Flores v. Hartnett ( 2022 )

Case: 21-50139 Document: 00516160665 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/10/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 10, 2022
No. 21-50139 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Ezequiel Flores; Jose Luis Flores; Martha M. Flores;
Juan C. Flores; Victor M. Flores,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
District Director Margaret A. Hartnett; Tae D.
Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 3:20-CV-140
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Southwick and Wilson, Circuit
Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 21-50139
The Flores siblings claim United States citizenship under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(c). The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied
their Applications for Certificate of Citizenship (Forms N-600). They did
not appeal this denial to the Administrative Appeal Office (AAO) and instead
filed suit in federal court. The district court granted the Government’s
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), agreeing
that it did not have jurisdiction because the Flores siblings failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies. We AFFIRM.
I
The Flores siblings allege that they were born out of wedlock in
Mexico and that their mother is a citizen of the United States who had been
physically present in the United States for a continuous one-year period prior
to each of their births. They submitted Forms N-600 and attached their
mother’s Mexican birth certificate, her Certificate of Citizenship, her
affidavit regarding her physical presence in the United States, and blood test
results confirming the mother-child relationship.
USCIS denied their applications. Rather than administratively appeal
the denials to the AAO, the Flores siblings filed suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Texas. They requested that the district court
issue a declaratory judgment under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) and a temporary
restraining order under Rule 65. The Government filed a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction asserting that Ezequiel Flores, Jose
Luis Flores, Juan C. Flores, and Victor M. Flores had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies as required by § 1503(a) and that Martha M. Flores
had not shown she resides in the United States.
The district court ordered the Flores siblings to file a response and
show cause why the case should not be dismissed. The Flores siblings
conceded that Martha M. Flores was not present in the United States and
2
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No. 21-50139
was therefore ineligible to pursue her claims under § 1503(a). But the
remaining siblings argued their case could proceed because § 1503(a) does
not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The district court
granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, agreeing that the statute
requires plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in
district court. The court defined exhaustion in this statutory context as an
adverse decision resulting from an appeal to the AAO. Because the court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, it declined to consider the
Government’s remaining arguments. It then dismissed the case without
prejudice and this appeal followed.
II
This case focuses on whether 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) requires the
exhaustion of administrative remedies before a district court can obtain
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. “It is incumbent on all federal
courts to dismiss an action whenever it appears that subject matter
jurisdiction is lacking.” 1 “We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction
de novo.” 2
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) “establish[es] a
range of residency and physical-presence requirements calibrated primarily
to the parents’ nationality and the child’s place of birth” in order to
1
Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998).
2
Wagner v. United States, 545 F.3d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Bissonnet
Invs. LLC, 320 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2003)).
3
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determine who shall be considered a U.S. citizen and national. 3 Under 8
U.S.C. § 1409(c):
[A] person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United
States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth
the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the
nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s
birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present
in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a
continuous period of one year. 4
Section 1503(a) allows a person to bring an action in the district court
for a declaration of U.S. nationality under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the Declaratory
Judgment Act) when that person “is denied [a] right or privilege by any
department or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that
he is not a national of the United States.” 5 Such an action “may be instituted
only within five years after the final administrative denial of such right or
privilege and shall be filed in the district court of the United States for the
district in which such person resides or claims a residence.” 6
The parties in this case disagree on the meaning of “final
administrative denial” and on whether this court’s previous interpretation of
the statute is binding. The Flores siblings contend that the district court
erroneously considered dicta in two Fifth Circuit cases. The Government
3
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
4
8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
5
8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).
6
Id. (emphasis added).
4
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responds that this court’s exhaustion requirements in those cases were not
merely dicta but rather binding determinations.
The two cases at issue are Gonzalez v. Limon 7 and Rios-Valenzuela v.
Department of Homeland Security. 8 In both instances, this court mentions in
a footnote that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to a claim under § 1503(a). 9 A statement is dictum if it “could
have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of
the holding—[and], being peripheral, may not have received the full and
careful consideration of the court that uttered it.” 10 “A statement is not
dictum if it is necessary to the result or constitutes an explication of the
governing rules of law.” 11 We have previously stated that “[i]n light of this
court’s obligation to assess its jurisdiction, an evaluation of . . . such
jurisdiction is anything but ‘unnecessary.’” 12 In Perez v. Stephens, 13 this
court “addressed all avenues of potential relief [the plaintiff] possessed and
rejected each in turn.” 14 The court concluded that a footnote “ruling upon
7
926 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 2019).
8
506 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
9
Gonzalez, 926 F.3d at 188 n.7 (“Additionally, a plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies.”); Rios-Valenzuela, 506 F.3d at 397 n.4 (“A person must exhaust
the agency procedures.”).
10
In re Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc., 109 F.3d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986)).
11
Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, 372 F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2004).
12
Perez v. Stephens, 784 F.3d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see also id. at
280 (“It is axiomatic that we must consider the basis of our own jurisdiction, sua sponte if
necessary.”).
13
784 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2015).
14
Id. at 281.
5
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an alternative basis for appellate jurisdiction” was binding precedent and not
“[o]biter dictum.” 15
In Gonzalez, this court stated in a footnote that “a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies.” 16 The footnote is located in a paragraph
on the jurisdictional requirements of § 1503(a). 17 We stated that “an action
brought under Section 1503(a) must comply with . . . jurisdictional
requirements,” including the five-year statute of limitations period that
begins to run after a final administrative denial as well as the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. 18 The court concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s second administrative denial. 19 Additionally,
the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her first administrative denial. 20 Similar to
the rulings in Perez, these determinations were “multiple avenues that
arrive[d] at the same conclusion” that the court did not have jurisdiction and
the appeal should be dismissed. 21 Therefore, the court’s statement on
exhaustion was a “ruling upon an alternative basis for appellate jurisdiction”
and was not “[o]biter dictum.” 22
Rios-Valenzuela presents a similar situation in which the court noted
the exhaustion requirement in a footnote. 23 The court had to conclude that
15
Id.
16
Gonzalez v. Limon, 926 F.3d 186, 188 n.7 (5th Cir. 2019).
17
Id. at 188.
18
Id.19
Id. at 190.
20
Id. at 188.
21
Perez v. Stephens, 784 F.3d 276, 284 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
22
See id. at 281.
23
Rios-Valenzuela v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 506 F.3d 393, 397 n.4 (5th Cir. 2007).
6
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the plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing to the AAO
before reaching its analysis under § 1503(a)(1)-(2). 24 The plaintiff’s appeal
of his Form N-600 denial to the AAO was a prerequisite to the court
determining whether § 1503(a)(1)-(2) further barred the district court’s
jurisdiction over his claim. The jurisdictional analysis is not dictum, but a
necessary step to the ultimate conclusion. 25
The determination that § 1503(a) requires exhaustion of agency
procedures also finds support in other circuits. The Third Circuit concluded
that a district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a plaintiff’s § 1503(a) case
“[i]n light of [his] failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.” 26 The
Fourth Circuit has similarly concluded that a plaintiff’s action was barred
“because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing his habeas
action in the district court.” 27 Specifically, the plaintiff “failed to appeal the
rejection of his Form N-600 Application for Certificate of Citizenship to the
Administrative Appeals Unit of INS.” 28 As the Government points out,
24
See id. at 397.
25
See Perez, 784 F.3d at 281.
26
Juste v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 697 F. App’x 130, 131 (3d Cir. 2017)
(unpublished) (per curiam); see also United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 892 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“As section 1503(a) expressly requires a ‘final administrative denial’ before any such
action may be instituted, a federal district court does not have jurisdiction to declare
citizenship absent exhaustion of an applicant’s administrative remedies.”).
27
Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 2011).
28
Id.7
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district courts across the country have similarly determined that § 1503(a)
requires exhaustion. 29
We will not disturb a prior panel’s binding determination. 30 Section
1503(a) requires that the Flores siblings exhaust their administrative
remedies by appealing to the AAO before filing in the district court. Because
they did not do so, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
their claims.
* * *
The order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
29
See, e.g., Xia v. Kerry, 73 F. Supp. 3d 33, 45 (D.D.C 2014) (“Section
1503 . . . requires administrative exhaustion.”); Harris v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 18 F.
Supp. 3d 1349, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“Section 1503(a), by its terms, makes exhaustion of
administrative remedies a jurisdictional requirement.”); Patino v. Chertoff, 595 F. Supp. 2d
310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Place v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. L-10-781, 2010 WL 1416136,
at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 6, 2010) (“It is well-established under the case law that district courts
do not have jurisdiction to declare citizenship absent exhaustion of an applicant’s
administrative remedies.”).
30
See United States v. Segura, 747 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Three-judge
panels ‘abide by a prior Fifth Circuit decision until the decision is overruled, expressly or
implicitly, by either the United States Supreme Court or by a Fifth Circuit sitting en
banc.’”) (quoting Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881, 893 (5th Cir. 2001));
see also id. (“The binding force of a prior-panel decision applies ‘not only [to] the result but
also [to] those portions of the opinion necessary to that result.’”) (quoting Gochicoa v.
Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 286 n.11 (5th Cir. 2000)).
8