Viola Brittner v. Beach Anesthesia, LLC ( 2023 )

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1511 Doc: 20 Filed: 06/23/2023 Pg: 1 of 4
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-1511
VIOLA MAE BRITTNER,
Debtor - Appellant,
v.
BEACH ANESTHESIA, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
Joseph Dawson, III, District Judge. (4:21-cv-01917-JD)
Submitted: December 1, 2022 Decided: June 23, 2023
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and TRAXLER, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Matthew M. Breen, LOWCOUNTRY LAW, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South
Carolina; David H. Breen, BREEN LAW FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Richard R. Gleissner, GLEISSNER LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Viola Mae Brittner filed an adversary proceeding against Beach Anesthesia, LLC,
alleging a violation of the automatic stay in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy
court assumed Beach had violated the stay but held that Brittner failed to establish or
mitigate damages. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. Brittner
appeals. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
“[W]e review the factual findings of the bankruptcy court for clear error and the
legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court and the district court de novo.” In re Pfister, 749
F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 2014). The Bankruptcy Code imposes a stay on “any act to collect,
assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before” the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). “[A]n individual injured by any willful violation of” the
stay “shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). The parties agree
that Brittner needed to satisfy a five-part test to establish a violation of the automatic stay:
(1) that a bankruptcy petition was filed, (2) that the debtors are individuals
under the automatic stay provision, (3) that the creditors received notice of
the petition, (4) that the creditor’s actions were in willful violation of the stay,
and (5) that the debtors suffered damages.
In re Warren, 532 B.R. 655, 660 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2015) (cleaned up).
We conclude that Brittner failed to establish damages. Her damages center on two
categories—emotional distress and attorney’s fees and costs. “An award of compensatory
emotional distress damages requires evidence establishing that the plaintiff suffered
demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently articulated; neither conclusory
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statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress nor the mere fact that a violation
occurred supports an award of compensatory damages.” Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 180
(4th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up); see also Lodge v. Kondaur Cap. Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1271
(11th Cir. 2014) (applying similar standard for debtor seeking emotional distress damages
for creditor’s violation of automatic stay). Thus, “[a] plaintiff’s own conclusory allegations
that [s]he felt embarrassed, degraded, or devastated, and suffered a loss of self-esteem, will
not suffice.” Doe, 306 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, we
have found that “a plaintiff [who] can produce evidence that emotional distress caused
chest pains and heart palpitations, leading to medical and psychological treatment which
included a formal diagnosis of major depressive disorder, as well as necessitated
prescription medication” was entitled to emotional distress damages. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Brittner did not establish
emotional distress damages. Brittner testified that she was anxious and suffered increased
heart palpitations. But as the bankruptcy court emphasized, she suffered from a preexisting
heart condition, and she did not see her cardiologist for two months. And Brittner provided
no medical documentation to support her assertions.
Turning to the issue of attorney’s fees and costs, we agree with the bankruptcy court
that Brittner’s counsel’s conduct caused most of her damages and ratcheted up the amount
of costs and fees. Brittner should not be entitled to a windfall based on her attorney’s
actions, whether awarded under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) or 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). See, e.g., In
re Preston, 333 B.R. 346, 351 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (finding the only damages—attorney’s
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fees and costs associated with the request for sanctions—were manufactured by counsel
and “could have easily been mitigated”); In re Sammon, 253 B.R. 672, 681-82 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2000) (holding a debtor could have mitigated damages by engaging in timely
corrective action with creditor); In re Craine, 206 B.R. 594, 597-98 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1997) (holding damages not appropriate when only damages were costs associated with
filing contempt motion and matter could have been resolved without court intervention).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s
order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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