U.S. v. Vasquez-Rodriguez ( 1992 )


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  •                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ______________________________
    Nos. 91-2341 and 91-2821
    ______________________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    versus
    JOSE LUIS VASQUEZ-RODRIGUEZ
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    (November 19, 1992)
    Before JONES and WIENER, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, District
    Judge.*
    LITTLE, District Judge:
    Relying on a double jeopardy defense, Jose Luis Vasquez-
    Rodriguez asks this court to reverse his conviction for conspiracy
    to possess, with intent to distribute, more than five kilograms of
    cocaine. Finding the appellant's challenge baseless, we affirm the
    conviction.
    *
    Judge F. A. Little, Jr., U. S. District Judge, Western District of
    Louisiana, sitting by designation.
    BACKGROUND
    Vasquez was charged, tried and convicted of (1) possession
    with intent to distribute heroin and (2) conspiracy to possess
    heroin with intent to distribute.       The heroin based counts were
    tried in federal court in the Southern District of Texas in January
    1991.
    In April of the same year, Vasquez was tried and convicted in
    federal court in the Southern District of Texas of conspiracy to
    possess cocaine with intent to distribute.        Vasquez claims that he
    was involved in only one conspiracy and that agreement had as its
    centerpiece   distribution   of   cocaine   and    heroin.   Thus,   the
    conviction at the second trial should be nullified by application
    of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
    We review the experiences of defendant Vasquez beginning with
    his acquaintance with Candelario Leon in the summer of 1990.         The
    introduction of Leon to Vasquez occurred in Reynosa, Mexico. Leon,
    a former drug dealer, was a confidential informant for, but not an
    employee of, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.
    Vasquez, a Mexican national without U. S. credentials of any
    sort, offered to sell or acquire any drugs that Leon desired.         In
    fact, Vasquez hounded Leon to buy heroin from him.           After each
    communication with Vasquez, Leon would report to his contact, Tony
    Santos, an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration.
    Leon told Vasquez that he had a buyer for heroin.           Rodney
    Alverez, a DEA agent posing as a dealer in heroin, met Vasquez in
    2
    a lot between two restaurants on South Tenth Street in McAllen,
    Texas. The date of the meeting was 16 November 1990.    Accompanying
    the defendant was Jose Zamarripa.      The predicate for the meeting
    was the offer by Vasquez to Leon in Reynosa on the 15th that he had
    a quantity of heroin for sale.     The appellant recounted the fact
    that there were 15 ounces of heroin for sale.    Earlier in the day,
    while in Mexico, Zamarripa and the defendant had told Leon that
    they would sell a small sample, which they possessed, to Leon's
    contact.   At 1:30 p.m. on the 16th, Leon and agent Rodney Alverez,
    met with Zamarripa in a parking lot on South Tenth Street in
    McAllen, Texas.   Zamarripa agreed to sell 15 ounces of heroin to
    Alverez for $4,500 per ounce.    Alverez contemplated the situation
    and agreed to buy a sample of the heroin for $200.      Marked bills
    were given to Zamarripa.   Alverez promised to communicate further
    with Zamarripa later in the day.
    After Alverez departed with the sample, Leon and Zamarripa
    scoured the neighborhood to find the defendant.      Vasquez had not
    attended the afternoon meeting, but was located, traveling on foot,
    in the area.   Zamarripa told Vasquez that he gave, not sold, the
    sample to Alverez.     With that news, Vasquez became miffed at
    Zamarripa and told him that the heroin was theirs.   The sale should
    have been for $200 and the consideration should have been divided
    equally between Vasquez and Zamarripa.
    Later the same day, Vasquez, Zamarripa, agents Alverez and
    Jose Aguilar and Leon met in the McAllen parking lot.    The purpose
    3
    of the meeting was to perfect a purchase of a greater quantity of
    heroin.     While Vasquez acted as a lookout, Zamarripa and agents
    Aguilar and Alvarez conferred in a parked automobile.               Zamarripa
    presented the large quantity of heroin for the two agents to
    inspect.    Agent Aguilar signaled for support, agents appeared, and
    Zamarripa    and    Vasquez   were   arrested.     The   heroin    experience
    resulted in a guilty verdict in January of 1991.
    The April trial had as its hub a cocaine transaction.              As we
    previously reported, Leon met defendant Vasquez in Reynosa, Mexico.
    Leon advised Santos that Vasquez had expressed an interest in
    selling heroin and buying cocaine. After describing Tony Santos as
    a Colombian cocaine dealer, Leon arranged a meeting between Santos
    and Vasquez on 17 October 1990.            The meeting was held in leased
    office space in Unit C of the Professional Plaza, 4311 North Tenth
    Street in McAllen, Texas.
    When defendant arrived, he was accompanied by Ramiro Tijerina.
    Tijerina described clients from Houston who desired to purchase
    significant quantities of cocaine.          Vasquez served as a mediator.
    If the principals foundered over a point, Vasquez negotiated their
    differences    by   suggesting   alternative     procedures   so    that   the
    bartering would continue, not terminate.             Tijerina offered to
    purchase 1,000 kilograms of cocaine.          Agent Santos stated that he
    could not deliver that quantity of cocaine but that his source of
    supply could accommodate such an order. Vasquez's compensation for
    4
    services was discussed, but no agreement was reached in that
    regard.
    The following day another meeting was held at the same place.
    Present were Ramiro Tijerina, his son Ramiro, Jr., Santos, and
    Vasquez.     Tijerina pushed Santos for a 150 kilogram purchase but
    Santos declined.         Santos claimed that his source had made a big
    sale leaving     no      inventory    to   satisfy   the   demands    of   others.
    Tijerina was deflated and advised Santos that when his source had
    been replenished to contact him through Vasquez.
    A third meeting was held on 25 October 1990 at Unit C of the
    Professional Plaza.           Tijerina, Jr. appeared as did Vasquez, Leon,
    and Santos.         Unlike the last meeting, this time it was the
    purchasers who refused Santos' cocaine.                Feigning displeasure,
    Santos departed, followed by Vasquez. Vasquez kept assuring Santos
    that Tijerina was big time and that Santos would have other
    opportunities to sell them cocaine.
    Another meeting was scheduled for 26 October. Here again, the
    site   was   Unit    C   of    the   Professional    Plaza.    Both    Tijerinas
    appeared, as did Vasquez, Joel Cavazos (a potential purchaser from
    Houston, Texas), Leon, and Santos.             Prior to the meeting, Vasquez
    had mentioned privately to Santos that he needed money and that if
    the planned drug sale did not materialize Vasquez would find other
    purchasers for Santos' cocaine.
    At the plenary meeting, Vasquez suggested that Santos sell a
    cocaine sample to Tijerina.           The quality of the Santos stuff could
    5
    be determined as a harbinger of quality to follow in larger
    deliveries.   Santos surrendered a sample to Tijerina and quoted a
    $2,000 per kilogram price, delivered in Houston, Texas.    Tijerina
    indicated a desire to purchase 1,000 kilograms and promised a
    definite response after chemical analysis of the sample.    Vasquez
    was arrested on 16 November and Tijerina met a similar fate on 26
    November.   The jury found Vasquez guilty of conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute less than 5 kilograms of cocaine.
    ANALYSIS
    We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion to
    dismiss the cocaine indictment (the April trial) on the ground of
    double jeopardy.   United States v. Atkins, 
    834 F.2d 426
     (5th Cir.
    1987) overruled on other grounds, 
    933 F.2d 325
     (5th Cir. 1991);
    United States v. Deshaw, 91-3131 Fifth Cir. 1992 at 339.   The fifth
    amendment protects one against multiple prosecutions for the same
    offense. United States v. Felix, 
    112 S. Ct. 1377
    , 1382 (1992); see
    also United States v. Levy, 
    803 F.2d 1390
    , 1393 (5th Cir. 1986)
    (quoting Green v. United States, 
    355 U.S. 184
    , 187-88, 
    78 S. Ct. 221
    , 223, 
    2 L. Ed. 2d 199
     (1957)).    Vasquez has been charged with
    conspiracy to possess heroin and conspiracy to possess cocaine.
    It is implicit in the record that the district court felt that
    the defendant carried his burden of establishing a prima facie
    claim of double jeopardy.   United States v. Levy, 
    803 F.2d at 1393
    .
    It is explicit in the district court's ruling that the government
    6
    demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the cocaine
    indictment charged a crime separate and apart from that for which
    Vasquez was previously placed in jeopardy. When analyzing multiple
    conspiracy counts not bound in the same indictment we are guided,
    if not directed, by Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 
    52 S. Ct. 180
    , 
    76 L. Ed. 306
     (1932).     Blockburger instructs us to
    dismiss the cocaine indictment unless the government can prove by
    a preponderance of the evidence that the two conspiracies are
    factually distinct, i.e. the cocaine conspiracy indictment charges
    a crime separate from the heroin conspiracy indictment.      In the
    Fifth Circuit, five factors are considered when determining the
    number of agreements.    These factors, as established in United
    States v. Marable, 
    578 F.2d 151
     (5th Cir. 1978) are:   (1) time; (2)
    persons acting as co-conspirators; (3) the statutory offenses
    charged in the indictments; (4) the overt acts charged by the
    government or any other description of the offense charged that
    indicates the nature and scope of the activity that the government
    sought to punish in each case; and (5) places where the events
    alleged as part of the conspiracy took place.          The acts as
    described in the indictment will be examined as well as the acts
    admitted into evidence at the trials or hearings.   United States v.
    Deshaw   at 347; United States v. Levy, 
    803 F.2d at 1395
    .       The
    following graphic display compels us to conclude that there are two
    conspiracies.
    7
    Heroin Transaction             Cocaine Transaction
    Time                  16 November 1990              17    October   1990
    18    October   1990
    25    October   1990
    26    October   1990
    Persons acting        Jose Luis Vasquez-            Jose Luis Vasquez-
    as co-                  Rodriquez                     Rodriquez
    conspirators          Jose Zamarripa                Ramiro Tijerina
    Jose Aguilar, DEA             Ramiro Tijerina, Jr.
    Agent                       Joel Cavazos
    Rodney Alverez, DEA           Tony Santos, DEA
    Agent                         Agent
    Candelario Leon,              Candelario Leon,
    Confidential                  Confidential
    Informant                     Informant
    Statutory             
    21 U.S.C. § 846
                   21 U.S.C. § 846
    Offenses              
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1)         
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1)
    and (b)(1)(B)                and (b)(1)(B)
    Overt Acts            Offer to sell large           Offer to purchase a
    quantity of heroin,           large quantity of
    possession of a large         cocaine
    quantity of heroin
    Places Where          Parking lot, South            Office on 4311 North
    Acts Occurred         Tenth Street,                 Tenth Street,
    McAllen, Texas                McAllen, Texas
    The government has clearly proved the existence of two separate
    conspiracies.    The time period of each event is clearly different.
    The persons acting as co-conspirators are not the same.                     In the
    heroin transaction, the defendant conspired with Jose Zamarripa to
    possess and     sell   a    proscribed       substance.      Weeks   before,   the
    defendant conspired with Tijerina, Tijerina, Jr., and Cavazos to
    purchase cocaine.      It is true that the same statutes are used by
    the government in both conspiracies, but the statutes are not
    invoked to regulate identical conduct.                To the contrary, the
    8
    statutes are applied to two events, neither of which is involved
    with the other.      The times are not the same, the parties are not
    the same, and the objects of the conspiracies are not the same.1
    Nothing links the two transactions other than the defendant. There
    is no evidence that the conspirators in one transaction knew the
    conspirators in the other transaction. In one case an illegal sale
    was planned and in the other, the parties considered an illegal
    purchase.      Both conspiracies were conducted in McAllen, Texas, but
    one was confined to a parking lot on South Tenth Street and the
    other to an office on North Tenth Street.            Comparing the facts in
    the record against the five Marable factors, we are persuaded that
    the   government     has    proved    the    existence     of   two   separate
    conspiracies.
    1
    This clearly is not a case of a single agreement to sell two different
    drugs. If it were, Vasquez might have a valid defense of double jeopardy. In
    United States v. Winship, 
    724 F.2d 1116
     (5th Cir. 1984), this court deduced:
    The double jeopardy prohibition would not allow separate public
    drunkenness convictions for a man who drank enough of two whiskies
    to be drunk on either liquor. Public drunkenness laws do not
    inquire whether the violators consumed Old Crow or Chivas Regal.
    Similarly, whether the government may bring separate Section 846
    charges does not hinge on whether separate controlled substances
    were involved. In this case, analysis of the Marable factors
    provides objective indications of a single agreement. Furthermore,
    the conspiracy was clearly not departmentalized or compartmentalized
    in the minds of the conspirators. One conspirator's testimony
    emphasized the close links between efforts to sell the two drugs.
    Jack Goudeau could not recall whether he was buying marijuana or
    methamphetamine when he first met appellant Winship (citation
    omitted). We see no logic or reason to dichotomize the conspiracy
    here. This criminal blend came from a single agreement to sell two
    drugs. We cannot allow the government to distill separate offenses
    from that agreement by prosecuting for each kind of drug. Counts I
    and II constituted a single offense. Appellants' right not to be
    twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense was violated.
    
    Id. at 1127
    .
    9
    We AFFIRM the district court's denial of the defendant's
    motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy.
    10