United States v. Thomas Madison , 538 F. App'x 244 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4709
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
THOMAS MCKENNY MADISON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:06-cr-00497-HEH-2)
Submitted: March 29, 2013 Decided: August 13, 2013
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Valencia D.
Roberts, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Roderick Charles Young, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas McKenny Madison appeals from the district
court’s judgment finding he violated the conditions of his
supervised release, revoking his supervised release, and
sentencing him to fifteen months in prison. Madison’s attorney
has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues, but
raising whether the court applied the proper standard in finding
the violations, whether a preponderance of the evidence
supported the alleged commission of a new crime violation by
obstruction of justice, and whether Madison’s sentence is
plainly unreasonable.
We review a district court’s decision to revoke an
individual’s supervised release for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke
supervised release, a district court need only find a violation
of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012);
United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992).
This burden “simply requires the trier of fact to believe that
the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court reviews the district court’s factual
findings for clear error. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401,
410 (4th Cir. 2010). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if
the court reviews all the evidence and “is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). It is not enough for the
court to conclude that it would have decided the case
differently. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S.
564, 573 (1985).
Madison argues that the district court erred by
allegedly applying a probable cause standard to determine
whether the Government proved the obstruction of
justice/commission of a new crime violation instead of the
proper preponderance of the evidence standard. This claim is
reviewed for plain error because it was not raised below. See
Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428-29 (2009). He
also argues that the evidence was insufficient to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that he committed the obstruction
of justice violation. We have reviewed the record and conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly
err in determining that the Government’s evidence established
that Madison violated his supervised release by committing a new
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crime of obstruction of justice. Madison admitted several other
violations.
We also discern no error in the district court’s
decision to impose a fifteen-month sentence. Madison argues
that the district court improperly considered 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors that are not to be considered for a
revocation sentence; namely, “to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense[.]” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006). He also
contends that his sentence was substantively unreasonable
because it was greater than necessary in light of the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors. We will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a
district court must consider the Chapter Seven policy
statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. B
(2011), and the statutory requirements and factors applicable to
revocation sentences under § 3553(a) and § 3583(e) in fashioning
a sentence after revoking supervised release, the district court
ultimately has broad discretion to revoke the previous sentence
and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
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A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the
§ 3553(a) factors that it is permitted to consider in a
supervised release revocation case. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e);
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Although the district court
need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation sentence
in as much detail as when it imposes an original sentence, “it
still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will this court “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable[.]” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (emphasis omitted).
We have reviewed the record and have considered Madison’s
arguments and discern no reversible error. We therefore
conclude that Madison’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Madison, in writing, of the right
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to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Madison requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Madison.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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