United States v. Louis Michael Pasquazzi , 607 F. App'x 900 ( 2015 )


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  •           Case: 14-11688   Date Filed: 04/09/2015   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-11688
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cr-00001-JES-CM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LOUIS MICHAEL PASQUAZZI,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    No. 14-11822
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00138-JES-DNF-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Case: 14-11688     Date Filed: 04/09/2015   Page: 2 of 8
    versus
    LOUIS MICHAEL PASQUAZZI,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 9, 2015)
    Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    In these consolidated appeals, Defendant Louis Pasquazzi appeals both his
    71-month sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to passing or uttering a
    counterfeit $100 bill in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 472
     and 2, and his consecutive
    24-month sentence, imposed following the revocation of his supervised release.
    Defendant argues that it was substantively unreasonable for the district court to
    sentence him to the high-end of the applicable guideline ranges for both his
    supervised release violation and criminal conviction and to run those sentences
    consecutively. After review, we affirm.
    I. Background
    In 2011, Defendant pled guilty to seven counts of uttering counterfeit $50
    and $100 bills, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 472
     and 2. As part of his 2011 offense
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    conduct, Defendant manufactured and passed (and had unindicted co-conspirators
    also pass) counterfeit $20, $50, and $100 bills. After serving a 33-month sentence,
    Defendant was released from prison in June 2013 and began his three-year term of
    supervised release.
    Shortly after his release from prison, Defendant began manufacturing $100
    bills. From August 1 to August 27, 2013, Defendant, along with a half-dozen other
    individuals, passed the counterfeit bills. Defendant and his cohorts used the
    counterfeit $100 bills to make small purchases for which they then received
    genuine currency as change. Defendant’s fellow participants then gave their
    change to Defendant.
    In August 2013, Defendant’s probation officer filed a petition for revocation
    of supervised release. The petition alleged that Defendant had violated the
    conditions of his supervised release by: (1) having two positive drug tests for
    cocaine and amphetamines on July 8 and 22, 2013 and (2) failing to submit to two
    periodic drug tests on July 29 and August 6, 2013. In September 2013, Defendant
    was indicted for one count of passing or uttering a counterfeit $100 bill, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 472
     and 2. The probation officer filed a superseding
    revocation petition, in which he added the allegation that Defendant had violated a
    condition of supervised release by engaging in new criminal conduct.
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    After Defendant pled guilty to passing or uttering a counterfeit $100 bill, the
    district court held a joint revocation and sentencing hearing. Defendant admitted
    the violations of his conditions of supervised release, and the district court revoked
    Defendant’s supervised release. Defendant requested that a 24-month total
    sentence, with significant mental health treatment, be imposed for both his
    supervised release violations and criminal conviction.1 He argued that such a
    downward variance was warranted based on his mental health issues. He further
    claimed that he had used cocaine to self-medicate his untreated Attention Deficit
    Hyperactivity Disorder and bipolar disease and that he had engaged in criminal
    activity in order to get cocaine. Defendant contended that he would no longer use
    cocaine, and thus not engage in future criminal conduct, if he received
    psychological and medical treatment. The district court declined Defendant’s
    request for a downward variance and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment
    for violating the conditions of his supervised release and to 71 months’
    imprisonment for his conviction for uttering a counterfeit $100 bill, to be served
    consecutively, for a 95-month total sentence.
    1
    Defendant’s guideline range for his supervised release violations was 21 to 24 months’
    imprisonment. His guideline range for his uttering a counterfeit $100 bill conviction was 57 to
    71 months’ imprisonment.
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    II. Discussion
    On appeal, Defendant argues that both the length of his sentences and their
    consecutive nature are substantively unreasonable because the district court did not
    adequately account for his expressed desire to receive effective mental health
    treatment. We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion
    using a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1190 (11th Cir.
    2008). We look first to whether the district court committed any significant
    procedural error and then to whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable in
    light of the totality of the circumstances and the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors. 2 
    Id.
    Likewise, we review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
    reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 
    437 F.3d 1105
    , 1106-07 (11th Cir.
    2006).
    The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is
    unreasonable. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d at 1189
    . We will reverse only if “left with the
    definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
    2
    The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
    to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
    deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
    educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
    Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
    the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
    victims. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).
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    judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
    outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at
    1191 (quotation marks omitted).
    Whether a term of imprisonment imposed for supervised release violations is
    to be served concurrently or consecutively to another sentence is a question
    entrusted to the district court’s discretion. United States v. Quinones, 
    136 F.3d 1293
    , 1295 (11th Cir. 1998). In determining whether sentences should run
    consecutively or concurrently, the district court must consider the § 3553(a)
    factors. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (b).
    Here, Defendant has not shown that the length of his sentences or the
    imposition of consecutive sentences is substantively unreasonable. Defendant’s
    71-month sentence for his conviction for passing counterfeit currency is within the
    advisory guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment, and well below the
    20-year statutory maximum under 
    18 U.S.C. § 472
    . See United States v. Hunt, 
    526 F.3d 739
    , 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, while we do not apply a
    presumption, we ordinary expect a sentence inside the advisory guidelines range to
    be reasonable); United States v. Gonzalez, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th Cir. 2008)
    (citing the fact that the sentence imposed was well below the statutory maximum
    as an indication of reasonableness). Likewise, Defendant’s 24-month revocation
    sentence is within the advisory guideline range of 21 to 24 months’ imprisonment
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    and does not exceed the 24-month statutory maximum under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3).
    At the sentencing hearing, Defendant presented evidence, including a report
    and testimonial evidence from a doctor who had evaluated him, in an effort to
    show that his previously untreated mental health issues had led to his cocaine use
    and past criminal activity. Defendant argued that medical treatment would break
    this cycle of drug addiction and criminal activity. In imposing sentence, the
    district court specifically acknowledged that it had heard and considered
    Defendant’s arguments and evidence, including the doctor’s report and testimony,
    and that it had considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. Responding to Defendant’s
    argument about his need for mental health treatment, the court recommended that
    Defendant serve his sentence in a facility that had the ability to address those
    medical needs. As to the appropriate sentence, however, the district court noted
    that Defendant’s violent and lengthy criminal history suggested that it was unlikely
    Defendant’s behavior would change, even with medical treatment.
    We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this
    determination. See United States v. Clay, 
    483 F.3d 739
    , 743 (11th Cir. 2007)
    (stating that “[t]he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
    committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” (quotation marks
    omitted)). Defendant’s criminal history spans 25 years and includes numerous
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    violent offenses, such as battery, assault, aggravated battery with a firearm, and
    aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant also has a prior federal
    conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, as well as a federal
    conviction for possession of cocaine. Moreover, Defendant admitted that he
    violated the terms of his supervised release less than three months after he was
    released from prison. Indeed, Defendant committed the very same offense for
    which he was on supervised release.
    We also conclude that it was well within the district court’s discretion to
    impose consecutive sentences after considering Defendant’s criminal history. See
    Quinones, 
    136 F.3d at 1295
    . We note that the Sentencing Guidelines provide, in a
    policy statement, that a sentence resulting from a supervised release violation
    “shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that
    the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served
    resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of probation or
    supervised release.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). On these facts, the district court did not
    abuse its discretion by complying with this policy statement.
    For all of these reasons, Defendant has not carried his burden to show that
    his two sentences are substantively unreasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
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