United States v. Roman ( 2019 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 18-1914
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellant,
    v.
    JAMIL ROMAN,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Mark G. Mastroianni, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Stahl, and Lipez,
    Circuit Judges.
    Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
    appellant.
    Ashley P. Allen, with whom Patricia A. DeJuneas was on brief,
    for appellee.
    November 5, 2019
    STAHL, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of an order
    suppressing evidence obtained from a search of Defendant-Appellee
    Jamil Roman's residence. The district court found that the warrant
    affidavit, reformed after a Franks hearing, did not establish
    probable cause to search either Roman's business or his home.
    Here, the government appeals the district court's order with
    respect to the search of Roman's residence only, contending the
    court erred in its probable cause determination.             After careful
    review, we affirm.
    I.   Factual Background
    We recite the facts "as the trial court found them,
    consistent with record support."           United States v. Andrade, 
    551 F.3d 103
    , 106 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
    A.   The Confidential Informant
    In January 2014, federal agents seized three kilograms
    of cocaine from an individual known as "Confidential Human Source
    1" ("CS"), who was under surveillance for suspected involvement in
    narcotics trafficking.        CS subsequently agreed to cooperate with
    law enforcement as a confidential informant.              At the local FBI
    office, CS provided a statement about his involvement in the
    narcotics    operation   to     federal    agents   and   law   enforcement
    officers, including DEA Task Force member Robert Alberti, who
    transcribed CS's statement.       CS stated that the cocaine agents had
    seized "came from Javier Gonzalez" and that Gonzalez had "had
    - 2 -
    [Roman] drop the kilos off" at CS's business at 712 Boston Road in
    Springfield, Massachusetts.           CS initialed the written statement
    paragraph by paragraph and confirmed its accuracy.
    Approximately a week after CS's statement was taken, DEA
    Special Agent Scott Smith joined the investigation.                  Smith, who
    was not present when CS's statement was taken, was not informed of
    the existence of the statement, nor did any DEA reports on the
    record reference it.
    B.   The Affidavit
    After    approximately     two    months    of     surveilling   the
    Gonzalez     organization,    Smith     drafted   an     affidavit   supporting
    search    warrant     applications     for    seven    locations     purportedly
    connected to the enterprise.1            These included Roman's Holyoke,
    Massachusetts, business, TWC, as well as a residence located in
    Chicopee, Massachusetts, which agents believed to be Roman's home.
    A   single    affidavit    was   used    to    support    all    seven   warrant
    applications.
    1While the opinion below states that the affidavit supported
    applications to search six locations, in the affidavit the
    government sought to search seven locations: (1) JGL Truck Sales
    ("JGL"), owned by Gonzalez; (2) 654, 656, and 658 South Summer
    Street in Holyoke, Massachusetts, a series of parcels owned by
    Gonzalez which together compromised a parking lot across the street
    from JGL; (3) Cano Used Tire, a business adjacent to JGL; (4)
    Gonzalez's residence; (5) TWC Auto Body ("TWC"), owned by Roman;
    (6) a property believed to be Roman's residence in Chicopee,
    Massachusetts; and (7) the residence of another suspected
    participant.
    - 3 -
    The affidavit set forth the following information that
    between   January   and   March   2014,   the   DEA   had   conducted   an
    investigation that included in its scope a series of meetings
    between CS, Gonzalez, and, on occasion, Roman, some of which were
    recorded.    At a January meeting between Gonzalez, Roman, and CS,
    held the day after CS told Gonzalez that the cocaine agents seized
    had been stolen, Gonzalez and Roman discussed the "robbery" of the
    drugs.    During this meeting, as CS reported to law enforcement,
    Roman showed CS a firearm when discussing CS's safety during drug
    transactions.    At a March meeting between CS and Roman, Roman
    discussed with CS the quality of the "traps" in certain vehicles
    and stated the "trapped vehicles" were in the garage of Cano Used
    Tire.2    Roman also stated at this meeting that he suspected law
    enforcement was nearby and he would "shut down for a while and
    cool off" if he thought he was being surveilled. Three days later,
    at another meeting with Gonzalez, CS, and Roman, Roman stated they
    were "'dry'," which Agent Smith explained meant "they [did] not
    currently have a supply of drug[s]."      According to the affidavit,
    Gonzalez told CS during the same conversation that CS needed to
    "repay his drug debt" and "should bring the money to either him
    2 According to the affidavit, "traps" are hidden compartments
    designed to conceal drugs and drug proceeds in vehicles.       The
    investigation focused on the organization's transportation of
    drugs from Texas to Massachusetts in vehicles outfitted with those
    compartments.
    - 4 -
    (Gonzalez) or Roman as soon as possible."                       The affidavit also
    differed from CS's transcribed statement in that it alleged the
    drug transaction between Roman and CS had taken place at Roman's
    Holyoke business rather than at CS's business in Springfield.
    The    affidavit     alleged         further    that     Gonzalez       had
    transported fifty to sixty kilograms of cocaine from Texas to
    Massachusetts "approximately every three months over the past 7-8
    years" and had on recent trips "been obtaining approximately 20
    kilograms of heroin."          It stated that CS had identified Roman as
    a    "close    criminal      associate        of     Gonzalez"       who   "overs[aw]
    distribution of the narcotics for" him, as well as that CS had
    "relayed that . . . he would obtain kilogram quantities of cocaine"
    at TWC. The affidavit also alleged that Roman was "a known cocaine
    trafficker,"        though   it   did   not    identify       the    source    of   this
    information.        Smith stated further in the affidavit that, based on
    his training and experience, drug traffickers commonly store drugs
    or   drug-related         inventory,    proceeds,       and     records       at    their
    residences.
    In    the   affidavit,    the        government       identified      three
    reasons it had probable cause to search the Chicopee property: (1)
    law enforcement believed it was Roman's primary residence; (2)
    Roman had initiated a utility service at this address in October
    2013; and (3) "[o]n numerous occasions . . . , agents ha[d]
    observed Roman driving a blue colored Acura SUV," which was
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    "registered to Tanya Roman, believed to be [Roman's] wife," and
    which had been "seen at th[e] residence as recently as on March
    16, 2014."    The affidavit also sought to establish probable cause
    to search Cano Used Tire, stating that agents had seen Roman "park
    his vehicle on the side walk of Cano Used Tire and carry a weighted
    bag into the business," then drive his vehicle into the garage and
    leave "a few minutes later."
    Based on the warrant affidavit, on March 21, 2014, the
    magistrate judge authorized the warrants, which were executed four
    days later on TWC and the Chicopee residence.         Roman was arrested
    at TWC and his person was searched incident to the arrest.
    II.   Procedural Background
    A.   The Franks Hearing
    On March 24, 2016, a grand jury indicted Roman on one
    count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
    distribute cocaine and heroin in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     and
    one count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute
    cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    .          On May 10, 2017, Roman
    moved to suppress the fruits of the searches of TWC, his person,
    and his residence.      See United States v. Roman, No. 16-30020-MGM-
    2, 
    2017 WL 4517963
    , at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 10, 2017) ("Roman I").
    Roman also requested a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    ,   155-56      (1978),   on   the   grounds   that   the   government
    intentionally or recklessly misrepresented the location of the
    - 6 -
    drug transaction in the affidavit as being at TWC when it had in
    fact taken place at CS's Springfield business, as set forth in
    CS's written statement.              Roman I, 
    2017 WL 4517963
    , at *2.              The
    court         granted      a     Franks      hearing   as      to    the      alleged
    misrepresentations.             Id. at *3-4.
    Following the Franks hearing, the district court granted
    Roman's motion to suppress fruits obtained from the search of TWC.
    See United States v. Roman, 
    311 F. Supp. 3d 427
    , 441 (D. Mass.
    2018) ("Roman II").             The court found that the affidavit contained
    material           misrepresentations     and   omissions     made   with    reckless
    disregard for the truth and without which a finding of probable
    cause would not have been made. 
    Id.
     Specifically, the court found
    that        CS's    statement    that   he   had   received    the   drugs    at   his
    Springfield business—not at TWC—was accurate and, further, that
    the statement in the affidavit that CS "would obtain kilogram
    quantities of cocaine" at TWC was false.3                     Id. at 435-36.       The
    court also found that the statement in the affidavit that Roman
    was "a known cocaine trafficker" was "conclusory" and lacked
    evidentiary support.            Id. at 440-41.
    Regarding recklessness, the district court found that a
    series of "easily preventable errors" demonstrated agents had
    3
    The court also concluded that the affidavit involved an
    omission, which was "the failure to divulge CS's . . . written
    statement." Id. at 436.
    - 7 -
    acted with reckless disregard for the truth.           Id. at 437.    These
    included in particular the failure of officials to retain, place
    in the case file, or inform Agent Smith of the existence or content
    of CS's written statement, or to reference it in DEA reports.4           Id.
    The district court focused on the testimony of Smith, Alberti, and
    another agent, John McGrath, and had the opportunity to evaluate
    their credibility.      Id. at 432.     When questioned about the source
    of the statement that CS would obtain kilogram quantities of
    cocaine from TWC, Smith could not identify the source of the
    information, but thought it came from CS, McGrath, or Alberti,
    while McGrath and Alberti gave "inconsistent testimony" regarding
    its source.   Id.   As such, the court found that Smith's affidavit
    misstated his own personal knowledge.           Id.
    The   court    also   found    that    several   "less   egregious
    errors," while "not determinative, support[ed] an inference" of
    reckless disregard for the truth.         Id. at 437.      These included a
    finding that Smith had "falsely quoted [Roman] as using the word
    'dry'" in one recorded meeting, when Roman had actually stated
    "[t]here is nothing around brother, nothing."              Id. at 433, 437.
    4 The district court also found that CS's written statement
    had been taken in a "chaotic atmosphere." Id. at 430. It found
    that Alberti had "struggled at times keeping up with CS's responses
    because of significant disorganization in the multi-agent
    questioning process" conducted by both FBI and DEA agents, who
    "asked questions [to CS] rapidly and seemingly in random fashion"
    during the interview. Id.
    - 8 -
    These also included agents' failure to notice and follow up on an
    FBI report in the case file referencing CS's written statement.
    Id. at 437.
    Accordingly, the district court removed statements that
    CS "would obtain kilogram quantities of cocaine" at TWC and that
    Roman was "a known cocaine trafficker" from the reformed affidavit
    "for lack of evidentiary support."           United States v. Roman, 
    327 F. Supp. 3d 312
    , 325 (D. Mass. 2018) ("Roman III").             It also reformed
    the   affidavit    by   altering        statements     indicating       the    drug
    transaction occurred at TWC to properly state it instead took place
    at CS's business address.         See 
    id.
           It found that the reformed
    affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search TWC.                   Roman
    II, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 439-41.
    B.    The Fruits of the Residential Search
    The     district      court    also   found    that     the    reformed
    affidavit did not support a finding of probable cause to search
    Roman's residence.       See Roman III, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 325-28.
    Specifically,     the   court    held    that    the    reformed    affidavit's
    allegations   "d[id]    not     create   a    sufficient   link    between      the
    criminal activity and" the home.             Id. at 325 (citation omitted).
    The court concluded that the government had not sufficiently set
    forth facts showing Roman had a "long-time" history of drug dealing
    to permit the inference Roman would keep drug-related evidence in
    his residence.    Id. at 326.      It observed that, unlike other cases
    - 9 -
    from this Court identifying such a nexus, there was no evidence in
    the affidavit as to the length of time Roman was engaged in drug
    trafficking, facts that directly connected the residence with drug
    activity, or any evidence Roman had left or returned to that
    location in connection with drug transactions.5      Id.     Moreover,
    the court noted that the affidavit alleged that "the vehicles,
    used to conceal the cash and drugs, were stored near Gonzalez's
    business" and that Gonzalez "clearly occupied the main focus of
    the affidavit."   Id. at 327 (citation omitted).   As such, it found
    that "any inference that could permissibly be drawn from [Roman's]
    status as a drug dealer regarding the location of evidence is
    significantly weakened where . . . it is more likely that such
    evidence would be found at the residence or business of another
    individual"—Gonzalez.   Id. (citation omitted).
    Accordingly, the district court suppressed the fruits of
    the search of Roman's residence, that is, $438,560 in cash, a
    firearm, and photographic identification documents.        Id. at 328.
    It is from this ruling that this timely appeal followed.
    5 The court also found "the force and weight of [Smith's]
    assertion" that it was common for drug traffickers to store
    inventory, paraphernalia and records at the home to be
    "significantly compromised" given the findings in the Franks
    hearing. Id. at 327.
    - 10 -
    III. Analysis
    In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this court
    "accepts the district court's factual findings to the extent that
    they are not clearly erroneous, and review[s] its legal conclusions
    de novo."    United States v. Davis, 
    909 F.3d 9
    , 16 (1st Cir. 2018)
    (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).     We   afford   "due   weight    to   inferences    drawn    from
    [historical facts]" by lower courts.          United States v. Dapolito,
    
    713 F.3d 141
    , 147 (1st Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
    Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 699 (1996)).            In applying
    this standard, "we take the record evidence in the light most
    favorable to the suppression ruling."          United States v. Arnott,
    
    758 F.3d 40
    , 43 (1st Cir. 2014).            We may affirm "on any basis
    apparent in the record."     
    Id.
    The government argues on appeal that the district court
    erred in ruling that the reformed affidavit did not establish
    probable cause to search Roman's residence.         We find no such error
    for the reasons below.
    The "very core" of the Fourth Amendment is to be "free
    from   unreasonable   governmental     intrusion"     into     one's    home.
    Florida v. Jardines, 
    569 U.S. 1
    , 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v.
    United States, 
    365 U.S. 505
    , 511 (1961)).           Indeed, the home is
    "first among equals" in Fourth Amendment protection.              Jardines,
    
    569 U.S. at 6
    ; see also Morse v. Cloutier, 
    869 F.3d 16
    , 23 (1st
    - 11 -
    Cir. 2017) (the home "is shielded by the highest level of Fourth
    Amendment protection") (internal quotation marks omitted).               These
    bedrock principles guide our analysis and disposition.
    An application for a warrant "must demonstrate probable
    cause   to   believe   that   (1)    a   crime   has    been   committed—the
    'commission' element, and (2) enumerated evidence of the offense
    will be found at the place searched—the so-called 'nexus' element."
    United States v. Dixon, 
    787 F.3d 55
    , 59 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting
    United States v. Feliz, 
    182 F.3d 82
    , 86 (1st Cir. 1999)).                    A
    magistrate judge considering the "nexus" element must "make a
    practical,     common-sense    decision      whether,     given    all     the
    circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him," there exists
    a "fair probability" evidence will be found in the place to be
    searched.     Feliz, 
    182 F.3d at 86
     (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238 (1983)).        And, while reviewing courts generally
    afford substantial deference to a magistrate's determination of
    probable cause, where "[a]llegations of intentional or reckless
    misstatements or omissions" are proven true, we owe "no deference
    to a magistrate's decision" because this "implicate[s] the very
    truthfulness, not just the sufficiency, of a warrant application."
    Burke v. Town of Walpole, 
    405 F.3d 66
    , 82 (1st Cir. 2005).
    The government claims it had probable cause to search
    Roman's residence on two grounds.            First, it argues that the
    reformed affidavit contained direct evidence establishing a nexus
    - 12 -
    between drug activity and the home.          It also contends that absent
    direct evidence, the reformed affidavit set forth facts permitting
    the inference that drug-related evidence would be found at the
    residence.    We address these assertions in turn.
    As to the government's first contention, we find that
    the reformed affidavit contained insufficient evidence to directly
    tie drug activity to Roman's residence.          The affidavit is devoid
    of information from CS or any other source connecting drug activity
    to the home.       CS did not state or indicate that he believed Roman
    conducted drug-related business from or kept drug-related evidence
    at the home, that any of the "trapped" vehicles could be found at
    or had traveled to the home, that any meetings of the conspiracy
    or drug deals had taken place there, or that Gonzalez had been
    observed at the residence.       Rather, the government's case depends
    entirely on inferences in the affidavit made by Smith, drawn
    largely from stricken material.
    The   government   offers   a   single   statement   from   the
    reformed affidavit in support of its argument there existed direct
    evidence: that agents observed Roman parking his vehicle outside
    of and carrying a "weighted bag" into Cano Used Tire.         It contends
    this "supports the drawing of at least an inferential link between
    Roman's car . . . and his criminal activities," which extends to
    Roman's home because the car was "registered to his wife at their
    shared residence."
    - 13 -
    We do not agree.     The nexus element requires a showing
    that "enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the place
    searched."     Dixon, 787 F.3d at 59 (emphasis added).         The inquiry
    is not whether "the owner of the property is suspected of crime"
    but rather whether "there is reasonable cause to believe that the
    specific things to be searched for and seized are located on the
    property to which entry is sought."         Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
    
    436 U.S. 547
    , 556 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Tested against this standard, the government's argument fails.
    First, the affidavit does not establish that the vehicle
    Roman parked at Cano Used Tire is the same "blue colored Acura
    SUV" that agents on separate occasions observed Roman driving and
    saw parked at the residence.        It also does not suggest that the
    "weighted bag" contained drugs or drug-related evidence.           Nor does
    it allege that Roman had driven the car to or from his residence
    on the day he carried the weighted bag, a factor we have previously
    found supports an inference of nexus.       See Dixon, 787 F.3d at 60;
    United States v. Barnes, 
    492 F.3d 33
    , 37-38 (1st Cir. 2007); United
    States v. Ribeiro, 
    397 F.3d 43
    , 49-50 (1st Cir. 2005).
    The government argues that "at a minimum," surveillance
    of Roman carrying the weighted bag from a car into Cano Used Tire
    "provides     some   additional   support   for   the    proposition   that
    activities associated with the operation occurred at multiple
    locations and involved the use of a vehicle."           Even if true, these
    - 14 -
    additional facts do not sufficiently link Roman's suspected crimes
    to his home—"the place searched"—such that there was probable cause
    to search the residence.        Dixon, 787 F.3d at 59.    A proper reading
    of the reformed affidavit is that agents observed Roman carrying
    a weighted bag, contents unknown, into Cano Used Tire from "his
    vehicle," which may or may not be the same vehicle seen at Roman's
    residence.     We see no basis to conclude on these facts that drug-
    related evidence would be present at Roman's home.
    The government argues next that absent direct evidence,
    the reformed affidavit "provided ample reason" to infer relevant
    evidence would be found in Roman's home.           We disagree.
    A "nexus . . . need not, and often will not, rest on
    direct observation, but rather 'can be inferred from the type of
    crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent of an opportunity
    for concealment and normal inferences as to where a criminal would
    hide [evidence of a crime].'"         Feliz, 
    182 F.3d at 88
     (alteration
    in original) (quoting United States v. Charest, 
    602 F.2d 1015
    ,
    1017   (1st    Cir.   1979)).     This   follows   from   the   well-settled
    principle that "a probable cause determination is fundamentally a
    fact-specific inquiry" where "[n]o one factor possesses talismanic
    powers."      United States v. Khounsavanh, 
    113 F.3d 279
    , 285 (1st
    Cir. 1997).
    But we have not permitted this inference to be applied
    lightly.      We have made clear that we "do not suggest that, in all
    - 15 -
    criminal cases, there will automatically be probable cause to
    search a suspect's residence."           Feliz, 
    182 F.3d at 88
    .          As such,
    we have rejected a per se rule automatically permitting the search
    of a defendant's home when he has engaged in drug activity.
    Khounsavanh,     
    113 F.3d at 285
    .      We   have    further    "expressed
    skepticism     that    probable      cause    can   be     established    by   the
    combination of the fact that a defendant sells drugs and general
    information from police officers that drug dealers tend to store
    evidence in their homes."           United States v. Bain, 
    874 F.3d 1
    , 23-
    24 (1st Cir. 2017) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 1593
       (2018).        Accordingly,     we    have   found    that   "generalized
    observations" of this type should be "combined with specific
    observations," or facts "connecting the drug dealing to the home"
    to permit an inference of nexus to a defendant's residence.
    Ribeiro, 
    397 F.3d at 50-51
    ; Bain, 874 F.3d at 24.                     Examples of
    such   "specific       observations"         include     evidence     that     drug
    distribution     "was     being      organized      from    [the    defendant's]
    residence," United States v. Keene, 
    341 F.3d 78
    , 82 (1st Cir.
    2003), that the defendant used his home as a communications hub
    for drug activity, United States v. Rivera, 
    825 F.3d 59
    , 64-65
    (1st Cir. 2016), or that the defendant "move[d] back and forth
    from his residence in relation to drug transactions," Ribeiro, 
    397 F.3d at 51
    .
    - 16 -
    The government argues that, when "[t]aken together,"
    facts drawn from the reformed affidavit permit the inference that
    Roman "would have a need to keep drugs, proceeds, and records" at
    his residence.       We find that they do not.           Here, the reformed
    affidavit, unlike the affidavits in the cases above and cited by
    the   government,     contains   no   specific   facts     or    observations
    connecting Roman's alleged drug activity to his home.             Indeed, it
    fails to even on one occasion place Roman himself at the residence,
    let alone in connection with drug crimes.
    We have, however, in narrow circumstances inferred a
    nexus to a defendant's residence absent such specific facts.                 In
    Feliz, we permitted this inference where the affidavit established
    the defendant was "a long-time, successful, drug trafficker,"
    identified "[n]o other residence or drug-dealing headquarters,"
    and contained a statement from a law enforcement affiant that drug
    traffickers commonly keep drug-related evidence at their homes.
    
    182 F.3d at 87-88
    .   Accordingly,    we   found    that   it    was   not
    "unreasonable" for the issuing magistrate to have "relied upon
    . . . common sense, buttressed by affiant's opinion as a law
    enforcement officer," to infer a nexus between drug activity and
    the defendant's residence.       
    Id. at 88
    .
    The   government    argues   that   the   reformed       affidavit
    permits the inference of a nexus to Roman's residence under our
    holding in Feliz.      Again, we find that it does not.
    - 17 -
    We agree with the district court that the facts here are
    "a far cry" from the facts in Feliz.             Roman III, 327 F. Supp. 3d
    at 326 (citation omitted).             As an initial matter, the Feliz
    affidavit      did     not   contain    any     recklessly       made     material
    misrepresentations or present any questions of credibility as to
    the affiant.        Accordingly, the Feliz court afforded "considerable
    deference" to the magistrate judge's probable cause determination.
    
    182 F.3d at 86
     (internal quotation marks omitted).                  Further, the
    affidavit      there     included      information        from   two      reliable
    confidential informants who averred that the defendant trafficked
    drugs, including direct testimony from one informant that the
    defendant was a "long-time, successful, drug trafficker" from whom
    the informant had purchased drugs on several prior occasions,
    dating back approximately twelve years.             
    Id. at 86-87
    .       The court
    found there that "[i]n sum, the affidavit contained substantial,
    detailed information indicating that [the defendant] had engaged
    in illegal drug trafficking for at least twelve years," supporting
    the conclusion that "Feliz's drug trafficking was of a continuous
    and ongoing nature."         
    Id. at 87
    .       The affidavit also identified
    "[n]o   other       residence   or   drug-dealing     headquarters        of   [the
    defendant's]," supporting the inference that a "likely place to
    seek to find incriminating items" would be his home.                 
    Id. at 88
    .
    The reformed affidavit here establishes no such record.
    It   offers    no    evidence   pertaining     to   the    length    of    Roman's
    - 18 -
    involvement with drug trafficking in general or the Gonzalez
    organization in particular.     See 
    id. at 87
    .    Nor does it suggest
    that Roman had any prior drug-related criminal convictions or that
    any drug activity had been conducted from the residence.              Cf.
    United States v. Hicks, 
    575 F.3d 130
    , 137 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding
    that "the circumstances set forth in the affidavit—which included
    . . . appellant's prior convictions and his connections to known
    drug dealers who operated out of [the residence]" established
    probable cause).     Further, unlike the affidavit in Feliz, which
    offered testimony from two experienced informants, the reformed
    affidavit here relies on the testimony of only one informant, CS,
    whose credibility as a source was not established.          The affidavit
    also   does   not   offer   corroboration   through   law    enforcement
    surveillance, other informants, or any other source, of CS's
    statement that Roman was a "close criminal associate" of Gonzalez's
    or "overs[aw] the narcotics" operation.       See Keene, 
    341 F.3d at 81-82
     ("Factors to be considered in determining whether a search
    warrant should issue include 'the value of corroboration of details
    of an informant's tips by independent police work.'" (quoting
    Gates, 
    462 U.S. at 241
    )).
    Our conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the
    reformed affidavit supported warrant applications for several
    other locations purportedly connected to the organization.         As we
    asked in Feliz, "[i]f [the defendant] did not maintain his accounts
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    and records, and the presumably large sums of money received in
    the course of his dealings, at his apartment, where else would he
    keep them?"      
    182 F.3d at 88
    .      We do not face that question here.
    The reformed affidavit supported searches of six other locations,
    including TWC and JGL, which the government itself characterizes
    as the "headquarters" of the organization.6             It establishes that
    police      believed   that   drug   activity   did   take   place   at   those
    locations,      suggesting    that   vehicles   the   organization    used   to
    conceal drugs and drug proceeds would be found at or had traveled
    through JGL and Cano Used Tire; drug transactions had taken place
    at JGL and the residence of another suspect; and meetings between
    Gonzalez, CS, and, on occasion, Roman, had taken place at JGL and
    TWC.7       We agree with the district court's conclusion that "any
    inference that could permissibly be drawn from [Roman's] status as
    a drug dealer regarding the location of evidence is significantly
    weakened where, as here, it is more likely that such evidence would
    be found at the residence or business of another individual"—
    6
    The government argues that Roman would have kept drug-
    related evidence at his home because TWC was "frequented by
    employees and/or customers and [the home] would thus be more likely
    to keep contraband away from prying eyes." However, the fact that
    the government also sought a warrant to search TWC in connection
    with alleged drug activity lessens the force of this contention.
    7
    We find the government's theory that Roman could not have
    returned proceeds to JGL when Gonzalez was out of town and, as
    such, would "logical[ly]" have stored items at his home, to be
    speculative and without factual basis.
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    Gonzalez.     Roman II, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (citing Feliz, 
    182 F.3d at 88
    ).
    Moreover, as the affidavit here contained "reckless
    misstatements,"    unlike   the   affidavit   in   Feliz,   we   afford   no
    deference to the magistrate judge's determination.               Burke, 
    405 F.3d at 82
    .    Accordingly, we cannot infer from the facts before us
    that Roman was a "long-time, successful, drug trafficker" with
    "continuous and ongoing" involvement sufficient to establish a
    nexus to his residence under Feliz.        
    182 F.3d at 87-88
    .       We hold
    so even if considered in tandem with Smith's statement that
    traffickers commonly store relevant evidence at their homes.8
    Relatedly, the government contends that the "large-
    scale" nature of the conspiracy and Roman's allegedly central role
    in it prove Roman was an "experienced trafficker" sufficient to
    infer a nexus under Feliz.        We afford due weight to the factual
    inference made by the district court that the record is "simply
    not sufficient to substantiate the affidavit's assertions that
    . . . [Roman] was an established drug dealer."         Roman III, 
    327 F. 8
     The government contends in reply that the district court's
    findings as to Smith's credibility "do not preclude consideration
    of his statements."      We recognize that "[w]e have, with a
    regularity bordering on the echolalic, endorsed the concept that
    a law enforcement officer's training and experience may yield
    insights that support a probable cause determination."       United
    States v. Floyd, 
    740 F.3d 22
    , 35 (1st Cir. 2014). However, we
    need not reach this issue, given our conclusion that there was not
    probable cause to search Roman's home even assuming we can consider
    the statements made by Smith based on his training and experience.
    - 21 -
    Supp. 3d at 324.    Further, the government cites no basis in law
    for the proposition that a nexus to a defendant's residence may be
    inferred where the defendant plays a "central role" in a large-
    scale enterprise.   As previously stated, we consider the totality
    of circumstances in making a probable cause determination.     See
    Feliz, 
    182 F.3d at 88
    .   Accordingly, we consider factors such as
    Roman's role and the size of the operation but find neither fact,
    alone or in combination, dispositive as to the issue of whether
    Roman was an established trafficker, nor sufficient to upset the
    district court's factual inference that there was insufficient
    evidence to support this conclusion.9
    9 We do wish to address the government's assertion that "[i]n
    its scale, Gonzalez's operation, and Roman's alleged role in it,
    far exceeds that [which] courts have found sufficient" to establish
    probable cause to search a defendant's residence. The cases the
    government cites are distinguishable on the facts. In Ribeiro,
    while we did consider the size and scope of the defendant's drug
    activity, we did not make our determination on this factor alone.
    See 
    397 F.3d at 50
    . The affidavit there contained specific facts
    connecting the defendant's drug activity to his residence, as "the
    police observed [him] on several occasions when it was virtually
    certain that he left his residence carrying the ecstasy tablets"
    he would later sell in a controlled buy. 
    Id. at 50, 52
    . Similarly,
    in United States v. Hodge, 
    246 F.3d 301
    , 306-07 (3d Cir. 2001),
    the Third Circuit considered the amount of cocaine the defendant
    possessed as part of its finding of probable cause, but also noted
    that the affidavit suggested he was an "experienced and repeat
    drug dealer who would need to store evidence of his illicit
    activities somewhere."       The court found further that the
    defendant's home was more likely to be that location in part
    because the defendant's residence was in the same city as an
    anticipated drug delivery and the defendant conceded that there
    was probable cause to arrest him on drug-related charges. 
    Id.
    - 22 -
    Further, even if we were to accept the government's
    contention that the "large scale of the operation provide[s] strong
    grounds for concluding that relevant evidence might be kept at
    multiple locations," this does not relieve the government of its
    burden to provide specific evidence as to each "place [to be]
    searched."     Dixon, 787 F.3d at 59.             The government has not met
    this burden.
    This is not a "case where the affidavit recite[s] facts
    establishing       a    clear     and   substantial   connection   between   the
    illegal activity and the place searched"; rather, the government's
    argument     relies        upon     "speculative      inferences   piled     upon
    inferences" that Roman's residence would yield relevant evidence.
    United States v. Rodrigue, 
    560 F.3d 29
    , 33-34 (1st Cir. 2009).
    Accordingly, because the reformed affidavit fails to establish
    probable cause to search Roman's residence, the fruits of the
    search of the residence were properly suppressed.
    IV.       Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
    the motion to suppress evidence obtained from Roman's residence is
    AFFIRMED.
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