United States v. Ivan Stevenson ( 2022 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-7253
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IVAN JULIAN STEVENSON, a/k/a Ike, a/k/a Isaac,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
Harrisonburg. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (5:93-cr-30025-JPJ-3)
Submitted: April 21, 2022 Decided: April 27, 2022
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Juval O. Scott, Federal Public Defender, Charlottesville, Virginia, Erin
Trodden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United
States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ivan Julian Stevenson appeals the district court’s opinion and order denying his
motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (“First Step Act”). Stevenson asserts that the district
court procedurally erred by failing to consider his argument that reducing his sentence
would not create an unwarranted sentencing disparity. We affirm.
Where, as here, a defendant is eligible for relief because he was convicted of a
covered offense, the district court must analyze the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to
determine whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence. First Step
Act § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222 (stating that First Step Act does not “require a court to
reduce [an eligible defendant’s] sentence”); see United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667,
674 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he § 3553(a) sentencing factors apply in the § 404(b) resentencing
context.”). One purpose of reviewing the § 3553(a) factors is “to determine whether its
balancing of the factors was still appropriate in light of intervening circumstances.” United
States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2021).
We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a sentence reduction under the
First Step Act for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 495, 502
(4th Cir. 2020). The court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to
consider judicially recognized factors, or relies on erroneous factual or legal premises.
United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 187 (4th Cir. 2021). In explaining the decision, the
district court judge “need only set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
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decisionmaking authority.” United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, 409 (4th Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When considering a request for relief under § 404(b), a district court must: (1)
“accurately recalculate the Guidelines sentence range,” (2) “correct original Guidelines
errors and apply intervening case law made retroactive to the original sentence,” and (3)
“consider the § 3553(a) factors to determine what sentence is appropriate.” United
States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir. 2021). “Ultimately, the First Step Act
contemplates a robust resentencing analysis, albeit not a plenary resentencing hearing.” Id.
at 358. This Court reviews the denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under § 404(b)
for procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 358-61. Thus, a district court must
“consider a defendant’s arguments, give individual consideration to the defendant’s
characteristics in light of the § 3553(a) factors, determine—following the Fair Sentencing
Act—whether a given sentence remains appropriate in light of those factors, and
adequately explain that decision.” Id. at 360.
Section 3553(a)(6) speaks of “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”
The stated goal of § 3553(a)(6) is “to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities
nationwide.” United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1149 (4th Cir. 1996). “[A]voidance
of unwarranted disparities was clearly considered by the Sentencing Commission when
setting the Guidelines ranges,” and if the district court “correctly calculated and carefully
reviewed the Guidelines range, he necessarily gave significant weight and consideration to
the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007).
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The district court is not required to address every argument a defendant makes.
“Instead, the adequacy of the sentencing court’s explanation depends on the complexity of
each case and the appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write,
what to say, depends upon the circumstances. At bottom, we look to whether the
sentencing court has said enough to satisfy us that the court has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decision-making
authority.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 2020) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Stevenson’s contention that similarly situated defendants received sentence
reductions was at best anecdotal. “[C]omparisons of sentences may be treacherous because
each sentencing proceeding is inescapably individualized or because some defendants
possess . . . a demonstrated propensity for criminal activity that is almost unique in its
dimensions.” United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105-06 (4th Cir. 2012). “[W]e
are unwilling to isolate a possible sentencing disparity to the exclusion of all the other
§ 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted). Stevenson’s reference
to sentence reductions obtained by 12 defendants did not support a substantive argument
that Stevenson’s life sentence was out of line with similarly situated defendants. Stevenson
failed to offer substantial support for his contention that a sentence reduction to time served
would not produce an unwarranted sentencing disparity. We conclude that the district court
adequately explained its denial of Stevenson’s motion for a sentence reduction.
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Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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