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 2011-03

Misel v. Mazda Motor of America, Incorporated , 420 F. App'x 272 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2018
STEPHEN MISEL; TIFFANY MISEL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MAZDA   MOTOR   OF   AMERICA,    INCORPORATED,   a    California
corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:09-cv-00457-F)
Submitted:   February 18, 2011             Decided:   March 28, 2011
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher W. Livingston, White Oak, North Carolina, for
Appellants. H. Toby Schisler, Amy L. Keegan, DINSMORE & SHOHL,
LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stephen and Tiffany Misel appeal the district court’s
order   and    judgment      granting        Mazda     Motor    of   America,   Inc.’s
(“Mazda”)      Federal    Rule       of   Civil        Procedure     12(b)(1)   (“Rule
12(b)(1)”)      motion    to     dismiss         for     lack   of   subject    matter
jurisdiction.      Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
The Misels filed suit against Mazda, alleging that it
violated the North Carolina New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act,
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20
    -15A (2010), and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act,
    15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
     (2006) (“MMWA”), when it failed to
repair or replace the new car that the Misels purchased.                           The
Misels sought to recover the purchase price of the car less an
amount for reasonable use before the first attempted repair,
tripled pursuant to
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-351.2
    , 20-351.3, for a
total   of     $66,405.15.           Mazda       moved    to    dismiss   the   Misels
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.                    The district court granted
Mazda’s motion, holding that the Misels failed to satisfy the
MMWA’s $50,0000 amount in controversy requirement because the
aggregate of their MMWA claims was less than $50,000.
We review de novo a district court’s decision granting
a   motion    to   dismiss     for   lack     of     subject    matter    jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1).           See Etape v. Chertoff,
    497 F.3d 379
    , 382
(4th Cir. 2007).         The district court should grant such a motion
“only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute
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and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”
Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co.,
    166 F.3d 642
    , 647 (4th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).                          The burden of
proving    subject      matter    jurisdiction          in    response       to   a    Rule
12(b)(1)   motion       to    dismiss      is   on    the    plaintiff,       the     party
asserting jurisdiction.          Williams v. United States,
    50 F.3d 299
    ,
304 (4th Cir. 1995).
A    plaintiff      may    file     a    MMWA    suit   for    damages      for
certain    breach      of    warranty      obligations        in    either     state     or
federal court.
    15 U.S.C. § 2310
    (d)(1) (2006).                    Such a suit,
however,    is    not       appropriately       brought      in     a   United      States
district court
(A)    if the amount in controversy of any individual
claim is less than the sum or value of $25;
(B)    if the amount in controversy is less than the sum
or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and
costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be
determined in this suit; or
(C)    if the action is brought as a class action, and
the number of named plaintiffs is less than one
hundred.
    15 U.S.C. § 2310
    (d)(3).
The Misels concede that their claims do not meet the
$50,000 requirement unless they receive treble damages pursuant
to North Carolina law.                The aggregate amount in controversy,
however,   is    not    computed      on   the      basis    of    pendent    state     law
claims.    See, e.g., Ansari v. Bella Auto. Group, Inc.,
    145 F.3d 
                                               3
1270, 1272 (11th Cir. 1998);          Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc.,
    748 F.2d 1058
    ,      1071       (5th        Cir.   1984);       Collins       v.
Computertraining.com, Inc.,
    376 F. Supp. 2d 599
    , 602 (E.D. Va.
2005); Barnes v. West, Inc.,
    249 F. Supp. 2d 737
    , 739 n.4 (E.D.
Va. 2003); Critney v. Nat’l City Ford, Inc.,
    255 F. Supp. 2d 1146
    , 1147-49 (S.D. Cal. 2003); Rose v. A & L Motor Sales,
    699 F. Supp. 75
    , 77 (W.D. Pa. 1988).             Therefore, the Misels do not
meet the MMWA’s aggregate amount in controversy requirement and
the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over their
suit.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We   dispense    with   oral   argument     because   the   facts   and   legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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