K.A. Holdings Ltd. of New York v. Christopher Chagaris , 583 F. App'x 192 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2328
K.A. HOLDINGS LTD. OF NEW YORK, a/k/a K.A. Holdings of New
York, Inc., a/k/a K.A. Holdings of New York, Ltd., a/k/a
K.A. Holdings, Ltd.,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHAGARIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:09-cv-00487-MOC-DCK)
Submitted: August 29, 2014 Decided: September 15, 2014
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rodney A. Dean, Clay A. Campbell, Sr., DEAN GIBSON HOFER &
NANCE, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. David G.
Redding, Joseph R. Pellington, TISON REDDING, PLLC, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a trial, a federal jury found for the
Appellee on its claims of legal malpractice and conversion
against Christopher Chagaris, the Appellee’s former attorney.
The jury awarded the Appellee $793,568.45 in damages and the
district court denied Chagaris’ renewed motion for a directed
verdict. Chagaris now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
Chagaris first argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that
the legal malpractice claim was barred by the applicable statute
of limitations. We review de novo a district court’s summary
judgment order. Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F.,
Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). Under North Carolina
law, a three-year statute of limitations applies to actions for
malpractice, and the claim accrues “at the time of the last act
of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-15(c). The date of the last act giving rise to the
cause of action is “the point in time when the elements
necessary for a legal wrong coalesce.” Carle v. Wyrick,
Robbins, Yates & Ponton, LLP, 738 S.E.2d 766, 770 (N.C. Ct. App.
2013). “To determine when the last act or omission occurred
[courts] look to factors such as the contractual relationship
between the parties, when the contracted-for services were
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complete, and when the alleged mistakes could no longer be
remedied.” Id. at 771. We have thoroughly reviewed the record
and the relevant legal authorities and hold that the district
court correctly concluded that the Appellee’s claim of legal
malpractice was not barred by the statute of limitations.
Chagaris next argues that the district court abused
its discretion in admitting the Appellee’s evidence of damages
when the Appellee failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and
the evidence failed to meet the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. “We review evidentiary rulings of the
district court for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Caro,
597 F.3d 608, 633 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs only when “the
[district] court acted arbitrarily or irrationally in admitting
evidence.” United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 732 (4th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged
evidence.
Finally, Chagaris argues that the Appellee failed to
establish its claim for legal malpractice. We review de novo
the denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a
matter of law, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, and will affirm the denial of such a
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motion unless the jury lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for its verdict.” Gregg v. Ham, 678 F.3d 333, 341 (4th
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). We conclude, based on the
evidence at trial, that the court did not err in denying
Chagaris’ renewed motion for a directed verdict.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and the district
court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this Court and argument would not aid in the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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