Ling Yu v. Holder , 433 F. App'x 174 ( 2011 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-2088
    LING YU,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.
    Submitted:   May 19, 2011                   Decided:   June 2, 2011
    Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Charles Christophe, CHRISTOPHE & ASSOCIATES, P.C., New York, New
    York, for Petitioner.    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General,
    John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel, Rosanne M. Perry,
    Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ling Yu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic
    of    China,    petitions       for       review    an   order       of   the    Board     of
    Immigration      Appeals       (“Board”)      dismissing       her    appeal     from     the
    immigration judge’s order denying her applications for asylum,
    withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”).              We deny the petition for review.
    The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes
    the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee.                                
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)    (2006).        The     INA   defines      a    refugee     as    a     person
    unwilling or unable to return to her native country “because of
    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion.”                
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A) (2006).
    “Persecution         involves       the    infliction         or    threat      of     death,
    torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
    of the enumerated grounds. . . .”                    Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 
    405 F.3d 171
    ,     177   (4th     Cir.    2005)       (internal       quotation    marks     and
    citations omitted).
    An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
    for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 
    455 F.3d 484
    , 486 (4th Cir.
    2006);   see     
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a)      (2010),       and   can    establish
    refugee status based on past persecution in her native country
    on account of a protected ground.                        
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)
    2
    (2010).     “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject
    of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
    persecution.”      Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 
    371 F.3d 182
    , 187 (4th Cir.
    2004).        Without   regard    to    past    persecution,      an       alien   can
    establish     a   well-founded    fear    of    persecution     on     a    protected
    ground.       Ngarurih,   
    371 F.3d at 187
    .   The   well-founded           fear
    standard contains both a subjective and an objective component.
    The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete
    facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances
    to fear persecution.         Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 351
    , 353 (4th Cir. 2006).          “The subjective component can be met
    through     the   presentation     of     candid,     credible,      and      sincere
    testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . .
    [It] must have some basis in the reality of the circumstances
    and be validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it
    cannot be mere irrational apprehension.”               Qiao Hua Li, 
    405 F.3d at 176
     (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony
    on credibility grounds, as in this case, must offer “specific,
    cogent reason[s]” for doing so.              Figeroa v. INS, 
    886 F.2d 76
    , 78
    (4th   Cir.    1989).     “Examples      of    specific   and   cogent       reasons
    include   inconsistent     statements,         contradictory      evidence,        and
    inherently improbable testimony . . . .”                  Tewabe v. Gonzales,
    
    446 F.3d 533
    , 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
    3
    citations       omitted).        This    court          accords    broad,       though    not
    unlimited,       deference       to    credibility          findings      supported        by
    substantial evidence.             Camara v. Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 361
    , 367
    (4th Cir. 2004).
    The     REAL    ID   Act    of    2005       amended   the   law      regarding
    credibility        determinations        for      applications       for       asylum     and
    withholding of removal filed after May 11, 2005, as is the case
    here.     Such determinations are to be made based on the totality
    of the circumstances and all relevant factors, including “the
    demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness,
    the     inherent       plausibility      of       the    applicant’s       or     witness’s
    account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s
    written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not
    under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the
    statements were made), the internal consistency of each such
    statement,       the     consistency         of    such     statements         with     other
    evidence of record . . . . and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in
    such    statements,       without      regard      to    whether    an   inconsistency,
    inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
    claim.”    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
    A    determination         regarding        eligibility      for     asylum    or
    withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
    evidence on the record considered as a whole.                            INS v. Elias-
    Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992).                      Administrative findings of
    4
    fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
    any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
    contrary.       
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B) (2006).                       Legal issues are
    reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s
    interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.”                                    Li
    Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 
    517 F.3d 685
    , 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008).                               This
    Court    will    reverse       the    Board       only    if   “the    evidence      .   .   .
    presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
    fail     to      find        the      requisite           fear      of      persecution.”
    Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. at 483-84
    ; see Rusu v. INS, 
    296 F.3d 316
    ,    325   n.14     (4th    Cir.    2002).            Furthermore,       “[t]he   agency
    decision that an alien is not eligible for asylum is ‘conclusive
    unless     manifestly         contrary    to        the     law     and     an   abuse       of
    discretion.’”         Marynenka v. Holder, 
    592 F.3d 594
    , 600 (4th Cir.
    2010) (quoting 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(D) (2006)).
    Yu claims the immigration judge’s adverse credibility
    finding was in error.              We have reviewed the record and note that
    the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding was based on
    specific      and     cogent    reasons       as     noted     by     the   Board.        For
    instance, Yu lied when asked if she had ever applied for a visa.
    It was also noted that there were inconsistencies between her
    testimony       and    her     credible       fear       interview.         “Inconsistent
    statements and contradictory evidence qualify as cogent reasons
    that could support an adverse credibility finding.”                              Dankam v.
    5
    Gonzales, 
    495 F.3d 113
    , 121 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).       The immigration judge was entitled to reject
    Yu’s   explanations    for    the    discrepancies.              
    Id. at 122
    .       We
    further conclude that the immigration judge’s findings regarding
    the lack of credible independent evidence in support of Yu’s
    claim for    relief   under    the    CAT       are    supported       by    substantial
    evidence.
    Accordingly,     we     deny       the    petition   for        review.      We
    dispense    with   oral      argument      because        the    facts        and     legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
    6