraudulent bankruptcy petitions; instead, she was on
supervised release for convictions arising from her charging customers for bankruptcy
petition preparation and legal advice, despite being enjoined by the court from doing so.
Moreover, Skinner did not file four fraudulent bankruptcy petitions while on the instant
supervised release; she only filed one, even though four charges arose from that filing.
Also, the district court did not address the upward variance or why the Guidelines
range was insufficient. Given the court’s failure to explain its sentence and its reliance on
incorrect facts, we find that Skinner’s revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable.
Accordingly, we vacate Skinner’s revocation sentence and remand for resentencing.
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We affirm Skinner’s bankruptcy fraud convictions and resulting sentence. * We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED
*
We decline to address the additional claims raised in Skinner’s pro se supplemental
briefs. While counsel originally filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), counsel has now filed a merits brief. See United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d
566, 569 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011) (denying motion to file pro se supplemental brief because
defendant was represented by counsel).
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