United States v. John Jackson ( 2023 )

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-7795
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOHN JACKSON, a/k/a Aaron Green,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:05-cr-00184-1)
Argued: October 25, 2022 Decided: July 11, 2023
Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and Sherri A. LYDON, United
States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the majority opinion, in which
Judge Lydon joined. Judge Richardson wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Negar M. Kordestani, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Michael B. Stuart, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston,
Acting United States Attorney, John J. Frail, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
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OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to the First Step Act, the district court reduced John Jackson’s prison
sentence by 27 months and his supervised release by two years. Jackson appeals,
contending that the district court committed two procedural errors that warrant remand.
We affirm.
In 2006, Jackson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or
more of cocaine base (crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). After determining that
Jackson was a career offender, the district court calculated an advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Jackson to
262 months’ imprisonment, eight years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment,
and a $7,500 fine.
In 2019, Jackson moved for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Section 404 of the First Step Act, 132 Stat. at 5222,
permits a district court to reduce a sentence previously imposed for certain crack cocaine
offenses by retroactively applying Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. Through counsel, Jackson argued that he was eligible
for a sentence reduction, that he no longer qualified as a career offender, and that his
amended Guidelines range was 57 to 71 months. Because he had already served more than
12 years in prison, Jackson urged the district court to impose a sentence of time served with
no supervised release. In response, the Government agreed that Jackson was eligible for
Section 404 relief but contended he still qualified as a career offender. The Government
calculated Jackson’s amended Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months and urged the court
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to reduce his sentence to within that range, followed by six years of supervised release.
Jackson did not file a reply.
The district court determined that Jackson was eligible for a sentence reduction and
that his new Guidelines range was 188 months to 235 months. After considering the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court concluded “that a sentence at the high end of the
[G]uideline range is appropriate.” United States v. Jackson, No. 3:05-00184-01, 2019 WL
5681191, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2019). The court specifically noted that Jackson “has
been sanctioned repeatedly over the entire term of his imprisonment without any sign of
improved institutional adjustment,” citing a probation memorandum. Id. When describing
the background facts of the case, the district court elaborated that Jackson had “completed
two drug education programs” while incarcerated but had “also been subject to sanctions
on at least thirty-five separate occasions,” including “numerous instances of engaging in
sexual acts, refusing work assignments, and threatening bodily harm,” citing the same
memorandum. Id. at *1. The court reduced Jackson’s sentence to “235 months of
imprisonment, but not less than time served, to be followed by six years of supervised
release” and did not change Jackson’s fine or special assessment. Id. at *4 & n.5.
Jackson appealed. We held his appeal in abeyance on two separate occasions
pending decisions from our Court and the Supreme Court clarifying a district court’s
procedural obligations when deciding a Section 404 motion and our standards for
reviewing those decisions. The primary contours of First Step Act procedure having been
drawn, what remains of this appeal is a narrower, fact-specific dispute.
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We review a district court’s grant or denial of Section 404 relief for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 819–820 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v.
Collington, 995 F.3d 347, 358–359 (4th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion
if its decision to retain or reduce a sentence under the First Step Act is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Troy, 64 F.4th 177, 184 (4th Cir. 2023). But
“[a]s a general matter, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for
that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence,” and, “[o]ther
than legal errors in recalculating the Guidelines to account for the Fair Sentencing Act’s
changes, appellate review should not be overly searching.” Concepcion v. United States,
142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When assessing whether a district court’s Section 404 decision was procedurally
reasonable, we evaluate whether the district court committed “significant procedural error,
such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .”
Reed, 58 F.4th at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have recently explained
in the context of procedural reasonableness, “[i]n resolving a motion under the First Step
Act, a district court’s discretion is broad and its burden light.” Troy, 64 F.4th at 184.
Jackson contends that his reduced sentence is procedurally unreasonable because
(1) the district court did not solicit further argument from the parties after it determined the
applicable Guidelines range and (2) the district court relied on information about Jackson’s
prison conduct that was not disclosed to him. We find neither argument persuasive.
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As to the first contention, Jackson concedes on appeal that the district court correctly
calculated the applicable Guidelines range. The Government calculated the same correct
range in its district court filing. Jackson chose not to reply to that filing or to present an
alternative argument based on that sentencing range. Instead, he argued exclusively for a
sentence within what he now concedes was an incorrectly calculated Guidelines range.
Jackson nevertheless contends that, after the district court resolved the Guidelines dispute,
it was required to solicit a second round of argument from the parties so that he could
present arguments recalibrated to that corrected range. Although this is the typical
sequence of events during a plenary sentencing hearing, see United States v. Pauley, 511
F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007), defendants are not entitled to hearings on their Section 404
motions, see Collington, 995 F.3d at 360. Acknowledging that no hearing was requested
or required, Jackson suggests that another round of briefing would have been appropriate
because of the wide gulf between the parties’ Guidelines calculations. But as Jackson
admits, the reason for that gulf was his own erroneous calculation. The district court gave
Jackson and the Government the opportunity through briefing to present their Guidelines
calculations, to discuss the § 3553(a) factors, and to advocate for whatever sentence they
deemed appropriate. That procedure was sufficient.
Jackson bases his second assignment of error on the district court’s consideration of
his postsentencing conduct. Despite urging the district court to evaluate the § 3553(a)
factors and all information concerning his “background, character, and conduct,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661, Jackson made no argument to the district court about his postsentencing conduct.
Neither did the Government. The court nevertheless considered Jackson’s prison conduct,
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both positive and negative, in reaching its decision. The record suggests that the district
court expected that the memorandum detailing this information would be disclosed to the
parties, but apparently it was not.
It is reversible procedural error to select a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.
See Reed, 58 F.4th at 820; cf. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). But Jackson
does not contend that what the district court said about his postsentencing conduct is untrue,
so he is not entitled to relief on that basis. Cf. United States v. Vestal, 716 Fed. App. 512,
514 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Given that neither [defendant] asserts that the district court was
mistaken about his post-sentencing conduct, we can discern no abuse of discretion.”).
Indeed, at oral argument, Jackson’s counsel explained that his prison disciplinary record
was filed on the docket in subsequent proceedings in this case and, having reviewed it, he
did not dispute its accuracy. Oral Arg. at 35:09–35:15.
Jackson argues that because his prison disciplinary record was “never disclosed” to
him, he was given “no opportunity to counter” it. Supp. Opening Br. at 9. “Yet it was his
history; who knew it better?” United States v. Neal, 611 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).
And postsentencing conduct is invariably relevant at resentencing, see, e.g., Concepcion,
142 S. Ct. at 2402–2403; Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490–491 (2011), as
Jackson’s seasoned counsel acknowledged, see Oral Arg. at 3:38–5:01. Jackson had the
opportunity to explain his extensive disciplinary record and tout his positive postsentencing
conduct in his briefing to the district court but he did not, instead making the strategic
choice to focus exclusively on what he now realizes was an incorrect argument for a time-
served sentence. Jackson notes that at an original sentencing hearing, defense counsel has
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the chance to comment on the presentence report and any other information on which the
court will rely. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e), (i)(1). But again, procedural reasonableness
does not require a resentencing hearing for Section 404 motions. See Collington, 995 F.3d
at 360. Nor does Jackson claim there was any factual dispute to resolve. On this record,
we cannot find that the district court denied Jackson an opportunity to address his
disciplinary record or based its sentence on clearly erroneous facts.
Confining our review to the arguments Jackson has made on appeal, we conclude
the district court did not commit “significant procedural error.” Reed, 58 F.4th at 820
(internal quotation marks omitted). And Jackson does not challenge the substantive
reasonableness of his reduced sentence. So the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In resentencing this defendant, the district court got prison disciplinary records from
the executive branch (the Bureau of Prisons) and relied on them. Typically, there is nothing
wrong with this common occurrence. But here, the defendant received no notice that the
district court received that information or intended to rely on it. The majority says that this
is ok because, even without notice, the defendant had the opportunity to preemptively inject
his own prison disciplinary records. I respectfully disagree: A district court cannot—
unbeknownst to the defendant—obtain information from the government and then—still
unbeknownst to the defendant—consider that information when fashioning a sentence.
First, a brief retelling of the circumstances. John Jackson moved to reduce his
sentence under the First Step Act. In his motion, he made no argument about his
postsentencing conduct. In response, the United States Attorney agreed that Jackson was
eligible for resentencing but opposed the requested, reduced sentence. Like Jackson, the
United States Attorney didn’t mention postsentencing conduct. The district court granted
Jackson’s motion for resentencing. Yet the court did not reduce his 262-month sentence
as much as Jackson wanted. To Jackson’s surprise, the court’s order relied on Jackson’s
postsentencing conduct in prison to justify the new 235-month sentence. United States v.
Jackson, No. 3:05-00184-01, 2019 WL 5681191, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2019).
In the order, the district court underscored that Jackson had “been subject to
sanctions on at least thirty-five separate occasions.” Id. at *1. It later reiterated that
Jackson had “been sanctioned repeatedly” while in prison. Id. at *4. And the district court
didn’t hide the ball on where it got that information: the government. See id. at *1 n.1.
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But not the government through a filing from the United States Attorney’s Office, which
Jackson could see and respond to; instead, the district court had directed the United States
Probation Office to file a memorandum on Jackson. And Probation, in turn, collected
information from the Bureau of Prisons.
The majority sees no problem. They say that Jackson—even without disclosure of
the information—knew his own prison record and thus had the opportunity to address it.
See Maj. Op. at 7. But his knowledge and opportunity to interject his prison record is not
enough. Even in a First Step Act resentencing, a defendant has a right to notice of the
factual information that the court is relying on to impose the sentence. Without that notice,
the defendant’s opportunity to respond—whether to contest or contextualize—is illusory.
To be clear, the issue is not that this information—Jackson’s prison disciplinary
record—was not disclosed to him. On that point, the majority and I agree: Jackson likely
knew his disciplinary record better than anyone. It was his record after all. The issue,
rather, is that Jackson had no idea that the information had been disclosed to the district
court, let alone that the district court was considering it in when fashioning his sentence.
Since our founding, sentencing judges have appropriately possessed wide discretion
to consider aggravating and mitigating information in crafting the right sentence. See
generally Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022). That discretion permits
considering prison behavior in a First Step Act resentencing. And resentencing regularly
does in fact address prison behavior.
But that’s because prison behavior is regularly addressed by the parties. (What new
factual information, you might wonder, can a criminal defendant point to when they are
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back before a judge on resentencing other than how they’ve shaped up?) That didn’t
happen here. Unbeknownst to the defendant, the district court obtained and considered
information that the defendant had no reason to believe that the district court had. Neither
party had mentioned it, nor did the district court have a standing order that prison records
would be considered as part of any First Step Act resentencing. So Jackson had no idea—
until it popped up in the sentencing order—that the district court was even considering that
information.
In fairness to the district court, the docket suggests that the court expected
Probation’s memorandum—presumably containing Jackson’s prison disciplinary record—
to be filed, and thus provided to the parties. But it appears that never occurred. Given that
lack of notice, I would vacate Jackson’s sentence. I thus respectfully dissent.
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