Jayne M. Eiden-Kellam, Relator v. Mayo Clinic Health System – Fairmont, Department of Employment and Economic Development ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1302
Jayne M. Eiden-Kellam, petitioner,
Relator,
vs.
Mayo Clinic Health System – Fairmont,
Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed March 9, 2015
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 32374349-3
Jayne M. Eiden-Kellam, Welcome, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Mayo Clinic Health System – Fairmont, Rochester, Minnesota (respondent)
Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Relator appeals the decision of the unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that she was
ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged for employment
misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Jayne M. Eiden-Kellam worked full-time at respondent Mayo Clinic
Health System – Fairmont as a customer-service representative from January 6, 1998,
until she was discharged on February 27, 2014. Eiden-Kellam applied for unemployment
benefits following her discharge and a Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development (DEED) administrative clerk determined that Eiden-Kellam was
ineligible for unemployment benefits. Eiden-Kellam appealed the determination and a
ULJ held an evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, a Mayo Clinic human-resources representative testified that
employees of the Mayo Clinic’s privacy and compliance offices discovered during a
compliance audit that Eiden-Kellam had accessed a patient’s electronic file and viewed
the patient’s protected health information on one occasion in January 2014. The human-
resources representative testified that she met with Eiden-Kellam to find out whether she
had actually accessed the patient’s confidential information, and Eiden-Kellam admitted
that she had. Eiden-Kellam explained that she recognized the patient’s name and
accessed the patient’s record to see where the patient lived. The human-resources
representative testified that Eiden-Kellam had received training about patient
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confidentiality and HIPAA confidentiality standards at the time she was hired as well as
ongoing annual training. The Mayo Clinic discharged Eiden-Kellam due to the
confidentiality breach.
Eiden-Kellam testified that she accessed the patient’s electronic file because she
recognized the patient’s name and wanted to see the current town where the patient lived.
She testified that she was “not real sure” why she accessed the information, but that she
never intended to share the information with anyone. She testified that it was a mistake
and she only viewed the patient’s electronic record for three to six seconds.
The ULJ issued an order determining that Eiden-Kellam was ineligible for
unemployment benefits because the Mayo Clinic discharged her for employment
misconduct. Eiden-Kellam requested reconsideration and the ULJ affirmed his decision.
This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
When reviewing a ULJ’s eligibility decision, this court may affirm, remand for
further proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the
relator have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are
affected by an error of law or are unsupported by substantial evidence. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2014). We view the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most
favorable to the decision and defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. Peterson v.
Nw. Airlines Inc., 753 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Oct. 1,
2008). “[T]his court will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence
substantially sustains them.” Id.
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Eiden-Kellam challenges the ULJ’s decision that she is ineligible for
unemployment benefits because she was discharged for employment misconduct. An
employee who was discharged is eligible for unemployment benefits unless the discharge
was for employment misconduct. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2014).
“Employment misconduct” is “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the
job or off the job that displays clearly: (1) a serious violation of the standards of behavior
the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee; or (2) a substantial lack
of concern for the employment.” Id., subd. 6(a) (2014). “Whether an employee
committed employment misconduct is a mixed question of fact and law.” Peterson, 753
N.W.2d at 774. Whether the employee committed the act is a fact question. Skarhus v.
Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006). But whether the employee’s
act constitutes employment misconduct is a question of law, which we review de novo.
Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011).
In general, an employee’s refusal to abide by an employer’s reasonable policies
and requests constitutes employment misconduct. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644
N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002). In the health-care context, this court has recognized that
maintaining the confidentiality of patient records in a hospital is very important. Grp.
Health Plan, Inc. v. Lopez, 341 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn. App. 1983). In Grp. Health
Plan, this court concluded that because “[a] hospital has the right to expect its employees
to keep patient records confidential . . . a violation of patient records confidentiality is
misconduct.” Id.
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Eiden-Kellam admits that she received training about the Mayo Clinic’s
confidentiality policy and the requirements of HIPAA and that she violated those policies
when she viewed a patient’s protected health information. But she contends that the
Mayo Clinic routinely violates HIPAA. In support of her assertion, she submitted
photographs of the Mayo Clinic’s alleged HIPAA violations to this court. But the focus
of an employment misconduct “inquiry is the employee’s conduct, not that of the
employer.” Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 316. And whether other employees have violated or
continue to violate HIPAA is not relevant to our consideration of whether Eiden-Kellam
committed employment misconduct. See Sivertson v. Sims Sec., Inc., 390 N.W.2d 868,
871 (Minn. App. 1986) (“Whether or not other employees violated those same rules and
were disciplined or discharged is not relevant here.”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20,
1986); Dean v. Allied Aviation Fueling Co., 381 N.W.2d 80, 83 (Minn. App. 1986)
(“Violation of an employer’s rules by other employees is not a valid defense to a claim of
misconduct.”).
Eiden-Kellam also argues that her discharge from her employment after only one
HIPAA violation was a pretext because the Mayo Clinic was trying to downsize her
department. She contends that the Mayo Clinic should have given her a written warning
instead of discharging her. If an employee disputes the reason for her discharge, the ULJ
must allow her to present evidence of the competing reasons for the discharge and then
must make factual findings on the cause of the discharge. Scheunemann v. Radisson S.
Hotel, 562 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. App. 1997).
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Here, there is nothing in the record to support Eiden-Kellam’s claim that she was
discharged because the Mayo Clinic was downsizing her department. The record further
shows that Eiden-Kellam never presented this argument to the ULJ or submitted any
evidence to the ULJ in support of the argument. See Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668
N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003) (“[A] party
cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in [the party’s] favor when one of
the reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with
the evidence that would allow the district court to fully address the question.”). And
although the evidence in the record shows that Eiden-Kellam violated the Mayo Clinic’s
confidentiality policy on only one occasion, it is well-established that “[a] single incident
can constitute misconduct when an employee deliberately chooses a course of conduct
that is adverse to the employer.” Schmidgall, 644 N.W.2d at 806. Finally, there is no
equity in the award of unemployment benefits, and we do not consider whether an
employee should have been discharged because our sole consideration is whether the
employee is entitled to unemployment benefits. See Minn. Stat. § 268.069, subd. 3
(2014); Auger v. Gillete Co., 303 N.W.2d 255, 257 (Minn. 1981).
Therefore, we conclude that the ULJ did not err by determining that Eiden-Kellam
is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she committed employment misconduct.
Affirmed.
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