United States v. Edward Brantley, Jr. , 546 F. App'x 163 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4752
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
EDWARD MILLER BRANTLEY, JR.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:07-cr-00020-BO-1; 5:10-cv-00600-BO)
Submitted: October 30, 2013 Decided: November 8, 2013
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Eric D. Goulian, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Richard A. McCoppin,
MCCOPPIN & ASSOCIATES, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Miller Brantley, Jr., pleaded guilty to
distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
(2006). The district court originally sentenced Brantley to 108
months of imprisonment, grounded in part on an enhancement under
the career offender provision of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Brantley subsequently filed
a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2013) motion, arguing that he
did not qualify as a career offender, citing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
The Government moved to dismiss the motion based in part on the
waiver of appellate rights contained in Brantley’s plea
agreement. The district court, however, granted Brantley’s
motion and determined that the rule of Carachuri was
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review,
Brantley’s claim was cognizable on collateral review, and under
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en
banc), Brantley no longer qualified as a career offender. The
district court then resentenced Brantley to twenty-seven months
of imprisonment.
The Government has appealed, arguing that Brantley
waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence and that
such a claim is not cognizable on collateral review. We review
the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v.
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Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). We will enforce an
appeal waiver to preclude a defendant from raising an issue if
the waiver is valid and the issue on appeal is within the scope
of the waiver. Id.; see also United States v. Lemaster, 403
F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2005) (defendant may waive the right to
collaterally attack his conviction and sentence as long as the
waiver is knowing and voluntary). We have thoroughly reviewed
the record and conclude that Brantley’s waiver of his appellate
rights was knowing and voluntary and that the issue he sought to
raise fell within the scope of that waiver. See United
States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528-30 (4th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, Copeland v. United States, No. 12-10514, 2013 WL 2370444
(U.S. Oct. 7, 2013).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order
granting Brantley’s § 2255 motion, vacate the sentence, and
remand with instructions to re-enter the original judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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