Summer Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist College ( 2023 )

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-1447
SUMMER D. LASHLEY, Ph D
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
SPARTANBURG METHODIST COLLEGE; W. SCOTT COCHRAN; MARK W.
GIBBS, Ph D; TERESA D. FERGUSON; JONATHAN J. KEISLER, Ph D;
ANGELIA A. TURNER; CLEVON A. BOYD, in his individual capacity
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Spartanburg. Joseph Dawson, III, District Judge. (7:18−cv−02957−JD)
Argued: March 7, 2023 Decided: April 18, 2023
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge
Niemeyer and Judge King joined.
David Eliot Rothstein, ROTHSTEIN LAW FIRM, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Todd Russell Flippin, HOLCOMBE BOMAR, P.A., Spartanburg, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
In 2017, Summer Lashley signed a one-year contract to teach criminal justice
courses at Spartanburg Methodist College (SMC). Less than a year later, SMC decided not
to renew Lashley’s contract and terminated her shortly thereafter. Lashley brought a mix
of state and federal law claims against SMC, essentially arguing that her contract non-
renewal and termination were unlawful. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of SMC on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims. Lashley now appeals. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), Lashley accuses SMC of discrimination, retaliation, and engaging in an unlawful
health inquiry. Under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX), she
accuses SMC of retaliation. For the following reasons, we shall affirm the district court.
I.
A.
In May 2017, Summer Lashley signed a contract to teach criminal justice courses at
Spartanburg Methodist College and to serve as the Director of the Criminal Justice
Program. Per the one-year contract, Lashley taught a full course load in the Fall 2017 and
Spring 2018 semesters. During her time at SMC, Lashley was supervised by Mary Jane
Farmer, the Chair of the Social Sciences Department, Mark W. Gibbs, the Dean of
Instruction, and Anita Bowles, the Executive Vice President of Academic Affairs.
The facts relevant to this appeal can be divided into three sections: (1) facts
underlying Lashley’s Title IX and ADA claims, (2) facts pertaining to SMC’s decision not
to renew her contract, and (3) facts surrounding her termination.
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1.
Lashley’s Title IX retaliation claim stems from complaints she raised on behalf of
students. Lashley informed SMC’s Human Resources and Title IX Coordinator, Jenny
Dunn, of several incidents between September and December 2017 in which she thought
female students were being harassed by male students. These included reports of male
athletes allegedly violating Title IX by sexually exploiting and bullying female athletes.
According to Lashley, some of these incidents involved SMC employees covering
up any misbehavior. So Lashley, assuming the posture of whistleblower, felt compelled to
take her concerns to HR personnel. See Opening Br. at 8 (“Lashley had been very
outspoken in raising numerous injustices that she became aware of at SMC.”). Lashley
believed many students brought their issues to her because she was the Director of the
Criminal Justice Program. She also claims not everyone at SMC was happy with her
reports. Following one such complaint, Mark Gibbs allegedly confronted her and said he
heard a rumor that Lashley told a female student to get an attorney. Gibbs denies this.
Lashley’s ADA allegations originate from a series of incidents starting in January
2018, when Lashley complained of ostensible mold or mildew in her office building.
Lashley claimed the mold exacerbated her respiratory problems due to her asthma. SMC’s
maintenance department brought these concerns to the attention of Gibbs and others. Gibbs
met with Lashley at the end of January to discuss her health concerns.
During this meeting, Lashley claims that Gibbs was “angry” and stated, “tell me
about your health issues.” Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist Coll., No. 7:18-CV-02957-
KFM, 2022 WL 872604, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2022). In response, Lashley informed
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Gibbs that she suffered from Lupus, asthma, post-traumatic stress disorder, and severe
gastrointestinal issues. Id. at *3. Gibbs denies demanding that Lashley tell him about her
medical issues, J.A. 912, but he testified that he did meet with her to “assess what could be
done to accommodate her health,” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3. Gibbs offered to move
Lashley’s office to a different building a short walk away to address her concerns, but
Lashley rejected this option.
On February 5, 2018, Lashley requested a reasonable accommodation form. HR
Coordinator Dunn sent her the form, along with SMC’s faculty handbook. Lashley
responded via email a few days later and informed the HR department that she had been
diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease, that she had informed her supervisor of this diagnosis,
and that she wanted the information to remain confidential. Despite her response, Lashley
never filled out or returned the reasonable accommodation form.
2.
SMC eventually decided not to renew Lashley’s contract for the following academic
year. SMC claims this decision was the product of growing concerns regarding Lashley’s
performance, professionalism, and conflicts with faculty and students. Mary Jane Farmer,
Lashley’s direct supervisor, reported that though she was “pleased” with Lashley’s job
performance after the Fall semester, she noted a variety of problems. Lashley, 2022 WL
872604, at *2.
Farmer reported that Lashley exhibited a proficiency with course material, but her
classes lacked structure due to inadequate preparation. Lashley complained that she did not
have enough time to get ready for class, so Farmer advised Lashley to use the ten hours of
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weekly office time to prepare. Yet Farmer worried that Lashley was instead spending this
time fraternizing with students, calling Lashley’s office a “student lounge”—a sentiment
shared by other faculty. Id. Farmer further stated that Lashley maintained an
unprofessionally close relationship with a work-study student. By late January 2018,
Farmer described Lashley as “emotional, volatile, and [] uncontrollable.” Id.This was not the only cause for concern. Throughout Lashley’s time at SMC, Gibbs
received numerous complaints from Lashley about various students, faculty, and staff. The
complaints were “quite regular” and suggested that Lashley was struggling to “settle[] into
her position.” Id. at *3. According to Gibbs, Lashley informed him on “multiple occasions
that SMC was not a good fit for her.” J.A. 575. Lashley’s inability to work with others was
demonstrated by the numerous conflicts that arose around her. The district court
highlighted a few examples.
First, Lashley complained about her identity appearing in a SMC press release. She
lodged this complaint even though she had consented to the use of her name. Next, Lashley
appeared to have an ongoing conflict with Dale Hyder, an adjunct faculty member in the
Criminal Justice Program. Gibbs observed that Lashley “had a personality conflict with
Mr. Hyder” and “was allowing the conflict to disproportionately affect her job
performance.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4. Farmer likewise described the conflict as
a “petty thing between the two of them” that seemingly revealed a “professional rivalry.”
J.A. 853–54. Further, echoing concerns from other SMC faculty, Gibbs noted that Lashley
had an inappropriately close relationship with her work-study student. She was spending
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too much time with the student, even once requesting that the student drive to Lashley’s
home a good distance away to deliver teaching materials.
Lashley’s multiple contentious interactions led Gibbs to worry that she was not
forming constructive relationships with faculty and students and would have difficulty
maintaining the professionalism required to perform as a SMC professor. In consultation
with other SMC administrators, Gibbs decided not to renew Lashley’s contract for the
following year. On February 13, 2018, Gibbs informed Lashley that her contract was not
being renewed, explaining that she “and SMC were not a good fit for each other.” Lashley,
2022 WL 872604, at *4.
3.
Lashley did not take kindly to this news. Various employees at SMC reported
troubling behavior from Lashley in the following three days. On the same day Lashley was
notified of the decision not to renew her contract, Gibbs claims he saw Lashley cleaning
out her office and taking boxes to her car. When he asked her what she was doing, she
angrily shouted at him for betraying her. The following day, a professor who shared an
office with Lashley testified that she overheard Lashley tell a group of students that she
felt like “blowing the school up.” Id. Then on February 15, another member of the faculty
testified that Lashley spoke with him and said, “Bad stuff happens when people cross me.
My dad says it’s true. They turn up dead.” Id. Lashley allegedly called certain individuals
like Gibbs “evil people” who would “get theirs.” Id.Reports of these incidents made their way to SMC’s President, W. Scott Cochran.
Even though Lashley denies ever making these alleged remarks, President Cochran came
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to believe Lashley’s behavior revealed she was a threat to the safety of the SMC
community. On February 16, 2018, Cochran made the decision to immediately terminate
Lashley. He informed Lashley that her termination was due to “unprofessional,
inappropriate interactions” with faculty. Id.B.
After receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Lashley brought suit against SMC on November 1, 2018. Her verified
complaint alleged a mixture of state and federal law violations centering on her contract
non-renewal and her termination.
On October 15, 2021, Lashley moved for sanctions against SMC, claiming it had
failed to comply with her discovery requests. The same day, SMC moved for summary
judgment. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to grant summary
judgment in SMC’s favor on all federal law claims and to grant partial summary judgment
on the state law claims. See Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist Coll. (Lashley R&R), No.
7:18-CV-2957-JD-KFM, 2021 WL 8014689, at *32 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2021).
The district court adopted the report and recommendation, granting summary
judgment in SMC’s favor on all federal law claims. Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *10. The
district court declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims, which were thus remanded to state court. Id.Lashley filed a timely notice of appeal, objecting to the district court’s findings on
four federal law issues. She now presses claims of (1) discrimination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; (2) retaliation in
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violation of the ADA; (3) unlawful health inquiry in violation of the ADA; and
(4) retaliation in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681 et seq. She withdrew all other federal claims on appeal. Opening Br. at 4 n.1.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n v. McLeod Health, Inc., 914 F.3d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 2019). Summary
judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). We of course construe the evidence and reasonable inferences at this stage “in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.” McLeod Health, 914 F.3d at 880; Halpern
v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2012). The “nonmoving
party must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists ‘by offering sufficient
proof in the form of admissible evidence’ instead of ‘relying solely on the allegations of
her pleadings.’” Webster v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.4th 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Guessous v. Fairview Property Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016)).
II.
We first address Lashley’s ADA and Title IX retaliation claims. The ADA’s
retaliation provision prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any individual because such
individual has” taken an action protected by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Title IX lacks
an explicit cause of action for retaliation, but the Supreme Court has held that “the private
right of action implied by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation.” Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005). In the absence of a statutory backdrop
for evaluating Title IX retaliation claims, our circuit has looked to Title VII to provide an
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applicable legal framework. Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 694 (4th
Cir. 2018).
Under both the ADA and Title IX, the crux of a successful retaliation claim is that
the plaintiff engaged in activity protected by law, and then, because of this, the defendant
took an adverse employment action against him. See Hurley, 911 F.3d at 694 (explaining
elements of Title IX retaliation); Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 577
(4th Cir. 2015) (explaining elements of ADA retaliation).
Lashley argues that she engaged in ADA-protected activity by requesting an
accommodation for her disability. Opening Br. at 26. Lashley also asserts she engaged in
Title IX-protected activity by helping female students raise complaints about SMC students
and employees. Id. at 29. Because of these actions, Lashley argues, SMC retaliated against
her by not renewing her contract and terminating her employment.
To prevail on her retaliation claims, Lashley must either offer “sufficient direct and
indirect evidence of retaliation, or proceed under a burden-shifting method.” Smith v.
CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 416 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 577). Lashley
concedes that the “burden-shifting framework[] is applicable to [her] retaliation claims
under both the ADA and Title IX.” Opening Br. at 31–32. The “burden-shifting scheme set
forth in McDonnell Douglas” proceeds in three steps. Hux v. City of Newport News, Va.,
451 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973)).
Lashley must first make a prima facie showing of retaliation—i.e., she engaged in
a protected activity and was retaliated against because of it. Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 578. The
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“employer then has the burden to rebut the presumption of retaliation by articulating a
legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its actions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The burden then shifts back to [Lashley] to show that the proffered reason is pretext.” Id.Importantly, Lashley “always bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
she was the victim of retaliation.” Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 392 (4th Cir. 2001).
When we analyze the case through this well-settled framework, it becomes clear
that Lashley’s retaliation claims cannot succeed. SMC offers nonretaliatory reasons for not
renewing Lashley’s contract and terminating her employment, and she is unable to
demonstrate that SMC’s reasons are pretextual. We therefore need not decide whether
Lashley established a prima facie case, for assuming arguendo that she satisfied the first
step of the burden-shifting framework, her retaliation claims still fall short. See Hux, 451
F.3d at 314 (assuming prima facie case when pretext was dispositive); see also Engler v.
Harris Corp., 628 F. App’x 165, 168 (4th Cir. 2015) (same in retaliation context). We first
discuss SMC’s proffered reasons before turning to pretext.
A.
The record contains ample evidence of legitimate reasons not to renew Lashley’s
contract and to terminate her employment. SMC offered evidence showing the reason
behind Lashley’s contract non-renewal was that she was not a good fit for SMC.
Additionally, SMC put forth evidence that the decision to terminate Lashley was based on
reports of threatening and unprofessional behavior. We address each in turn.
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1.
Regarding the decision not to renew Lashley’s contract, SMC proffered evidence
that Lashley had a hard time performing to its expected level of professionalism and
collegiality. As noted earlier, several sources reported that Lashley was often at the center
of conflicts with students and faculty, revealing that she struggled to form healthy
relationships at SMC.
Multiple people at SMC complained of Lashley’s unprofessional relationships with
students. Faculty members complained that Lashley’s office, which she shared with
another professor, had become a “student lounge.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *2.
Students reported that Lashley was playing favorites with their classmates, requesting, for
example, that a favored student drive to her house far from SMC. And Lashley’s direct
supervisor observed that Lashley was excessively fraternizing with students in ways that
went beyond constructive mentoring and educational guidance. While there is obviously
nothing wrong, and much that is right, with faculty conversing with students outside of
class, Lashley’s supervisor worried that the excessive familiarity inhibited Lashley’s
ability to prepare and consequently made her classes disorganized.
Lashley also clashed with multiple members of the faculty at SMC. For example,
Gibbs observed that Lashley had difficulty working with her colleague Dale Hyder.
Although she was Hyder’s direct supervisor, she declined to talk through their problems.
While the issues apparently arose from a personality conflict, the personal spat negatively
impacted Lashley’s job performance according to Gibbs. This and other repeated problems
led Lashley’s supervisor to describe her as “emotional, volatile, and [] uncontrollable.”
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Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *2. What’s more, the record shows that Lashley herself was
dissatisfied during her time at SMC, often complaining to Gibbs about various people and
incidents. J.A. 575, 884. She sent emails in January stating that she “just ha[d] to get out
of SMC” and that she was applying for new jobs “everywhere and determined to get the
f*** out of there.” Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *5.
Problems such as these are not unknown in institutional settings, and assessing fault
and blame can become a complicated undertaking. At the same time, it was not wrong,
much less unlawful, for a supervisor to conclude that Lashley’s conflicts with faculty
demonstrated a lack of conflict-resolution skills needed in a professional setting where
interactions with colleagues are frequent and essential. Lashley’s relationships with
students similarly displayed a lack of professionalism and hurt her teaching abilities. An
educational institution like SMC is justifiably sensitive to how its professors interact with
students and faculty, relationships that often spell the difference between educational
progress and its absence.
By the time Gibbs and others decided whether to renew Lashley’s contract, the
cumulative complaints from multiple sources had become “quite regular.” Lashley, 2022
WL 872604, at *3. Gibbs ultimately concluded that Lashley “would have difficulty
maintaining the professional relationships necessary to perform as a SMC professor.”
Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *4. When Gibbs informed Lashley that her teaching
contract would not be renewed, he explained it was because “she was not a good fit for
SMC.” Id. at *5. For the reasons noted above, SMC produced sufficient evidence of
legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for not renewing Lashley’s teaching contract.
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2.
We next consider SMC’s reasons for terminating Lashley’s employment. Lashley
claims her termination was motivated by retaliatory animus. Here too, as we have
recounted, SMC puts forth evidence to show legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for firing
Lashley.
The decision to fire Lashley was made by President Cochran on February 16, 2018.
By that point in time, Cochran had received three independent reports of Lashley’s
inappropriate and threatening behavior. First, Gibbs reported that on the day Lashley was
informed her contract was not being renewed, she began to clear out her office and angrily
confronted him. Second, a professor overheard Lashley tell a group of students that she felt
like “blowing the school up.” Third, Lashley told a colleague that “[b]ad stuff happens
when people cross me. . . . They turn up dead.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4.
Lashley denies ever making these comments. Her denial, however, does not negate
the fact that these reports of unprofessional and dangerous behavior made their way to
President Cochran, who naturally believed they revealed that Lashley was potentially
violent and a threat to campus safety. Importantly, the burden at this stage of the analysis
is “one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). So it does not suffice for Lashley to simply challenge the veracity of the evidence
SMC puts forth. Despite Lashley’s protestations, SMC’s evidence shows that Cochran
believed Lashley was dangerous—Cochran’s apparent motivation was not retaliation;
it was safety.
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In sum, SMC advanced legitimate reasons for not renewing Lashley’s contract and
terminating her employment. SMC therefore carried its burden at this step of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to “produc[e] evidence that” it acted “for a legitimate,
non[retaliatory] reason.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
B.
The burden then shifts back to Lashley to show that SMC’s proffered reasons were
a pretext for unlawful retaliation. At this final stage, “the McDonnell Douglas
framework—with its presumptions and burdens—disappears,” and the “employee must
prove” that the “legitimate reasons offered by the defendant[] were not its true reasons, but
were a pretext.” Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 726 (4th Cir. 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The analysis “has long demanded proof at the pretext
stage that retaliation was a but-for cause of a challenged adverse employment action.”
Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015).
Lashley faults the district court at this step for applying an invalid “pretext plus”
standard. Opening Br. at 39. We disagree. A “pretext-plus” standard would require “that
an employee introduce new evidence, separate from her prima facie case, that not only
undercut the employer’s justification but also showed a specific and discriminatory [or
retaliatory] motive.” Westmoreland, 924 F.3d at 726–27. That is not required here.
Lashley’s claims fall short not only because she fails to provide evidence of retaliatory
motive, but because she does not offer evidence beyond mere conjecture to undercut
SMC’s justifications. Lashley’s claims therefore fail under the well-established pretext
standard for multiple reasons. We examine each below.
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1.
First, Lashley’s claim of pretext is undermined by the fact that the primary
decisionmakers at SMC were not aware of Lashley’s ADA or Title IX protected activity.
Gibbs was the primary decisionmaker behind not renewing Lashley’s contract. Yet
Lashley failed to produce any concrete evidence that Gibbs was even aware that Lashley
helped students file Title IX complaints. Indeed, Gibbs’s decision was not influenced by
previous Title IX complaints because Lashley raised Title IX complaints in September and
December of 2017, yet in January of 2018, Gibbs extended her a separate contract to teach
an additional Spring semester class. The record is also devoid of evidence that Gibbs was
aware of Lashley’s request for an ADA reasonable accommodation form, which Lashley
had in fact requested remain confidential.
Similarly there is no evidence that President Cochran, who made the call to
terminate Lashley, knew of Lashley’s ADA request or her Title IX complaints when he
decided to fire her. To the contrary, the record shows Lashley’s ADA and Title IX
complaints went to Jenny Dunn, SMC’s Human Resources and Title IX Coordinator. See
Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3 (describing that Lashley’s request for ADA
accommodation went to Dunn); Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *2 (showing that
Lashley’s Title IX complaints likewise went to Dunn). There is no evidence that Dunn was
even consulted in the decisions regarding Lashley’s contract or termination. See Lashley
R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *10, *13. Decisionmakers can hardly be accused of harboring
a retaliatory animus when they were unaware of the actions that allegedly led to the
retaliation. Without evidence on this score, the chain of causation is broken and Lashley
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cannot show that retaliation was “a but-for cause” of the adverse action. Foster, 787 F.3d
at 252; see also Guessous, 828 F.3d at 217.
Second, any notion of pretext is further dispelled by the fact that SMC’s
explanations have been consistent throughout. Gibbs did not renew Lashley’s contract
because she was not a good fit for SMC. Cochran fired Lashley because of her threatening
interactions with colleagues. These were the very reasons communicated to Lashley back
in February 2018. See Lashley R&R, 2021 WL 8014689, at *5–6. The record lacks any
sign of deviating from these explanations to make SMC’s story seem more plausible. See
EEOC v. Sears Roebuck, 243 F.3d 846, 852–53 (4th Cir. 2001) (instructing that
inconsistent explanations for an adverse employment action are “probative of pretext”). A
straight and consistent line of explanation is more persuasive than one which wanders here,
there, and yonder.
Third, Lashley has not shown that Cochran did not honestly believe the reports of
Lashley’s threatening comments. While Lashley denies making any threats, three different
sources indicated that she did. We have previously explained that a plaintiff must rebut the
fact that the “decisionmaker[] honestly believed” the threats, “regardless of whether [the
plaintiff] did in fact issue the threats.” Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208,
217 (4th Cir. 2007). If Cochran sincerely believed the threats, then his decision to fire
Lashley was not a pretext for retaliation. An honest, nonretaliatory belief cannot by
definition be the basis for the imposition of retaliatory liability. Rather than refuting
Cochran’s sincere belief, the record supports the contention that he found the threats
credible. The professor who informed Cochran of Lashley’s “evil people” comment
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testified that he was “genuinely concerned that she might be angry enough to harm
someone.” Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *4.
2.
We come then to the main thrust of Lashley’s pretext argument, namely that SMC’s
“good fit” justification is a thinly veiled disguise for retaliation. Lashley insists that
“Gibbs’s conclusory statement that she was not a ‘good fit’ for SMC . . . is itself compelling
evidence of retaliatory animus.” Opening Br. at 32.
This is too broad an assertion. Describing an employee as not a “good fit” is an
assessment that employers make all the time. Maybe someone’s skills do not match up with
the institution’s mission. Maybe someone’s work ethic falls short of expectations. Maybe
someone is just not a good team player. Though there may be circumstances where
evidence reveals that “good fit” is a subterfuge for discrimination or retaliation, it is also a
perfectly innocuous comment that an organization’s collaborative goals would not be
furthered, and in fact might be retarded, by a particular employee. Institutional success is
often a collective enterprise toward which an employer has entirely reasonable expectations
that each employee should contribute.
Any institution, especially a place of higher education whose “core . . . mission” is
to foster a certain community and advance a unique pedagogical vision, is well within its
rights to want people who can work well with others to achieve those goals. Our Lady of
Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064 (2020). To wit, SMC has such
a mission. SMC’s President explained that a good fit “for us is someone who is able and
willing to effectively teach the demographics we teach with great success and academic
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integrity,” who possesses the “[a]bility to be a good colleague with your faculty and staff,”
as well as the ability to exhibit the “appropriate behavior with students and a level of
professionalism with the appropriate boundaries between students and faculty.” J.A. 1041.
This decidedly does not mean that every employee hold the same views or teach the
same way or refrain from the kind of individual expression and opinions that make for
genuine mutual respect. The record here indicates SMC was seeking cooperation, not
conformity. Respect for individuality within a healthy institutional whole was a valid
aspiration for the college to adopt.
Lashley attempts to refute SMC’s “good fit” reasoning by portraying herself as the
embodiment of the ideal whistleblower, intent on bringing to light misbehavior by students
and employees. See Oral Arg. at 0:41. Whistleblowers certainly play a salutary role in our
society. They can point out deficiencies and dishonesty within an organization that would
otherwise go unnoticed and unrevealed. Their status is often protected under law, and for
good reason. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 218c; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(a)(6); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 436 (2014) (referencing “some 20 United
States Code incorporated whistleblower protection provisions”). Plaintiff, however, cannot
claim that mantle. We have accorded her the benefit of the reasonable inferences due her
under the summary judgment standard. But at the end of the day, the record reveals
unrelieved personality conflicts, unprofessional favoritisms, unwarranted threats, and
contempt for what the defendant institution was attempting to accomplish. We cannot see
how addressing those problems was a pretext for retaliatory or discriminatory animus.
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III.
Lashley finally brings several claims under the ADA.
A.
The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual
on the basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination can include failing to make “reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
We thus address Lashley’s claim that SMC discriminated against her by failing to
accommodate her disability. To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, “a plaintiff
must show (i) she was disabled, (ii) the employer had notice of her disability, (iii) she could
perform the essential functions of her position with a reasonable accommodation, and (iv)
the employer refused to make such accommodation.” Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc.,
41 F.4th 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2022). 1
The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The
district court found that Lashley’s gastrointestinal issues could arguably qualify as a
disability as defined by the ADA. Lashley insists that she also suffered from PTSD and
1
Lashley also claims she suffered an adverse employment action when SMC
rescinded its promise to pay her salary and benefits through the end of her contract year.
The record shows, however, that SMC paid the full salary and benefits owed to her. See
J.A. 600.
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Lupus. The record is devoid of evidence, however, that PTSD and Lupus “substantially
limit[ed] one or more” of Lashley’s “major life activities.” Id. Though she claims she
informed Gibbs of these ailments in a meeting, no evidence indicates that she informed
Gibbs or anyone else at SMC how these medical issues were significantly impairing her
life activities. Lashley’s claims of additional disabilities beyond gastrointestinal issues
therefore do not survive the first step of the analysis.
Regardless of the district court’s conclusion on the first prong of Lashley’s failure-
to-accommodate claim, her argument falters on the subsequent prongs. The ADA’s
implementing regulations instruct that to “determine the appropriate reasonable
accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,
interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation,”
which “should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 16 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3).
Any failure here to engage in such an interactive process was not caused by SMC.
Lashley contacted HR personnel to request an accommodation form and informed them
that she had been diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease, which was causing her gastrointestinal
issues. From that point, however, the record reveals that Lashley failed to engage in the
interactive process in several ways. She did not tell SMC how the diagnosis limited her
ability to work. She neglected to inform SMC of the accommodation she would need to
perform the essential duties of her job. See Cowgill, 41 F.4th at 378. She did not request
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any measures that would mitigate the effects of her Crohn’s Disease. Worse still, Lashley
never returned the accommodation form. Lashley, 2022 WL 872604, at *3.
We cannot fault SMC for failing to accommodate plaintiff. Due to Lashley’s
communication breakdown, SMC was left guessing what an accommodation for Lashley
might entail. “Before an employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodations—or even
to participate in the ‘interactive process’—is triggered under the ADA, the employee must
make an adequate request, thereby putting the employer on notice.” Wilson v. Dollar Gen.
Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d
1028, 1049 (10th Cir. 2011)). Lashley cannot show that SMC refused to make an
accommodation because she cannot show that she ever properly requested one. Her failure-
to-accommodate claim fails for this reason.
B.
Lashley’s last claim is that SMC violated the ADA by asking her unlawful health
questions. The ADA provides that an employer “shall not make inquiries of an employee
as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity
of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Lashley argues that Gibbs
violated that ADA when he allegedly told Lashley—in an “angry” and “threatening”
tone—“tell me about your health issues.” Opening Br. at 45–46. Gibbs denies ever
demanding that Lashley tell him about her medical issues. J.A. 912.
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lashley, her bare testimony
cannot form a successful claim for unlawful health inquiry. See Webster, 38 F.4th at 410.
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To begin with, “[w]hether a medical inquiry is job-related and consistent with business
necessity is an objective inquiry.” Coffey v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 23 F.4th 332, 339 (4th Cir.
2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). So how Lashley subjectively perceived Gibbs’s
tone is immaterial under that standard.
Furthermore, we have noted that the objective “standard is met if the employer
reasonably believes that an employee’s medical condition impairs [her] ability to perform
the essential functions of the job” and the inquiry “is no broader or more intrusive than
necessary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming Gibbs had Lashley tell
him about her health, the inquiry satisfies this standard.
Lashley had told faculty, staff, and students at SMC about her various health issues,
usually in the context of missing or rescheduling classes. See Lashley R&R, 2021 WL
8014689, at *14 (cataloguing nearly a dozen examples of Lashley telling others about a
variety of ailments). In particular, Lashley told a colleague that she had “been sick since
she arrived and was going to see a pulmonary doctor to have her lungs swabbed” due to
the “unhealthy conditions” in her office building, referring to the alleged mold in the
ceiling. J.A. 585. These complaints came to Gibbs’s attention. 2
Given these circumstances, Gibbs acted reasonably in meeting with Lashley to
discuss her health issues. When a teacher tells others at the school that she is having
medical problems, causing her to cancel classes, it is only reasonable that one of her
2
We note that these generalized health complaints, as opposed to a more formal
request for an ADA accommodation, do not rise to the level of ADA-protected activity,
and indeed Lashley does not pursue them as such. See Opening Br. at 26.
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superiors inquires about them. See Reynolds v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155 (4th
Cir. 2012) (holding summary judgment proper where health issues disclosed to others).
Moreover, to determine whether Lashley’s claimed issues threatened her ability to
perform the essential functions of the job, Coffey, 23 F.4th at 339, Gibbs needed to know
how he could accommodate her so that she could continue working. Lashley had
complained of unhealthy conditions in the building that housed her office and classes.
Gibbs therefore had to assess whether these conditions would obstruct her ability to teach
classes and hold meetings in that building. Gibbs offered Lashley an alternative office in
another building to address her concerns about mold, but Lashley rejected this option.
Last, Lashley fails to show that this inquiry was “broader or more intrusive than
necessary.” Id. The sole evidence put forth is her testimony that Gibbs demanded she tell
him about her health issues in an angry tone. There is no evidence of invasive follow-up
questions or demands for confidential medical information. Lashley’s assertions are not
enough to conclude that the query was unlawfully obtrusive, especially when viewed
against the objective evidence that Gibbs needed some information in order to alleviate
Lashley’s concerns. There is no indication that Gibbs crossed the line drawn by the ADA.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 3
AFFIRMED
3
Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we reject
Lashley’s contention that the court abused its discretion in failing to award her sanctions.
23