Estrada v. Nehls ( 2022 )

Case: 21-20160 Document: 00516353991 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/13/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 13, 2022
No. 21-20160 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Patricio Estrada,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Troy Nehls, Sheriff of Fort Bend County, Texas; Sergeant Pale;
Officer Owens; Deputy Erivo; Deputy Lilly; Correct
Care Solutions, Medical Contractor with the Fort Bend County Jail;
Dr. Kahn; Nurse Shirley Rabius; Fort Bend County;
The State of Texas,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-3883
Before King, Costa, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-20160 Document: 00516353991 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/13/2022
No. 21-20160
Patricio Estrada, Texas prisoner # 2089041, appeals the dismissal of
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against: (1) Fort Bend County Sheriff Troy Nehls;
(2) Sergeant William Pailes 1; (3) Deputy Chris Owens; (4) Deputy Richard
Erivo; (5) Deputy Connie Lilly; (6) Nurse Shirley Rabius; and (7) Correct
Care Solutions (CCS). Estrada raised various claims related to a physical
altercation with another inmate, including challenges to the subsequent
disciplinary proceeding and the medical care he received after the incident.
He also moves for appointment of counsel.
Estrada argues that the district court erred in granting the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion filed by Sheriff Nehls, Sergeant
Pailes, Deputy Owens, Deputy Erivo, and Deputy Lilly. Rule 12(b)(6)
permits dismissals when a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We review Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissals de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing
those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Morris v. Livingston,
739 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Even pro se complaints must “plead enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d
458, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A claim has facial plausibility “where a plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Morris, 739 F.3d at 745 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Challenging the district court’s dismissal of his claims against Sheriff
Nehls, Estrada contends that the sheriff committed constitutional violations
1
Estrada listed Sergeant Pailes as “Pale,” but that appears to be a misspelling based
on other record documents.
2
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No. 21-20160
by seizing reading materials and not activating or fixing a kiosk machine,
which impeded his ability to obtain hygiene products and file administrative
grievances. Estrada also claims that Sheriff Nehls violated his due process
rights by placing him in administrative segregation before having a
disciplinary hearing.
Estrada has not demonstrated that the district court erred in granting
Sheriff Nehls’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See id. Estrada’s conclusory
allegations regarding the kiosk, the seizure of reading materials, and
municipal liability are insufficient to state a claim for relief. See Coleman v.
Lincoln Par. Det. Ctr., 858 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017); Fields v. City of S.
Hous., 922 F.2d 1183, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1991). Similarly, Estrada has not
stated a facially plausible claim for relief in regard to Sheriff Nehls’s
placement of Estrada in administrative segregation before a hearing. See
Coleman, 858 F.3d at 309; Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1995).
Because Estrada has not stated a facially plausible claim of a constitutional
violation, he has not shown that the district court erred in concluding that
Sheriff Nehls is entitled to qualified immunity on Estrada’s various civil
rights claims. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
In addition, Estrada argues that the district court erred in its Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of his claims against Deputy Owens and Sergeant Pailes in
regard to their response to his safety and medical needs after the altercation
with the fellow inmate. He asserts that these officers confiscated a second
mattress despite his medical need for it and the fact that the prescription for
it remained active. Estrada also urges that the district court erroneously
dismissed his equal protection claim against Deputy Owens and Sergeant
Pailes because they treated the fellow inmate differently after the altercation
despite the fact that he was the aggressor in the fight. He further asserts that
Deputy Owens and Sergeant Pailes are not entitled to qualified immunity.
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Estrada has not established that the district court erred in its Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of these claims because Estrada has not stated a facially
plausible claim that Deputy Owens and Sergeant Pailes were deliberately
indifferent to Estrada’s medical needs given that he indeed received medical
attention and there is no indication that the officers ignored his complaints
or refused to seek treatment for him. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994); Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th
Cir. 2001). Similarly, Estrada has not stated a plausible equal protection
claim that he received inadequate medical care when compared to the
treatment received by the other inmate because Estrada has not pleaded facts
to establish that the two inmates were similarly situated in terms of their
injuries and subsequent medical treatment needs. See Bustos, 599 F.3d at 461-
62; Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998). Because Estrada has
not stated a facially plausible claim of a constitutional violation, he has not
shown that the district court erred in concluding that Deputy Owens and
Sergeant Pailes were entitled to qualified immunity on Estrada’s deliberate
indifference claims. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
Next, Estrada contends that the district court erred in its Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of his failure-to-protect claim against Deputy Erivo
because he was aware that Estrada faced a risk of serious harm from the fellow
inmate through previous grievances filed by Estrada and other inmates.
Estrada has not stated a facially plausible claim for relief given that he does
not detail the substance of those grievances or submit them as evidence. See
Bustos, 599 F.3d at 461-62. To the extent Estrada argues that Deputy Erivo
should have resolved any previous grievances in Estrada’s favor, Estrada has
not pleaded a plausible claim of a constitutional violation because he has no
constitutional right to satisfactory resolution of his administrative grievances.
See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Estrada
has not stated a facially plausible claim of a constitutional violation, he has
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not shown that the district court erred in concluding that Deputy Erivo was
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
Estrada urges that the district court erred in its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
of his claims against Deputy Erivo and Deputy Lilly regarding Estrada’s
disciplinary proceedings while placed in what he categorizes as disciplinary
lockdown rather than administrative segregation. Again, Estrada has not
established that the district court erred in its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of these
claims because “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative
segregation . . . , being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never
be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612
(5th Cir. 1996). Because Estrada has not stated a facially plausible claim of a
constitutional violation, he has not shown that the district court erred in
concluding that Deputy Erivo and Deputy Lilly were entitled to qualified
immunity on these claims. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
Additionally, Estrada avers that the district court erred in granting
Nurse Rabius’s and CCS’s motion for summary judgment. He claims that
Nurse Rabius delayed care and exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs after the fight, specifically the administration of pain
medication, the cancellation of a prescription for a second mattress, and the
alleged alteration of medical records.
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same
standard as the district court. Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, LLC, 636 F.3d
752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011). In general, summary judgment is appropriate if the
record discloses “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Estrada’s conclusional allegations regarding altered medical records
and denial of pain medication, without any supporting record evidence, are
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insufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding his claim of deliberate
indifference by Nurse Rabius. See Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice,
369 F.3d 854, 860 (5th Cir. 2004). Similarly, he has not shown a genuine
factual dispute regarding Nurse Rabius’s alleged cancellation of his mattress
prescription. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In sum, Estrada has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact
surrounding Nurse Rabius’s medical treatment, see id., and therefore, the
district court did not err in granting her motion for summary judgment on
Estrada’s claims of her deliberate indifference to his medical needs, see
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Estrada has not briefed his challenge to the
grant of CCS’s motion for summary judgment and therefore has abandoned
the issue. See United States v. Abdo, 733 F.3d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 2013); see also
Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The motion for
appointment of counsel is DENIED.
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