In re Alyssa G. CA2/7 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 6/23/21 In re Alyssa G. CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    In re ALYSSA G., A Person Coming                                    B306721
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.
    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP03419)
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    CAROLINA G.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Martha A. Matthews, Judge. Affirmed.
    Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rodrigo Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy
    County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION
    Carolina G. appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition
    order removing her 16-year-old daughter Alyssa G. from her
    custody. Carolina contends substantial evidence did not support
    the court’s finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section
    361, subdivision (c)(1),1 that there were no reasonable means to
    protect Alyssa other than removal. Carolina also contends the
    juvenile court erred by failing to state the facts supporting its
    finding the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
    Family Services made reasonable efforts to prevent removal and
    by failing to consider alternatives to removal. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.     Alyssa Runs Away from Home and Reports Abuse; the
    Department Investigates
    On June 17, 2020 Alyssa ran away from home after
    Carolina pushed her in the car during an argument. Carolina
    was “extremely angry” and, while she was driving, hit herself in
    the face and said to Alyssa, “‘You see what you made me do? You
    make me want to kill myself.’” Alyssa reported the abuse to her
    father, Derek S., who contacted the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
    Department, which in turn contacted the Department. Alyssa
    told a Department social worker she was “tired of the ongoing
    physical and emotional abuse” by Carolina. Alyssa said Carolina
    “hits her all the time when angry or upset.” Alyssa reported a
    May 31, 2020 incident where Carolina hit her in the face, near
    her right eye, causing redness and swelling. Alyssa stated, “‘My
    1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
    Institutions Code.
    2
    mother has hit me before. This time was different. I did not feel
    safe.’” Alyssa also reported that Carolina was “unstable” and
    “unpredictable” and that Carolina exhibited behavior that caused
    Alyssa to be “concerned for her safety,” such as gluing closed the
    windows in their home, removing Alyssa’s bedroom door, and
    transferring “thousands of dollars” to Alyssa’s bank account and
    telling her, “‘Here is the money in case I have a heart attack or
    die.’” Alyssa said Carolina frequently called her derogatory
    names, such as “‘whore,’” “‘slut,’” “‘disgrace,’” and “‘bitch,’” and
    said she was going to disown Alyssa. Alyssa told the social
    worker she “is afraid” of Carolina and “no longer wants to live in
    her mother’s home.”
    Suzanne G., Alyssa’s maternal grandmother, corroborated
    Alyssa’s account of Carolina’s abuse. Suzanne told the social
    worker she witnessed Carolina hitting Alyssa, and she described
    a relatively recent incident where Carolina hit Alyssa “several
    times with a closed fist on different parts of her body.” Suzanne
    reported that Carolina had also physically and verbally abused
    her. Suzanne said Alyssa told her about the incident where
    Carolina hit her in the face and about the more recent incident
    where Carolina hit herself in the face while she was driving, later
    poked herself in the eye, and said she wanted die. Suzanne told
    the social worker that there was a history of schizophrenia and
    bipolar disorder in her family and that she believed Carolina had
    schizophrenia and was paranoid. Suzanne said Carolina hears
    voices of people talking about her, sees “things” that are not
    there, and gets on the floor and hits her forehead when she is
    angry or irritated. Suzanne stated Carolina has said that she
    was related to the President and that her father, who died more
    than 20 years ago, was working undercover for the President.
    In his interview with the social worker, Derek said Alyssa
    told him three weeks ago Carolina had hit her in the face. Derek
    3
    did not report the incident because, according to him, when he
    calls the police, “things turn[ ] against him and he gets arrested.”
    Derek also stated Alyssa told him Carolina “gets physical with
    her all the time over nothing.”
    Carolina denied the allegations of physical and emotional
    abuse. Carolina told the social worker that she has sole legal and
    physical custody of Alyssa and that she and Alyssa have a
    “‘fantastic relationship.’” Carolina stated Alyssa was merely
    “‘acting up a little bit,’” and Carolina blamed the pandemic for
    Alyssa’s frustrations. Carolina admitted that she had slapped
    Alyssa two weeks before the interview with the social worker, but
    explained that she had not allowed Alyssa to go out because
    “there was a lot of looting going on” with “the protests” and that,
    when Alyssa “kept taunting her,” Carolina “slapped her on the
    face once.” Carolina denied she had any mental illness or
    experienced auditory or visual hallucinations. She explained she
    glued “some of the windows” in her home closed to prevent other
    people, including Derek, from breaking in. Carolina summed up
    Alyssa’s allegations as “‘just one disagreement.’”
    B.     The Department Files a Petition Under Section 300,
    Subdivisions (a) and (b), and the Court Detains
    Alyssa
    On June 24, 2020 the Department filed a petition under
    section 300, subdivision (a), alleging Carolina physically abused
    Alyssa, which endangered Alyssa’s physical health and safety
    and placed her at risk of serious physical harm. The Department
    also alleged, under section 300, subdivision (b), that Carolina’s
    physical abuse of Alyssa, Derek’s failure to protect Alyssa from
    that abuse, and Carolina’s “mental and emotional problems,
    including paranoia, suicidal ideation, visual hallucinations and
    auditory hallucinations,” endangered Alyssa’s physical health
    4
    and safety and placed her at risk of serious physical harm.2 At
    the detention hearing, Carolina denied the Department’s
    allegations. The juvenile court detained Alyssa and placed her
    with Suzanne. The court ordered the Department to provide
    Carolina referrals for mental health assessment and treatment.
    C.     The Department Investigates Further
    In a follow-up interview, Alyssa reported Carolina had
    physically abused her for five years, approximately three times a
    week. On one occasion, Carolina pinched Alyssa’s nose so hard
    that “she could not breathe,” and on another Carolina yanked
    Alyssa’s ear “‘really hard.’” Alyssa stated her grandmother
    Suzanne cannot stop Carolina from physically abusing her
    because Carolina also physically abuses Suzanne. Suzanne has
    called law enforcement in the past but, according to Alyssa, law
    enforcement “‘does nothing.’”
    Carolina told the social worker she did not understand why
    Alyssa would make these allegations of abuse. Carolina
    continued to deny she abused Alyssa and said she slapped Alyssa
    only once to “‘wake her up’” because Alyssa wanted to go out
    during the protests and looting. Carolina also said the allegation
    she had mental illness was “‘100% false.’” Carolina gave the
    Department a mental health report, prepared shortly after the
    detention hearing, that stated the assessor did not find evidence
    “that would suggest [Carolina] has any chronic history of mood
    disturbance or behavior-related impairments.” The Department
    2     The Department subsequently amended the petition to add
    a count against Derek under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging
    that Derek’s history of substance abuse and extensive criminal
    record endangered Alyssa and placed her at risk of serious
    physical harm. Derek is not a party to this appeal.
    5
    argued the report was based exclusively on Carolina’s statements
    and did not consider any information from the Department,
    Alyssa, or Suzanne regarding Carolina’s “erratic and violent
    behaviors.”
    In its report for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
    the Department stated the “case issues that brought the family to
    the attention of the Court and the Department have yet to be
    addressed.” The Department recommended the court order
    family reunification services, a psychiatric evaluation under
    Evidence Code section 730,3 a parenting program, and individual
    counseling to address mental health, anger management, and
    child safety issues.
    D.    The Juvenile Court Asserts Jurisdiction and Removes
    Alyssa from Carolina
    At the July 16, 2020 combined jurisdiction and disposition
    hearing, Carolina testified that she completed 26 sessions of a
    parenting course and that she learned to adapt her discipline
    methods to what works best for Alyssa. Carolina denied that she
    3      Evidence Code section 730 provides in pertinent part:
    “When it appears to the court . . . that expert evidence is or may
    be required by the court or by any party to the action, the court
    . . . may appoint one or more experts to investigate, to render a
    report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert
    at the trial of the action.” (See In re Alexandria P. (2016)
    
    1 Cal.App.5th 331
    , 344, fn. 9.) “Frequently after a finding of
    jurisdiction a parent may be ordered to undergo an evaluation to
    determine if the parent is mentally disabled and if reunification
    services are likely to prevent continued abuse and neglect.”
    (Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 
    26 Cal.App.4th 195
    , 201.)
    “The psychological evaluation is an ‘information-gathering tool.’”
    (Id. at p. 202.)
    6
    hit, spit on, or demeaned Alyssa and stated that she only called
    Alyssa “positives names” like “beautiful” and “honey.” Carolina
    denied she ever hit herself or poked herself in the eye. Carolina
    did admit she slapped Alyssa once, “not to cause bodily injury or
    harm,” but because Alyssa “started mouthing off” when Carolina
    caught her sneaking out of the house during the protests.
    Carolina stated that, in retrospect, “it wasn’t the correct way to
    parent [Alyssa] because she didn’t take it well.” Carolina
    explained that “it was [her] attempt at that time to . . . prevent
    [Alyssa] from going outside.” When asked about the allegations
    of abuse, Carolina declared, “Everything that was written in that
    detention [report] is fictitious.”
    The juvenile court found credible Alyssa’s statements that
    Carolina abused her and declared Alyssa a dependent of the court
    under section 300, subdivision (b).4 The court concluded it
    appeared Carolina “may not be fully aware of her own mental
    health condition and the behavior that that condition has
    sometimes caused her to engage in.” Referring to Carolina’s
    assertion that none of the events alleged in the petition “ever
    happened” and that Carolina only slapped Alyssa once “due to a
    concern about her safety,” the court stated, “I simply do not find
    that credible.”
    For disposition, Carolina argued that Alyssa “thrived” in
    Carolina’s care and that, because Alyssa was “old enough to make
    reports to law enforcement . . . and social workers, . . . custody
    won’t jeopardize her safety and well-being.” Carolina agreed to
    continue with her parenting program and participate in
    individual counseling, but objected to the Department’s
    4     The court did not sustain the allegations in the petition
    under section 300, subdivision (a), because it did not believe that
    Carolina “intentionally abused [Alyssa].”
    7
    recommendation of a psychiatric evaluation under Evidence Code
    section 730 and to “taking all psychotropic medication.”
    The court acknowledged Carolina’s request that the court
    release Alyssa to her “with services in place,” but found the
    Department met its burden to prove that removal was necessary
    to protect Alyssa. The court explained Carolina “simply denies
    the conduct that has caused this court to take jurisdiction, and
    it’s very difficult to solve a problem unless you recognize that the
    problem exists. It’s hard to see how [Alyssa] could be kept safe
    from behavior that [Carolina] doesn’t admit that she ever
    engage[d] in, such as physically hitting and saying verbally
    abusive things to [Alyssa].” The court found that Alyssa was “at
    serious risk of dangers to her health and well-being” and that
    “the only way to protect her [was] to remove her from [Carolina’s]
    custody.”5 The court ordered Carolina to submit to a psychiatric
    evaluation under Evidence Code section 730 and to have her
    visits with Alyssa monitored. Carolina timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    A.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Order Removing
    Alyssa from Carolina
    1.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
    “Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) children may not be
    removed from their home ‘unless the juvenile court finds clear
    and convincing evidence’ of a substantial danger to the children’s
    5     The court’s minute order stated the Department “made
    reasonable efforts to prevent removal” and that “there [were] no
    reasonable means by which [Alyssa’s] physical health [could] be
    protected, without removing [her] from the home.”
    8
    physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-
    being ‘and there are no reasonable means’ for protecting the
    children other than removal from their home. The statute ‘is
    clear and specific: Even though children may be dependents of
    the juvenile court, they shall not be removed from the home in
    which they are residing at the time of the petition unless there is
    clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the
    child’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
    emotional well-being and there are no “reasonable means” by
    which the child can be protected without removal.’” (In re
    Ashly F. (2014) 
    225 Cal.App.4th 803
    , 809; see § 361, subd. (c)(1);
    In re I.R. (2021) 
    61 Cal.App.5th 510
    , 520; In re V.L. (2020)
    
    54 Cal.App.5th 147
    , 154; In re D.P. (2020) 
    44 Cal.App.5th 1058
    ,
    1065.)
    “‘A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of
    (1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and
    (2) potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the
    parent.’ [Citations.] It is not required that the parent be
    dangerous or that the child have been harmed before removal is
    appropriate. [Citation.] ‘The focus of the statute is on averting
    harm to the child.’” (In re D.D. (2019) 
    32 Cal.App.5th 985
    , 996.)
    “‘“The court may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as
    present circumstances.”’” (In re A.F. (2016) 
    3 Cal.App.5th 283
    ,
    292; see In re I.R., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.)
    “In general, when presented with a challenge to the
    sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring
    clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether
    the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from
    which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of
    high probability demanded by this standard of proof.”
    (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 989
    , 1005; see In re I.R.,
    supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 520-521 [“‘On appeal from a
    9
    dispositional order removing a child from a parent we apply the
    substantial evidence standard of review, keeping in mind that the
    trial court was required to make its order based on the higher
    standard of clear and convincing evidence.’”]; In re V.L., supra,
    54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154 [“‘“Clear and convincing” evidence
    requires a finding of high probability.’”].)
    “In conducting its review, the court must view the record in
    the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
    appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
    the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
    drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
    (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011-1012; see
    In re G.C. (2020) 
    48 Cal.App.5th 257
    , 265 [“[a]ll evidentiary
    conflicts are resolved in favor of the respondent”].) “‘“We do not
    reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but
    merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
    findings of the trial court.”’” (In re I.J. (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 766
    ,
    773; accord, In re Nathan E. (2021) 
    61 Cal.App.5th 114
    , 123.)
    “The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to
    make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.” (In re
    I.R., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 521, internal quotation marks
    omitted.)
    2.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
    Court’s Finding There Were No Reasonable
    Means To Protect Alyssa Other Than Removal
    Carolina contends that “[s]ubstantial evidence does not
    support the juvenile court’s finding there were no reasonable
    means to protect Alyssa without removing her from [Carolina’s]
    home” because “there were, in fact, reasonable means to prevent
    removal.” Substantial evidence, however, supported the juvenile
    court’s finding that removal was the “only way” to protect Alyssa.
    10
    The court believed Alyssa’s account of the ongoing abuse
    she suffered from Carolina, and we defer to that credibility
    determination. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
    pp. 1011-1012; see In re R.T. (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 622
    , 633 [“‘issues of
    fact and credibility are the province of the trial court’”].) Instead
    of accepting responsibility for her conduct, Carolina consistently
    denied she ever hurt Alyssa and attempted to minimize the
    pervasive abuse she inflicted on her daughter by characterizing it
    as a one-time slap in the face, purportedly to keep Alyssa safe
    from protesters and rioters. Carolina’s parenting classes also did
    not appear to have made much of an impact. After 26 sessions,
    Carolina concluded that slapping Alyssa was not the correct way
    to parent her because Alyssa “did not take it well,” not because
    her disciplinary method harmed Alyssa.
    As the juvenile court found, Carolina’s unwillingness or
    inability to acknowledge she had abused Alyssa for five years left
    the court with no choice but to remove Alyssa from Carolina’s
    custody to keep her safe.6 Given Carolina’s lack of awareness and
    remorse, there were no reasonable means other than removal to
    protect Alyssa. (See In re Cole C. (2009) 
    174 Cal.App.4th 900
    ,
    918 [“the evidence supports the court’s finding that no reasonable
    means to protect [the child] were available without removing
    [him] from [his father’s] custody” where the child “would not be
    safe . . . until [the father] acknowledged the inappropriate nature
    of his parenting techniques and disciplinary methods”]; see also
    6     Carolina points out she “did at least partially admit
    wrongdoing; she admitted she hit Alyssa on May 31,” 2020. Not
    really. On May 31, 2020 Carolina hit Alyssa in the face.
    Carolina admitted to a different incident that Alyssa did not even
    mention: slapping Alyssa on June 14, 2020. Carolina’s blanket
    denial of “everything” alleged against her undermined any
    admission of “wrongdoing.”
    11
    In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156-157 [“there were no
    reasonable means to protect [the children] without removal from
    [their] father’s physical custody” because the “inference from [the
    father’s] denial [of domestic violence] is that he is less likely to
    change his behavior in the future”]; In re A.F., supra,
    3 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [“[i]n light of [the] mother’s failure to
    recognize the risks to which she was exposing the minor, there
    was no reason to believe the conditions would not persist should
    the minor remain in her home”]; In re John M. (2012)
    
    212 Cal.App.4th 1117
    , 1127 [mother’s failure to acknowledge her
    actions endangered her child supported the juvenile court’s
    finding he could not safely remain in her custody]; In re
    Gabriel K. (2012) 
    203 Cal.App.4th 188
    , 197 [“[o]ne cannot correct
    a problem one fails to acknowledge”]; cf. In re A.E. (2014)
    
    228 Cal.App.4th 820
    , 826 [“the risk to [the child] of future abuse
    [was] low” because her father “expressed remorse and [was]
    committed to learning better discipline methods”]; In re Ashly F.,
    supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [given the mother’s expression
    of remorse and her enrollment in a parenting class, “[a]mple
    evidence existed of ‘reasonable means’ to protect [the children] in
    their home”].)
    Carolina argues the assertion of jurisdiction “was, itself, a
    reasonable alternative to removal.” Carolina maintains that,
    given Alyssa’s maturity, she “could call for help in the event of
    any future physical alternations with [Carolina].” That Alyssa
    may have had the ability to seek help if Carolina lost her temper
    again would not protect Alyssa from the first blow. (See In re
    Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 918 [“[o]ne of the goals of
    dependency is to protect a child before harm takes place”]; see
    also In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 157-158 [“the issue is
    not whether te minors can report domestic violence after it
    12
    happened,” but rather “whether there is a risk that they will be
    injured while any future domestic violence is occurring”].)
    Carolina asserts that Alyssa would have been safe under a
    “plan of strict supervision.” As discussed, however, no amount of
    supervision could have assured Alyssa’s safety in Carolina’s
    custody. Carolina had not addressed the underlying issues that
    placed Alyssa at risk—her inability to accept she had abused
    Alyssa, her failure to understand why Alyssa would accuse her of
    abuse, and her refusal to take responsibility for years of wrongful
    conduct. Thus, for example, a court order prohibiting Carolina
    from using corporal punishment would not have been effective.
    As the juvenile court recognized, Alyssa could not be protected
    from behavior that Carolina denied ever occurred. Unannounced
    visits to the home from the social worker would have been even
    less effective; the most recent incident of physical abuse occurred
    in a car while Carolina was driving. (See In re A.F., supra,
    3 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [“[u]nannounced visits can only assess
    the situation . . . at the time of the visit”].)
    B.     Any Error in the Court’s Failure To Comply with
    Section 361, Subdivision (e), Was Harmless
    Carolina contends the juvenile court erred by failing to
    state the facts that supported its finding the Department made
    reasonable efforts to prevent removal. To the extent Carolina did
    not forfeit this argument by failing to raise it at the disposition
    hearing,7 it is meritless.
    7     See In re S.B. (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 1287
    , 1293 [“a reviewing
    court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an
    objection could have been but was not made in the trial court,”
    and “[d]ependency matters are not exempt from this rule”]; In re
    13
    “To aid the court in determining whether ‘reasonable
    means’ exist for protecting the children, short of removing them
    from their home, the California Rules of Court require [the
    Department] to submit a social study which ‘must include’ among
    other things: ‘A discussion of the reasonable efforts made to
    prevent or eliminate removal.’” (In re Ashly F., supra,
    225 Cal.App.4th at p. 809; see Cal. Rules of Court,
    rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).) In turn, the juvenile court must “make a
    determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to
    prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from
    his or her home. . . . The court shall state the facts on which the
    decision to remove the minor is based.” (§ 361, subd. (e); see In re
    V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154; In re D.P., supra,
    44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1065.)
    In its report prepared for the combined jurisdiction and
    disposition hearing, under the heading “Reasonable Efforts,” the
    Department listed the services it provided in this case:
    “Emergency Response Services as to the current allegations,”
    referrals for Alyssa to undergo medical and mental health
    evaluations, family interviews about “the current allegations,”
    and case plan development. Although the court’s minute order
    stated the Department made “reasonable efforts” to prevent
    removal, the court did not discuss the facts that supported this
    finding, such as whether the services the Department provided
    were effective. This was error. (See In re Ashly F., supra,
    225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [juvenile court erred in failing to “‘state
    the facts’” supporting its conclusion the child protective agency
    Daniel B. (2014) 
    231 Cal.App.4th 663
    , 672 [same]; In re E.A.
    (2012) 
    209 Cal.App.4th 787
    , 791 [father forfeited his argument
    the court failed to make an express finding by failing to raise the
    issue in the juvenile court].
    14
    made reasonable efforts to prevent and eliminate the need for
    removal].)
    The juvenile court’s error, however, was harmless. “[W]hen
    a juvenile court fails to make the factual findings required under
    section 361, subdivision (e), its removal order is subject to the
    constitutional mandate that no judgment shall be set aside
    ‘unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the
    evidence, the [appellate] court shall be of the opinion that the
    error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’
    [Citations.] Under this mandate, a ‘miscarriage of justice’ will be
    declared only when the appellate court, after examining the
    entire case, is of the opinion that ‘“it is reasonably probable that a
    result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
    reached in the absence of the error.”’” (In re D.P., supra,
    44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068; see In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 159.)
    The Department reasonably provided referrals for Carolina
    to seek mental health evaluation and treatment, interviewed the
    relevant people to investigate the veracity and scope of the abuse
    allegations, and arranged for Carolina to have monitored
    visitation with Alyssa. (See In re H.E. (2008) 
    169 Cal.App.4th 710
    , 725 [“reasonable efforts . . . need only be reasonable under
    the circumstances, not perfect”].) Carolina does not specify what
    more the Department should have done. Thus, had the juvenile
    court complied with section 361, subdivision (e), and stated the
    facts that supported its finding the Department made reasonable
    efforts to prevent removing Alyssa, it is not reasonably probable
    the court would have made a contrary finding. (See In re
    Diamond H. (2000) 
    82 Cal.App.4th 1127
    , 1137 [“[a]lthough the
    court did not state a factual basis for its removal order, any error
    is harmless because it is not reasonably probable such findings, if
    made, would have been in favor of continued parental custody”],
    15
    disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court
    (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 735
    , 748, fn. 6; In re Jason L. (1990)
    
    222 Cal.App.3d 1206
    , 1219 [had the juvenile court made the
    findings required under section 361, “it undoubtedly would have
    made findings adverse to [the father]” because “no reasonable
    effort could be made by [the agency] to protect [the minor] if he
    remained in [the father’s] custody”]; cf. In re D.P., supra,
    44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069 [“it is reasonably probable that, had
    the juvenile court reflected upon and stated the facts as required
    under section 361, it would have found [the child] was reasonably
    protected under the restraining order, and removing him from
    [his] mother’s physical custody was unnecessary to ensure his
    safe return home”].)
    C.     The Court Did Not Fail To Consider Less Drastic
    Alternatives to Removing Alyssa
    Carolina asserts the juvenile court failed to consider less
    drastic alternatives to removing Alyssa from her custody (see In
    re Hailey T. (2012) 
    212 Cal.App.4th 139
    , 148; In re Basilio T.
    (1992) 
    4 Cal.App.4th 155
    , 171), but the record does not support
    that assertion. In finding there were no reasonable means to
    protect Alyssa, the court necessarily considered but rejected
    Carolina’s argument at the hearing Alyssa could remain safe in
    her custody “with services in place” because she had the maturity
    to report any further instances of abuse. (See In re Diamond H.,
    supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137.) As discussed, unannounced
    visits or court orders prohibiting corporal punishment would not
    have protected Alyssa. The court’s comment, “it’s hard to see how
    [Alyssa] could be kept safe,” confirms the court considered
    alternative means to protect Alyssa, but ultimately concluded
    that any alternative to removal would be insufficient.
    16
    DISPOSITION
    The disposition order removing Alyssa from Carolina’s
    physical custody is affirmed.
    SEGAL, J.
    We concur:
    PERLUSS, P. J.
    FEUER, J.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B306721

Filed Date: 6/23/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/23/2021