Franklin Reaves v. Mullins Police Dept ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1459
REVEREND FRANKLIN C. REAVES; VASTENA REAVES; DONALD N.
REAVES; HENRY O. REAVES,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MULLINS POLICE DEPARTMENT, City of; MARION COUNTY; W.
KENNETH MCDONALD, individually and in his official capacity
as Mayor; TERRY B. STRICKLAND, individually and in his
official capacity as member of Mullins City Council; JO A.
SANDERS, individually and in her official capacity as member
of Mullins City Council; JAMES W. ARMSTRONG, individually
and in his official capacity as member of Mullins City
Council; PATRICIA A. PHILLIPS, individually and in her
official capacity as member of Mullins City Council; D.
WAYNE COLLINS, individually and in his official capacity as
member of Mullins City Council; DANIEL B. SHELLEY, JR.,
individually and in his official capacity as member of
Mullins City Council; GEORGE HARDWICK, individually and in
his official capacity as City Administrator for City of
Mullins; JOHN Q. ATKINSON, individually and in his official
capacity as member of Marion County Council; ELOISE W.
ROGERS, individually and in her official capacity as member
of Marion County Council; TOM SHAW, individually and in his
official capacity as member of Marion County Council; ALLEN
FLOYD, individually and in his official capacity as member
of Marion County Council; MILTON TROY, individually and in
his official capacity as member of Marion County Council;
PEARLY BRITT, individually and in his official capacity as
member of Marion County Council; ELISTA H. SMITH,
individually and in her official capacity as member of
Marion County Council; KENT WILLIAMS, individually and in
his official capacity as member of Marion County
Administrator; K. DONALD FLING, individually and in his
official capacity as Marion County Code Enforcement Officer;
RUSSELL BASS, individually and in his official capacity as
Chief of City of Mullins Police Department; EDWIN ROGERS,
individually and in his official capacity as City of Mullins
Planner,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-1461
REVEREND FRANKLIN C. REAVES, PHd And All Others Similarly
Situated; VASTENA REAVES, And All Others Similarly
Situated,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
and
DONALD N. REAVES,
Appellant,
v.
ROBERT STETSON, individually and in his official capacity as
Fire Chief and Building Inspector for City of Mullins; DANNY
GARDNER, individually and in his official capacity as Marion
County Employee; DENNIS FLOYD, individually and in his
official capacity as Marion County Employee; DONALD BRYANT,
individually and in his official capacity as Marion County
Employee; MICHAEL CROUCH, individually and in his official
capacity as Marion County Employee; LAYFAYETT REED,
individually and in his official capacity as Marion County
Employee; MULLINS, City of; MARION COUNTY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District
Judge. (4:08-cv-01818-TLW-SVH; 4:09-cv-00816-TLW-SVH)
Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 5, 2011
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Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Franklin C. Reaves, Vastena Reaves, Donald N. Reaves, and Henry
O. Reaves, Appellants Pro Se. Douglas Charles Baxter,
RICHARDSON, PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, PA, Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina; Robert Thomas King, WILLCOX BUYCK & WILLIAMS, PA,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Appellants appeal the
district court’s order declining to accept the magistrate
judge’s recommendations that attorney’s fees be awarded to
Defendants. In their informal brief, Appellants fail to address
the district court’s ruling on attorney’s fees. Therefore,
Appellants have forfeited appellate review of that issue. See
4th Cir. R. 34(b) (limiting review to issues raised in the
informal brief); see also Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d
231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding failure to raise issue in
opening brief constituted abandonment of that issue).
Accordingly, we affirm. * We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
To the extent that Appellants also seek review of the
district court’s orders accepting the recommendations of the
magistrate judge and denying relief on their civil complaints as
well as denying their subsequent motions for reconsideration, we
conclude that any appeal from these orders is untimely. See
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
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