United States v. Richard Rollins ( 2021 )


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  •                                      UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 21-4009
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    RICHARD COLT ROLLINS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
    Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:07-cr-00082-MR-WCM-1)
    Submitted: August 3, 2021                                         Decided: August 11, 2021
    Before KING, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Ben C. Scales, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF BEN SCALES, Asheville, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Richard Colt Rollins appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking his
    supervised release and sentencing him to 24 months’ imprisonment. Rollins’ counsel filed
    a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), stating that there are no
    meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Rollins was prejudiced by the 12-
    year delay between the filing of the petition seeking revocation of his supervised release
    based on his alleged violations of several criminal laws and the revocation hearing. The
    Government has declined to file a brief. Although notified of his right to do so, Rollins
    has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We now affirm the district court’s judgment.
    “We review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised
    release for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Padgett, 
    788 F.3d 370
    , 373 (4th Cir.
    2015). “[L]ike parole and probation revocation proceedings, supervised release revocation
    hearings are not criminal proceedings.” United States v. Riley, 
    920 F.3d 200
    , 206 (4th Cir.
    2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, these proceedings do not trigger the
    “full panoply of rights” that attach in criminal prosecutions, Morrissey v. Brewer, 
    408 U.S. 471
    , 480 (1972), including the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial, United
    States v. Ward, 
    770 F.3d 1090
    , 1098 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, the Supreme Court has
    held that there is “no constitutional duty to provide [a parolee] an adversary parole hearing
    until he is taken into custody as a parole violator.” Moody v. Daggett, 
    429 U.S. 78
    , 89
    (1976). Although the probation officer filed the revocation petition in 2008, Rollins did
    not enter federal custody on the petition until 2020.
    2
    “Although there is no constitutional basis for these rights in a revocation proceeding
    . . . these rights are addressed to some degree by Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure.” Ward, 770 F.3d at 1098 n.8. Rule 32.1(b)(2) gives the defendant the right to
    have a “revocation hearing within a reasonable time.” However, a person facing revocation
    of supervised release may not obtain relief from delay in conducting supervised release
    revocation proceedings “unless there was both unreasonable delay and prejudice.” United
    States v. Santana, 
    526 F.3d 1257
    , 1260 (9th Cir. 2008). A delay may frustrate a defendant’s
    due process rights if it undermines his ability to contest the issue underlying the violation
    or to proffer mitigating evidence. United States v. Tippens, 
    39 F.3d 88
    , 90 (5th Cir. 1994)
    (per curiam).
    We conclude that Rollins cannot establish prejudice. To revoke supervised release,
    a district court need only find a violation of supervised release by a preponderance of the
    evidence. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3). While Rollins claimed that he did not commit the
    conduct underlying his state convictions, the jury’s verdict alone provided the district court
    a sufficient basis to revoke his supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Goodon, 
    742 F.3d 373
    , 376 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Trowery, 401 F. App’x 642, 644 (3d Cir.
    2010); United States v. Spraglin, 
    418 F.3d 479
    , 481 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
    Huusko, 
    275 F.3d 600
    , 602–03 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, Rollins is still serving his state
    sentence and has yet to enter federal custody to serve his revocation sentence. Accordingly,
    we discern no prejudice to Rollins from the 12-year delay between the filing of the
    revocation petition and the revocation hearing.
    3
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
    found no other meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
    judgment and, at this juncture, deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that
    counsel inform Rollins, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
    States for further review. If Rollins requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
    that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
    withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served
    on Rollins.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4