Alvera Lewis v. University of Maryland, Baltimore , 533 F. App'x 270 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1051
ALVERA E. LEWIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, BALTIMORE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Stephanie A. Gallagher, Magistrate
Judge. (1:12-cv-00298-SAG)
Submitted: June 6, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John B. Stolarz, THE STOLARZ LAW FIRM, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland,
Katherine D. Bainbridge, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Alvera Lewis sued her former employer, the
University of Maryland, Baltimore (“the University”), alleging
disability, race, and gender discrimination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act (“the FMLA”), 29
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and four provisions of the Maryland Fair
Employment Practices Act (“the FEPA”), Md. Code Ann., State
Gov’t § 20-601 et. seq. After dismissing Lewis’s federal claims
as barred by Maryland’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, the district court denied Lewis’s motion to remand
the case to state court, granted summary judgment in favor of
the University on Lewis’s state claims, and denied Lewis’s
cross-motion for summary judgment on her claim that the
University failed to accommodate her disability in violation of
the FEPA. Lewis now appeals, and we affirm. ∗
Lewis underwent knee surgery in May 2010. When surgical
complications necessitated a multi-week rehabilitation, she
requested and received leave under the FMLA. The University
informed Lewis in June 2010, by certified letter, that her FMLA
∗
On appeal, Lewis does not challenge the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on her state race and gender
discrimination claims, nor does she contest the district court’s
conclusion that Maryland’s sovereign immunity precludes her ADA
and FMLA claims.
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leave would expire on July 8, 2010. Lewis did not request
additional leave or inform the University that she was able to
return to work. When Lewis did not return to work on July 9,
2010, the University terminated her for job abandonment. Lewis
then initiated this action against the University.
After its grant of summary judgment in favor of the
University on Lewis’s federal claims under the ADA and the FMLA,
the district court determined that the balance of factors
weighed in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
Lewis’s state claims. In particular, the district court found
that because Maryland patterned its reasonable accommodation
requirement on federal Department of Health and Human Services
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794, and because the dispositive issues had been fully briefed,
“considerations of convenience and judicial economy weigh
strongly in favor of an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.”
Lewis v. Univ. of Md., Balt., 1:12-cv-00298-SAG, 2012 WL
5193820, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2012).
Addressing Lewis’s state law claims that the University
failed to accommodate her disability and discriminated against
her on the basis of disability, the district court reasoned that
Lewis was not a “qualified individual with a disability,” and
therefore could not recover on either her accommodation or
discrimination claim. Id. at *4. A “qualified individual” is
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one who “[w]ith or without reasonable accommodation can perform
the essential functions of the job in question.” Md. Code Regs.
14.03.02.02(B)(10). Because attendance at work is an essential
function of Lewis’s job and evidence, including Lewis’s own
testimony, indicated that she had not been approved to return to
work on July 8, 2010, the district court concluded that Lewis
was not a “qualified individual” at the time of her termination.
On appeal, Lewis contests the district court’s decision to
retain supplemental jurisdiction over her state discrimination
claims, as well as its conclusion that she was not a “qualified
individual with a disability”, particularly in light of the
passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559, which has been incorporated into
Maryland law, see Meade v. Shangri-La P’ship, 36 A.3d 483, 489-
90 (Md. 2012).
After thorough review of the record, the briefs of the
parties, and the controlling law, we affirm on the basis of the
careful opinion of the district court. Considering the district
court’s “wide” discretion over whether or not to retain
jurisdiction over state claims, we find no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s decision here. Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58
F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). We agree with that court’s
judgment that we need not reach the question of whether Lewis
had a disability under the FEPA. We dispense with oral argument
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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