Omaira Mora De Lobo v. U.S. Attorney General , 598 F. App'x 726 ( 2015 )


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  •             Case: 14-10095    Date Filed: 02/13/2015   Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-10095
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    Agency No. A088-246-755
    OMAIRA MORA DE LOBO,
    LUIS ALFONSO LOBO QUINTERO,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ________________________
    (February 13, 2015)
    Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Petitioners Omaira Mora De Lobo (“Mora”), a native and citizen of
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    Venezuela, and her husband Luis Alfonso Lobo Quintero (“Lobo”) 1 (collectively
    “Petitioners”), proceeding pro se, seek review of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals’s (“BIA”) order, affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of
    asylum based on a finding of no past persecution and no well-founded fear of
    future persecution. After review, we deny the petition for review.
    I. Factual Background
    In January 2007, while in the United States on a visitor’s visa, Mora applied
    for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), listing Lobo as a derivative beneficiary.
    The Department of Homeland Security subsequently issued Petitioners’ notices to
    appear, charging them with removability pursuant to Immigration and Nationality
    Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for having remained in the
    United States for a time longer than permitted.
    The IJ conducted a merits hearing on Mora’s asylum application at which
    she and one of her sons testified. According to the credible hearing testimony,
    Petitioners were active members of the anti-Chavez Democratic Action Party. In
    July 2003, people whom Petitioners think may have been “Chavistas”2 broke into
    Petitioners’ home, damaging the roof, refrigerator, kitchen, and living room
    1
    Lobo is a citizen of Venezuela and a native of Colombia.
    2
    The term “Chavista” indicates a person supportive of the Chavez regime in Venezuela.
    2
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    furniture; defacing family pictures; and writing graffiti on the kitchen wall.
    Petitioners then began receiving threatening phone calls.
    In September 2003, Petitioners’ son Frank, a priest and a chaplain with the
    Venezuelan military, was riding in a helicopter with several high-ranking military
    personnel when it crashed. Mora and Frank both testified that they believed that
    the crash was the result of sabotage targeting Frank and the other military officials
    for their anti-Chavez beliefs. The official government report following the crash
    concluded that it was an accident. Later that month, Petitioners’ home was broken
    into a second time and the intruders took dishes, emptied drawers, and again wrote
    graffiti on the walls.
    In January 2004, as he was leaving their home, Petitioners’ son William was
    assaulted by people Petitioners believed to be Chavistas. The Chavistas hit
    William really hard, but ran off when the neighbors came outside. William did not
    go to the hospital for medical treatment, but his bruises and hematomas were
    treated at home. Petitioners continued to receive harassing phone calls and people
    they believed to be Chavistas often drove motorcycles by Petitioners’ home at
    night.
    In October 2004, Petitioners opened a video rental store, and, in January
    2005, presumed Chavistas came into the store asking why Petitioners only carried
    American films. In February 2005, the windows of the Petitioners’ car were
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    broken while it was parked in the video store’s parking lot.
    In October 2006, Lobo was in a car accident after he turned in the proceeds
    of a raffle held to benefit Petitioners’ political party and the parties’ presidential
    candidate. Lobo got nervous because he thought he was being following by
    Chavistas, and he lost control of the vehicle and crashed. Later that month,
    Petitioners decided to leave the country.
    After the hearing, the IJ denied Mora’s application and ordered Petitioners
    removed to Venezuela. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. Before this Court,
    Petitioners do not dispute that they are removable as charged, but contend that the
    BIA erred in finding that Mora did not establish past persecution or a well-founded
    fear of future persecution.
    II. Discussion
    When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the
    extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
    257 F.3d 1262
    , 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). When the BIA explicitly agrees with the
    findings of the IJ, we review the decisions of both the BIA and IJ as to those
    issues. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    605 F.3d 941
    , 948 (11th Cir. 2010). Here,
    because the BIA agreed with the IJ’s findings regarding past persecution and well-
    founded fear of future persecution, we review both decisions.
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    In a petition for review of a BIA decision, we review factual determinations
    under the substantial evidence test. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    577 F.3d 1341
    ,
    1350 (11th Cir. 2009). Under the substantial evidence test, we draw every
    reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of the decision, and reverse a
    finding of fact only if the record compels a reversal. 
    Id. at 1351.
    We must affirm
    if the BIA’s decision is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
    evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 
    Id. The fact
    that the record may
    support a contrary conclusion is insufficient to reverse. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 
    386 F.3d 1022
    , 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
    An applicant for asylum must meet the INA’s definition of a refugee. INA
    § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). The INA defines a refugee as a person who
    cannot return to his or her home country due to “persecution or a well-founded fear
    of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    social group, or political opinion.” INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
    § 1101(a)(42)(A). To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must
    demonstrate either past persecution, or a well-founded fear of future persecution,
    based on a statutorily listed factor. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    440 F.3d 1247
    , 1257
    (11th Cir. 2006). If the applicant demonstrates past persecution, there is a
    rebutable presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
    Id. If the
    applicant cannot demonstrate past persecution, she must demonstrate that her
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    well-founded fear of future persecution is subjectively genuine and objectively
    reasonable. 
    Id. We have
    held that “persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a
    few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, and that mere
    harassment does not amount to persecution.” Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
    
    492 F.3d 1223
    , 1232 (11th Cir. 2007). In determining whether the petitioner has
    suffered persecution, we consider the cumulative effects of the incidents. De
    Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    525 F.3d 999
    , 1008 (11th Cir. 2008).
    We have previously concluded that circumstances involving only minimal
    violence do not compel a conclusion of persecution. See 
    Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1353
    (upholding the BIA’s determination of no past persecution where the
    petitioner was “arrested while participating in a student demonstration,
    interrogated and beaten for five hours, and detained for four days, but . . . did not
    prove that he suffered any physical harm,” and state authorities monitored him
    after his release and ordered him to appear before a university disciplinary
    committee and a state court); Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    514 F.3d 1168
    , 1174 (11th
    Cir. 2008) (upholding the BIA’s determination of no past persecution where the
    petitioner was threatened with arrest by students who lacked the power to carry out
    that threat, “in conjunction with [a] minor beating” that merely resulted in
    “scratches and bruises”).
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    On the other hand, we have held that repeated death threats accompanied by
    the attempted kidnapping of the petitioner’s daughter and the attempted murder of
    the petitioner whose moving vehicle was shot at multiple times, but he was not
    struck by the bullets or physically injured, constituted persecution. See Sanchez
    
    Jimenez, 492 F.3d at 1233
    . We have also held that the petitioner suffered past
    persecution based on the totality of the verbal death threats, an attempted attack,
    and one attack by three gunmen who threw the petitioner to the ground, hit him
    with the butt of a rifle, and broke his nose that occurred over an 18-month period.
    Mejia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    498 F.3d 1253
    , 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2007). In addition to
    in-person threats or violence against the petitioner, we have held that threats
    against others can support a claim of past persecution where the threat
    “concomitantly threatens the petitioner.” De 
    Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1009
    & n.7
    (finding past persecution where the applicant suffered “repeated death threats, two
    physical attacks [which resulted in minor physical injuries], the murder of a family
    friend, and a kidnapping cut short only by a harrowing escape”).
    Here, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Mora failed
    to establish past persecution. Mora’s testimony established that, over an
    approximately three-year period, her family’s home was broken into and
    vandalized twice, she received an unspecified number of threatening and harassing
    phone calls, people suspected of being Chavistas drove past her home on
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    motorcycles at night, her car windows were broken, one son was assaulted, her
    other son was in a helicopter crash, and her husband was in a car accident. Even
    when viewed cumulatively, we cannot conclude that these incidents compel a
    finding that Mora suffered persecution.
    Unlike De Santamaria, Sanchez Jimenez, and Mejia, this is not a case where
    the threats were accompanied by attacks or attempted attacks on Mora or her
    family members. While Mora asserts that the helicopter crash was an attempt on
    her son Frank’s life based on his political activity, neither she nor Frank offer
    anything more than their own speculation that the crash was the result of sabotage
    or that Frank, who was in the company of high-ranking military officials, was
    specifically targeted for his anti-Chavez beliefs. Moreover, the official report on
    the helicopter crash concluded that it was an accident. Likewise, there is no
    evidence that Lobo’s accident was an attempt on his life. Mora’s own testimony
    reflects that Lobo got nervous because he believed he was being followed, lost
    control of his vehicle, and drove off the road into a telephone box, not that
    Chavistas intentionally forced him off the road. Thus, we are left with the
    threatening phone calls, the house and car being broken into, motorcycles driving
    past the home, and the assault of Petitioners’ other son that resulted in nothing
    more than bruises. When compared to our precedent, these remaining incidents do
    not compel the finding that these incidents were anything more than isolated
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    incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation. See 
    Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1353
    ;
    
    Djonda, 514 F.3d at 1174
    . Because Mora did not establish past persecution, there
    is no presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 
    Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1257
    .3 Therefore, the BIA did not err in denying Mora’s asylum
    application, and we deny the petition for review. 4
    PETITION DENIED.
    3
    To the extent that Petitioners’ appellate brief is construed as raising an argument that
    she established a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a pattern or practice of
    persecution, we lack jurisdiction to review this argument because she is raising it for the first
    time on appeal. See Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    463 F.3d 1247
    , 1251 (11th Cir. 2006)
    (stating if a petitioner has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, we lack jurisdiction to
    consider the claim).
    4
    Petitioners’ petition for review does not challenge the BIA’s denial of Mora’s claim for
    withholding of removal and CAT relief, and thus, these claims are deemed abandoned. See
    Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1226
    , 1230 (11th Cir. 2006).
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