United States v. Trevon Hopkins ( 2023 )

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4130 Doc: 43 Filed: 06/05/2023 Pg: 1 of 4
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4130
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TREVON DARNELL HOPKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:19-cr-00239-RJC-DCK-1)
Submitted: March 30, 2023 Decided: June 5, 2023
Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: D. Baker McIntyre III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King
United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Trevon Darnell Hopkins of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Following his conviction, the
district court sentenced Hopkins to 120 months’ imprisonment. Hopkins raises two
arguments on appeal. First, he contends that his waiver of counsel at his sentencing hearing
was invalid because it was not knowing and intelligent. Second, Hopkins argues that the
court incorrectly calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.
We review de novo the legal question of whether Hopkins’ waiver of his right to
counsel was knowing and intelligent. See United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 227 (4th
Cir. 2021). But because Hopkins was represented by counsel at the time of his waiver, and
counsel did not challenge the adequacy of the district court’s Faretta * colloquy, we review
the adequacy of the district court’s consideration of Hopkins’ mental competency for plain
error. See id. at 227-28. “To establish plain error, [Hopkins] must show that the district
court erred, that the error was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights.” United
States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013). “With regard to the third element of
that standard, [Hopkins] must show that the alleged error actually affected the outcome of
the district court proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a criminal defendant the right to the assistance
of counsel before he can be convicted and punished by a term of imprisonment.” Ziegler,
1 F.4th at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted). “But it is equally clear that the Sixth
Amendment also protects a defendant’s affirmative right to self-representation.” Id.
*
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he right to self-representation is inescapably in
tension with the right to counsel,” but “the right to counsel is preeminent and hence, the
default position.” United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 649 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a court presumes that a defendant should proceed
with counsel absent an “unmistakable expression” to the contrary by the defendant. Id. at
650 (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel must
be (1) clear and unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and (3) timely.”
Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, to validly waive his or
her right to counsel, a defendant must be mentally competent. Id. If a defendant is mentally
competent to stand trial, a court may constitutionally permit the defendant to represent
himself or herself. Id. at 227.
Hopkins does not dispute that his request for self-representation was clear,
unequivocal, and timely. Rather, Hopkins argues that his waiver was not knowing and
intelligent. We disagree. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that, when Hopkins
waived his right to counsel, Hopkins knew the charges against him, the possible
punishment, the manner in which an attorney could be of assistance, and the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation. See United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314, 359 (4th Cir.
2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 303 (2022). Therefore, the district court did not err in
concluding that Hopkins’ waiver was knowing and intelligent.
Hopkins also suggests that the district court did not adequately consider his
competence, but again, we disagree. The court had already held a competency hearing and
found that Hopkins was competent to stand trial—a finding that Hopkins does not
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challenge on appeal. And Hopkins has identified nothing to suggest his status changed by
the time of his sentencing hearing.
Next, Hopkins argues that the district court erred by finding that his prior conviction
under N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-258.4(a) was a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(3) (2021). We conclude that, even if the court erred, the
error was harmless and does not require resentencing. A Guidelines error is considered
harmless when “(1) the district court would have reached the same result even if it had
decided the [G]uidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence would be reasonable
even if the [G]uidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s favor.” United States v.
Barronette, 46 F.4th 177, 210-11 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 143 S. Ct. 414 (2022). Even without the two-level increase to Hopkins’ offense
level under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3), Hopkins’ Guidelines range would have still been 120
months’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum. So the court’s error had no effect on the
Guidelines sentence, and the court made clear it would have imposed the same 120-month
sentence regardless of whether Hopkins’ prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence.
Moreover, the 120-month sentence is reasonable based on the factors identified by the court
at sentencing.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We deny Hopkins’ motions seeking the
withdrawal of appellate counsel and the appointment of new counsel. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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