State of Minnesota v. Leroy Hamer, Jr. ( 2015 )


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  •                         This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A14-0615
    State of Minnesota,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    Leroy Hamer, Jr.,
    Appellant.
    Filed April 6, 2015
    Affirmed
    Kirk, Judge
    Steele County District Court
    File No. 74-CR-12-2331
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
    Daniel A. McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Christy M. Hormann, Assistant County
    Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
    Public Defender, Connor Chapman (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for
    appellant)
    Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    KIRK, Judge
    Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea, arguing that the district court
    erred in finding that there was a sufficient factual basis to support his conviction for
    third-degree burglary. We affirm.
    DECISION
    The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.
    State v. Raleigh, 
    778 N.W.2d 90
    , 94 (Minn. 2010). Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1,
    states in relevant part that “[a]t any time the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a
    guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal
    is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” A guilty plea is invalid and manifestly
    unjust if it is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 93. For a
    guilty plea to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be established. State v. Ecker, 
    524 N.W.2d 712
    , 716 (Minn. 1994). A proper factual basis requires “sufficient facts on the
    record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which
    he desires to plead guilty.” Kelsey v. State, 
    298 Minn. 531
    , 532, 
    214 N.W.2d 236
    , 237
    (1974). Ultimately, it is the district court’s responsibility to ensure that the parties have
    established a proper factual basis on the record. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716.
    On October 31, 2012, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Leroy
    Hamer, Jr., with second-degree burglary and fourth-degree damage to property. The
    charges arose from an incident in which appellant broke into the apartment of K.K., his
    ex-girlfriend, and punched a television in the living room, damaging the screen. K.K.
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    submitted a request for restitution and affidavit requesting a total of $2,076 for damaged
    or missing personal property, including two televisions, one valued at $350, the other at
    $1,200.
    At the plea hearing, appellant’s counsel stated on the record that the parties had
    reached an agreement where appellant would plead guilty to an amended count of third-
    degree burglary and, in exchange, the state would dismiss the damage-to-property charge
    and appellant would pay restitution to K.K. The state also agreed to recommend a
    bottom-of-the-box guideline sentence. Appellant confirmed to the district court on the
    record that he had enough time to talk with his attorney about the plea agreement, and
    that he went line-by-line through the plea petition with his attorney. Appellant’s counsel
    questioned appellant on the record about his conduct on the day in question to establish
    the factual basis for the plea.
    The district court found that there was a sufficient factual basis to support the
    entry of appellant’s guilty plea, and entered a judgment of conviction for third-degree
    burglary, dismissed the damage-to-property charge, and ordered a restitution analysis.
    On January 13, 2014, the district court sentenced appellant to 24 months in prison and
    ordered that he pay $2,076 in restitution.
    Appellant filed an affidavit contesting K.K.’s request for restitution. Specifically,
    he challenged K.K.’s claimed value of “the television,” stating that there was no
    supporting documentation of its value, and K.K. had admitted that she was unsure of its
    value. Appellant failed to identify which television he was referring to in his affidavit.
    The district court held a restitution hearing, and the state noted that it had received a letter
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    from K.K. stating that she was no longer requesting restitution. Because K.K. refused to
    testify, the district court voided its earlier order requiring appellant to pay restitution.
    On appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred in finding that there was a
    sufficient factual basis to support a conviction for third-degree burglary. For appellant to
    be guilty of third-degree burglary, the state must establish that appellant (1) entered a
    building; (2) without consent; and (3) had the intent to steal or commit a felony or gross
    misdemeanor while in the building. 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.582
    , subd. 3 (2012).
    First, appellant argues that the plea colloquy did not establish that he lacked
    consent to enter K.K.’s apartment. Appellant points to the exchange with his counsel
    when she asked him, “[Y]ou didn’t have [K.K.’s] permission to go into the home and
    break her items; is that true?” Appellant argues that his response to counsel’s compound
    question—“No. Yes, that’s true”—does not conclusively establish that he admitted to
    lacking consent to enter K.K.’s apartment. But appellant also stated in the plea colloquy
    that he “broke into” K.K.’s place. “Breaking” is defined as “the act of entering a building
    without permission.”      Black’s Law Dictionary 215 (9th ed. 2009).             Applying that
    definition to appellant’s admission, appellant clearly admitted to entering K.K.’s
    apartment without consent when he stated that he “broke into” her apartment.
    Appellant next argues that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he stole
    or intended to steal from K.K.’s apartment.          But the statute requires that the state
    establish intent to steal or intent to commit a felony or gross misdemeanor. In his plea
    colloquy, appellant agreed with his counsel’s statement that he “intend[ed] to break some
    of [K.K.’s] items” to get back at her for some relationship problems that they were
    4
    experiencing. Appellant’s admission is sufficient to establish intent to commit damage to
    property under 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.595
    , subd. 1(3) or subd. 2(a) (2012).
    Finally, appellant argues that his plea does not establish the sufficient amount of
    property damage necessary to sustain his third-degree burglary conviction as the record is
    unclear as to the value of the property damage that he caused or the reduction in the value
    of the property. An element of third-degree burglary is the commission of a gross
    misdemeanor or felony, such as criminal damage to property. See 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.582
    ,
    subd. 3. Third-degree criminal damage to property constitutes a gross misdemeanor and
    requires proof that a person intentionally damaged property, thereby reducing the value
    of property by at least $500 but not more than $1,000. See 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.595
    , subd.
    2(a) (stating the elements and possible sentence for third-degree criminal damage to
    property); see also 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.02
    , subd. 4 (2012) (defining gross misdemeanor). A
    conviction of first-degree property damage requires evidence that a defendant caused at
    least $1,000 in damage to property. 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.595
    , subd. 1(3) (2012).
    The state was required to prove intent to commit property damage of at least $500
    to support appellant’s guilty plea for third-degree burglary. This court may “also look to
    the whole record, beyond what the defendant said, when evaluating the quality of a guilty
    plea’s factual basis.” Barnslater v. State, 
    805 N.W.2d 910
    , 914 (Minn. App. 2011).
    Here, appellant admitted at the plea hearing that he intended to damage K.K.’s property
    and that he was aware that he would have to pay restitution. The record includes the
    complaint of the responding police officer who observed the damaged television, a
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    receipt for repair of the damaged front door, and the restitution affidavit, which in total
    establishes that appellant committed property damage in excess of $500.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: A14-615

Filed Date: 4/6/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021