Hoover v. Morales ( 1999 )


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  •                     Revised January 29, 1999
    
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF     APPEALS
    
                             FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    
    
                                 NO. 97-50734
    
    
                         ROBERT HOOVER, Doctor;
                       TEXAS FACULTY ASSOCIATION,
    
                                                      Plaintiffs-Appellees
    
    
    
                                    VERSUS
    
              DAN MORALES, individually and in his official
          capacity as Attorney General of the State of Texas;
           BARRY THOMPSON, Doctor in his official capacity as
              Chancellor of the Texas A&M University System,
    
                                                     Defendants-Appellants,
    
    
    
              Appeal from the United States District Court
                    For the Western District of Texas
    
                               December 31, 1998
    
    Before REAVLEY, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    
    PARKER, Circuit Judge:
    
         We sua sponte withdraw our prior opinion, Hoover v. Morales,
    
    
    146 F.3d 304
     (5th Cir. 1998), and substitute the following:
    
                                      I.
    
                       FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    
         At issue in this case are two Texas state policies, one
    
    
    
                                       1
    legislative and one administrative, which have the effect of
    
    prohibiting state employees from acting as consultants or expert
    
    witnesses on behalf of parties opposing the State in litigation.
    
    The first such policy is Texas A & M University System (“TAMUS”)
    
    policy No. 31.05, which prohibits university professors from taking
    
    employment as consultants or expert witnesses when doing so would
    
    create a conflict with the interests of the State.           The second
    
    policy is in the form of an “expert witness rider” attached to the
    
    Texas Legislature’s 1997 appropriations bill.      The rider provides:
    
            Because of an inherent conflict of interest, none of the
    
            funds appropriated by this Act shall be expended in
    
            payment of salary, benefits, or expenses of any state
    
            employee who is retained as or serves as an expert
    
            witness or consultant in litigation against the state,
    
            unless the state employee serves in that capacity on
    
            behalf of a state agency on a case in which the state
    
            agency is in litigation against another state agency.
    
    
    
    Appropriations Act 1997-99, art. IX, § 2(5); Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
    
    at 6352.
    
            Certain professors, who have been retained or have volunteered
    
    on a pro bono basis to testify in various litigation against the
    
    State,1 and the Texas Faculty Association filed suit under § 1983
    
        1
         E.g.: Prof. Robert Hoover, Dr. Finis Welch and Dr. Cecil Reynolds of
    Texas A & M have been retained as expert witnesses for the defense in the
    
                                       2
    against the Texas Attorney General and the TAMUS Chancellor,
    
    seeking to enjoin enforcement of the “expert witness rider” and
    
    TAMUS policy No. 31.05, on the grounds that these policies offend
    
    the   First       Amendment    and    the   Equal      Protection   clause     of   the
    
    Fourteenth Amendment.          The district court granted the plaintiffs’
    
    requested preliminary injunction and the State appeals.                      The State
    
    argues that the district court should have abstained from deciding
    
    the merits of the constitutional challenge under the Pullman
    
    doctrine.     Alternatively, the State argues that the district court
    
    abused its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction on the
    
    merits.
    
                                                II.
    
                                         LAW & ANALYSIS
    
                                                A.
    
                                    Standard of Review
    
                  A    preliminary       injunction        is   an   extraordinary
    
          equitable       remedy    that     may      be   granted   only   if   the
    
          plaintiff establishes four elements: (1) a substantial
    
          likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial
    
          threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if
    
          the injunction is denied; (3) that the threatened injury
    
    
    
    State of Texas law suit against various tobacco companies; Prof. Frank
    Skillern of the Texas Tech University School of Law has volunteered his
    services on a pro bono basis to members of a Lubbock, Texas, neighborhood
    association opposing state permitting of a nearby incinerator.
    
                                                 3
         outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause the
    
         defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve
    
         the public interest.      These four elements are mixed
    
         questions of law and fact.         Accordingly, we review the
    
         factual findings of the district court only for clear
    
         error, but we review its legal conclusions de novo.
    
         Likewise, although the ultimate decision whether to grant
    
         or deny a preliminary injunction is reviewed only for
    
         abuse of discretion, a decision based on erroneous legal
    
         principles is reviewed de novo.
    
    
    
    Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 
    123 F.3d 246
    , 250 (5th
    
    Cir. 1997), citing Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 
    864 F.2d 1253
    , 1256 (5th Cir. 1989).        All the arguments on this appeal
    
    concerning the merits of the preliminary injunction focus on the
    
    first   element--likelihood   of   success     on   the   merits   of   the
    
    constitutional challenge.
    
                                       B.
    
                                  Abstention
    
         Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 
    312 U.S. 496
    , 61 S.
    
    Ct. 643, 
    85 L. Ed. 971
     (1941), established that federal courts
    
    should not determine the federal constitutional implications of
    
    state law when that law has not yet been authoritatively construed
    
    by the state courts, and the law could be given a construction by
    
    
                                       4
    the state courts which would avoid the constitutional dilemma. See
    
    Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Morales, 
    986 F.2d 962
    , 967 (5th Cir. 1993).       The State argues that there are two
    
    such open questions under the “expert witness rider” which are in
    
    need of authoritative state court interpretation before a federal
    
    court can address its constitutional implications, i.e.,             whether
    
    the rider applies to pro bono expert testimony, and whether the
    
    rider applies to expert testimony against political subdivisions of
    
    the State, as opposed to the State directly.2
    
         Abstention       is   inappropriate   in   this    case,   because     the
    
    constitutional overbreadth problem posed by the expert witness
    
    rider cannot be avoided by any interpretation which its language
    
    will bear.
    
                                         C.
    
                 Is Speech Still Free If You Get Paid For It?
    
         There is a side-debate in this case about whether testimony by
    
    a state employee acting as a paid expert witness is “commercial
    
    speech”   or   just    “speech”.     The   difference     is    critical,   as
    
    commercial speech is generally less protected.           Central Hudson Gas
    
    & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 
    447 U.S. 557
    , 563, 
    100 S. Ct. 2343
    , 2350, 
    65 L. Ed. 2d 341
     (1980).            In this case, we are
    
    
         2
           The State concedes that the district court properly reached the
    merits of TAMUS policy No. 31.05 and of the “expert witness rider” to the
    extent that the rider prohibits state employees from acting as paid expert
    witnesses in litigation against the state directly. Appellant’s Brief, pp.
    24-26.
    
                                          5
    dealing with just “speech”.         If all it takes to make speech
    
    commercial is that the speaker is paid to say it, then every writer
    
    with a book deal, every radio D.J., and every newspaper and
    
    television reporter is engaged in commercial speech.           “It is well
    
    settled that   a    speaker’s   rights   are   not   lost   merely   because
    
    compensation is received; a speaker is no less a speaker because he
    
    or she is paid to speak.” Riley v. National Federation of the Blind
    
    of North Carolina, Inc., 
    487 U.S. 781
    , 801, 
    108 S. Ct. 2667
    , 2680,
    
    
    101 L. Ed. 2d 669
     (1988).       Likewise, the fact that one is paid to
    
    be an expert witness, does not make his testimony commercial
    
    speech.   Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561, 100 S. Ct. at 2349
    
    (defining commercial speech as “expression related solely to the
    
    economic interests of the speaker and its audience”)(citing cases).
    
    Therefore, the defining element of commercial speech is not that
    
    the speaker is paid to speak, but rather that the speech concerns
    
    the “economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” See,
    
    e.g., 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
    517 U.S. 484
    , 116 S.
    
    Ct. 1495, 
    134 L. Ed. 2d 711
     (1996)(product advertisement), Florida
    
    Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 
    515 U.S. 618
    , 
    115 S. Ct. 2371
    , 
    132 L. Ed. 2d
     541 (1995)(solicitation of legal services).
    
                                        D.
    
                            Pickering & Its Progeny
    
              “The problem in any case is to arrive at a
    
              balance     between     the    interests     of    the
    
    
                                         6
              [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
    
              matters of public concern and the interest of
    
              the State, as an employer, in promoting the
    
              efficiency of the public services it performs
    
              through its employees.” Pickering v. Board of
    
              Education, 
    391 U.S. 563
    , 568, 
    88 S. Ct. 1731
    ,
    
              1734-35, 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 811
     (1968).
    
    
    
         Thirty years ago in Pickering, the Supreme Court distilled a
    
    test for governmental restriction of its employees’ speech.     The
    
    test is essentially in two parts.     First, the district court must
    
    determine whether the State’s action or policy restricts the speech
    
    of its employees on matters of public concern. Pickering, supra at
    
    568; Connick v. Myers, 
    461 U.S. 138
    , 145-149, 
    103 S. Ct. 1684
    ,
    
    1689-1691, 
    75 L. Ed. 2d 708
     (1983).   If so, then the district court
    
    must weigh the interest of the employee in freedom of expression
    
    and his audience’s legitimate need for access to the information
    
    against the government’s interest, “as an employer, in promoting
    
    the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
    
    employees.” Pickering, supra at 568; Connick, supra at 142; Waters
    
    v. Churchill, 
    511 U.S. 661
    , 668, 
    114 S. Ct. 1878
    , 1884, 
    128 L. Ed. 2d
     686 (1994); United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,
    
    
    513 U.S. 454
    , 465-466, 
    115 S. Ct. 1003
    , 1012, 
    130 L. Ed. 2d 964
    
    (1995); Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,---,
    
    
                                    7
    
    116 S. Ct. 2342
    , 2347-48, 
    135 L. Ed. 2d 843
     (1996).
    
                                         I.
    
                             Matters of Public Concern
    
         TAMUS policy No. 31.05 and the expert witness rider both have
    
    the effect of curtailing speech on matters of public concern in
    
    this case.   For example, some of the parties in this case have been
    
    retained as expert witnesses in the State of Texas suit against the
    
    tobacco companies.       Although the specific testimony to be offered
    
    by the faculty-member plaintiffs may be highly esoteric and of
    
    little   interest   to    the   public,   that   testimony   bears   on   the
    
    addictive nature of cigarettes/nicotine, its health consequences
    
    and resulting public costs, which are matters of public concern.
    
    Ultimately, a ban on testimony by state employees in litigation
    
    against the State, such as TAMUS Policy No. 31.05, or a refusal to
    
    fund the salary and benefits of state employees who testify in
    
    litigation against the State, such as the expert witness rider, can
    
    be expected to curtail speech on a wide variety of matters of
    
    public concern.
    
                                        ii.
    
                              The Competing Interests
    
         The plaintiffs’ right is generally identified as the right to
    
    speak freely on matters of public concern.          More specifically, it
    
    is the right to serve as (pro bono) or be retained as (for hire) an
    
    expert witness or consultant in litigation against the State
    
    
                                         8
    (expert witness rider) or when doing so would create a “conflict of
    
    interest” with the State (TAMUS policy No. 31.05).                Balanced
    
    against that, under Pickering, is the State’s interest “as an
    
    employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
    
    performs through its employees.”
    
         The justification offered by the State is the State’s right to
    
    prevent   its   employees   from   acting   contrary   to   the    State’s
    
    interests.   The State argues that an inherent conflict of interest
    
    is created by state employees acting as or being retained as
    
    consultants or expert witnesses for the opposition in litigation
    
    against the State.   Since the State has an interest in preventing
    
    such conflicts of interest, the expert witness rider and TAMUS
    
    policy No. 31.05 are designed to prevent state employees from
    
    speaking against the State when doing so would create a conflict
    
    with the interests of the State.        Boiled down to its core, the
    
    State is simply arguing that the State’s interest is in preventing
    
    state employees from speaking in a manner contrary to the State’s
    
    interests.
    
         Whatever else we might say about that “justification”, the
    
    State’s amorphous interest in protecting its interests is not the
    
    sort which may outweigh the free speech rights of state employees
    
    under Pickering.     The notion that the State may silence the
    
    testimony of state employees simply because that testimony is
    
    contrary to the interests of the State in litigation or otherwise,
    
    
                                        9
    is antithetical to the protection extended by the First Amendment.
    
    The scope of state interests which may outweigh the free speech
    
    rights of state employees is much narrower than that.        Indeed, the
    
    only state interest acknowledged by Pickering and its progeny,
    
    which may outweigh the right of state employees to speak on matters
    
    of public concern, is the State’s interest, “as an employer, in
    
    promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
    
    its employees.”
    
          In this case, the State has not identified how the State’s
    
    interest in promoting efficiency of the public services it performs
    
    through its employees will be adversely affected by allowing state
    
    employees to serve as or be retained as expert witnesses or
    
    consultants.    We may safely assume that there will be occasions
    
    when the State’s interest in efficient delivery of public services
    
    will be hindered by a state employee acting as an expert witness or
    
    consultant, and therefore, the expert witness rider or TAMUS policy
    
    No.   31.05   would   legitimately   curtail   that   employee’s   speech.
    
    However, the problem with the rider and policy No. 31.05 is the
    
    quantity and quality of speech they will curtail, which would not
    
    adversely affect the interest of the State in efficient delivery of
    
    public services.      That is, by their operation, the expert witness
    
    rider and TAMUS policy No. 31.05 would likely serve to silence
    
    those whose speech would not adversely affect the efficiency of the
    
    public services performed by the State through its employees.
    
    
    
                                         10
    Specifically, this Court does not see how the expert testimony of
    
    the faculty-member plaintiffs in this case will adversely affect
    
    the efficient delivery of educational services by the institutions
    
    in which these faculty members serve.             Even if such an adverse
    
    impact might occur, the State has not identified it.                   The State
    
    bears the burden of justifying these restrictions, and when it
    
    enacts a “wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by
    
    a   massive    number      of   potential    speakers”,     the       burden   of
    
    justification is indeed heavy. National Treasury Employees Union,
    
    513 U.S. at 466-67, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.           In this case, the State’s
    
    burden proved too heavy, and having identified the flaws in the
    
    expert witness rider and TAMUS policy No. 31.05, the district court
    
    properly enjoined their enforcement.
    
                                          E.
    
                            Content-Based Restriction
    
         An additional basis for enjoining enforcement of the expert
    
    witness rider and TAMUS policy No. 31.05 is that they draw a
    
    distinction between state employee speakers based on the content of
    
    the employees’ relative speech. The one who testifies as an expert
    
    witness   or   acts   as   a    consultant   on   behalf   of   the    State   is
    
    protected.     The one who testifies as an expert witness or acts as
    
    a consultant on behalf of those who oppose the state in litigation
    
    
    
    
                                          11
    is punished.3
    
            “A    statute    is   presumptively        inconsistent    with   the   First
    
    Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of
    
    the content of their speech.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York
    
    State Crime Victims Board, 
    502 U.S. 105
    , 115, 
    112 S. Ct. 501
    , 508,
    
    
    116 L. Ed. 2d 476
     (1991), citing Leathers v. Medlock, 
    499 U.S. 439
    ,
    
    447, 
    111 S. Ct. 1438
    , 1443-44, 
    113 L. Ed. 2d 494
     (1991).                   See also
    
    R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
    505 U.S. 377
    , 383, 
    112 S. Ct. 2538
    ,
    
    2542, 
    120 L. Ed. 2d 305
     (1992)(holding that government restriction
    
    of otherwise unprotected speech (“fighting words”) on the basis of
    
    ideas        expressed    thereby,     is        unconstitutional    content-based
    
    regulation).            “Regulations    which       permit   the    Government     to
    
    discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be
    
    tolerated under the First Amendment.” Id., quoting Regan v. Time,
    
    Inc., 
    468 U.S. 641
    , 648-49, 
    104 S. Ct. 3262
    , 3266-67, 
    82 L. Ed. 2d 487
     (1984).        Therefore, the district court’s decision to enjoin
    
    enforcement of the expert witness rider and TAMUS policy No. 31.05
    
    may be justified on this alternative basis as well.
    
                                            IV.
    
                                         CONCLUSION
    
            The district court properly refused to abstain from addressing
    
    
        3
         It is this discriminatory treatment of state employees based on the
    content of their speech which prompted the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection
    challenge. Our resolution of the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim makes
    it unnecessary to discuss the merits of plaintiffs’ Equal Protection
    challenge.
    
                                                12
    the constitutionality of the expert witness rider, because no
    
    matter how it is construed by the Texas courts, the constitutional
    
    problem cannot be avoided. The district court properly granted the
    
    preliminary injunction against enforcement of TAMUS policy No.
    
    31.05 and the expert witness rider, because they both will cause
    
    the censorship of more speech by state employees than may be
    
    justified in order to protect the efficient delivery of public
    
    services.     Furthermore, the expert witness rider and TAMUS policy
    
    No. 31.05 are presumptively impermissible content-based regulations
    
    of otherwise protected speech.       Therefore, we affirm the district
    
    court’s decision to enjoin the enforcement of these policies.
    
           As we previously have stated, there may be occasions when the
    
    State’s interest in efficient delivery of public services will be
    
    hindered by a state employee acting as an expert witness or
    
    consultant.     Certainly the State’s interests heighten when the
    
    employee happens to be a policy maker. We can hypothesize examples
    
    of legislative or administration rules limiting expert testimony
    
    which would not violate the First Amendment, including rules
    
    regulating outside employment that do not turn on the content of
    
    any speech related activity that may be part of the outside
    
    employment. Moreover, the opinion should not be taken to decide or
    
    draw   into   question   other   kinds   of   rules   regulating   arguably
    
    expressive conduct by public sector employees.          See, e.g., Weaver
    
    v. United States Info. Agency, 
    87 F.3d 1429
     (D.C. Cir. 1996);
    
    
    
                                        13
    Vicksburg Firefighters Assoc., Local 1686 v. City of Vicksburg, 
    761 F.2d 1036
    , 1040 (5th Cir. 1985); Zook v. Brown, 
    865 F.2d 887
     (7th
    
    Cir. 1989); Arceneauz v. Treen, 
    671 F.2d 128
     (5th Cir. 1982).            But
    
    our task in this case requires us to apply a Pickering case-by-case
    
    analysis, and in doing so we conclude that the expert witness rider
    
    and TAMUS policy No. 3105 are impermissibly overbroad. Our opinion
    
    does not foreclose consideration of rules and regulations aimed at
    
    limiting    expert   testimony   of   faculty   members   or   other   state
    
    employees which adhere to our First Amendment jurisprudence.
    
    
    
         AFFIRMED.
    
    
    
    ENDRECORD
    
    
    
    
                                          14
    DeMOSS, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
    
    
    
    
         I concur only in the result.
    
         The only issue before this Court is whether the district court
    
    abused its discretion by granting a temporary injunction enjoining
    
    the enforcement of Texas A & M University System Policy 31.05 and
    
    Regulation 31.0501 (the "TAMUS Policy") and the "Expert Witness
    
    Rider" attached to the Appropriations Act 1997-99, art. IX, § 2(5)
    
    (the "Rider").     The Order of the district court granting that
    
    injunction does not address and does not constitute any final
    
    determination concerning:
    
              a.     whether   the   district   court   would   apply   the
    
         abstention doctrine of Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman
    
         Co., 
    312 U.S. 496
    , 
    61 S. Ct. 643
    , 
    85 L. Ed. 971
     (1941) and
    
         Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Morales,
    
         
    986 F.2d 962
     (5th Cir. 1993);
    
              b.     whether the "speech" in this case is "commercial
    
         speech";
    
              c.     whether the speech in this case relates to "matters
    
         of public concern";
                    d.     whether a balancing of interest between the rights
    
            of the employee and the rights of the state as employer under
    
            Pickering v. Board of Education, 
    391 U.S. 563
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1731
    ,
    
            
    20 L. Ed. 2d 811
     (1968) would require a result in favor of
    
            plaintiff/appellees;
    
                    e.     whether the TAMUS policy or the Rider constitute an
    
            unconstitutional content based restriction on the free speech
    
            rights of the plaintiffs/appellees under United States v.
    
            National Treasury Employees Union, 
    513 U.S. 454
    , 
    115 S. Ct. 1003
     (1995).
    
    Likewise, the district court did not file any findings of fact and
    
    conclusions of law on these issues for us to review.
    
            In my view this case raises a serious and fundamental issue
    
    not previously decided by the United States Supreme Court or this
    
    Court.       That is, whether the State of Texas or one of its state
    
    universities can prohibit a state employee or a full-time professor
    
    at the university from serving as a compensated expert witness
    
    against the state when the subject matter of his testimony and the
    
    basis of his qualifications as an expert are directly connected
    
    with, and are the product of, his employment by the state.           That
    
    issue was expressly left undecided by the Supreme Court in National
    
    Treasury Employees and needs far more factual development and legal
    
    analysis by the parties and the Court than it has received on the
    
    hearing for preliminary injunction.
    
    
    g:\opin\97-50734.con                   16
            Our task on this appeal is much narrower than the decision
    
    penned by the majority.              We are simply to decide whether, based
    
    upon the limited evidence presented at this early stage of the
    
    litigation, we believe that the district court’s decision is so
    
    wanting for support that it constitutes an abuse of discretion.                  I
    
    can imagine several reasons why the district court might have found
    
    it appropriate to grant an injunction.               For example, the expert
    
    testimony relationships which are the subject of this case appear
    
    to have been entered into prior to the effective date of the Rider;
    
    and     raise      an     issue   concerning   whether   the   Rider   should   be
    
    retroactively applied against the plaintiffs during the pendency of
    
    this suit.             Where I differ from the majority is that I would have
    
    neither assumed to know the reasoning of the district court nor
    
    presumed to include that reasoning in an opinion disposing of the
    
    more narrow preliminary injunction question.
    
            Consequently, I concur with the majority that the district
    
    court did not abuse its discretion, but I decline to join in the
    
    discussion and commentary by the majority relating to matters
    
    which, in my view, are not raised by this appeal.
    
    
    
    
    g:\opin\97-50734.con                      17
    

Document Info

DocketNumber: 97-50734

Filed Date: 1/29/1999

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016

Authorities (21)

Sunbeam Products Inc v. The West Bend Co , 123 F.3d 246 ( 1997 )

Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S. 496 ( 1941 )

Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205,... , 391 U.S. 563 ( 1968 )

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of ... , 447 U.S. 557 ( 1980 )

Connick v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138 ( 1983 )

Regan v. Time, Inc. , 468 U.S. 641 ( 1984 )

Riley v. National Federation of Blind of NC, Inc. , 487 U.S. 781 ( 1988 )

Leathers v. Medlock , 499 U.S. 439 ( 1991 )

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of NY State Crime Victims ... , 502 U.S. 105 ( 1991 )

RAV v. St. Paul , 505 U.S. 377 ( 1992 )

United States v. National Treasury Employees Union , 513 U.S. 454 ( 1995 )

Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc. , 515 U.S. 618 ( 1995 )

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island , 517 U.S. 484 ( 1996 )

Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr , 518 U.S. 668 ( 1996 )

Edward Arceneaux v. David C. Treen, Individually and in His ... , 671 F.2d 128 ( 1982 )

Vicksburg Firefighters Association, Local 1686 ... , 761 F.2d 1036 ( 1985 )

Stephen D. Zook, Cross-Appellee v. Joseph T. Brown, William ... , 865 F.2d 887 ( 1989 )

Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Dan ... , 986 F.2d 962 ( 1993 )

carolyn-weaver-v-united-states-information-agency-joseph-duffey , 87 F.3d 1429 ( 1996 )

robert-hoover-texas-faculty-association-v-dan-morales-individually-and-in , 146 F.3d 304 ( 1998 )

View All Authorities »