E.E.O.C. v. Bailey Ford, Inc. ( 1994 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 93-2436.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Cross-Appellee,
v.
BAILEY FORD, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
July 21, 1994.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
Before REAVLEY and JONES, Circuit Judges, and JUSTICE*, District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
There was evidence in the record to support the district
court's finding that Bailey Ford did not discriminate against Ms.
Qualls on the basis of her sex in refusing to hire her as a truck
salesperson. EEOC has not persuaded us that the court's assessment
of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses was clearly
erroneous. Consequently, we cannot reverse his findings.
Further, Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 was not properly invoked by Bailey
Ford as a device to charge costs against EEOC in this case. See
Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 101 S. Ct. 1146, 67
L. Ed. 2d 287 (1991). EEOC did not "obtain" a judgment in the sense
used by the Supreme Court in August. Moreover, even if appellee
were entitled to recover "costs" under Rule 68, its attorneys' fees
are not among the properly recoverable costs without a
*
District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
1
determination that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation. See O'Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d
1115, 1120 (8th Cir.1989); Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329
(1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029, 107 S. Ct. 1955, 95
L. Ed. 2d 527 (1987).1
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICE, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
I concur in that part of the majority's opinion which holds
Rule 68 unavailable to Bailey Ford, but I dissent from the
majority's affirmance of the district court judgment denying relief
to EEOC and Ms. Qualls.
Plaintiff-appellant, Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(EEOC), filed this civil action on behalf of Frances Qualls,
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, alleging that Bailey Ford, defendant-appellee, failed to
hire her as a sales person because of her sex. After a two day
bench trial, the court found that Bailey Ford's failure to hire
Qualls was not based on sex. The trial court entered judgment for
the defendant, and ordered each party to bear its own costs. The
trial court later denied Bailey Ford's request for attorney's fees.
In order to prevail in a Title VII suit, a plaintiff must
first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. If the
plaintiff presents a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden
1
Because Bailey Ford did not raise the issue, we do not here
decide whether EEOC had the authority to continue pursuing the
discrimination case after the death of the charging party.
2
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its decision. If the defendant
articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to show that he articulated reason is a mere pretext. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668
(1973). Recently, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must
also prove that the defendant intended to discriminate, even after
proving that the articulated reason is pretextual. St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d
407 (1993).
The trial court found that the defendant did not intend to
discriminate against Ms. Qualls, and entered a judgment for the
defendant based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The question of whether discriminatory intent exists is one of fact
that is reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous
standard. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572-75,
105 S. Ct. 1504, 1510-12, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985). Without sufficient
findings of fact, an appellate court cannot engage in meaningful
review.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the trial court "shall find the facts specially." The purpose
of the rule is to (1) engender care on the part of the trial judge
in making factual determinations, (2) make clear what was decided
for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and (3) make
possible appellate review. Ratliff v. Governor's Highway Safety
Program, 791 F.2d 394, 400 (5th Cir.1986).
3
In the present appeal, the trial court's findings of fact are
conclusory, mostly relating to undisputed facts and jurisdictional
matters. The following findings were made as to the question of
intentional discrimination on the basis of gender:
16. Bailey Ford's decision not to hire Ms. Qualls was not
because of her sex.
18. Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Ms. Qualls' sex played any part in Bailey Ford's
decision to pass her over as a sales trainee.
20. Bailey Ford would not have employed Ms. Qualls as an
automobile and truck sales person even absent any
discriminatory motive.
The trial court also came to two legal conclusions:
19. Frances Qualls is not entitled to an award of back pay,
the Commission is not entitled to any relief in this cause.
22. Neither the EEOC nor Frances Qualls are entitled to any
relief in this cause.
While it is true that the trial court made a finding on the
ultimate issue in an employment discrimination case—whether the
defendant acted with discriminatory intent, St. Mary's, --- U.S. --
--, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993)—a trial court normally
examines the defendant's assertedly legitimate non-discriminatory
reason, and then determines whether plaintiff has proved that such
reason is not worthy of credence. When a court reaches the
ultimate issue in a discrimination case without explaining how or
why it reached its conclusions, such findings cannot be reviewed.
See Lopez v. Current Director of Texas Economic Development
Commission, 807 F.2d 430, 434 (5th Cir.1987) ("This lack of
explanation is fatal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)."). The Fifth
Circuit has repeatedly refused to review findings of fact such as
4
those in the court below, explaining that:
In an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff may prevail
either by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is not worthy of credence.
The ultimate issue, however, and the one to be decided by the
court, is whether the employer intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff. If the trial court believes the
employer's explanation of its motivation, the court may not
merely state, in conclusory terms, that the plaintiff has
failed to prove the employer's suggested reason to be a
pretext for invidious discrimination or that there is not
evidence of discriminatory treatment. It must at least infer
to the evidence tending to prove and disprove the merits of
the proffered explanation and state why the court reached the
conclusion that the explanation has not been credited.
Ratliff, 791 F.2d at 400-01 (5th Cir.1986). The court has also
stated:
In reviewing the district court's finding of no discrimination
under the clearly erroneous standard, this Court cannot be
left to second guess the factual basis for the district
court's conclusion. This Court cannot determine whether the
district court's finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate
pretext was clearly erroneous when the district court's
finding is not expressed with sufficient particularity. It is
not the function of this Court to make credibility choices and
findings of fact.
Redditt v. Mississippi Extended Care Centers, 718 F.2d 1381, 1386
(5th Cir.1983); see also, Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 939
F.2d 260 (5th Cir.1991); Smith v. Texas Department of Water
Resources, 799 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.1986); Chaiffetz v. Robertson
Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731 (5th Cir.1986).
The court below found Bailey Ford's decision not to hire Ms.
Qualls was not because of her sex, and that plaintiff had failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her sex played any
part in Bailey Ford's decision to pass her over as a sales trainee.
However, the bases for the trial court's decision are unclear,
5
because its factual and legal findings are too vague to be
reviewed. I would, therefore, remand the case to the trial court,
for more complete and particular findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
On remand, the trial court should be directed to make clear
the evidentiary bases for its factual findings, pointing out which
evidence it adopted and which evidence it rejected in making such
findings. Specifically, it should be plain whether the trial court
accepted defendant's asserted non-discriminatory reason, and, if
so, which one. Further, the trial court should be required to
explain whether plaintiff failed to prove discriminatory intent.
Rule 52(a) "exacts neither punctilious detail nor slavish tracing
of the claims issue by issue and witness by witness," but it does
require findings detailed enough to allow the appellate court to
engage in meaningful review. Lopez, 807 F.2d at 434 (citing
Ratliff, 791 F.2d at 400).
On this aspect of the case, I dissent.
6