United States v. Cedrick Armstrong ( 2023 )

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4339
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CEDRICK TYLER ARMSTRONG, a/k/a Squeeze,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00450-D-1)
Submitted: June 28, 2023 Decided: August 14, 2023
Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: W. Michael Dowling, THE DOWLING FIRM PLLC, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
Assistant United States Attorney, Ashley H. Foxx, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Cedrick Tyler Armstrong of possession of a firearm and
ammunition after having been convicted of a felony offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). 1 The district court sentenced Armstrong to 120 months’
imprisonment. Armstrong appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence and the admission of a statement made by Armstrong’s coconspirator. We affirm.
During the hearing on Armstrong’s motion to suppress, Investigator Todd Williams
of the Wendell, North Carolina Police Department testified that, on October 12, 2018, he
observed Armstrong driving a Jeep. Williams had prior knowledge from numerous prior
interactions with Armstrong that Armstrong’s driver’s license had been indefinitely
suspended in 2007 and had remained suspended during the eight years that Williams had
been a police officer in Wendell. Williams had last checked Armstrong’s license status in
June 2018. Williams testified that, upon observing Armstrong driving the Jeep, he had
reason to believe that Armstrong was committing a traffic violation by driving without a
valid license.
Williams observed Armstrong drive the Jeep into the driveway of a house that
Williams had under surveillance due to reports of drug activity at that location. Williams
1
Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)
convictions; the new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory
maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer
Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15-
year statutory maximum does not apply in this case, however, because Armstrong’s offense
was committed before the June 25, 2022, amendment to the statute.
2
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was familiar with the occupants of the house and their vehicle. Williams observed a man
pacing in the front yard of the house. This man was not known to Williams to be an
occupant of the residence, and Williams had not previously seen this man at that residence.
Williams also noted that the occupant’s vehicle was not visible, leading him to conclude
that the occupants of the residence were not home.
As Williams continued to observe, Armstrong approached the man in the yard and
the two men entered the residence. Minutes later, Williams watched the men carry a flat
screen television out of the house and place it in the Jeep. The men went back into the
house. When they again emerged, Williams saw that the other man was carrying a bag or
a bundle and that Armstrong did not appear to be carrying anything. The unknown man
got into the driver’s seat of the Jeep, Armstrong got into the passenger seat, and the men
drove away from the residence.
Williams had previously arrested Armstrong on robbery and drug charges, and he
had knowledge that Armstrong had been implicated in a robbery of a house in this same
area earlier in the year. Although Williams did not see burglary tools or any evidence that
the men forced their way into the house, he was aware from an incident report from earlier
that week that entry into this house could be gained by the use of a stiff card, like a credit
card or an identification card. Williams testified that he believed the two men were
committing a crime and, as the Jeep left the house, he followed and initiated a traffic stop.
During the traffic stop, the driver, who was identified as Michael Lee Kent, opened
the glove compartment, and Williams observed a white powdery substance in a baggie in
the glove compartment. When Williams inquired what it was, Armstrong denied that there
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were drugs in the vehicle and handed the baggie to Williams. Williams field tested the
substance, which tested positive for cocaine. Williams then informed Kent that the
substance was positive for cocaine and asked him to step out of the vehicle. Kent initially
started to comply, and Williams started to place handcuffs on Kent. When Armstrong
protested, Kent resisted Williams’ efforts, put the Jeep into gear, and drove off—dragging
Williams for 25 to 30 feet and running over Williams’ foot. Kent and Armstrong engaged
law enforcement in a high speed chase, during which shots were fired from their vehicle at
the pursuing officer. That officer backed off and eventually lost sight of the Jeep. The
officers subsequently learned that Kent had been living at the house Williams had under
surveillance and that the television and other property he removed was his.
The officers tracked Armstrong and Kent to an address in Raleigh, North Carolina,
from which the officers recovered a firearm and ammunition matching a shell casing that
was found along Kent and Armstrong’s flight route and a live round of ammunition that
was found in the Jeep.
Armstrong was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition
by a felon. He asserted that the traffic stop was unlawful and moved to suppress evidence
discovered as a result of the traffic stop and the subsequent events, including the search of
the house that resulted in the discovery of the firearm and ammunition. The district court
determined that the traffic stop was valid and was supported by Williams’ reasonable
suspicion that Armstrong had committed a traffic violation and, alternatively, by Williams’
reasonable suspicion that Armstrong and Kent had committed a burglary of the residence
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from which they removed the television and other property. The court therefore denied
Armstrong’s motion to suppress evidence.
On appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Sueiro,
59 F.4th 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2023). We may find clear error “only if we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Crawford, 734 F.3d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, “[w]hen reviewing factual findings for clear error, we particularly defer to a
district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe
witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United
States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, we “must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party and give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and law
enforcement officers.” United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109, 114-15 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“An officer may stop and briefly detain a person when the officer has reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity.” United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660, 665 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). For such an investigative stop to be lawful, the “police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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A police officer may conduct a traffic stop of a vehicle based upon the officer’s
reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct.
1183, 1187-88 (2020). Such a stop is lawful even for a minor traffic violation, such as
driving with a revoked license. Id. at 1190.
Armstrong contends that Williams’ failure to verify the status of Armstrong’s
driver’s license prior to initiating the traffic stop renders the stop unlawful. Based on our
review of the record and the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in finding that Williams’ belief that Armstrong had committed a
traffic violation was reasonable and that the traffic stop was lawful. 2 See Sueiro, 59 F.4th
at 139 (providing standard); Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188 (stating that courts must permit
officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, the district court properly denied Armstrong’s motion to suppress
evidence discovered as a result of the traffic stop and the subsequent events, including the
2
Armstrong contends that the district court did not account for Williams’ testimony
in the state court that he had checked Armstrong’s driving status just prior to the traffic
stop. He asserts that the failure to have verified that Armstrong’s license was suspended
contemporaneously with the traffic stop defeats reasonable suspicion. During the
suppression hearing, when asked about his state court testimony, Williams admitted that
he “misspoke during that testimony” and explained that at that time, it was his “recollection
that [he] ran [the report] that day. [He] did run [the report] that day, just not at that
moment.” We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding Williams
credible and in ruling that he had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation justifying the
traffic stop. See Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376 (requiring deference to district court’s credibility
determinations).
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firearm and ammunition discovered during the search of the house at which Armstrong and
Kent were arrested. 3
Armstrong also contends on appeal that the district court erred by admitting into
evidence a portion of a recorded jail phone conversation in which Kent described the events
of October 12, 2018. Armstrong concedes that most of Kent’s statement describing the
events is admissible. He contends, however, that “the discrete statement that Kent made
during this call that ‘Bruh star[t]s shooting’ was not against Kent’s penal interest” and
therefore the district court erred in admitting that statement.
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion, viewing the “evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent[ and]
maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” Burgess v.
Goldstein, 997 F.3d 541, 559 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we
“will overturn an evidentiary ruling only if it is arbitrary and irrational.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). And we will not overturn a conviction due to an erroneous
evidentiary ruling if the error is harmless—that is, if we “can say with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In light of our ruling, we need not consider the district court’s alternative bases for
3
denying Armstrong’s motion to suppress evidence.
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Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the admission of an out of
court statement by an unavailable declarant if (1) a “reasonable person in the declarant’s
position would have made [the statement] only if the person believed it to be true because,
when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so
great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the
declarant to civil or criminal liability” and (2) the statement “is supported by corroborating
circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as
one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
Rule 804(b)(3) only allows the admission of the self-inculpatory portions of a
hearsay statement. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599, 604 (1994). It does
not permit the admission of statements concerning the roles of other individuals in the
alleged crime. Id. at 599-600. Whether a statement is “self-inculpatory” requires an
analysis of the statement in the context and may be a matter of interpretation. Id. at 603.
“A declarant’s statement is not magically transformed from a statement against penal
interest into one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant names another person or
implicates a possible codefendant.” Id. at 606 (Scalia, J., concurring).
In ruling that the entirety of Kent’s statement, including the reference to Armstrong
shooting at the police officers, was admissible, the district court found that the reference to
Armstrong shooting “directly implicate[d] and inculpate[d] Kent in criminal conduct.” We
agree with the district court’s reasoning that Kent’s statement that Armstrong shot at the
police was “also inculpatory as to Kent based on either a conspiracy theory or an aiding
and abetting theory.” The shooting took place as Kent and Armstrong were engaged in
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joint criminal activity of attempting to flee from the police. Accordingly, the district court
did not clearly err in finding that Kent’s statement about Armstrong’s criminal actions in
furtherance of that joint activity was against Kent’s penal interest. See Burgess, 997 F.3d
at 559; see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946) (stating standard
for coconspirator liability).
In any event, our review of the record establishes that overwhelming evidence—
outside of this challenged statement—supported the jury’s determination that Armstrong
was in possession of a firearm and ammunition on October 12, 2018. Accordingly, we
conclude that any error in the admission of this portion of Kent’s statement was harmless.
We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Armstrong’s motion to suppress
and affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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