United States v. Ronnie Robbins , 494 F. App'x 337 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4757
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONNIE L. ROBBINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:10-cr-00006-JPJ-PMS-1)
Submitted: September 11, 2012 Decided: September 13, 2012
Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Robert W. Austin, Johnny L. Rosenbaum, SCYPHERS & AUSTIN, P.C.,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United
States Attorney, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States
Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronnie L. Robbins appeals his convictions following a
jury trial on two counts of possession of a falsely altered
military discharge certificate (Counts 1s and 2s), in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 498 (2006); one count of falsely claiming receipt
of a military decoration or medal (Count 3s), in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 704(b) (West Supp. 2012); one count of making false
statements to the Department of Veterans Affairs in his
application for disability benefits (Count 5s), in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), (3) (2006); and one count of mail fraud
in conjunction with his application for disability benefits
(Count 6s), in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2012). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Robbins first challenges the district court’s denial
of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for judgment
of acquittal on Counts 1s, 2s, 5s, and 6s for insufficient
evidence. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a
Rule 29 motion. United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 160
(4th Cir. 2006). A jury verdict must be upheld “if there is
substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government, to support it.” Id. “[S]ubstantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “We consider both circumstantial and direct
evidence,” drawing all reasonable inferences from such evidence
in the government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d
326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). However, “[w]e may not weigh the
evidence or review the credibility of the witnesses [because]
[t]hose functions are reserved for the jury.” United States v.
Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation
omitted).
Section 498, under which Counts 1s and 2s arose,
criminalizes the use, possession, or exhibition of a military
discharge certificate “knowing the same to be forged,
counterfeited, or falsely altered.” 18 U.S.C. § 498. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
that Robbins knowingly used a forged or falsely altered military
discharge certificate as charged in Counts 1s and 2s. * Thus, the
district court did not err in denying Robbins’ Rule 29 motion on
those counts.
*
We decline Robbins’ invitation to apply the rule of lenity
to his case, as § 498 is not ambiguous. See United States v.
Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (“The rule of lenity requires
ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the
defendants subjected to them.”).
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Section 1001(a), under which Count 5s arose,
criminalizes the making of “any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation” and the use of “any
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.”
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), (3). “The test of materiality is
whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence
agency action or is capable of influencing agency action.”
United States v. Garcia-Ochoa, 607 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Viewed in the light most
favorable to the Government, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to find that Robbins made a materially
false statement to the Department of Veterans Affairs in order
to obtain disability benefits for post-traumatic stress
disorder. See id. at 376 (“Materiality, as an element of a
criminal offense, is a question of fact (or at the very least, a
mixed question of law and fact) to be resolved by the fact
finder . . . .”). Likewise, viewed in the light most favorable
to the Government, we conclude that the Government presented
sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Robbins
committed mail fraud in conjunction with his attempt to obtain
disability benefits. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341; United States v.
Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001) (providing elements of
mail fraud); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25
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(1999) (stating that scheme to defraud must involve material
misrepresentation).
Finally, Robbins contends that Count 3s should be
dismissed because the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 704(b), is
unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543-51
(2012), in which the Court concluded that the Stolen Valor Act
violates the First Amendment, Robbins’ point is well-taken. We
therefore vacate Robbins’ conviction on Count 3s.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
on Counts 1s, 2s, 5s, and 6s, vacate the court’s judgment on
Count 3s, and remand for entry of a corrected judgment
consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
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