United States v. Sergeant BRENT J. MCBRIDE ( 2013 )


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  • UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    Before
    YOB, LIND, and KRAUSS
    Appellate Military Judges
    UNITED STATES, Appellee
    v.
    Sergeant BRENT J. MCBRIDE
    United States Army, Appellant
    ARMY 20120316
    Headquarters, III Corps and Fort Hood
    Kirsten Brunson, Military Judge
    Colonel Stuart W. Risch, Staff Judge Advocate
    For Appellant: Colonel Patricia A. Ham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Imogene M.
    Jamison, JA; Major Richard E. Gorini, JA; Captain Robert A. Feldmeier, JA (on
    brief).
    For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, JA;
    Major Catherine L. Brantley, JA; Captain T. Campbell Warner, JA (on brief).
    25 November 2013
    ----------------------------------
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION
    ----------------------------------
    KRAUSS, Judge:
    A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant,
    pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of failure to obey a lawful general order,
    one specification of willful dereliction in the performance of duties , and one
    specification of involuntary manslaughter in violation of Articles 92 and 119,
    Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § § 892 and 919 (2006) [hereinafter
    UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge,
    confinement for fifty months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening
    authority approved only so much of the sentence extending to a bad-conduct
    discharge and confinement for thirty-six months.
    This case is before the court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Ap pellant
    raises three assignments of error, one of which merits brief discussion, but no relief.
    Appellant also raises matters pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 
    12 M.J. 431
    (C.M.A. 1982), none of which merit discussion or relief .
    MCBRIDE — ARMY 20120316
    The matter we address involves the nagging difficulties * associated with
    defense counsel submission of requests for waiver of automatic forfeitures. Here,
    there is no doubt appellant directed his counsel to request waiver of automatic
    forfeitures. His defense counsel never submitted a request explicitly dealing with
    “waiver,” but rather submitted a request entitled: “Request for Deferment of
    Automatic Forfeitures and Automatic Rank Reduction .” In the body of that request,
    counsel repeatedly requested the convening authority defer those forfeitures, but he
    never referred to waiver of forfeitures. However, counsel did explicitly reference
    the statutory authority for both deferment and waiver of automatic forfeitures in
    support of the request. In addition, counsel attached a letter from the appellant’s
    wife, who explicitly referenced request for “waiver/deferment” of forfeitures , before
    requesting the convening authority grant the “request for deferment.” Finally, and
    most importantly, the convening authority explicitly considered the factors relevant
    to consideration of both deferment and waiver of automatic forfeitures contained
    separately in Rules for Courts-Martial 1101(c)(3) and 1101(d)(2) before
    disapproving the request for deferment. Therefore, even if we assume deficiency on
    the part of defense counsel in this respect, we find that appellant fails to establish
    the “colorable showing of possible prejudice” necessary for relief in this case.
    United States v. Fordyce, 
    69 M.J. 501
    , 503 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2010). It is plain
    that the convening authority would disapprove a mor e distinct request for waiver.
    After considering the entire record, the parties’ briefs, and those matters
    personally raised by appellant pursuant to Grostefon, the findings of guilty and the
    sentence are AFFIRMED.
    Senior Judge YOB and Judge LIND concur.
    FOR THE
    FOR THE COURT:
    COURT:
    MALCOLM
    MALCOLM H.  H. SQUIRES,
    SQUIRES, JR.
    JR.
    Clerk
    Clerk of
    of Court
    Court
    *
    We continue to see a variety of problems associated with an appellant’s express
    desire to submit requests for deferment and waiver of automatic forfeitures. This
    case reveals the apparent confusion of deferment with waiver of automatic
    forfeitures, a confusion not all too uncommon. The distinction is set forth in
    Articles 57 and 58b and RCM 1101(c) and 1101(d). This case reminds us as well
    that a request for waiver of automatic forfeitures need not wait until submission of
    an accused’s matters under R.C.M. 1105.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: ARMY 20120316

Filed Date: 11/25/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021