In re Allstate Ins. Co. ( 1993 )


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  •               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 93-1179
    _______________
    IN RE ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Petitioner,
    _________________________
    Petition for Writ of Mandamus
    to the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    _________________________
    (November 16, 1993)
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
    JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
    This petition for writ of mandamus presents an issue of first
    impression in the circuit courts, and one we expressly reserved in
    FDIC v. Loyd, 
    955 F.2d 316
    , 321 n.4 (5th Cir. 1992), to wit:
    whether the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq.,
    permits a district court to remand a case sua sponte for a "defect
    in removal procedure" where the remand occurs within the thirty-day
    period allowed by § 1447(c) for motions to remand.        We conclude
    that the 1988 amendments to § 1447(c) divested the district courts
    of any such discretion.
    I.
    Oran Washburn filed suit in Texas state court on October 5,
    1992, against Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") for breach of
    contract arising from his uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance
    policy.    Although the original petition did not allege more than
    $50,000   in   damages,   Washburn's      amended   petition,   which   added
    several statutory causes of action, alleged a breach of the duty of
    good faith and fair dealing, and sought punitive damages, would, if
    he were successful, entitle him to recover greater than the $50,000
    jurisdictional minimum needed to support diversity jurisdiction.
    On December 30, 1992, Allstate filed its notice of removal in
    the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    Texas.    The same day, the district court entered its order of
    remand, citing as its reason Allstate's failure adequately to
    allege Washburn's residence at the time the state petition was
    filed.1   Allstate now seeks a writ of mandamus to vacate the order
    of remand.
    II.
    We first address whether we have jurisdiction to review the
    district court's order.      Our authority to review a remand order is
    severely circumscribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides, in
    pertinent part, that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State
    court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
    otherwise . . . ."2       Despite the broad sweep of the statute, the
    1
    Because the district court mistakenly ordered the cause remanded to
    the 18th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, an amended order was
    entered on January 8, 1993, remanding to the point of origin, the 18th
    Judicial District Court of Johnson County.
    2
    Section 1447(d) allows an exception to its general rule of
    unreviewability for certain civil rights actions. Obviously, that exception
    is inapplicable here.
    2
    Court in Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 
    423 U.S. 336
    , 345-46
    (1976), limited its purview by holding that "only remand orders
    issued   under     §    1447(c)   and       invoking    the   grounds     specified
    therein . . . are immune from review under § 1447(d)."                   The Court
    concluded   that       mandamus   is   an       appropriate   remedy    "where   the
    district court has refused to adjudicate a case, and has remanded
    it on grounds not authorized by the removal statutes."                  
    Id. at 353.
    We may review a remand order on petition for writ of mandamus,
    therefore, provided that it was entered on grounds not authorized
    by § 1447(c).    As we explain in greater detail below, the district
    court acted without statutory authority when it sua sponte remanded
    the case on procedural grounds.             Consequently, § 1447(d) poses no
    bar to our review.
    III.
    As amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
    Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4644, 4670, § 1447(c)
    states, in pertinent part,
    A motion to remand the case on the basis                      of any
    defect in removal procedure must be made within                   30 days
    after the filing of the notice of removal under                   section
    1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it                  appears
    that   the   district   court   lacks   subject                    matter
    jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.
    28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (Supp. 1993).                 In the recent cases of In re
    Shell Oil Co., 
    932 F.2d 1518
    , 1519 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
    
    112 S. Ct. 914
    (1992), and Loyd, we granted the petitions for writs
    of mandamus and directed the district courts to vacate their remand
    orders, respectively, where the court had granted a motion to
    3
    remand for a defect in removal procedure made outside § 1447(c)'s
    thirty-day limit, and where the court sua sponte had entered an
    untimely order on the same ground.3
    Here, the district court remanded on the same day Allstate
    filed its notice of removal, explaining that "[Allstate] has failed
    to adequately plead Plaintiff's residence at the time of filing of
    the original petition.       Thus, [Allstate] has failed to properly
    remove this case, and this case must be remanded."             Plainly, the
    district court's order was nothing if not timely; the question that
    concerns us is whether it was made in response to a defect in
    removal procedure, and, if so, whether § 1447(c) authorizes a
    court's sua sponte remand on such grounds.
    Although it is "well settled that a removing party must allege
    diversity both at the time of the filing of the suit in state court
    and at the time of removal," Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Brown, 535 F.
    Supp. 486, 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Hubbard v. Tripp, 
    611 F. Supp. 895
    , 896 (E.D. Va. 1985), a "procedural defect" within the meaning
    of § 1447(c) refers to "any defect that does not go to the question
    of whether the case originally could have been brought in federal
    district court . . . ."       Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, 
    932 F.2d 1540
    ,
    1544 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    112 S. Ct. 430
    (1991); see also
    
    Shell, 932 F.2d at 1522
    ("`[A]ny defect in removal procedure'
    includes all non-jurisdictional defects existing at the time of
    removal."). By this standard, Allstate's failure to allege, in its
    3
    Cf. In re Medscope Marine Ltd., 
    972 F.2d 107
    , 110 (5th Cir. 1992)
    (timely remand motions premised on a defect in removal procedure are
    unreviewable under § 1447(d)).
    4
    notice of removal, the plaintiff's citizenship at the time the
    original petition was filed constitutes a procedural, rather than
    jurisdictional, defect; although Allstate failed conclusively to
    demonstrate diversity, the record discloses no dispute that it in
    fact existed.4
    Thus, we are faced squarely with the question left undecided
    in Loyd: whether § 1447(c)'s use of the word "motion" refers
    exclusively to motions made by parties or includes sua sponte
    remands.       In Loyd, the district court concluded that the state
    court defendants had removed untimely, and it remanded sua sponte
    after twenty-one months had elapsed since the date of removal.                               On
    petition for writ of mandamus, we rejected the district court's
    contention (i) that § 1447(c)'s thirty-day limit for filing remand
    motions did not constrain the district court, and (ii) that the
    court      possessed     inherent       authority       to   remand      sua    sponte      for
    procedural defects even after the time limit had passed.                           See 
    Loyd, 955 F.2d at 318
    .
    4
    Because we base our decision on other grounds, we merely note that
    plaintiff Washburn's original petition, enclosed by Allstate with its notice
    of removal, averred that Washburn was then a resident of Tarrant County,
    Texas. Not only the plaintiff's complaint but also the record as a whole may
    be considered in determining the propriety of removal. Villarreal v. Brown
    Express, 
    529 F.2d 1219
    , 1221 (5th Cir. 1976); Kerbow v. Kerbow, 
    421 F. Supp. 1253
    , 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1976). While such an averment as to residency, of
    course, is not conclusive proof of citizenship, see, e.g., Nadler v. American
    Motors Sales Corp., 
    764 F.2d 409
    , 412-13 (5th Cir. 1985), any qualms the
    district court may have had concerning the distinction between the two are
    best addressed by allowing Allstate to amend the removal petition to cure the
    defect under 28 U.S.C. § 1653. See D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire
    Ins. Co., 
    608 F.2d 145
    , 146-47 (5th Cir. 1979) (missing allegation of
    citizenship in notice of removal not fatal but may be cured by amendment),
    cert. denied, 
    449 U.S. 830
    (1980); 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
    § 3739, at 575-76 (2d ed. 1985) ("Irregularities or defects in the removal
    procedure . . . ordinarily do not provide grounds for remand. They may be
    cured by amendment in the federal court.").
    5
    Finding use of the word "motion" inconclusive as to whether it
    includes sua sponte actions, the Loyd panel reasoned, from the
    caselaw and the legislative history of the 1988 amendments, that
    the district court had no authority to remand on its own motion
    after the expiration of the thirty-day limit.              The court expressly
    reserved the question whether § 1447(c) authorizes a court to
    remand sua sponte within the thirty-day limit.              See 
    Loyd, 955 F.2d at 321
    n.4.5
    Prior to the 1988 amendments to § 1447(c), a court undoubtedly
    possessed the power to remand sua sponte "[i]f at any time before
    final     judgment     it   appear[ed]    that   the       case      was    removed
    improvidently    and    without   jurisdiction    .    .    .   ."     28    U.S.C.
    § 1447(c) (1973) (repealed 1988).          Respondent Washburn points to
    our statement in Medscope 
    Marine, 972 F.2d at 109-10
    , that the
    amended statute "is a mere reconstitution of the existing statute
    and jurisprudence, with the addition of a strict time limitation on
    the privilege of filing remand motions," to advance his argument
    that the court still may remand sua sponte.6           While we acknowledge
    5
    Two other circuit courts have addressed the issue resolved in Loyd and
    have reached similar conclusions. It bears noting, too, that each case
    reserved the same question as did Loyd. See Maniar v. FDIC, 
    979 F.2d 782
    ,
    785-86 (9th Cir. 1992); Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 
    891 F.2d 63
    , 65 (3d Cir.
    1989). See also Notations, Inc. v. Tongkook Am., No. 92 Civ. 4850 (JSM), 
    1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19240
    , at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1992) (same). But cf.
    Averdick v. Republic Fin. Servs., 
    803 F. Supp. 37
    , 41-43 (E.D. Ky. 1992)
    (rejecting holdings in Fullam and Loyd and adopting instead the reasoning of
    the vacated district court opinion in FDIC v. Loyd, 
    744 F. Supp. 126
    (N.D.
    Tex. 1990)).
    6
    While respondent Washburn's point )) that the prior statute permitted
    sua sponte remands for procedural defects and the 1988 amendment intended no
    change in this regard )) is well taken, we cannot agree that the caselaw was
    well settled that a court possessed such power under former § 1447(c). The
    statute was phrased in the conjunctive; the court could remand provided that
    (continued...)
    6
    the thrust of Medscope's reading, we find it more than balanced in
    this regard by the dictum in Ziegler v. Champion Mortgage Co., 
    913 F.2d 228
    , 230 (5th Cir. 1990), which states that
    considering a motion to remand is both procedurally and
    substantively different from inquiring into the existence
    of subject matter jurisdiction. Procedurally, a court
    may consider remand only if the parties raise the issue;
    conversely, a court must consider the existence of
    subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion.
    (Emphasis added.)       See also 
    Loyd, 955 F.2d at 323
    (incorporating
    Ziegler's dictum into its holding).
    Beginning, as we must, with the language of the statute, we
    note that the phrase, "[a] motion to remand the case . . . must be
    made," implies that only a party to the case may initiate it.7
    6
    (...continued)
    the case was removed both improvidently and without jurisdiction. See also
    14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3739, at 575-76 ("Irregularities or defects in
    the removal procedure . . . ordinarily do not provide grounds for remand.").
    Moreover, two cases cited by Washburn are distinguishable. Although
    Smith v. City of Picayune, 
    795 F.2d 482
    , 484 (5th Cir. 1986), states that a
    court "may, on its own motion, consider the correctness of the grounds for
    removal," that case merely restated the pre-amendment standard and upheld the
    retention of the case by the district court, despite the non-existence of
    removal jurisdiction, where the court had subject matter jurisdiction at the
    time of judgment. 
    Id. at 485.
    In Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Brown, 
    535 F. Supp. 486
    , 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982), the court noted that the removal petition was
    defective, but the basis for remand was the lack of removal jurisdiction owing
    to the defendant's alleged status as a citizen of the forum state.
    Also, the Loyd court cited, in addition to Smith, London v. United
    States Fire Ins. Co., 
    531 F.2d 257
    , 260 (5th Cir. 1976), as authority for the
    proposition that a court may sua sponte remand on procedural grounds. But
    London simply let stand a district court's ruling, apparently in response to a
    motion by the parties, remanding following an untimely petition for removal,
    despite the conceded existence of subject matter jurisdiction. The primary
    basis for the affirmance was in fact the improper avenue of review pursued by
    the defendant, who challenged the district court's ruling by direct appeal
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and not, as Thermtron directs, by petition for
    writ of mandamus. 
    Id. at 259.
          7
    Interestingly, the district court's parsing of the statute in the
    vacated Loyd opinion resulted in the same conclusion: "Given the predominant
    use of the phrase `own initiative' in the federal civil procedural rules, the
    term `motion' in § 1447(c) likely means only a request presented by a party."
    (continued...)
    7
    Respondent's argument that "[t]he court's power to monitor its
    cases for defects is inherent in its authority" fails to recognize
    that Loyd implicitly rejected the district court's related argument
    that its inherent authority to remand sua sponte (even outside the
    thirty-day limit) had survived the 1988 amendments. 
    Loyd, 955 F.2d at 318
    . Our reading of Loyd leaves no room for inherent authority;
    either the statute confers upon the court power to remand on its
    own initiative, or the court has no such power.
    Given Thermtron and Loyd, moreover, we are persuaded that the
    better   reading   precludes    the   existence    of   discretion   in   the
    district court to remand for procedural defects on its own motion.
    Section 1447(c)'s second sentence assigns to the court concern for
    its jurisdictional prerequisites; the first consigns procedural
    formalities to the care of the parties.           We believe this to be a
    wise and warranted distribution.
    Where a removed plaintiff, by its inaction, has acquiesced in
    federal jurisdiction, for example, it hardly will do for the court
    sua sponte to interfere with the parties' apparent choice of forum.
    In such circumstances, where subject matter jurisdiction exists and
    any procedural shortcomings may be cured by resort to § 1653, we
    can surmise no valid reason for the court to decline the exercise
    7
    (...continued)
    
    Loyd, 744 F. Supp. at 131
    . See also Notations, Inc., 
    1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19240
    , at *6 ("Certainly the wording of § 1447(c) does not appear to permit
    the exercise of discretion in remanding for defects in removal procedure, and
    courts in this Circuit have so considered it in passing."). But cf. 
    Loyd, 955 F.2d at 321
    ("[W]e find that the word `motion' is not dispositive of whether
    sua sponte remands are subject to the thirty-day limit.").
    8
    of jurisdiction.8     Congressional intent seems to sanction such a
    result, for as the legislative history of the 1988 amendments
    states,
    [s]o long as the defect in removal procedure does not
    involve a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction,
    there is no reason why either State or Federal courts, or
    the parties, should be subject to the burdens of
    shuffling a case between two courts that each have
    subject matter jurisdiction.
    H.R. REP. NO. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988), reprinted in
    1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033.          See also 
    Loyd, 955 F.2d at 323
    ("Because there was subject matter jurisdiction, the district court
    had no valid interest in remanding the case under § 1447(c).").
    As we can discern no basis, in either the language of the
    amended statute or in policy, for conferring upon the district
    courts discretion sua sponte         to remand for purely procedural
    defects, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the
    court's remand order and, accordingly, the petition for writ of
    mandamus is GRANTED.
    HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    The majority opinion expands our power to review remand
    orders, contrary to the will of Congress in section 1447(c) and of
    8
    In Thermtron, for example, the district court remanded on the ground
    that the crowded state of its docket would deprive the plaintiffs of a speedy
    resolution of their claim. The Court refused to accept this pragmatic
    consideration as a legitimate basis for declining jurisdiction, stating, "But
    we are not convinced that Congress ever intended to extend carte blanche
    authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing
    removal by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifiable to them but which
    are not recognized by the controlling statute." 
    Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351
    .
    9
    the Supreme Court in Thermtron Products.        In so doing it fails to
    abide by controlling precedent of this circuit and creates a split
    with another circuit.     I must respectfully dissent.
    I
    This circuit reviews remand orders only if the district court
    "affirmatively states a non-1447(c) ground for remand."           Soley v.
    First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 
    923 F.2d 406
    , 408 (5th Cir. 1991); In
    re Weaver, 
    610 F.2d 335
    , 337 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Merrimack Mut.
    Fire Ins. Co., 
    587 F.2d 642
    , 647 (5th Cir. 1978).              It does so
    because Thermtron limits review to the "extreme situation" where a
    judge has "clearly not relied upon § 1447(c)."         
    Weaver, 610 F.2d at 337
    .    This order simply does not create an extreme situation.
    Correct or not, the district judge decided subject matter
    jurisdiction.     Section 1446, like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    8(a), requires a "short and plain statement" of the grounds for
    jurisdiction.     See H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
    reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6032; Charles A. Wright et
    al., 14A Federal Practice and Procedure § 3733 (Supp. 1993).
    Pleading residency instead of citizenship fails to meet that
    requirement.     Nadler v. American Motors Sales Corp., 
    764 F.2d 409
    ,
    413 (5th Cir. 1985).          The judge recognized that failure and
    remanded, basing his decision solely on the inadequacy of the
    jurisdictional pleadings.       No matter how faulty we consider his
    reasoning or how inaccurate we consider his result, we cannot
    review    such   a   remand   order.       Thermtron    Prods.,   Inc.   v.
    Hermansdorfer, 
    423 U.S. 336
    , 343 (1976) (section 1447(d) prohibits
    review of remand orders issued under 1447(c) "whether erroneous or
    not").
    II
    Two   arguments   can   be   made   that   such   a   remand    is     not
    "jurisdictional" but rather is "procedural."           The first is that
    jurisdiction "exists" independently of the allegations in the
    notice of removal, and a jurisdictional remand is present only when
    the trial judge undertakes a review of the entire record to
    determine that "existence."
    This argument is not persuasive because the jurisdictional
    nature of a remand order should not hinge on the depth of the
    judge's inquiry   into   jurisdiction.      A   remand     order    based   on
    jurisdiction is nonreviewable even if the trial court appears to
    have reasoned superficially or reached the wrong result. Thermtron
    
    Products, 423 U.S. at 343
    .        The trial judge in this case made a
    quick decision based solely on the pleadings, but those actions are
    within his discretion.       See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Brown, 
    535 F. Supp. 486
    , 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (remanding sua sponte because the
    removal petition alleged residence rather than citizenship).                See
    also 
    Nadler, 764 F.2d at 413
    (trial court could allow cure by
    amendment or remand as district courts "do not sit to receive new
    evidence"); D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 
    608 F.2d 145
    , 146-47 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
    449 U.S. 830
    (1980)
    (noting that defective allegations of jurisdiction in removal
    petitions "can" and "may" be amended). When this court reviews the
    entire record to decide if remand is proper, it reviews the judge's
    11
    reasoning in the guise of reviewing his thoroughness.           Such review
    makes an end run around Thermtron.
    This argument also subverts the purpose of the statute, which
    is   to    prevent    "delay    through     protracted       litigation    of
    jurisdictional issues."        
    Soley, 923 F.2d at 408
    .          If we must
    evaluate   the   thoroughness    of    a   trial   judge's    inquiry     into
    jurisdiction to decide if the trial judge's inquiry was in fact
    "jurisdictional," section 1447(d) will not prevent much delay.
    The second argument that the order is not jurisdictional is
    that the judge did not state with sufficient clarity that he was
    remanding on jurisdictional grounds.          The order is comparable,
    however, to other orders this court has found unreviewable.                In
    Merrimack the judge stated that:
    This case was removed from state court to this Court due
    to the existence of diversity of citizenship between the
    original parties. Subsequent to removal, two additional
    persons were included as defendants. It is apparent that
    no diversity exists between the plaintiff and the new
    defendant, Rex N. Smutts and K.W. McDowell. Accordingly,
    this Court no longer has jurisdiction over this matter,
    and the entire case should be, and is hereby, REMANDED
    back to state court for appropriate 
    disposition. 587 F.2d at 644
    .     The defendant complained that the two new parties
    were not indispensable but had been added by the court in its
    discretion.      The court agreed that remanding on the basis of
    joinder of dispensable parties would be "clearly improper" but
    added that it "simply [could not] tell from the face of the remand
    order what grounds the district judge relied on" and upheld the
    order.
    12
    Judge Maloney's order in this case has a stronger claim to
    nonreviewability than did the one in Merrimack.          The Merrimack
    judge did say the word "jurisdiction," but the court did not
    consider the presence or absence of that word.      It instead focused
    on the absence of a proper reason for remanding.       Judge Maloney's
    order has a reason for remanding--the inadequate pleading of
    jurisdictional facts--that is a proper and potentially dispositive
    concern in evaluating jurisdiction.
    This order also has as strong a claim to nonreviewability as
    the claim in In re Weaver.    That order read "in pertinent part: `If
    the case was removable at all, it was removable prior to the
    appearance of the Defendants in the Superior Court 
    action.'" 610 F.2d at 336
    n.4.    The court concluded that it "seems apparent" that
    the judge "believed the case was not removable," producing a
    "logical inference that he felt jurisdiction was lacking."        
    Id. at 337.
       Judge Maloney's order produces an inference at least that
    strong.
    This interpretation of a "procedural" remand does not collapse
    its    definition    into   that   of    a   "jurisdictional"    remand.
    "Procedural" defects involve the parts of the removal process
    separate from the invocation of jurisdiction.       See, e.g.,   Maniar
    v. FDIC, 
    979 F.2d 782
    , 784 (9th Cir. 1992) (untimely removal).      See
    generally Wright et al., supra, § 3739 at 575 & n.9 (listing
    various "procedural irregularities").
    III
    13
    The majority's decision forgets the Supreme Court's statement
    to this court in Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 
    430 U.S. 723
    (1977) (per curiam).            This court granted a writ of mandamus
    vacating    a    remand    order,     reasoning   that     the    district   court
    incorrectly applied the Texas doctrine of judicial estoppel in
    determining the existence of diversity.               In re Southwestern Bell
    Tel., 
    535 F.2d 859
    (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), aff'd, 
    542 F.2d 197
    (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam).                  The Supreme Court
    reversed, stating that "[t]he District Court's remand order was
    plainly within the bounds of § 1447(c) and hence was unreviewable
    by the Court of Appeals, by mandamus or otherwise."                    
    Gravitt, 430 U.S. at 723
    .        Our sister circuit recognizes that Gravitt bars
    review when a district judge bases a remand order on the inadequacy
    of the jurisdictional pleadings.              Bregman v. Alderman, 
    955 F.2d 660
    , 664 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).           On this issue the majority
    stands alone.
    In sum, the only issue addressed in the remand order is the
    adequacy of the jurisdictional pleadings.                  Calling this issue
    "procedural"       undermines    judicial      discretion        and   circumvents
    1447(c)'s ban on review of jurisdictional remands by requiring
    appellate       courts    to   test    the    depth   of    the    inquiry    into
    jurisdiction.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 93-1179

Filed Date: 11/17/1993

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016

Authorities (20)

Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Brown , 535 F. Supp. 486 ( 1982 )

air-shields-inc-v-honorable-john-p-fullam-chief-judge-united-states , 891 F.2d 63 ( 1989 )

Arnold London v. United States Fire Insurance Company , 531 F.2d 257 ( 1976 )

In Re Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Company , 587 F.2d 642 ( 1978 )

Adeline Nadler, Robert B. Nadler and Carole M. Nadler v. ... , 764 F.2d 409 ( 1985 )

In Re Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, American ... , 535 F.2d 859 ( 1976 )

Dale L. Ziegler v. Champion Mortgage Company , 913 F.2d 228 ( 1990 )

Erwin J. Smith v. City of Picayune, Carle Cooper and ... , 795 F.2d 482 ( 1986 )

In Re Medscope Marine Limited and H. Glahr & Co. , 972 F.2d 107 ( 1992 )

Francisco Villarreal v. Brown Express, Inc. , 529 F.2d 1219 ( 1976 )

Victor C. Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Caltex Petroleum, ... , 932 F.2d 1540 ( 1991 )

dinesh-maniar-amphora-wine-company-inc-v-federal-deposit-insurance , 979 F.2d 782 ( 1992 )

in-re-a-vernon-weaver-administrator-of-the-small-business-administration , 610 F.2d 335 ( 1980 )

in-re-shell-oil-company-castle-cooke-inc-dole-fresh-fruit-company , 932 F.2d 1518 ( 1991 )

Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer , 96 S. Ct. 584 ( 1976 )

Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. , 97 S. Ct. 1439 ( 1977 )

Hubbard v. Tripp , 611 F. Supp. 895 ( 1985 )

Kerbow v. Kerbow , 421 F. Supp. 1253 ( 1976 )

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loyd , 744 F. Supp. 126 ( 1990 )

Averdick v. Republic Financial Services, Inc. , 803 F. Supp. 37 ( 1992 )

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