United States v. Ocampo , 227 F. App'x 229 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4698
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANDRES OCAMPO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00380-JAB-4)
Submitted: February 22, 2007 Decided: March 16, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James D. Cowan, Jr., SMITH MOORE, L.L.P., Greensboro, North
Carolina; Laura M. Loyek, SMITH MOORE, L.L.P., Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
Attorney, L. Patrick Auld, Assistant United States Attorney, Deputy
Chief, Criminal Division, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andres Ocampo was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to
possess, conceal, and pass counterfeit federal reserve notes, see
18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2000); possessing and concealing
counterfeit federal reserve notes, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 472 (West
2000); possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien,
see 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(5) (West 2000); and making false
statements to a federal agent, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a)(2) (West
2000 & Supp. 2006). The district court sentenced Ocampo to 46
months imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised
release. Ocampo appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying each conviction.1 We affirm.
“A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction bears a heavy burden. In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, our
role is limited to considering whether there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it.” United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th
Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of
1
Ocampo also challenges his sentence. The district court
repeatedly stated that it was treating Sentencing Guidelines as
advisory, and the factual findings made by the district court at
sentencing were therefore consistent with the requirements of
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Ocampo’s sentencing
challenge is therefore without merit.
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fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
Ocampo was one of four occupants of a small car that the
police found on a Sunday at 2:30 a.m. parked in front of a closed
auto parts store in Asheboro, North Carolina. The driver agreed to
a search of the car, which revealed a 9-mm handgun gun and
ammunition, along with nearly $20,000 in medium-quality counterfeit
currency. The gun was found on the backseat floorboard of the car,
under the front passenger seat. The counterfeit currency was found
in two locations--on the backside of the driver’s headrest, hidden
under the seat cover, and inside a plastic grocery bag that was
wedged in between the back, passenger-side seat and the center
“hump” that separated the back seats. Wedged in beside the seat
along with the currency was a box containing extra ammunition for
the gun.
Ocampo was seated in the back, behind the front passenger
seat. Thus, the gun was found in a spot that was at Ocampo’s feet,
and the ammunition and a portion of the currency were wedged in
beside the seat that Ocampo occupied. Ocampo’s fingerprint was
found on a plastic sleeve inside the ammunition box, and thirty-
four of Ocampo’s fingerprints and palm prints were found on the
currency. Given the fingerprint evidence and the location of the
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gun and ammunition relative to Ocampo’s position in the car, the
jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocampo was in possession
of the gun and ammunition. See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 873 (“Possession
[of contraband] may be actual or constructive . . . and need not be
exclusive, but may be shared with others. Constructive possession
may be proved by demonstrating that the defendant exercised, or had
the power to exercise, dominion and control over the item.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the
government presented sufficient evidence to support Ocampo’s §
922(g) conviction.
The counterfeit possession charge required the government to
prove that Ocampo possessed or concealed the counterfeit currency
with knowledge that the currency was counterfeit and with an intent
to defraud. See United States v. Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 347 (4th
Cir. 2003). The location of the currency in the car, along with
Ocampo’s fingerprints on it, was sufficient for the jury to
conclude that Ocampo was in possession of the currency. Moreover,
the currency was paper-clipped together in multiple stacks and
hidden in a car, which is far from the usual means of carrying
legitimate currency. The currency consisted of nearly two hundred
$100 bills, each bearing one of four serial numbers, along with
nine $20 bills, each bearing the same serial number. Although
Ocampo told investigators that he had no knowledge of the currency,
the fingerprint evidence showed that Ocampo had extensively handled
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it.2 When the evidence is considered in its entirety, we believe
it was sufficient to satisfy each element of § 472. See United
States v. Combs, 672 F.2d 574, 576 (6th Cir. 1982) (explaining that
a jury “could logically infer knowledge of the counterfeit nature
of the bills from the fact that the bills were in [the defendant’s]
possession, were in large quantities, and were unusually
packaged”); United States v. Browning, 390 F.2d 511, 512 (4th Cir.
1968) (“Direct proof of intent is not necessary. It may be
inferred from the acts of the parties and the facts and
circumstances of the case. It rarely can be shown by direct
evidence. Collateral and related conduct may be considered by the
jury for the purpose.” (footnote omitted)); see also United States
v. Callanan, 450 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1971) (“[G]uilty knowledge
and willfulness may be inferred from ... false explanations ....”).
The counterfeit conspiracy charge required the government to
also prove the existence of an agreement to possess counterfeit
currency. See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857 (The “gravamen of the crime
of conspiracy is an agreement to effectuate a criminal act”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We believe the government
2
Ocampo contends that the government’s evidence showed that he
denied knowing that the currency was counterfeit, not that he
denied knowledge of the currency that was found in the car. While
that is certainly a plausible interpretation of the evidence, the
evidence also could be viewed as establishing that Ocampo denied
knowledge of the currency itself. See J.A. 168. Our standard of
review, of course, requires that we give the government the benefit
of all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence.
See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862.
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presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude
that such an agreement existed.
Johnny Martinez-Orozco, the driver of the car, told
investigators that he and Josue Gonzalez left from Florida on
Saturday to visit a cousin in Asheboro. Martinez-Orozco stated
that he did not know Ocampo or Alejandro Reinoso (the fourth
passenger) before that day, when he and Gonzalez had picked them up
at a laundromat in Greenwood, South Carolina. A map with the town
of Greenwood circled and its name written in the margin was found
in the car, but Martinez-Orozco offered no explanation for why he
picked up two strangers and drove them to Asheboro. Although
Reinoso told investigators that he had met Gonzalez once before,
Ocampo told investigators that he did not know any of the other men
in the car before they picked him up at the laundromat.
Each of the men separately told investigators that they were
traveling from Florida or South Carolina on a 24-hour turn-around
trip to visit an unnamed friend or relative in Asheboro. Ocampo
first stated that he was going to visit a cousin in Asheboro, but
he later claimed that he was going to visit a friend. Although
each of the men denied knowledge of the counterfeit currency,
fingerprints of each were found on the currency.
The explanations offered by the men were essentially
identical, and the jury could reasonably have concluded that the
explanations were the product of a coordinated effort by the men to
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provide a legitimate purpose for their actions. The coordinated
cover story, and the implausible nature of the cover story (which
gave no explanation as to how four relative strangers from
different states came to be riding together in a small car, in
which was hidden a large quantity of counterfeit currency that had
been handled by all four men), is evidence that the jury could
consider when determining the existence of conspiracy. When that
evidence is considered along with all of the other circumstances of
this case, we believe that a reasonable jury could have found that
an agreement to counterfeit currency existed and that Ocampo was a
knowing participant. See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858 (explaining that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence tending to prove a conspiracy may
consist of a defendant’s relationship with other members of the
conspiracy, the length of this association, the defendant’s
attitude and conduct, and the nature of the conspiracy,” and that
a conspiracy “may be inferred from a development and collocation
of circumstances” (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted)). We therefore reject Ocampo’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conspiracy conviction.
We likewise reject Ocampo’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his conviction for making false statements.
That charge required the government to prove “(1) that the
defendant made a false statement to a governmental agency . . .;
(2) [that] the defendant acted knowingly or willfully; and (3)
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[that] the false statement . . . was material to a matter within
the jurisdiction of the agency.” United States v. Sarihifard, 155
F.3d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 1998); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001. Ocampo
contends that the government failed to prove that the statements
charged in the indictment were false or material. We disagree.
Ocampo told the Secret Service agent investigating the case
that he did not know about the currency in the car, and this
statement was one of the bases for the § 1001 charge. While Ocampo
contends that he only disclaimed knowledge that the currency was
counterfeit, we must, as explained above, view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government. Because the agent
testified that he asked Ocampo about his knowledge of “money,” the
jury could reasonably conclude that Ocampo’s denial was a denial of
any knowledge of the currency itself, not simply a denial of the
knowledge that the currency was counterfeit. The evidence showing
Ocampo’s fingerprints and palm prints on the currency thus provided
a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that Ocampo’s denial
was false. The jury could also have found the statement to be
material, because Ocampo’s knowledge of the currency had the
capacity to affect the government’s decision to prosecute. See
United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1095 (4th Cir.
1993) (explaining that a fact about a matter within an agency’s
jurisdiction is material under § 1001 if it “has a natural tendency
to influence agency action or is capable of influencing agency
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action” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Whether or not the
statement actually affected the agency’s decision is irrelevant.
See id. We therefore reject Ocampo’s challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting his § 1001 conviction.3
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ocampo’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3
Because the evidence of Ocampo’s statement about his
knowledge of the currency is enough to support the § 1001
conviction, we need not consider whether the other statements
alleged in the indictment also satisfied the requirements of §
1001. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970) (“The
general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an
indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, as Turner’s
indictment did, the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient
with respect to any one of the acts charged.”).
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