Daveaun D. Carson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                                 FILED
    09/06/2017, 9:44 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    CLERK
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                           Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                            and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Anthony S. Churchward                                    Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Deputy Public Defender                                   Attorney General of Indiana
    Anthony S. Churchward, PC
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                                      Henry A. Flores, Jr.
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Daveaun D. Carson,                                       September 6, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    02A03-1612-CR-2895
    v.                                               Appeal from the Allen Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable John F. Surbeck,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Jr., Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    02D05-1608-F3-48
    May, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1612-CR-2895 | September 6, 2017          Page 1 of 7
    [1]   Daveaun D. Carson appeals his conviction of Level 3 felony robbery, 1 arguing
    the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On July 28, 2016, John Burley was trying to buy a used television through a
    mobile device application called LetGo. 2 He located a television that interested
    him and entered into negotiations with a user calling himself “Brian,” (see, e.g.,
    Tr. Vol. 1 at 35), later identified as Carson. Burley agreed to buy the television
    for $250. After some confusion about the address where Burley could obtain
    the television, Burley and his two small children arrived at the location Carson
    indicated.
    [3]   Carson met Burley at his car and told Burley the television was inside the
    apartment. Burley agreed to follow Carson inside and locked his children in the
    car. Burley followed Carson around the building. Another man was sitting
    outside the apartment. Carson then pulled a gun on Burley and ordered him to
    hand over the money for the television. Burley told the men the money was in
    the car. “With the gun still [pointed] at [him],” the men walked Burley back to
    his car where he unlocked his car and retrieved the $250. (Id. at 41.) Carson
    took Burley’s money, phone, and car keys.
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2014).
    2
    LetGo is an application used on mobile devices to “buy and exchange goods with someone.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at
    79.)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1612-CR-2895 | September 6, 2017      Page 2 of 7
    [4]   Burley drove his car to a nearby gas station and requested assistance from a
    bystander. 3 The bystander called 911 for Burley, and the police arrived to take
    Burley’s statement. At the gas station, Burley stated the man with the gun was
    “5’9” to 5’11”, bald, African American with a dark complexion,” (id. at 74),
    and the other man at the scene was “African American, bigger build, 5’7”,
    5’9”ish . . . curly hair.” (Id. at 67.) However, when the police went to the
    apartment complex they were unable to locate either individual and the
    apartment toward which Carson led Burley to get the television was empty.
    [5]   The next day, Burley discovered his LetGo account was blocked from viewing
    any posts from “Brian.” Burley created a fake account in the name of
    “Brittney.” (See, e.g., 
    id. at 73.)
    Using this account, he located “Brian” and
    entered into negotiations to buy an iPhone “Brian” had listed. Burley
    contacted Detective Larry Tague of the Fort Wayne Police Department to tell
    him about his negotiations. Detective Tague asked Burley to arrange a meeting
    between “Brian” and “Brittney.” After warning Burley to stay away from the
    meeting location, Detective Tague and several other officers conducted
    surveillance of the area. Detective Tague observed Carson at the meeting area
    but Carson left when he saw Detective Tague. Uniformed police officers
    conducted a traffic stop of the car Carson was in and arrested the occupants.
    3
    Burley’s vehicle had a “mechanical malfunction” wherein it was able to run without a key in the ignition.
    (Tr. Vol. 1 at 80.)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1612-CR-2895 | September 6, 2017         Page 3 of 7
    [6]   Detective Tague requested Detective Daniel Peters present two photo arrays to
    Burley. Carson’s picture was in the first array and the driver of the car was in
    the second array. Burley identified Carson as the man who had “pointed [a
    gun] at [his] face” and robbed him. (Id. at 63.) Burley did not identify anyone
    in the second array.
    [7]   The State charged Carson with Level 3 felony robbery and the case was tried by
    jury. The jury found Carson guilty, and the trial court entered the conviction
    and sentenced Carson to twelve years.
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]   When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will
    consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
    judgment. Binkley v. State, 
    654 N.E.2d 736
    , 737 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The
    decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
    substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. 
    Id. We do
    not assess the
    credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
    evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind. 2007). Reversal
    is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
    the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id. Thus, the
    evidence is not
    required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient
    if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. 
    Id. at 147.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1612-CR-2895 | September 6, 2017   Page 4 of 7
    [9]    Carson was convicted of Level 3 felony robbery. “[A] person who knowingly
    or intentionally takes property from another person . . . by using or threatening
    the use of force . . . or by putting any person in fear . . . while armed with a
    deadly weapon” commits Level 3 felony robbery. Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2014).
    [10]   Carson argues the State did not present sufficient evidence because Burley’s
    testimony was incredibly dubious. Specifically, he asserts Burley originally
    identified the person who robbed him as bald and between 5’9” to 5’11” tall,
    but that Burley’s later identifications of Carson in the photo array and at trial
    were of a man who was not bald and stands between 6’3” and 6’4” tall.
    [11]   The incredible dubiosity rule allows the appellate court to impinge on the fact-
    finder’s assessment of witness credibility when the testimony at trial was “so
    contradictory that the verdict reached would be inherently improbable.” Moore
    v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 749
    , 751 (Ind. 2015). “For the incredible dubiosity rule to
    apply, the evidence presented must be so unbelievable, incredible, or
    improbable that no reasonable person could ever reach a guilty verdict based
    upon that evidence alone.” 
    Id. “Incredibly dubious
    or inherently improbable
    testimony is that which runs counter to human experience, and which no
    reasonable person could believe.” Campbell v. State, 
    732 N.E.2d 197
    , 207 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2000). This is a high standard to meet. There must be: (1) a sole
    testifying witness; (2) whose testimony is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or
    the result of coercion; and (3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.
    
    Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756
    . It is well-settled that “discrepancies between a
    witness’s trial testimony and earlier statements made to police and in
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1612-CR-2895 | September 6, 2017   Page 5 of 7
    depositions do not render such testimony ‘incredibly dubious.’” Holeton v. State,
    
    853 N.E.2d 539
    , 541-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
    [12]   The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here because Burley’s testimony
    was supported by circumstantial evidence and his testimony at trial was not
    inherently contradictory, equivocal or the result of coercion. At trial, Burley
    maintained he could “remember [Carson’s] face more than anything.” (Tr.
    Vol. 1 at 44.) He was focusing on Carson’s “nose, his eyes, and just the shape –
    what his picture of his face looked like.” (Id.) Thus, although he may have
    misconstrued very short hair for bald and did not have Carson’s height correct,
    his identification and subsequent testimony was unequivocal that Carson was
    the man who robbed him.
    [13]   Additionally, Burley’s identification of Carson is supported by the fact Carson
    showed up for the fictitious sale of the iPhone. When questioned by Detective
    Marc Deshaies, Carson indicated “he was there to meet a female in order to
    buy an IPhone [sic] 6S plus.” (Id. at 130.) Thus, Burley’s testimony was not
    inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion, nor was there a
    complete absence of circumstantial evidence. As such, the incredible dubiosity
    rule does not apply. See 
    Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 760
    (holding incredible dubiosity
    rule inapplicable where factors necessary to warrant application of the rule were
    not present). Carson’s arguments to the contrary are an invitation for us to
    reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See 
    Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146
    .
    Carson does not assert any other grounds to support his claim of insufficient
    evidence, and we therefore hold the State presented sufficient evidence to prove
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1612-CR-2895 | September 6, 2017   Page 6 of 7
    Level 3 felony robbery. See Wilburn v. State, 
    515 N.E.2d 1109
    , 1110 (Ind. 1987)
    (“The uncorroborated testimony of [robbery] victim was sufficient to convict
    the appellant.”).
    Conclusion
    [14]   The State presented sufficient evidence of Level 3 felony robbery as Burley’s
    testimony was not incredibly dubious. Accordingly, we affirm.
    [15]   Affirmed.
    Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1612-CR-2895 | September 6, 2017   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A03-1612-CR-2895

Filed Date: 9/6/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/6/2017