South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB ( 2023 )

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-1059
SOUTH CAROLINA STATE PORTS AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; UNITED STATES MARITIME
ALLIANCE, LTD.,
Intervenors,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent,
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1422;
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION,
Intervenors.
------------------------------
NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION; CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; SOUTH
CAROLINA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS; SOUTH CAROLINA MANUFACTURERS ALLIANCE;
GOVERNOR HENRY MCMASTER,
Amici Supporting Petitioner.
MARINE ENGINEERS’ BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION, District #1-PCD;
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATIONS; TRANSPORTATION TRADES DEPARTMENT; STATE
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OF MARYLAND; INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE
UNION,
Amici Supporting Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.
(10−CC−276241)
Argued: June 6, 2023 Decided: July 28, 2023
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Senior
Judge Motz joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Carter Glasgow Phillips, SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Petitioner. Heather Stacy Beard, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
Washington, D.C., for Respondent. John Philip Sheridan, MAZZOLA MARDON, P.C.,
New York, New York, for Intervenors. International Longshoremen’s Association and
International Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1422. William Michael Spelman, THE
LAMBOS FIRM, LLP, Tarrytown, New York, for Intervenor United States Maritime
Alliance, Ltd. ON BRIEF: Tracey C. Green, BURR & FORMAN LLP, Columbia, South
Carolina; Michael O. Eckard, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART,
P.C., Charleston, South Carolina, for Petitioner. Jennifer A. Abruzzo, General Counsel,
Peter Sung Ohr, Deputy General Counsel, Ruth E. Burdick, Deputy Associate General
Counsel, David Habenstreit, Assistant General Counsel, Milakshmi V. Rajapakse,
Supervisory Attorney, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C.,
for Respondent. Lawrence M. Goodman, Joseph D. Richardson, WILLIG, WILLIAMS,
& DAVIDSON, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Intervenor International Longshoremen’s
Association, Local 1422. Daniel Wolff, Nicholas M. Graziano, MAZZOLA MARDON,
P.C., New York, New York, for Intervenor International Longshoreman’s Association.
James R. Campbell, THE LAMBOS FIRM, LLP, Tarrytown, New York; Jonathan C.
Fritts, James D. Nelson, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Intervenor United States Maritime Alliance, Ltd. Glenn M. Taubman, NATIONAL RIGHT
TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, INC., Springfield, Virginia, for Amicus
The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. Anthony J. Dick,
Washington, D.C., Brian West Easley, Courtney L. Burks, JONES DAY, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for Amici Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, The South
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Carolina Chamber of Commerce, The National Association of Manufacturers, and The
South Carolina Manufacturers’ Alliance. Stephanie A. Maloney, Tyler S. Badgley,
UNITED STATES CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. Erica Klenicki, Michael A.
Tilghman II, NAM LEGAL CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amicus National
Association of Manufacturers. M. Dawes Cooke, Jr., John W. Fletcher, BARNWELL
WHALEY PATTERSON & HELMS, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Amicus South
Carolina Manufacturers’ Alliance. Thomas A. Limehouse, Jr., Chief Legal Counsel, Wm.
Grayson Lambert, Senior Legal Counsel, Erica W. Shedd, Deputy Legal Counsel, OFFICE
OF THE GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Amicus
Governor McMaster. James R. Rosenberg, Brian G. Esders, Paul D. Starr, ABATO,
RUBENSTEIN AND ABATO, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus Marine Engineers’
Beneficial Association, District #1-PCD. Matthew Ginsberg, Craig Becker, Andrew
Lyubarsky, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., for Amicus American Federal of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations and Transportation Trades Department. Anthony G.
Brown, Attorney General, Ryan R. Dietrich, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus State of
Maryland. Robert Remar, LAW OFFICE OF ROBER REMAR, San Francisco, California;
Eleanor Morton, LEONARD CARDER, LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amicus
International Longshore and Warehouse Union.
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DIAZ, Chief Judge:
A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s
Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of
carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the
East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at
a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX
and its carrier-members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier-members stopped
calling at that terminal.
We’re asked to determine whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of
its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State
Ports Authority petitioned for review.
We agree with the Board and deny the petition.
I.
A.
First, some historical context. Before the “container revolution,” longshore workers
would transfer loose (“break-bulk”) cargo piece-by-piece from pier to ship. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns v. NLRB, 734 F.2d 966, 968 (4th Cir. 1984), aff’d sub nom. NLRB v. Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n (ILA II), 473 U.S. 61 (1985). But “[a]s might be expected, moving
cargo in this break-bulk manner proved expensive and inefficient.”
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A more economical method emerged in the mid-1950s with the “containership,” a
vessel made to transport large containers of cargo. Id. at 969. Since containers didn’t need
to be packed and unpacked at the pier, the new ships could be “loaded or unloaded in a
fraction of the time required for a conventional ship.” NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n
(ILA I), 447 U.S. 490, 494–95 (1980). And since the containerships spent less time in port
and could make more frequent journeys, fewer ships were needed to carry a given volume
of cargo. Id. at 495.
But as “containerization” streamlined the shipping industry, it also “threatened the
jobs of longshoremen by dramatically increasing their productivity.” Id. at 496. Because
containers could be hooked up to trucks and driven to their destinations, shippers were no
longer bound to the ports closest to their customers. They “could now call at ports with
cheaper non-union labor, then truck the goods the extra distance, and save money.”
Bermuda Container Line Ltd. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, No. 97 CIV. 1257, 1997 WL
795766, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1997). The result was “wide job loss in the longshore
industry, and widespread upheaval and acrimony in the management-labor relationship in
the industry.” Id.B.
In the face of these technological developments, the ILA has sought to maintain its
members’ traditional work through collective bargaining. The ILA and its constituent local
units represent “longshoremen, clerks, checkers, and maintenance employees working on
ships and terminals” on the East and Gulf Coasts “from Maine to Texas.” J.A. 433–34.
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Local 1422, an intervenor here, represents members working at the Port of Charleston,
South Carolina.
The ILA has negotiated a series of collective-bargaining agreements—known as
“Master Contracts”—with USMX, a multi-employer association of shipping carriers and
longshore companies. The current Master Contract, effective from 2018 to 2024, contains
several provisions relevant to this appeal.
First, Article I, Section 3 provides that the Master Contract is a “full and complete
agreement” between the ILA and USMX on all issues
relating to the employment of longshore employees on container and ro-ro
[roll on/roll off] vessels and container and ro-ro terminals in all ports from
Maine to Texas at which ships of USMX carriers and carriers that are
subscribers to this Master Contract may call.
J.A. 434.
Second, Appendix A to the Master Contract (the “Containerization Agreement”)
recognizes the “existing work jurisdiction of ILA employees” and bars USMX from
contracting out that work to non-union members. It reads, in part:
1. Management and the Carriers recognize the existing work jurisdiction of
ILA employees covered by their agreements with the ILA over all container
work which historically has been performed by longshoremen and all other
ILA crafts at container waterfront facilities. Carriers, direct employers and
their agents covered by such agreements agree to employ employees covered
by their agreements to perform such work which includes, but which is not
limited to:
(a) the loading and discharging of containers on and off ships
(b) the receipt of cargo
(c) the delivery of cargo
(d) the loading and discharging of cargo into and out of containers
(e) the maintenance and repair of containers
(f) the inspection of containers at waterfront facilities (TIR men).
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2. Management, the Carriers, the direct employers and their agents shall not
contract out any work covered by this agreement. Any violations of this
provision shall be considered a breach of this agreement.
***
9. Violations of Agreement: This Agreement defines the work jurisdiction
of employees and prohibits the subcontracting out of any of the work covered
hereby. It is understood that the provisions of this Agreement are to be rigidly
enforced in order to protect against the further reduction of the work
force. . . . The parties agree that the enforcement of these provisions is
especially important and that any violation of such other provisions is of the
essence of the Agreement.
J.A. 484–85 (cleaned up).
Finally, Article VII, Section 7 of the Master Contract deals with the anomalous
“hybrid labor model” historically used by ports in Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston,
South Carolina; and Savannah, Georgia. Under the hybrid model, non-union employees
operate lift equipment to load and unload the containerships and ILA members perform the
rest of the longshore work.
It’s not clear from the record why the hybrid model arose at these ports. And while
the hybrid model seems to violate the no-subcontracting provision (included in all past
Master Contracts), the ILA has never sought to enforce the contract’s terms against those
ports.
The ILA and USMX negotiated Section 7 in 2012 and 2013 to address the hybrid
model and kept the provision in their current contract without further discussion. It reads:
Section 7. Port Authorities.
(a) USMX and the ILA shall conduct a study to determine how the business
model currently used by port authorities in the Ports of Charleston, SC,
Savannah, GA, and Wilmington, NC, could be altered to permit work
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currently performed by state employees to be performed by Master Contract-
bargaining-unit employees in a more productive, efficient, and competitive
fashion. USMX and the ILA will use this study to meet with these port
authorities in an effort to convince them to employ Master Contract-
bargaining-unit employees.
(b) USMX agrees to formally notify any port authority contemplating the
development of or intending to develop a new container handling facility that
USMX members may be prohibited from using that new facility if the work
at that facility is not performed by Master Contract bargaining-unit
employees.
J.A. 449.
USMX and the ILA never conducted the study described in Section 7(a). And they
disagree about Section 7(b)’s intended purpose and application. ILA and Local 1422
officials involved in the negotiations believed that Section 7(b) requires USMX carrier-
members to refrain from doing business at any new facility where ILA members don’t
perform all the longshore work. But USMX’s former counsel testified that the language
was meant to be a compromise, acknowledging the ILA’s issues with the hybrid model
without binding USMX.
C.
The South Carolina State Ports Authority operates three terminals at the Port of
Charleston: the North Charleston Terminal, the Wando Welch Terminal, and the new Hugh
K. Leatherman, Sr. Terminal. The North Charleston and Wando Welch Terminals use the
hybrid labor model, and USMX carrier-members have long docked at those terminals. The
Ports Authority isn’t a party to the Master Contract.
In 2020, the Ports Authority announced that it planned to operate the Leatherman
Terminal using the same hybrid model. Under the Master Contract’s Section 7(b), USMX
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notified the Ports Authority that “USMX members may be prohibited from using the new
facility . . . if the work at that facility is not performed by Master Contract bargaining-unit
employees.” J.A. 531. Several USMX carrier-members sent similar letters to the Ports
Authority. Then things fell apart.
USMX, the ILA, the Ports Authority, and the State of South Carolina met several
times over the ensuing months but couldn’t agree on a work arrangement for the new
terminal. At one meeting, the ILA proposed that the existing hybrid terminals be
“redline[d]” and allowed to keep using non-union labor, but that all longshore work at the
new terminal be performed by ILA members. J.A. 549. The State and the Ports Authority
responded that they weren’t bound by Section 7(b) and were free to use non-union lift
workers at the new terminal just as they had at the older Charleston terminals.
The State and the Ports Authority then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
National Labor Relations Board against the ILA, USMX, and Local 1422. They claimed
that the ILA and USMX violated Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, see 29
U.S.C. § 158(e), by agreeing to a “hot cargo” provision—a provision barring an employer
from doing business with another party—in Section 7(b) of the Master Contract.
Undeterred by the failed discussions, the Ports Authority began operating the
Leatherman Terminal using the hybrid model. Two USMX carrier-members sent ships to
the Leatherman Terminal, and the ILA promptly sued them (and USMX) in New Jersey
state court.
Among other claims, the ILA alleged that USMX and the carrier-members breached
Article I, Section 3 of the Master Contract and Sections 1, 2, and 9 of the Containerization
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Agreement by docking at Leatherman. Its complaint didn’t mention Section 7(b). And
while the ILA sought $300 million in damages, the union didn’t ask for injunctive relief
like assigning union employees to the work. J.A. 529.
Soon after the ILA filed its lawsuit, at least five USMX carrier-members contacted
the Ports Authority and demanded to be reassigned from the Leatherman Terminal to the
Wando Welch Terminal. One threatened to redirect its vessels to the Port of Savannah,
Georgia. The Ports Authority agreed to reassign the vessels, and USMX carrier-members
eventually stopped sending ships to the Leatherman Terminal.
The State, the Ports Authority, and USMX then filed more unfair labor practice
charges against the ILA and Local 1422, claiming that the ILA’s lawsuit also violated the
National Labor Relations Act.
II.
A.
The Board’s General Counsel consolidated both sets of charges and an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and issued a decision.
First, the ALJ rejected the Ports Authority’s argument that Section 7(b) of the
Master Contract was an illegal “hot cargo” provision. The section’s language was facially
valid, the ALJ held, because it didn’t require USMX to stop doing business with the Ports
Authority—it only required USMX to notify the Ports Authority that it “may be prohibited”
from using a hybrid facility. J.A. 942.
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The ALJ acknowledged that the ILA and USMX had debated the provision’s
meaning and that union officials believed it to bar USMX carrier-members from calling at
Leatherman. But he found that the evidence “establishe[d] disagreement, rather than
agreement,” so it didn’t demonstrate a meeting of the minds on the issue. J.A. 943.
Next, however, the ALJ held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX and the carrier-
members violated the National Labor Relations Act. Rejecting the ILA’s argument that
the lawsuit had a lawful “work preservation” goal, the ALJ found that the ILA used the
Master Contract “as a sword to achieve an unlawful, secondary object”—the acquisition of
“all the container work at the Leatherman Terminal, as well as at any future container-
handling facilities.” J.A. 948–49. And the ALJ further found that the ILA intended its
lawsuit to make USMX cease doing business at Leatherman Terminal, violating Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
B.
The State, the Ports Authority, and the ILA filed exceptions to the Board’s rulings.
A three-member panel issued its own opinion, finding for the ILA on both issues.
The Board quickly dismissed the challenge to Section 7(b) of the Master Contract,
unanimously affirming the ALJ’s ruling “for the reasons stated by the judge.” J.A. 1328.
But the Board disagreed that the ILA’s lawsuit had an illegal work-acquisition
objective. Instead, the Board found, the ILA lawfully sought to preserve its traditional
work and jobs—“the loading and unloading generally at East and Gulf Coast ports”—
against the technological changes wrought by containerization. J.A. 1332. While the
lawsuit may have had the “secondary effect” of causing ships to bypass the Port of
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Charleston, that effect was still “incidental to a lawful primary purpose.” Id. The Board
also disagreed with the ALJ’s requirement that the ILA show a threat of job losses in
Charleston—if such a showing was required, it was measured coastwide and “satisfied by
the history of containerization and its effect on the number of longshoremen.” J.A. 1333.
Board Member John F. Ring dissented on the lawsuit issue. Rejecting the majority’s
coastwide definition of the “work” being preserved, Ring instead posited that “the work in
question is the operation of the lift-equipment work at the Leatherman Terminal, and
USMX and its carrier-members do not have the power to give that work to ILA-represented
employees.” J.A. 1334. The ILA’s real beef was with the Ports Authority, he continued,
and its lawsuit had the unlawful secondary objective (rather than a secondary effect) of
pressuring the Ports Authority to assign lift-equipment work at Leatherman to union
members.
The Ports Authority petitioned for review of the Board’s decision under 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f), and the Board is the respondent before us. The State of South Carolina intervened
on the Ports Authority’s behalf, and the ILA and Local 1422 intervened for the Board.
USMX, also an intervenor, sides with the Ports Authority on the lawsuit issue, but with the
ILA on the Section 7(b) issue.
III.
The Ports Authority advances two issues on appeal. First, it argues, the ILA’s
lawsuit against USMX and its carrier-members had the illegal aim of obtaining the lift
work at Leatherman Terminal—work that ILA members had never performed and USMX
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was powerless to award. Second, the Ports Authority claims that the Master Contract’s
Section 7(b) represents a tacit unlawful agreement that USMX’s carrier-members won’t
call at new terminals unless ILA members perform all the longshore work there.
Because the Board’s rulings for the union are supported by substantial evidence and
aren’t illogical or inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act, we deny the Ports
Authority’s petition for review.
A.
Our review of a Board decision is “limited.” Tecnocap, LLC v. NLRB, 1 F.4th 304,
312 (4th Cir. 2021). We will uphold the Board’s findings of fact if they’re supported by
substantial evidence, “even though we might have reached a different result had we heard
the evidence in the first instance.” Id. at 313.
Under this standard, we can’t “displace the [Board’s] choice between two fairly
conflicting views” of the evidence. NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Fayetteville, 258
F.3d 305, 310 (4th Cir. 2001). And when factual findings “rest upon credibility
determinations,” we accept them absent “exceptional circumstances”—for example, when
a credibility determination is unreasonable or contradictory. Eldeco, Inc. v. NLRB, 132
F.3d 1007, 1011 (4th Cir. 1997).
We will also uphold the Board’s legal interpretations if they’re “rational and
consistent with the Act,” even if the Board’s reading isn’t “the best way to read the statute.”
Tecnocap, 1 F.4th at 313. But we don’t give “special deference . . . to the Board’s
interpretation of collective bargaining contracts” (though we’re “mindful of the Board’s
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considerable experience” in interpreting such agreements). Bonnell/Tredegar Indus. v.
NLRB, 46 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1995).
B.
The primary issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX and its carrier-
members violates the Act. Since the First Amendment protects a union’s right to access
the courts, the Board may determine that a union’s lawsuit constitutes an unfair labor
practice only if it is baseless or “has an objective that is illegal under federal law.” Bill
Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 738 n.5, 743 (1983).
No one asserts that the ILA’s lawsuit is baseless. So we’re left to determine whether
it has an illegal objective under the Act. We conclude that it doesn’t.
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union “to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce,” where “an object” of the
union’s coercive conduct is to force that person to “cease doing business with any other
person.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Section 8(e) prohibits unions and employers from
agreeing to “cease doing business with any other person,” and Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A)
prohibits unions from pressuring employers into such agreements. Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A),
(e).
These provisions exempt “primary” activity—that is, a “union’s efforts [] directed
at its own employer on a topic . . . that the employer can control.” ILA II, 473 U.S. at 81.
An activity has a “secondary” purpose, by contrast, if it is “directed at affecting the business
relations of neutral employers and [is] ‘tactically calculated’ to achieve union objectives
outside the primary employer-employee relationship.” Id; see also Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs.
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Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 623 (1967) (explaining that a secondary boycott is
characterized by “pressure tactically directed toward a neutral employer in a labor dispute
not his own.”).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that secondary purposes are distinct from
secondary effects: If a union has “no forbidden secondary purpose to disrupt the business
relations of a neutral employer,” any “extra-unit effects, no matter how severe, are
irrelevant to the analysis.” ILA II, 473 U.S. at 79 (cleaned up).
Preserving work for bargaining-unit members is a lawful, primary object. 1 ILA I,
447 U.S. at 504. A union’s activity must pass two tests to be considered work-preserving.
First, the activity “must have as its objective the preservation of work traditionally
performed by employees represented by the union.” Id. And second, the “contracting
employer must have the power to give the employees the work in question” (the “right of
control” test). Id.The Ports Authority claims that the ILA’s lawsuit violates several of the Act’s
prohibitions on activities with secondary purposes. In the Ports Authority’s view, the
union’s lawsuit aims to “coerc[e] neutral parties (USMX and its carrier-members) to
pressure [the Ports Authority] to give ILA members the lift-equipment jobs.” Petitioner’s
1
Several circuits have referred to the work-preservation doctrine as a “defense”
available to a union facing charges of an unfair labor practice. See, e.g., Int’l Longshore
& Warehouse Union v. NLRB, 978 F.3d 625, 637 (9th Cir. 2020); Loc. 32B-32J, SEIU v.
NLRB, 68 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Nat’l Mar. Union of Am. v. Com. Tankers Corp.,
457 F.2d 1127, 1134 (2d Cir. 1972). At oral argument, the Board agreed that the doctrine
could be characterized as a defense, giving the union the burden of proving it applies.
Assuming the burden is on the union, we find—as we’ll explain—that the ILA met it here.
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Br. at 3. But the Board found that the lawsuit met both requirements to be considered
lawful work preservation:
(1) the lawsuit’s objective was the preservation of work traditionally
performed by employees represented by ILA, and (2) USMX and its carrier
members had the power to give the employees the work in question, and
therefore, are primary employers.
J.A. 1331. We address each finding in turn.
1.
a.
First, the parties dispute whether the ILA’s lawsuit seeks to preserve the union’s
historic work jurisdiction or to acquire new work. To decide this question, “the first and
most basic question is: What is the ‘work’ that the [activity] allegedly seeks to preserve?”
ILA I, 447 U.S. at 505.
The Board looked to the Master Contract and found that the “work” was all
container work historically performed by ILA members “in all ports from Maine to Texas.”
J.A. 1331–32. But the Ports Authority argues that the work is narrower, encompassing
only “the lift-equipment jobs at the Port’s Leatherman Terminal” that are performed by
non-union employees. Petitioner’s Br. at 32.
We’re guided by a pair of 1980s Supreme Court cases that also involved the ILA.
These cases were about challenges to the ILA’s Rules on Containers, which gave union
longshore workers the right to load and unload containers that would otherwise be packed
or unpacked within fifty miles of the port. ILA I, 447 U.S. at 499.
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After several shipping companies contracted with third parties who used non-ILA
labor to pack and unpack cargo within the 50-mile radius, the ILA assessed damages
against the shipping companies. Id. at 502. The shipping companies stopped working with
the third parties, and the third parties filed unfair labor charges with the Board. Id.The Board found the charges substantiated, defining the “work” as “the off-pier
stuffing and stripping of containers” and determining that the ILA members hadn’t
traditionally performed that work. Id. at 506.
But the Court rejected that formulation of the “work” in ILA I. After sketching the
history of containerization, the Court explained that the Board needed to perform “a careful
analysis of the traditional work patterns that the parties are allegedly seeking to preserve”
in the face of “technological displacement.” Id. at 507.
The Board had “focused on the work done by the employees of the charging
parties . . . after the introduction of containerization.” Id. But it should have focused “on
the work of the bargaining unit employees”—the ILA longshore workers—“not on the
work of other employees who may be doing the same or similar work.” Id. The Court
remanded to the Board “to evaluate the relationship between traditional longshore work
and the work which the Rules attempt to assign to ILA members.” Id. at 509.
Five years later in ILA II, the Court held that the Rules on Containers—and the
ILA’s attempts to enforce them—were lawfully aimed at work preservation, articulating
two principles relevant here.
First, the Court noted that in cases involving work displaced by innovation, “the
place where work is to be done . . . is seldom relevant to the definition of the work itself.”
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ILA II, 473 U.S. at 77. The Court therefore defined the work as “simply ‘the work of
loading and unloading containers,’” not just at the ports or within the fifty-mile range
covered by the collective-bargaining agreements. Id. at 77 n.17. And second, the Court
reiterated that “extra-unit effects, no matter how severe, are irrelevant to the analysis.” Id.
at 79 (cleaned up).
Finding that the Rules on Containers were “motivated entirely by the
longshoremen’s understandable desire to preserve jobs” in the face of dwindling longshore
work, the Court concluded that harmful effects on non-union workers weren’t alone
sufficient to find an improper secondary objective. Id.Given the Court’s directive to focus “on the work of the bargaining unit employees,”
ILA I, 447 U.S. at 507, we hold that the Board here rationally determined that the “work in
question is the loading and unloading generally at East and Gulf Coast ports.” J.A. 1332.
The Master Contract defines the ILA’s existing work jurisdiction in similarly broad
strokes. 2 And the Contract controls “in all ports from Maine to Texas,” J.A. 434, reflecting
that it was “designed to preserve the work of ILA employees in the coast-wide bargaining
unit,” Bermuda Container Line Ltd. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 192 F.3d 250, 257 (2d
Cir. 1999).
2
See J.A. 484 (“Management and the Carriers recognize the existing work
jurisdiction of ILA employees covered by their agreements with the ILA over all container
work which historically has been performed by longshoremen and all other ILA crafts at
container waterfront facilities.”).
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The Ports Authority would prefer to define the work as only the lift-equipment work
at Leatherman Terminal. But that view ignores two takeaways from the ILA cases: (1) it
focuses on “the place where work is to be done,” which is “seldom relevant”; and (2) it
focuses on “extra-unit effects,” not the work of bargaining-unit employees. ILA II, 473
U.S. at 77, 79.
It’s true that “ILA-represented employees have never performed the lift-equipment
work at any terminal of the Port of Charleston,” Petitioner’s Br. at 33—the Board
recognized as much, see J.A. 1327. But as the Board explained, the ILA cases instruct us
to “look beyond the locus of a dispute and consider traditional work patterns” more
broadly. J.A. 1332; see also Bermuda Container, 192 F.3d at 257 (declining to “narrow
the employment relationship to include only employees of Maher terminals”); Int’l
Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB, 978 F.3d 625, 639–40 (9th Cir. 2020) (rejecting
a Board order as overly “preoccupied with the precise location of the disputed work” where
it “made prior performance of electrical M&R work” at a particular facility “a talisman”).
It would defang the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement to hold that the union couldn’t
enforce it at a new location just because no one, union or otherwise, had “historically”
worked there.
The Ports Authority relies on Marrowbone Development Co. v. District 17, United
Mine Workers of America, 147 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 1998), but that case is distinguishable.
Marrowbone involved a newly certified local union of mineworkers that sought work at a
particular mining site. Id. at 298–299. Although members of other locals had performed
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such work, we looked narrowly at the (lack of) work historically performed by the new
local to determine that it sought to acquire, not preserve, work. Id. at 302.
But in Marrowbone, the new local—as the “exclusive bargaining representative” of
the mine’s employees—was the relevant “bargaining unit.” Id. at 298, 303 (citing ILA I,
447 U.S. at 507); see also J.A. 946 n.29 (ALJ drawing same distinction). We emphasized
that given the site-specific nature of the mining work, only the members of the new local
would be “directly affected by the dispute”—any effects on members of other locals
“would be by and large incidental.” Marrowbone, 147 F.3d at 303.
Here, by contrast, the ILA (not Local 1422) is the relevant bargaining unit. The ILA
negotiated the Master Contract and filed the lawsuit to benefit its coastwide constituents.
And as we’ll explain, the “work” of loading and unloading containers isn’t tethered to a
single location, unlike the work at the Marrowbone mine—so it’s not the case that the
ILA’s lawsuit will have only “incidental” effects across the coastwide unit. We therefore
agree with the ALJ that Marrowbone is inapt.
At oral argument, the Ports Authority and USMX suggested that Section 7(a) of
the Master Contract effectively excludes the hybrid-model ports—Charleston, Savannah,
and Wilmington—from the ILA’s work jurisdiction. But while that section acknowledges
the reality that non-union employees currently perform the lift work at those ports, it
doesn’t suggest that the union meant to forever surrender its claim to that work. 3
3
To be clear, we express no view on the merits of USMX’s potential waiver defense
in the New Jersey lawsuit. We only observe that a union may still claim work preservation
(Continued)
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As the ALJ put it, the “origin and rationale for [the hybrid model] is not clear from
the record, but there is no indication the parties intended to carve out, individually or
collectively, these three South Atlantic ports from the multi-port bargaining unit.” J.A.
948 n.32. No party challenged this finding. So giving due deference to the agency, we
decline to find that Section 7(a) represents any kind of tacit agreement to exclude the lift
work at hybrid ports from the Master Contract’s jurisdiction.
In all, we conclude that the Board and ALJ rationally defined “the work in question”
as longshore work throughout the ILA’s coastwide jurisdiction, not just the lift work at
Leatherman Terminal.
b.
Next, we consider whether the challenged activity (the lawsuit) sought to preserve
that work. The Board found that although this case arose some 40 years after the ILA cases,
it follows in their lineage: The ILA is still “seeking to preserve the traditional work of unit
employees in the face of the technological advances affecting the coastal units,” including
at Leatherman Terminal. J.A. 1332. And the union is trying to do so by enforcing its
coastwide Containerization Agreement—the Rules on Containers’ direct descendant, see
J.A. 1328 n.9—against employers that breach its terms by choosing hybrid ports for their
when its traditional work is performed at a new location within the jurisdiction of its
collective-bargaining agreement.
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longshore work. 4 Though its lawsuit against USMX had the effect of diverting ships away
from Leatherman, the key word is effect—and “extra-unit effects, no matter how severe,
are irrelevant to the analysis.” ILA II, 473 U.S. at 79 (cleaned up).
None of the Ports Authority’s arguments undermine this conclusion. First, the Ports
Authority contends that the ILA cases are inapt because “the lift-equipment work at
Leatherman Terminal does not involve any technological change.” Petitioner’s Br. at 35–
36; see also Dissent at 44 (contending that the “historic loss of work because of
containerization” is “long past for this case”); J.A. 1341 (dissenting member arguing that
the Board’s opinion is stuck “back in the 1960s or 1970s”).
But we decline to disregard history, especially where the Court has demanded a
“careful analysis of the traditional work patterns that the parties are allegedly seeking to
preserve.” ILA I, 447 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added). And we see no reason why the passage
of time should negate the bargain the ILA negotiated in the (aptly named) Containerization
Agreement.
As the Board explains, “The lift work arose from and was enabled by
containerization.” Respondent’s Br. at 48. Before containerization, cranes were mounted
4
To support its view that the ILA seeks to acquire, not preserve work, the dissent
cites several comments from ILA officials expressing a “desire to ‘have all of the
work . . . that is performed by nonbargaining workers to be brought under the ILA[’s]
jurisdiction.” Dissent at 49 (citing J.A. 260). These remarks aren’t smoking guns,
however. It’s no secret that the ILA isn’t a fan of the hybrid model—but doesn’t follow
that the ILA isn’t entitled to sue to enforce its collective-bargaining agreement. And more
broadly, in nearly all work-preservation cases, a union is seeking work not currently
assigned to it. Our inquiry is whether that aim is lawful work preservation considering the
union’s traditional work patterns.
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on ships and operated by union employees. J.A. 269–72. The rise of containers made
specially designed shoreside cranes, like those operated by the state employees in
Charleston, a better option. Id. So the ILA negotiated its containerization agreements to
combat the loss of this traditional work. J.A. 272–73; see also J.A. 484 (defining work
jurisdiction to include “the loading and discharging of containers on and off ships”).
Indeed, no one disputes that at non-hybrid ports, ILA members perform all the lift work.
It’s true that at terminals in the Port of Charleston, non-union employees have
operated the shoreside cranes since the early days of containerization. But ILA I warns
against “focusing on the work as performed, after the innovation took place, by the
employees who allegedly have displaced the longshoremen’s work.” 447 U.S. at 508.
Such a focus would “foreclose[]—by definition—any possibility that the longshoremen
could negotiate an agreement” to keep loading or unloading cargo as the work evolved. Id.The Ports Authority also argues that this isn’t a situation “where the ILA workforce
is genuinely threatened” by the “continued use of state-employees to perform the lift-
equipment work.” Petitioner’s Br. at 37 (cleaned up); see also Nat’l Woodwork, 386 U.S.
at 630–31 (suggesting that workers boycotting to “acquire new job tasks when their own
jobs are not threatened” may be an unfair labor practice). But even if such a showing of
genuine threat is required, it’s satisfied by “the history of containerization and its effect on
the number of longshoremen.” J.A. 1333.
Like its predecessors, the Master Contract aims “to preserve jobs against the steadily
dwindling volume of cargo work.” ILA II, 473 U.S. at 79 (cleaned up). The Leatherman
Terminal contributes to that “dwindling” by assigning to non-union workers jobs
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earmarked for the union by contract. As the ILA argues, moreover, the lower labor costs
of hybrid-model ports could draw cargo away from fully union ports, threatening other
bargaining-unit jobs. See ILA’s Br. at 13, 34–35; cf. J.A. 92–93 (Ports Authority president
testifying that “[a] deviation from [the hybrid model] would put us at a competitive
disadvantage . . . relative to any new terminal or any facility that had to operate a more
expensive model”); Gov. McMaster’s Amicus Br. at 10 (heralding the “efficiency of the
Port’s hybrid model”). 5
Finally, the Ports Authority notes that the ILA has, for decades, “acquiesced in the
Port of Charleston’s use of state employees to perform the lift-equipment work.”
Petitioner’s Br. at 39; see also Gov. McMaster’s Amicus Br. at 10 (noting “settled
expectations” that Leatherman would also use the hybrid model). But while that might
serve as a defense for USMX in the New Jersey breach-of-contract lawsuit, it doesn’t bear
on whether the lawsuit itself has an unlawful work-acquisition object.
The Board rationally found the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX to have a valid work-
preservation purpose. We therefore find that it passes ILA I’s first prong.
5
Much of Governor McMaster’s amicus brief details the potential economic impact
of ruling in the ILA’s favor. The State of Maryland, in turn, argues in its amicus brief
supporting the Board that “union labor provides tremendous benefits for workers” and their
communities. Md.’s Amicus Br. at 12. While these arguments may have normative force,
it’s “not our function as a court of review to weigh the economic cost” of a collective
bargaining agreement. Am. Trucking, 734 F.2d at 979.
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2.
ILA I’s second prong asks whether USMX has the “right to control” the relevant
work’s assignment. 447 U.S. at 512. The answer largely turns on how we define the work.
Id. at 512 n.27.
The Board, viewing the “work” on a coastwide scale, found that USMX’s carrier-
members controlled the work because they could “bypass the Port of Charleston entirely
and call on other [fully union] ports.” J.A. 1332. But USMX and the Ports Authority again
urge us to focus on the lift-equipment work at the port of Charleston, which the Ports
Authority exclusively controls. Because we agree with the Board’s broader work
definition, it follows that USMX and its carrier-members have the right to control it.
In American Trucking, we held that shipping companies had the “right to control
the container work sought by the longshoremen” because they owned or leased the
containers and controlled where they went. 734 F.2d at 978. That holding applies here.
As the ALJ put it, “the USMX carrier-members, like the carrier-members in ILA I
and II, own or lease their containers, and, therefore, determine what ports they call on,
which ultimately gives the carriers the right to control who performs the lift-equipment
work on their containers.” J.A. 948. That’s because “[i]n the longshore industry,
containers (and other sorts of cargo) are the work.” ILA’s Br. at 44. If no ships dock at a
terminal, there’s no longshore work to be done there. So where USMX’s carrier-members
choose to send their ships is the whole ballgame.
The Ports Authority and USMX rely on a West-Coast longshore case holding that
the Port of Portland—not the carriers or third-party terminal operator—controlled the
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“reefer work” of “plugging in, unplugging, and monitoring refrigerated shipping
containers.” Hooks ex rel. NLRB v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 905 F. Supp. 2d
1198, 1201, 1211 (D. Or. 2012), aff’d in relevant part, 544 F. App’x 657, 658 (9th Cir.
2013) (unpublished); accord Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB, 705 F. App’x
1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). But Hooks is distinguishable.
In that case—a jurisdictional scuffle between two unions—the Board determined
that the “work in dispute” was site-specific reefer work at one terminal in Portland. See
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 48, 358 N.L.R.B. 903, 904 (2012). One union expressly
sought reassignment of the reefer work, threatening to picket the terminal operator “or take
other economic action if the disputed work was not assigned to its members.” Id. at 905.
ILA’s lawsuit, by contrast, seeks damages from USMX and its carrier-members for
breaching the Master Contract—not injunctive relief like work reassignment. We accept
that USMX, like the terminal operator in Hooks, can’t control who operates the cranes (or
plugs in the reefers) at a specific terminal. But USMX and its carrier-members can control
whether they send their containers to a terminal whose labor model doesn’t comply with
their contractual obligations. And under American Trucking, that’s what matters.
The Ports Authority also claims this case is like NLRB v. Enterprise Association of
Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507 (1977), which preceded ILA I and II. There, a subcontractor
entered into two conflicting agreements: one with a union, promising that pipe threading
and cutting would be performed onsite; and one with a general contractor, agreeing to use
units with pre-cut pipes on a construction project. Id. at 511–1. Relying on the first
agreement, the union members refused to install the units at the jobsite. Id. at 512–13.
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The Court found that while the agreement was valid, the boycott wasn’t. The union
members were exerting pressure on a subcontractor with “no power to award the [jobsite
cutting and threading work] to the union,” the Court held, when their real problem was
with the (neutral) general contractor. Id. at 513, 521–523.
Following the dissenting Board member’s lead, the Ports Authority argues that
USMX is analogous to the subcontractor in Pipefitters. Like the subcontractor, the Ports
Authority contends, USMX has no power to assign the lift work at Leatherman to union
members. 6 And while USMX could direct its carrier-members to avoid hybrid ports, the
subcontractor likewise could have walked away from its deal with the general contractor—
but the general contractor (like the Ports Authority) would still control the work.
But that analogy doesn’t fit. In Pipefitters, the “work” was confined to cutting and
threading pipes at one specific site. 429 U.S. at 529–30. The subcontractor could have
walked away from the deal with the general contractor—but the union members would
have gone home empty-handed too.
Here, as we’ve discussed, the “work” is the loading and unloading of containers
along the coastwide bargaining unit. And USMX’s carrier-members can unilaterally give
that work to union members by “simply refus[ing] to supply their containers” to ports using
non-ILA labor. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
aff’d, ILA I, 447 U.S. 490 (1980); see also id. n.192 (finding Pipefitters “inapplicable to
the instant cases”).
6
True enough, and the Board readily concedes the point.
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In other words, USMX has all the “power to settle the dispute with the union” by
avoiding terminals that would violate the Master Contract. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 522.
“It is difficult to imagine a more forceful demonstration of control.” Int’l Longshoremen’s
Ass’n, 613 F.2d at 913.
Since USMX and its carrier-members control where the containers go, the Board
rationally concluded they also control the relevant work—the loading and unloading of
containers along the East Coast. Finding that the union has satisfied ILA I’s right-of-control
test as well, we hold that the ILA’s lawsuit had a legitimate work-preservation objective.
We therefore deny the Ports Authority’s petition on this issue.
IV.
The ALJ separately held (and the Board affirmed) that Section 7(b) of the Master
Contract wasn’t a prohibited agreement to stop doing business—known as a “hot cargo”
clause—with the Ports Authority. The Ports Authority contends that the Board erred in
concluding that the provision didn’t violate Section 8(e) of the Act, which makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union and employer to form an agreement, “express or implied,
whereby such employer . . . agrees to cease . . . doing business with any other person.” 29
U.S.C. § 158(e).
In the Ports Authority’s view, the ILA and USMX had an “implied agreement not
to do business with new container-handling terminals that did not exclusively employ ILA
members”—an agreement that became reality when carriers asked not to dock at
Leatherman Terminal. Petitioner’s Br. at 56–57.
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The Board responds that the provision doesn’t require USMX carrier-members to
boycott Leatherman; it only requires them to give notice that they “may be prohibited”
from calling there. Respondent’s Br. at 25 (cleaned up). And while the Ports Authority
argues that extrinsic evidence shows the contracting parties made an unlawful agreement,
the Board and the ILA say that the evidence in fact shows “a dispute, not an agreement,”
about the provision’s meaning. ILA’s Br. at 54 (cleaned up); see also Petitioner’s Br. at
29–30. We agree with the Board and the ILA.
The Board evaluates whether a contractual clause violates Section 8(e) in two steps.
See Gen. Teamsters, Loc. 982, 181 N.L.R.B. 515, 517 (1970). First, the Board determines
whether the clause’s meaning is clear. Id. If it is, the Board will determine whether it’s
valid under Section 8(e). Id. But if the clause is ambiguous, the Board can then “consider
extrinsic evidence to determine whether the clause was intended to be administered in a
lawful or unlawful manner.” Id.In conducting this analysis, the ALJ first found that the meaning of Section 7(b) was
clear: It didn’t “require USMX or its carrier-members to boycott the Leatherman Terminal
or to cease doing business with [the Ports Authority] or any other employer or person.”
J.A. 942. The ALJ’s reasoning was sound.
The plain text of Section 7(b) requires USMX to “notify” port authorities that their
members “may be prohibited” from using terminals staffed by non-union workers. J.A.
449. As the ALJ explained, “The word ‘may’ is ordinarily construed to mean permissive
and discretionary,” while “shall” connotes a requirement. J.A. 1350; see also
Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 171–72 (2016) (“Unlike the word
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‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.”). And
elsewhere in the contract, the parties used “shall” and “may” to differentiate terms. See
J.A. 942 (listing examples). We therefore agree that Section 7(b) doesn’t bind USMX to a
particular plan—so the ALJ (and Board) correctly concluded that the provision isn’t
“clearly unlawful on its face.” Id.The Ports Authority contends that the provision is at least ambiguous and that we
should examine extrinsic evidence that “reveals the parties’ intentions.” Petitioner’s Br. at
52–53. But even if we consider the extrinsic evidence, it doesn’t change our view.
First, the Ports Authority notes that ILA President Harold Daggett testified that
Section 7(b) was meant to stop carriers from docking at “any new terminal that comes
online, if it’s not 100 percent ILA.” J.A. 295. But USMX’s former counsel Donato Caruso
testified that he negotiated for the term “may” because he “didn’t want to give the
impression that USMX agreed . . . with the Union’s position.” J.A. 314.
The ALJ credited Caruso over Daggett “because Caruso’s recollection and
testimony were more logical and consistent with the other evidence.” J.A. 935 n.16.
Giving due deference to the agency’s credibility findings, see Eldeco, 132 F.3d at 1011,
substantial evidence establishes that USMX and the ILJ didn’t come to a tacit unlawful
agreement when they negotiated Section 7(b).
The Ports Authority points to a series of communications from USMX carrier-
members indicating that they wouldn’t dock at Leatherman unless the terminal was fully
union-staffed. As the ALJ noted, however, the carrier-members weren’t speaking for
USMX, but for the individual shipping companies. And even if the statements could be
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attributed to USMX, none establish a bilateral agreement between ILA and USMX that
ships couldn’t call at Leatherman. See Loc. 27, Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 321
N.L.R.B. 540, 541 n.3 (1996) (“solely unilateral” conduct by a union “to enforce an
unlawful interpretation of a facially lawful contract clause does not violate Sec. 8(e)
because such conduct does not constitute an ‘agreement’” (cleaned up)). To the contrary,
the statements note the carriers’ concerns about “risk,” “challenges,” and “uncertainty,”
J.A. 117, 540, 651—all suggesting “disagreement, rather than agreement” about what
Section 7(b) meant. J.A. 943.
We agree that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section
8(e), so we deny the Ports Authority’s petition on this issue too.
V.
The Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve
its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act.
And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t
constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement.
The South Carolina State Ports Authority’s petition for review is therefore
DENIED.
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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting, except as to Part IV:
In its effort to coerce the South Carolina State Ports Authority to hire union workers
to operate the state-owned cranes at the new Leatherman Terminal in the Port of
Charleston, the International Longshoremen’s Association (“ILA”) sued the United States
Maritime Alliance, whose members are customers of the Port, to effect a boycott by
Maritime Alliance members’ ships of the new terminal. This was an unfair labor practice
under § 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), as so found by the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and I would reverse the National Labor Relations
Board and remand, directing it to provide relief to the Ports Authority.
After the State of South Carolina spent $1.5 billion building the new terminal to
handle increased demand, the Ports Authority staffed the new terminal in accordance with
the practice that it had followed at the port’s two other terminals for 50 years — “a hybrid”
division of labor in which the work of operating the state-owned cranes is performed by
state employees and the remaining longshore work is performed by members of the ILA
local union. The ILA, which represents longshoremen on the East Coast and Gulf Coast,
has long wanted to displace the port’s state employees with union workers, as it has also
wanted to do at the Ports of Wilmington, North Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia, which
likewise use the hybrid division of labor. As an ILA officer specifically stated, the ILA
wanted “100 percent” of the work at the new terminal. Indeed, he stated that they “were
interested in consuming all the jobs” and told the Ports Authority, “as you try to grow your
business, I have to try to grow mine as well.”
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Consequently, before the opening of the new terminal, the ILA negotiated with the
State and the Ports Authority in an attempt to displace the hybrid model and acquire new
work for union workers. When the discussions yielded no change, the ILA took further
steps to achieve its goal. After the new terminal opened and cargo ships began calling at
it, the ILA sued the United States Maritime Alliance — a multi-employer association of
container carriers — and two of its members whose ships had called at the new terminal,
alleging that, by doing so, they were violating the collective bargaining agreement between
the ILA and the Maritime Alliance. The ILA sought $300 million in damages. It also
made clear that the same fate would befall any other Maritime Alliance carrier whose ships
called at the new terminal. In response to that suit, Maritime Alliance carriers immediately
stopped calling at the new terminal, causing the Ports Authority extensive damages, which
are ongoing.
In response to this ILA activity, the Ports Authority and the Maritime Alliance
brought an unfair labor practice charge against the ILA, alleging that it was attempting to
enforce the collective bargaining agreement in a coercive manner so as to force Maritime
Alliance carriers to cease calling at the new terminal, thus effecting a boycott in violation
of § 8(b) of the NLRA. Separately, the Ports Authority brought an additional unfair labor
practice charge against both the ILA and the Maritime Alliance, alleging that a provision
of their collective bargaining agreement violates § 8(e) of the NLRA.
Section 8(b) prohibits unions “from engaging in secondary activities whose object
is to force one employer [here, the Maritime Alliance] to cease doing business with another
[here, the Ports Authority].” NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n (ILA I), 447 U.S. 490,
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503 (1980); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). And § 8(e) “makes unlawful those
collective-bargaining agreements in which the employer [here, the Maritime Alliance]
agrees to cease doing business with any other person [here, the Ports Authority].” ILA I,
447 U.S. at 503–04; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). Unions can, however, avoid liability
under those provisions if they show, as an affirmative defense, that the primary objective
of their activity is the preservation of work historically done by the bargaining unit, not the
acquisition of union work. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612,
630 (1967); see also ILA I, 447 U.S. at 504.
The majority concludes that because ILA workers perform “the loading and
unloading generally at East and Gulf ports,” ante at 18, as described without exception in
the Master Contract between the ILA and the Maritime Alliance, the ILA’s efforts at the
Port of Charleston were intended merely to preserve such work for union workers. This
conclusion, however, is fundamentally flawed because it fails to focus on the work
performed by the relevant bargaining unit, Local 1422, as required. See ILA I, 447 U.S. at
507 (requiring the analytical focus to be on “whether an agreement seeks no more than to
preserve the work of bargaining unit members” (emphasis added)); Marrowbone Dev. Co.
v. Dist. 17, United Mine Workers of Am., 147 F.3d 296, 302–03 (4th Cir. 1998) (same).
Moreover, the majority’s premise for making this argument is inaccurate. While ILA
workers do generally operate the cranes in East Coast and Gulf Coast ports, the undisputed
facts of record show a longstanding exception to that generalization — they have never
operated cranes in the Ports of Charleston, Wilmington, and Savannah, each of which has
always operated with a hybrid division of labor. Thus, the ILA’s effort to bring about
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change in the Port of Charleston to eliminate the hybrid model in favor of 100% ILA work
was clearly an effort to acquire work, which, as it was attempted, was illegal, and not the
lawful effort to preserve work. The record shows further that the ILA faced no loss or
threatened loss of work in the Port of Charleston from the opening of the new terminal.
Moreover, as the ALJ found, there is no record evidence that the opening of the new
terminal caused or threatened to cause loss of work at any other port on the East Coast or
Gulf Coast.
I agree with the ALJ in this case, as well as the dissenting member of the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”), both of whom concluded that the ILA
committed an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(b). I would therefore grant the Ports
Authority’s petition for review, reverse, and remand to require the Board to provide relief
to the Ports Authority.
I
In the spring of 2021, the Ports Authority opened the Hugh K. Leatherman, Sr.,
Terminal in the Port of Charleston, operating the new terminal with the same hybrid
division of labor that had been in use at the port for some 50 years. Under the hybrid
model, state employees operate the state-owed cranes at the port and ILA workers perform
all other longshore work. The state employees are not represented by the ILA, and the
Ports Authority has no agreement with the ILA governing the terms and conditions of the
Ports Authority’s employment of crane operators. This hybrid model is also in use at the
Ports of Wilmington and Savannah.
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The vast majority of container ships that call at the Port of Charleston are owned by
carriers who are members of the United States Maritime Alliance, which represents the
carriers in negotiating collective bargaining agreements with the ILA. The most recent
“Master Contract” between the ILA and the Maritime Alliance became effective in 2018
and will continue to 2024.
The Master Contract provides the terms and conditions for union longshore work in
all the ports on the East Coast and Gulf Coast — “from Maine to Texas.” It requires that
all Maritime Alliance members’ cargo be loaded and unloaded exclusively by ILA
longshore workers. While the Master Contract contains no explicit exception for crane
operators in the Ports of Charleston, Savannah, and Wilmington, the parties agree that the
crane operators in those ports have never been union workers. And the Master Contract
recognizes this in Article VII, § 7(a)–(b):
(a) [The Maritime Alliance] and the ILA shall conduct a study to determine how
the business model currently used by port authorities in the Ports of
Charleston, SC, Savannah, GA, and Wilmington, NC could be altered to
permit work currently performed by state employees to be performed by
Master Contract-bargaining-unit employees in a more productive, efficient,
and competitive fashion. [The Maritime Alliance] and the ILA will use this
study to meet with these port authorities in an effort to convince them to
employ Master Contract-bargaining-unit employees.
(b) [The Maritime Alliance] agrees to formally notify any port authority
contemplating the development of or intending to develop a new container
handling facility that [Maritime Alliance] members may be prohibited from
using that new facility if the work at that facility is not performed by Master
Contract-bargaining-unit employees.
(Emphasis added).
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The study contemplated by § 7(a) was never conducted, and no action has ever been
taken before the ILA’s activities in this case with respect to the Maritime Alliance
members’ right to call at these three ports. Even so, the representatives of the ILA and the
Maritime Alliance disagree over the meaning of § 7. The ILA asserts that it precludes
Maritime Alliance carriers from calling at the new terminal in the Port of Charleston unless
the terminal is staffed “100 percent ILA,” while the Maritime Alliance asserts that § 7 was
intended merely to cabin the hybrid model to those ports using the hybrid model.
Despite the long and consistent history of the hybrid model’s being used at the three
ports, the ILA has been intent on changing the model and acquiring 100% of the work at
those ports. Before the new terminal in the Port of Charleston opened, the ILA met with
representatives of the State of South Carolina and the Ports Authority in an effort to
persuade the Ports Authority to make the change at the new terminal. As the ALJ noted,
the ILA representative stated that the ILA “[was] interested in consuming all the jobs at
the Leatherman Terminal” and that the ILA representative “opposed the use of the hybrid
operating model throughout his 24-year career as a union officer.” The representative also
stated that with the opening of the new terminal, the ILA decided to focus on combatting
the use of the hybrid model at the Port of Charleston because “Charleston just happened to
be the ‘first terminal up at bat.’”
When negotiations between the ILA and the Ports Authority failed and the new
terminal opened using the hybrid model, the ILA pursued a different course and filed an
action against the Maritime Alliance and two member carriers who had called at the new
terminal, alleging that they violated the Master Agreement between the ILA and the
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Maritime Alliance. The ILA sought $300 million in damages, intending to deter other
carriers from calling at the new terminal. That effort proved effective. Thereafter, no
Maritime Alliance carriers called at the new terminal, causing the State and the Ports
Authority substantial damages, as it presently operates at only 10% capacity.
The Ports Authority filed two unfair labor practice charges against the ILA. In the
first, it alleged that by employing the ILA’s interpretation of Article VII, § 7 of the Master
Contract, the ILA illegally attempted to require Maritime Alliance carriers to refrain from
dealing with the Ports Authority at its new terminal, in violation of § 8(e) of the NLRA. In
the second charge, the Ports Authority alleged that the ILA filed suit against the Maritime
Alliance and its member carriers with the unlawful objective of forcing Maritime Alliance
carriers to cease doing business with the Ports Authority and thereby to coerce the Ports
Authority to assign union workers to state-owned cranes, in violation of §§ 8(b) and 8(e).
After a two-day trial in June 2021, the ALJ dismissed the first unfair practice charge
because the language of § 7 did not require the Maritime Association to refrain from calling
at the new terminal but merely required the Maritime Alliance members to warn the Ports
Authority that they may not be able to use the new terminal if it used the hybrid model.
With respect to the second charge, however, the ALJ found that the ILA’s action in filing
suit against the Maritime Alliance was an illegal effort to create a secondary boycott with
the purpose of acquiring new work, not preserving existing work. The ALJ drew on the
Supreme Court’s distinction in National Woodwork between contractual provisions
employed as a “‘sword’ to reach out and acquire new work” and provisions employed as a
“‘shield’ to retain work traditionally performed by Union employees.” (Quoting National
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Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 630). The ALJ concluded that the ILA had used its suit to enforce
the Master Contract as a “sword” to acquire new work because “a condition precedent to
finding a lawful work preservation object is evidence of an actual or anticipated threat to
[bargaining] unit jobs.” He found both (1) that the ILA had not adduced sufficient evidence
to support its claim that the new terminal in the Port of Charleston threatened existing ILA
jobs, and (2) that there was concrete evidence of the ILA’s “desire to obtain all the
container work at the Leatherman Terminal, as well as at any future container-handling
facilities.” Both findings supported a conclusion that the purpose of the ILA’s activities
was to acquire work.
While the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of the first charge, it reversed the
ALJ’s finding of an unfair labor practice with respect to the second charge by a 2-to-1 vote.
The panel majority concluded both that the ALJ took too narrow a view “of the work
preservation defense” and that the object of the ILA’s lawsuit was actually work
preservation. It found that the primary object of the suit was to force the Maritime Alliance
members to give longshore work to ILA members by avoiding the Leatherman Terminal
in favor of facilities staffed completely by ILA workers, and that any secondary effects on
the Port of Charleston were unintended — and thus permissible. With respect to the ALJ’s
conclusion that there was no job loss or threat thereof, the majority said that the ILA was
merely pursuing job preservation, a conclusion it took to be supported by the history of
containerization and its effect on longshoremen, citing NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s
Ass’n (ILA II), 473 U.S. 61, 79 (1985). It also concluded that the ILA’s activity was not a
secondary effort directed at the Ports Authority but rather was legitimately directed at the
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Maritime Alliance and its carriers because the carriers had “the power to give the
employees the work in question, and therefore, are primary employers.”
From the NLRB’s order of December 16, 2022, dismissing the Ports Authority’s
charges against the ILA, the Ports Authority filed this petition for review.
II
Section 8(b) of the NLRA forbids “forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease
doing business with any other person.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). And § 8(e) of the
NLRA forbids any employer from entering “into any contract or agreement . . . whereby
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease . . . doing business with any other
person.” Id. § 158(e). The general principles implemented by these provisions are not
complex or even unique to labor law. While the NLRA allows union activities “having the
object of pressuring the employer for agreements regulating relations between [the
employer] and [its] own employees,” it prohibits “‘secondary’ objectives” — that is, the
“use of the boycott to further [a union’s] aims by involving an employer in disputes not
[that employer’s] own.” National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 620. As the National Woodwork
Court noted:
The congressional design in enacting § 8(b)(4)(A) is therefore crucial to the
determination of the scope of §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). Senator Taft said of its
purpose:
This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary
boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly
unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his
employees.
* * *
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And the Senate Committee Report carefully characterized the conduct
prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(A) in the same terms:
Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in [a] strike
against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to
cease doing business with employer B; nor would it be lawful
for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or
otherwise deals in the goods of or does business with employer
B (with whom the union has a dispute).
Id. at 624–25 (emphasis added). Thus, in enacting §§ 8(b) and 8(e), “Congress intended to
reach only agreements with secondary objectives.” ILA I, 447 U.S. at 504 (emphasis
added). In other words, § 8(b) does not prohibit the kinds of activities described where
those activities are directed toward achieving primary union objectives, and “[a]mong the
primary purposes protected by the [NLRA] is ‘the purpose of preserving for the contracting
employees themselves work traditionally done by them.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
NLRB v. Enterprise Ass’n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice
Mach. & Gen. Pipefitters of N.Y. (Pipefitters), 429 U.S. 507, 517 (1977)). Thus, if a
union’s activity is directed at preserving “work traditionally performed by [bargaining unit
employees]” and if the target of the union action has the “right of control” over that work
— i.e., the right to decide who performs the work — then the union activity is permitted
even where it would otherwise violate the letter of § 8. Id. Because § 8(b) facially prohibits
union activities “requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any other person,”
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), the union carries the burden of establishing the affirmative
defense that its activities are nonetheless permissible on the ground that they (1) have the
purpose of preserving for its employees the work traditionally done by them, rather than
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acquiring new work, and (2) are directed at the employer with the right to control the work,
see ILA I, 447 U.S. at 504; Marrowbone, 147 F.3d at 302.
I conclude that the ILA’s activities clearly fall under § 8(b) and that the ILA did not
carry its burden to avoid liability. The intent of its conduct in filing suit against the
Maritime Alliance was to gain union work, not to preserve it, as the ILA failed to show
any loss or threatened loss of work caused by the opening of the new terminal in the Port
of Charleston. Furthermore, its effort was not directed against the employer it was seeking
to persuade — the Ports Authority — but against customers of the Ports Authority, i.e., the
Maritime Alliance and its members. Those entities had no control over the Ports
Authority’s employees, except to bring collateral pressure on the Ports Authority with a
boycott, and thus the ILA’s activity was secondary. In pursuing these activities, the ILA
violated § 8(b) and thus committed an unfair labor practice, as charged by the Ports
Authority. I address in turn the ILA’s failure to demonstrate each of the two requirements
of the affirmative defense.
A
With respect to the first requirement, the NLRB and the ILA contend that the ILA
is entitled to the benefit of its Master Contract, which has as its purpose “to preserve
traditional work and the jobs of union employees in the face of the technological advances
[such as containerization] affecting the coastal units.” While this assertion is true enough,
it gains the ILA nothing unless it also shows that the opening of the new terminal in the
Port of Charleston threatened a loss of work from technological advances and that its
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actions were directed toward preserving that work. To fill that gap in its reasoning, the
Board and the ILA argue that when more cargo — and therefore work — is directed to the
Port of Charleston or the other two ports using the hybrid model, work is being pulled away
from all other ports, which use only ILA workers. First, this analysis is too broad and is
inconsistent with the focused analysis required for determining whether work is being
preserved or acquired. As our court held in Marrowbone, “regardless of whether the
agreement is national in scope, in determining whether it preserves or acquires work, the
analysis must focus on the work of the local employees and not those elsewhere.” 147 F.3d
at 303 (citing ILA I, 447 U.S. at 507 (noting that “the Board must focus on the work of the
bargaining unit employees, not on the work of other employees who may be doing the same
or similar work”)). The NLRB and ILA’s argument focusing on all coastal units is thus
legally irrelevant.
Second, even the broad argument that the NLRB and the ILA make lacks support in
the record. The record lacks any evidence to show that the new terminal caused the
diversion of cargo in a manner that resulted in loss of union work, and the ILA only offered
the thought that “discretionary cargo work might migrate from ILA-controlled ports to
Charleston” (emphasis added), which the ALJ characterized as “vague speculation.”
Moreover, without any apparent logic, both the NLRB and the majority also
describe the ILA’s impetus in this case as being the loss of traditional work performed by
union workers emanating from the containerization of cargo in the 1950s. But there is no
factual or logical basis to conclude that the ILA’s effort to obtain the crane-operating work
at the new terminal in the Port of Charleston is an effort to preserve work lost by
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containerization. Both of the first two terminals in the Port of Charleston, as well as the
new terminal, handle containerized cargo, and the division of labor has always been that
state employees operate the state-owned cranes, and the union workers perform the other
longshore work. Simply, the issue is not whether there was a historic loss of work because
of containerization — that issue is long past for this case — but whether the union can
change the post-containerization settled status quo of the hybrid model’s use at the Port of
Charleston to obtain 100% ILA work at the new terminal.
Not only have the NLRB and the ILA not shown a loss or threatened loss of work
at other ports, they have not even shown any loss or threatened loss of work by Local 1422
within the Port of Charleston, the burden that they must carry. The cranes in the Port of
Charleston were always operated by state employees and never by union workers, and the
record shows that the hybrid division of work that existed before the opening of the new
terminal continued thereafter without change. The ALJ found, and no one challenges on
appeal, that after the new terminal opened, the same division of work and the same
proportion of workers were used at the new terminal as had been used at the other two
terminals in the port. There was no transfer of workers from the other two terminals to the
new one, but rather the new terminal was staffed by new employees, in the same proportion
that had always existed in the port i.e., the status-quo hybrid model. As the ALJ found,
“There is no evidence that the work performed by state employees at the Leatherman
Terminal differed in any way from the other Port of Charleston terminals. The same is true
regarding the work of [union] members performed there.”
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Both the NLRB and the ILA, perhaps recognizing that the undisputed facts show no
loss or threatened loss of jobs anywhere, argue with some futility that the ILA need not
show “a specific loss or threat of loss of jobs” because of the “unique” context of longshore
work, citing ILA I, ILA II, and American Trucking Ass’ns v. NLRB, 734 F.2d 966 (4th Cir.
1984). But this position is conclusively refuted by the very sources that the NLRB and
ILA cite, and their argument simply amounts to a concession of error. ILA I was, of course,
a maritime shipping case — decided much closer in time to the immediate aftereffects of
containerization — and yet even in that case, the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the
requirement that a union make a precise showing of there being an actual or imminent
threat to bargaining-unit jobs. In other words, the requirement of a rigorous showing was
imposed by the Supreme Court in a case that took place within precisely the same “unique
maritime context” as this dispute. Thus, the maritime context of this case in no way relieves
the ILA of the requirement that its activity be directed at preserving work traditionally
performed by the relevant bargaining unit of the union. As the Supreme Court stated:
Identification of the work at issue in a complex case of technological
displacement requires a careful analysis of the traditional work patterns that
the parties are allegedly seeking to preserve, and of how the agreement seeks
to accomplish that result under the changed circumstances created by the
technological advance. The analysis must take into account “all the
surrounding circumstances,” including the nature of the work both before
and after the innovation. . . . Whatever its scope, . . . the inquiry must be
carefully focused: to determine whether an agreement seeks no more than to
preserve the work of bargaining unit members, the Board must focus on the
work of the bargaining unit employees . . . .
ILA I, 447 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added) (quoting National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644).
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The Board’s conclusions to the contrary are owed deference only if they are
“supported by substantial evidence.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493
(1951) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)). Yet, there is no evidence in this case supporting the
proposition that any ILA jobs were lost or threatened by the use of the hybrid model at the
new terminal and were therefore in need of preservation.
This case closely resembles a course of conduct explicitly described as
impermissible by the Supreme Court in Pipefitters. In that case, an agreement required
that unionized workers perform threading and cutting of pipes themselves while on the job,
rather than working with pre-threaded and pre-cut pipes. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 511–12.
The Court held that the union’s actions in furtherance of that contract — a boycott of a
neutral subcontractor without authority to control whether the right kinds of pipes were
ordered for the job site — were illegal. Id. at 520–21, 528–31. The Court explained that
while the union’s activity was partially premised on permissible primary objectives, it was
also clearly partially premised on impermissible secondary objectives — it was enough
that “an object” of the union’s activities was an illegal secondary objective. Id. at 528(emphasis added); see also id. at 529–30 n.16 (stating that if a union were to attempt to
capture work it had previously acquiesced to non-union workers’ performing, such conduct
would serve “not to preserve, but to aggrandize, its own position and that of its members,”
concluding that “[s]uch activity is squarely within the statute” and thus prohibited).
In this case, the impermissible secondary objective motivating the ILA’s suit against
the Maritime Alliance was to obtain new work by means of a boycott of the Ports
Authority’s new terminal.
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B
To satisfy the second part of the ILA I test for demonstrating a defense of an alleged
§ 8(b) violation, the ILA must show that the Maritime Alliance had the “right of control”
over the work at issue. ILA I, 447 U.S. at 504. To meet that test, the Board and the ILA
argue that the boycott effected in this case was not secondary, as prohibited by § 8(b), but
primary, because the Maritime Alliance had the right of control over the crane-operating
work in the Port of Charleston. They make this claim on the basis that the Maritime
Alliance carriers have discretion as to where their ships call, and thus they can, in
exercising that discretion, offload ships at ports staffed solely by ILA workers. The
majority adopts the same reasoning, describing the Maritime Alliance members as having
the power to “unilaterally give [the] work to union members.” Ante at 27. But the ILA’s
coercing the Maritime Alliance members to exercise this power is precisely what § 8(b)
prohibits as an illegal secondary boycott. See National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 627 (noting
Congress’s concern with the “dangerous practice of unions” to widen industrial conflict by
creating coercive pressures on neutral employers) (cleaned up). Rather than dealing with
the Ports Authority directly with respect to the work that the Ports Authority controls, the
ILA brought pressure against the Ports Authority’s customers in an attempt to coerce the
Ports Authority. This is secondary activity and is illegal.
It must be recalled that, as an undisputed matter, the crane operators at the Port of
Charleston are employees of the Ports Authority, hired and paid by it. Neither those
employees nor the Ports Authority are under any contract with the ILA with respect to
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crane-operating work. The crane workers are thus neither employees of the Maritime
Alliance carriers nor under their control, as required for the ILA’s actions to be lawful.
The Maritime Alliance carriers were contractual strangers to the crane operators employed
by the Ports Authority. While it would indeed be primary conduct for the ILA to deal
directly with and bring pressure on the Ports Authority about the assignment of union
workers to crane operation, it was secondary conduct for them to seek to achieve that result
through a coercive suit against the Maritime Alliance. The determining fact focuses on
whether there was a contractual relationship between the Maritime Alliance carriers and
the port workers. As the Supreme Court made clear:
Whether an agreement is a lawful work preservation agreement depends on
“whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union’s objective
was preservation of work for bargaining unit employees, or whether the
agreement was tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. . .
. The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed
to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-à-vis his own
employees.”
ILA I, 447 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added) (cleaned up) (quoting National Woodwork,
386 U.S. at 644–45). The Court explained that “if the contracting employer has no power
to assign the work, it is reasonable to infer that the agreement has a secondary objective,
that is, to influence whoever does have such power over the work.” Id. at 504–05
(emphasis added). Of course, in this case, it was the Ports Authority that had the right to
assign the work.
Not only does the argument that the Board and the ILA make with respect to the
right of control fly in the face of controlling Supreme Court precedent, the ILA’s own
statements and testimony fairly concede that the Ports Authority is the relevant employer.
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First, the complaint in the ILA’s lawsuit against the Maritime Alliance states that a
Maritime Alliance ship “went to the Leatherman Terminal even though it knew that the
non-bargaining unit employees who were not covered by the Master Contract would be
hired to unload its containers.” Moreover, in previously negotiating with and attempting
to persuade the Ports Authority, the ILA by its actions acknowledged that it was the Ports
Authority that would assign the employees and that it was the Ports Authority whom had
to persuade to use union workers. But then, when those negotiations failed, the ILA sought
to bring secondary pressure on the Ports Authority by intimidating Maritime Alliance
carriers, who otherwise would call at the new terminal, thereby forcing them not to do so
and thus effecting a secondary boycott — the exact course of conduct that Congress
prohibited when it enacted § 8(b).
III
Finally, ILA II instructs that an absence of unlawful secondary purposes is essential
to a defense against charges under § 8(b). 473 U.S. at 82. But the record here shows
clearly, by undisputed evidence, that the ILA’s purpose was to acquire new work, not to
preserve existing work. An ILA representative acknowledged at trial that the very origin
of Article VII in the Master Contract was the ILA’s desire to “have all of the work . . . that
is performed by nonbargaining workers to be brought under the ILA jurisdiction.” An ILA
vice president also testified that the purpose of Article VII of the Master Contract was to
establish that, with respect to new terminals, the “jobs would be bargaining unit workers .
. . or else those [carriers] would be prohibited from coming into those terminals.” The ILA
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representative also testified that the ILA was interested in “consuming all the jobs,” and
that in doing so it was trying to “grow” its business. The goal of growing union work
through secondary pressure renders the ILA’s activity illegal and an unfair labor practice
under § 8(b).
* * *
For the reasons given, I would grant the Ports Authority’s petition for review and
reverse the NLRB’s order and remand with instructions to grant relief to the State and the
Ports Authority.
50