Logar v. West Virginia University Board of Governors , 493 F. App'x 460 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1133
CYRIL M. LOGAR; R. STEPHEN SEARS,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY BOARD OF GOVERNORS, including
members from 2008 through the present, a West Virginia
state board; MARY ROBERTA BRANDT, individually and as
former Vice President for Legal Affairs and General Counsel
at West Virginia University and adjunct professor of law;
BEVERLY D. KERR, individually and as Deputy General Counsel
for West Virginia University; MAJORIE A. MCDIARMID,
individually and as Steptoe and Johnson Professor of Law
and Technology and Academic Integrity Officer for West
Virginia University; MICHAEL S. GARRISON, individually and
as former President of West Virginia University; C. PETER
MCGRATH, individually and as former interim President of
West Virginia University; JAMES P. CLEMENTS, individually
and as current President of West Virginia University; E.
JANE MARTIN, individually and as former Provost of West
Virginia University,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cv-00201-FPS)
Submitted: August 30, 2012 Decided: September 7, 2012
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas A. Clare, P.C., KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C.;
John H. Tinney, Jr., Wesley M. Jarrell, II, THE TINNEY LAW FIRM
PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia; Robert J. Ridge, Ryan P.
Stewart, THORP REED & ARMSTRONG, LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
for Appellants. Stephen M. LaCagnin, Wendy G. Adkins, Seth P.
Hayes, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia; Debra H.
Scudiere, KAY CASTO & CHANEY PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia;
Scott A. Curnutte, Elkins, West Virginia; Robert P. Fitzsimmons,
Robert J. Fitzsimmons, FITZSIMMONS LAW OFFICES, Wheeling, West
Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
The Appellants, Drs. Cyril M. Logar and R. Stephen
Spears, appeal the district court’s orders granting summary
judgment in favor of the Appellees on the Appellants’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006) claims, and denying reconsideration and leave to
amend the complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The Appellants first argue that the district court
erred in converting the Appellees’ motions to dismiss into
summary judgment motions because the Appellants had not had a
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery. We review a
district court’s conversion of a motion to dismiss to a summary
judgment motion for abuse of discretion. See Laughlin v. Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998). Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), if a district court considers matters
outside of the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56.” Moreover, “[a]ll parties must
be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material
that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
We have held that “the term reasonable opportunity
requires that all parties be given some indication by the court
that it is treating the 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary
judgment, with the consequent right in the opposing party to
file counter affidavits or pursue reasonable discovery.” Gay v.
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Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Here, the district court provided
notice to the parties of its intention to convert the motions,
and allowed the parties an opportunity to submit any additional
information regarding the statute of limitations issue. We
conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in converting the motions to summary judgment
motions.
The Appellants next argue that the court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees and denying
reconsideration. Specifically, the Appellants take issue with
the court’s application of the legal standards with respect to
determining that their claims were time-barred under the
applicable statute of limitations. We review de novo a district
court’s order granting summary judgment. Providence Square
Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir.
2000). Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment”
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is proper. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
249-50 (1986) (citations omitted).
Moreover, we review the denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) motion “under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407
(4th Cir. 2010). To merit relief under Rule 59(e), a movant has
to demonstrate (1) an intervening change in controlling law;
(2) new evidence not available at trial; or (3) that there has
been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice. Pac. Ins.
Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998).
To determine the applicable statute of limitations for
a § 1983 claim, a court must look to the state statute of
limitations for personal injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In this case, the West Virginia statute
of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. See
W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 (2009). “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983
action[, however,] is a question of federal law that is not
resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.
We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities and
conclude that the district court did not err in determining when
the Appellants’ claims accrued. We also conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the Appellants’ motion
for reconsideration.
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Finally, the Appellants argue that the district court
abused its discretion in denying their post-judgment motion for
leave to amend the complaint to add new claims. We review a
district court’s denial of leave to file an amended complaint
for abuse of discretion. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 428
(4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Once a defendant has filed a
responsive pleading, a plaintiff has only a limited time to
amend his complaint as a matter of course; after that, he may
amend his complaint only with leave of the court. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1), (2). The Rules provide that leave should be
freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). This is so because of “the federal policy in favor of
resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on
technicalities.” Laber, 438 F.3d at 426 (citation omitted).
Therefore, we have “interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide
that leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the
amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has
been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment
would have been futile.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Moreover, “a post-judgment motion to amend
is evaluated under the same legal standard as a similar motion
filed before judgment was entered.” Id. at 427 (citation
omitted). In addition, while a district court must vacate its
judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) prior
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to granting a post-judgment motion for leave to amend a
complaint, “[a] conclusion that the district court abused its
discretion in denying a motion to amend . . . is sufficient
grounds on which to reverse the district court’s denial of a
Rule 59(e) motion.” Id. at 427-28 (citations omitted). Here,
however, we have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant
legal authorities and conclude that the district court’s
decision to deny leave to amend the complaint was not an abuse
of discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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