United States v. Private First Class ADAM L. BECKNER ( 2010 )


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  • UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    Before
    CONN, HOFFMAN, and CARLTON
    Appellate Military Judges
    UNITED STATES, Appellant
    v.
    Private First Class ADAM L. BECKNER
    United States Army, Appellee
    ARMY 20080605
    Headquarters, Fort Stewart
    Tara Osborn, Military Judge
    Lieutenant Colonel Stacy A. Flippin, Acting Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial)
    Colonel Jonathan C. Guden, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial)
    For Appellant:  Colonel Mark Tellitocci, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M.
    Miller, JA; Major Bradley Voorhees, JA; CPT Melissa Goforth Koenig, JA (on
    brief).
    For Appellee:  Colonel Norman F.J. Allen, III, JA; Lieutenant Colonel
    Martha L. Foss, JA; Major Lynn I. Williams, JA; Captain Christopher B.
    Witwer, JA (on brief).
    7 May 2010
    -----------------------------------
    SUMMARY DISPOSITION
    -----------------------------------
    Per Curiam:
    This case is before the court for review under Article 66, UCMJ.
    Appellant alleges he suffered prejudicial error because his defense counsel
    submitted clemency matters to the convening authority without input from
    appellant.  Specifically, appellant claims he would have submitted a
    personal statement, letters from his family and friends, and a request for
    deferral and waiver of forfeitures, had he been contacted by counsel.  We
    agree appellant suffered prejudicial error and order a new recommendation
    and action to ensure a meaningful opportunity for sentence relief.
    Law and DISCUSSION
    Our superior court has often noted an accused’s best chance for
    clemency rests with the convening authority.  See United States v. Wheelus,
    
    49 M.J. 283
    , 287 (C.A.A.F. 1998).  Consequently, a convening authority’s
    review of an accused’s clemency matters “is uniquely critical to an
    accused.”  United States v. Hamilton, 
    47 M.J. 32
    , 35 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
    “If the convening authority has not seen a convicted servicemember’s
    clemency submission, it is well established that he has not been afforded
    his best hope for sentence relief.”  See United States v. Spurlin, 
    33 M.J. 443
    , 445 (C.M.A. 1991) (quotations and citations omitted); see also United
    States v. Sosebee, 
    35 M.J. 892
    , 894 (A.C.M.R. 1992).  An accused convicted
    by court-martial “must receive adequate and appropriate representation
    throughout the entire appellate process,” including post-trial clemency
    submissions.  See United States v. Garner, 
    34 M.J. 575
    , 577 (A.C.M.R. 1992)
    (citations omitted).  Just as counsel must inform his client what is being
    done on his behalf during pretrial and trial stages, “so too should counsel
    engage in informative discussions with the client during the post-trial
    stage.”  United States v. Hicks, 
    47 M.J. 90
    , 93 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
    Based upon appellant’s affidavit detailing what he would have
    submitted to the convening authority, were he afforded the opportunity, we
    are not confident appellant was “afforded a full opportunity to present
    matters to the convening authority prior to action on the case.”  United
    States v. Hawkins, 
    34 M.J. 991
    , 995 (A.C.M.R. 1992).  To address any
    possible prejudice flowing from the post-trial omissions and errors in this
    case, we order a new review an action.  The facts and circumstances of this
    case, specifically the conduct of defense counsel in representing his
    client post-trial, are similar to those in our court’s opinion in United
    States v. Fordyce, __ M.J. __ (Army Ct. Crim. App. _ May 2010).  In
    ordering a new review and action in this case, we reiterate the court’s
    significant concerns, expressed in Fordyce.  We admonish trial defense
    counsel to be cognizant of counsel’s responsibility to advise and assist
    the accused in exercising his or her significant post-trial rights prior to
    convening authority action in future cases.
    CONCLUSION
    The convening authority’s initial action, dated 19 December 2008, is
    set aside.  The record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General
    for a new staff judge advocate recommendation and a new initial action by
    the same or a different convening authority in accordance with Article
    60(c)-(e), UCMJ.  This remedy will afford appellant the requested
    opportunity to submit clemency matters to the convening authority.
    FOR THE COURT:
    MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.
    Clerk of Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: ARMY 20080605

Filed Date: 5/7/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021