United States v. Clayton ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 97-60712
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee - Cross-Appellant,
versus
RONALD JOSEPH CLAYTON,
Defendant - Appellant - Cross-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi
_________________________________________________________________
April 12, 1999
Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge
Ronald Joseph Clayton, former Chief Deputy Sheriff of DeSoto
County, Mississippi, stands convicted of violating the civil
rights of an arrested woman by kicking her in the head. He also
was convicted of making a false statement of material fact to the
FBI when he denied the use of unreasonable force during the
incident of arrest. On appeal, Clayton challenges the district
court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the
grounds that the government had failed to establish venue.
Clayton also contends that the district court gave an improper
modified Allen charge to the jury. Finally, Clayton challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.
The government cross-appeals. It contends that the district
court erred in failing to enhance Clayton’s offense level by two
levels, first, under § 3A1.3 and, second, under § 3C1.1 of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines because Freeman was physically
restrained (handcuffed) during the time she was kicked, and
because Clayton obstructed the federal investigation of the
incident by warning officers at the scene of the offense to keep
silent about what they saw.
We affirm each of Clayton’s convictions, and his sentence for
making a false statement of material fact. We vacate Clayton’s
sentence with respect to the civil rights conviction and remand
for resentencing.
I
We do not retry a case in the appellate court. We therefore
view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. We
will very briefly state those facts. Clayton, during the drug-
related arrests of Jaefis Totten and Jennifer Freeman on
January 13, 1994, kicked Freeman in the head as she lay facedown
and handcuffed. Clayton was also charged with kicking Totten and
striking him with a police-issued flashlight. On March 9, 1995,
during the course of a federal investigation of the incident
2
conducted by the FBI, Clayton expressly denied kicking, striking,
or using force against the pair.
Some two years later, on May 22, 1997, the grand jury
indicted Clayton on one count of depriving Totten of his right to
be secure from unreasonable force by one acting under the color of
law,1 one count of depriving Freeman of her right to be secure from
unreasonable force by one acting under the color of law, and one
count of making a false statement of material fact to the FBI.2
The case was tried to a jury in July 1997. The jury, after
five and one-half hours of deliberating, informed the district
court that it was unable to reach a verdict on one of the charges.
The court gave the jury a modified Allen charge, instructing it
to keep deliberating. The jury returned the split verdict, now
the subject of this appeal, forty-five minutes after the district
court gave the charge. The jury found Clayton guilty of count 2,
violating Freeman’s civil rights and count 3, making a false
statement of material fact to the FBI. The jury, however,
acquitted Clayton of depriving Totten of his civil rights.
On October 15, 1997, the district court sentenced Clayton to
twelve months and one day imprisonment for the civil rights
conviction and twelve months and one day imprisonment for the
1
18 U.S.C. § 242.
2
18 U.S.C. § 1001.
3
false statement conviction. The district court ordered Clayton’s
sentences to be served concurrently. It also fined him a total of
ten thousand dollars, five thousand for each conviction. The
district court further ordered Clayton to be placed on supervised
release after his imprisonment for a term of three years.
Finally, in sentencing Clayton, the district court rejected the
government’s argument that under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3 Clayton’s
offense level should be adjusted upward by two-levels because he
assaulted Freeman while she was handcuffed. The district court
also rejected the government’s recommendation for the two-level
obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 on the
grounds that Clayton obstructed the subsequent FBI investigation
of the incident when, at the scene of the offense, he threatened
the officers with termination unless they kept quiet about what
they had seen.
On appeal, Clayton argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the
government failed to prove that venue for the indicted offenses
lay in the Northern Judicial District of Mississippi. Second,
Clayton contends that the district court’s modified Allen charge
was prejudicial and coercive. Finally, Clayton challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence.
4
On cross-appeal, the government contends that because Freeman
was handcuffed when Clayton kicked her in the head, the district
court erred in failing to enhance Clayton’s offense level under
the victim restraint adjustment, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3. The government
further contends that because Clayton threatened officers with
termination if they reported the offense, the district court erred
in refusing to apply the obstruction of justice adjustment,
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
After a careful review of the record, we are satisfied that
the government adequately established venue of the charged
offenses.3 We also find that the sufficiency of the evidence
supports Clayton’s convictions for violating Freeman’s civil
rights4 and for making a false statement of material fact the FBI.5
3
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, we conclude that the government established that each
of Clayton’s charged offenses occurred in the Northern Judicial
District of Mississippi. United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 633
(5th Cir. 1996)(citations omitted). There is no dispute that the
acts of unreasonable force underlying the charges against Clayton
occurred along Highway 178, eastbound. FBI Agent John Lavoie
testified that Highway 178 is located in DeSoto County,
Mississippi. Similarly, the conversation forming the basis of the
false statement of material fact to the FBI also occurred in DeSoto
County, specifically, at the DeSoto County Sheriff’s Department.
Finally, Clayton himself admitted at trial that DeSoto County,
Mississippi, is located in the Northern Judicial District of
Mississippi. In the light of this proof, it is unnecessary for us
to elaborate further on the other evidence establishing venue in
this case.
4
The evidence is clearly sufficient to support the civil
rights conviction. Three of the officers who witnessed Clayton
5
We therefore turn to address Clayton’s remaining argument and the
arguments raised by the government on cross-appeal.
II
A
Clayton argues that each of his convictions should be
reversed because the district court’s modified Allen charge6 was
both prejudicial and coercive. Specifically, Clayton contends
that the Allen charge was coercive because the district court
alluded to sequestering the jury in the course of its
kick Freeman in the back of the head testified that at the time of
assault, Freeman lay on the ground facedown, that she did not
resist arrest, and that she posed no threat of harm to the
officers. Officer Steve Bierbrodt testified that Freeman was
handcuffed during the offense. The three officers further agreed
that Clayton’s use of force in this manner was either unjustified
or without cause. In finding Clayton guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury must have credited this testimony over Clayton’s
explanation that he merely placed his foot between Freeman’s
shoulder blade and her neck, and that his actions were necessary to
put her under control so that she could be handcuffed. We find
this credibility determination well within the province of the jury
to make, and it is one that we will not disturb on appeal.
5
In support of Clayton’s false statement conviction, FBI Agent
Lavoie testified that in a March 9, 1995 interview, Clayton
explicitly stated that he had not struck nor kicked Freeman during
her January 13, 1994 arrest, and that in accordance with his hands-
off policy, he did not interfere with his officers during the
course of an arrest. There was sufficient evidence--noted above in
footnote 4--that Clayton’s statements to Agent Lavoie were false
and material. The jury could rationally conclude that they were
made with the specific intent to thwart the federal investigation
into his use of unreasonable force. See United States v. Sidhu,
130 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 1997)(citations omitted).
6
See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
6
deliberations. Clayton argues that the coercive effect of the
district court’s threat of sequestration is supported by the fact
that the jury returned a split verdict against him in only forty-
five minutes after receiving the instruction. Clayton further
argues that the Allen charge was prejudicial because no reference
was made to the government’s burden of proving the charges against
him beyond a reasonable doubt. Clayton therefore contends that
the instruction encouraged the jury to accept a level of proof
below a reasonable doubt.
B
Because Clayton failed to object to the jury charge at trial,
we review the district court’s modified Allen charge for plain
error, a very difficult standard to satisfy, indeed. Douglas v.
United Serv. Auto. Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc)(citations omitted). Under the plain error standard,
forfeited errors are subject to review only where the errors are
“obvious,” “clear,” or “readily apparent,” and they affect the
defendant’s substantial rights. Id.; United States v. Calverley,
37 F.3d 160, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated in part
by, Johnson v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997). We
will not exercise our discretion to correct the forfeited errors,
however, unless they “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial proceeding.” Calverley, 37 F.3d
7
at 164 (citations omitted). Applying these standards to the
record before us, we do not find that the district court erred,
plain or otherwise, in giving the jury the modified Allen charge.
We permit district courts to give modified versions of the
Allen charge, so long as the circumstances under which the
district court gives the instruction are not coercive, and the
content of the charge is not prejudicial. United States v. Heath,
970 F.2d 1397, 1406 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The
district court specifically instructed the jury, in part:
[I]f I dismissed you for the night–-it would be very
difficult at this time to get accommodations for you.
I know several of you live pretty far away, so that
might be impractical but it is not impossible that you
could go home for the night and come back tomorrow if
you thought that would help, give you a fresh start
tomorrow.
Because nothing in this record plausibly can be read to suggest
that the district court coerced the jury to reach its verdict by
threatening sequestration, we find no “clear” nor “obvious” error
in the charge. Nor do we find the jury’s return of a verdict
after only a forty-five minute deliberation, in and of itself, to
be proof that its verdict was coerced. Even under the more
stringent abuse of discretion standard, we have approved Allen
charges where the jury later deliberated for as short as twenty-
five minutes. United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 241 (5th
Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).
8
We are also satisfied that the Allen charge was not
prejudicial. The district court, in its final jury charge,
admonished the jury at least eleven times that the government had
the burden of proving Clayton’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court also took care in its final charge to define
the term “reasonable doubt” and the phrase “proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Given the district court’s constant emphasis
on the reasonable doubt standard, the exclusion of the standard
from the Allen charge could not have prejudiced the jury’s
understanding of the level of proof necessary to convict Clayton,
so as to have affected his substantial rights--the outcome of his
trial.
Even if we assumed plain error on the part of the district
court, Clayton can not show that the modified Allen charge
seriously affected the “fairness, integrity or public reputation”
of his trial. In the light of the jury’s discriminating verdict,
whereby Clayton was acquitted of one of the civil rights charges,
we cannot say that the district court pressured the jury into
returning guilty verdicts on the remaining counts that it
otherwise would not have reached.
In sum, Clayton has shown no plain error with respect to the
district court’s modified Allen charge.
III
9
A
We now turn to the government’s cross-appeal.
The district court concluded that because Freeman had been
lawfully restrained (handcuffed) during the course of a legitimate
arrest--a restraint that was separate from and not done to
facilitate the commission of the offense itself--the two-level
victim restraint adjustment, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3, was not applicable.7
In its cross-appeal, the government contends that the
district court erred in refusing to apply the victim restraint
adjustment to Clayton’s offense level. The government argues that
the district court’s interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3 is
contrary to the plain language of the guideline, which provides no
exception for the “lawful” restraint of the victim. The
government further argues that application of the guideline was
warranted because Freeman was handcuffed when Clayton kicked her
in the head.
7
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3 (1994) provides that “if a victim was
physically restrained in the course of the offense, increase by 2
levels.”
10
B
The district court’s interpretation of the sentencing
guidelines is a conclusion of law that we review de novo. United
States v. Lister, 53 F.3d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1995)(citations
omitted).
First, we find that the district court’s interpretation of
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3, although reasoned and well considered, is not
supported by the letter of the guideline. Section 3A1.3 simply
provides, with two exceptions that are inapplicable here, a two-
level enhancement to the defendant’s sentence if the victim was
physically restrained in the course of the offense. U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.3 (“if a victim was physically restrained in the course of
the offense, increase by 2 levels”). Furthermore, we think that
an underlying consideration in applying the guideline is that the
physical restraint of a victim during an assault is an aggravating
factor that intensifies the wilfulness, the inexcusableness and
reprehensibleness of the crime and hence increases the culpability
of the defendant. It is true, as the district court concluded,
that Freeman was not handcuffed to facilitate the commission of
the offense against her--Clayton’s use of unreasonable force.
Nevertheless, Clayton took advantage of the restraint Freeman was
under as she lay on the ground, handcuffed. She posed not the
slightest threat to him in this condition. She could not defend
11
herself against an assault, and could not flee from harm. Because
Clayton took advantage of this restraint and the particular
vulnerability of the victim, it seems to us that both the letter
and spirit of the guideline applies to impose an additional
sentence on Clayton, beyond the one mandated for his use of
unreasonable force. Especially in the light of the facts in this
case, we agree with the Fourth Circuit that the lawfulness of the
defendant’s restraint of the victim at the time the unreasonable
or excessive force occurs is not a concern implicated by U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.3. See United States v. Evans, 85 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1996)
(TABLE, TEXT IN WESTLAW, 1996 WL 233056) (rejecting argument
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3 enhancement inapplicable because handcuffing
incidental to lawful arrest).
We therefore reverse the district court’s ruling, vacate the
sentence on count two, and remand for resentencing not
inconsistent with this opinion.
C
The government further argues that the district court erred
in failing to add a two-level adjustment to Clayton’s offense
level for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, on the
grounds that Clayton threatened the witnesses prior to the federal
investigation of his civil rights offenses.
12
The government argues that at the scene of the January 13,
1994 arrests, Clayton warned several officers that they did not
see anything and that if he had to worry about them telling what
they saw, he did not need them working for him. These threats,
the government says, deterred officers from coming forward with
information to the FBI, thereby obstructing the federal
investigation. The government argues that the plain language of
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which speaks of conduct occurring during an
investigation,8 does not actually require the attempt to obstruct
justice to occur during the federal investigation. It is
sufficient if Clayton’s threats were made for the purpose of
obstructing the administration of justice. Relying on United
States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1334 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the
government argues that in 1990, the Sentencing Commission amended
the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to extend application of the
guideline to conduct made unlawful by the federal obstruction of
justice statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1516. This amendment, the
government argues, “implies that the Sentencing Commission did not
intend to bar consideration of attempts to obstruct the
administration of justice solely because the obstruction occurred
8
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1994) provides that “if the defendant
willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
impede, the administration of justice during the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the
offense level by 2 levels.”
13
before the commencement of the investigation of the offense.”
Finally, although the government concedes that Fifth Circuit
precedent limits application of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to conduct
occurring “during the investigation of the instant offense,” see
United States v. Luna, 909 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir. 1990), United
States v. Wilson, 904 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1990), the
government contends that because the 1990 amendments post-date
these cases, the 1990 amendments--not our cases--provide the
authoritative interpretation of the guideline.
D
We cannot agree with the government’s proposed application
of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The plain language of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
(1994) provides that “if the defendant willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice during the investigation . . . of the instant offense,
increase the offense level by 2 levels.” (Emphasis added.) We do
not dispute that the 1990 amendments extended the application of
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to conduct prohibited by the federal obstruction
of justice statutes. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment.
(n.3(i))(1994) (noting enhancement applies to conduct prohibited
by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1516.)9 Indeed, we have previously held
9
Application note 3 to U.S.S.G § 3C1.1 (1994) reads as
follows:
14
generally that conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1512 triggers the
application of U.S.S.G. 3C1.1. See United States v. Greer, 158
F.3d 228, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1129
(1999); United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1081 (1994); United States v.
Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1482-83 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 996 (1993). Furthermore, we note specifically that
§ 1512(b)(3) criminalizes intimidation or threats made with the
intent to “hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information
relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal
offense . . . .” Thus, it would seem that vis-à-vis application
note 3(i), which incorporates by reference § 1512(b)(3), the
guideline may be applied to conduct occurring before an
investigation begins.
Consequently, we acknowledge that there does exist an
apparent conflict between the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
and application note 3(i) that must be resolved. In resolving
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of the
type of conduct to which this enhancement applies . . .
(i) conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-
1516.
This adjustment also applies to any other obstructive
conduct in respect to the official investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense where
there is a separate count of conviction for such conduct.
(Emphasis added.)
15
such inconsistencies, we treat commentary to a guideline as akin
to a federal agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rules,
and it is therefore given controlling weight when interpreting and
applying a particular guideline. Stinson v. United States, 508
U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993). The Supreme Court has made clear, however,
that “if the commentary and the guideline it interprets are
inconsistent, in that following one will . . . violat[e] the
dictates of the other, the Sentencing Reform Act itself commands
compliance with the guideline.” Id. at 43 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(4), (b)); United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1340
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995). See also
United States v. Oritz-Granados, 12 F.3d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted).
In any event, it seems to us the apparent conflict between
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and its 1990 commentary can be reconciled without
declaring which must prevail over the other in this instance. In
short, the commentary properly interpreted creates no conflict
with the guideline. From the language of application note 3(i),
see footnote 9, supra, at 15, it does not automatically follow
that any and all conduct prohibited by the obstruction statutes
requires the application of the guideline. Furthermore, the
proper application of the commentary depends upon the limits--or
breadth--of authority found in the guideline that the commentary
16
modifies and seeks to clarify. Here, the guideline specifically
limits applicable conduct to that which occurs during an
investigation; application note 3(i) expressly provides that it is
describing only a type of conduct that is subject to the
guideline. We therefore conclude that conduct that violates 18
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1516 warrants application of U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 only
when such conduct occurs, in the words of the guideline, during an
investigation of the defendant’s instant offense. We agree with
the Tenth Circuit that the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
explicitly contemplates this temporal or nexus requirement. Cf.
United States v. Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 852-53 (10th Cir. 1995)
(conduct undertaken prior to investigation does not fulfill nexus
requirement enunciated in U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1) (citations omitted)
and United States v. Lister, 53 F.3d 66, 71 (5th Cir. 1995)
(“obstruction of justice [adjustment] involves . . . a temporal
requirement. . . .”).
We also find that our reading of § U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is
entirely consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s most recent
clarification of the guideline–-a clarification, we add, that
takes precedent over prior conflicting judicial interpretations.
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46.10 In 1998, the Sentencing Commission
10
We note that our interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is
inconsistent with other circuits who have previously addressed this
issue. See United States v. Lallemand, 989 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir.
17
amended the commentary to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 expressly to provide,
inter alia, that “[the obstruction] adjustment applies if the
defendant's obstructive conduct . . . occurred during the course
of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the
defendant's instant offense of conviction . . . .”11 U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1, comment. (n.1) (1998). The purpose of the 1998 amendment
to application note one was to clarify the point that we have made
here, that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, indeed, includes a “temporal
element.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Supplement to Appendix
C, Amendment 581 (1998).12 To be sure, we are bound by this
amended commentary, Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46, and our authority to
give it recognition retroactively is without question. United
States v. Anderson, 5 F.3d 795, 802 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1137 (1994) (citations omitted). Furthermore, in the
1993) (noting “obstruction of justice can be set in train before
investigation begins”); United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327,
1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 enhancement to
conduct occurring prior to investigation or prosecution of offense
of conviction).
11
The 1998 Amendments were effective November 1, 1998.
12
Amendment 581 provides in pertinent part:
The amendment also clarifies the temporal element of the
obstruction guideline (i.e., that the obstructive conduct
must occur during the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the defendant’s offense of conviction).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Supplement to Appendix C, Amendment
581 (1998).
18
light of the 1998 amendments, our earlier cases interpreting
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 remain binding authority. See Luna, 909 F.2d at
120, Wilson, 904 F.2d at 236.
Thus, in sum, we cannot say that Clayton’s conduct justifies
application of U.S.S.G. 3C1.1. Although it is clear that Clayton
took immediate steps to suppress information concerning the
incident by intimidating and threatening the officers at the
scene, there is no evidence that Clayton continued these threats
once the federal investigation of his case began. We therefore
reject the government’s argument for application of the
obstruction of justice enhancement.13
13
In reaching this end we note that the current, modified
version of application note 3(i) is found in application note 4(i)
of the 1998 obstruction of justice enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
(1998). Application note 4(i) provides in part:
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of the
types of conduct to which this adjustment applies. . .
(i) other conduct prohibited by the obstruction of
justice provisions under Title 18, United States Code
(e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1510, 1511).
This adjustment also applies to any other obstructive
conduct in respect to the official investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense where
there is a separate count of conviction for such conduct.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4) (1998). Without question,
application note 4(i) poses the same potential conflict with the
plain language of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 as does note 3(i). We therefore
emphasize that notwithstanding our repeated reference to the 1990
commentary and U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 (1994), our holding today is not
limited in application to this dated version of the obstruction of
justice enhancement.
19
IV
For the foregoing reasons, each of Clayton’s judgments of
conviction is affirmed. We AFFIRM the sentence with respect to
count three, we VACATE Clayton’s sentence with respect to count
two, and REMAND for resentencing on that count in a manner not
inconsistent with this opinion.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED in part;
REMANDED for resentencing.
20
WIENER, Circuit Judge, specially concurring.
I concur in the foregoing opinion, including its analysis of
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 in sections IIIC and D and its conclusion that
the sentence enhancement provisions of § 3C1.1 are inapplicable to
obstructive conduct that occurs before the commencement of an
investigation. Nevertheless, I write separately to express my
consternation with what I perceive to be absurd results produced
by that rule, for which perception the instant case could well be
Exhibit I: A high ranking county law enforcement officer blatantly
commits a federal crime in full view of several subordinate
officers (who are presumably at-will employees) and immediately
threatens them with loss of employment if they break the unwritten
“code of silence” either by reporting the crime or responding
truthfully to investigatory questions about the crime; yet because
the perpetrator’s obstructive conduct at the scene of the crime of
necessity predates the commencement of any investigation, his
sentence is immune from enhancement for obstruction of justice.
I reluctantly agree that this result is mandated by the
Sentencing Commission’s 1998 amendment of the commentary to §
3C1.1 —— specifically U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.1) (1998) ——
and the explanation contained in U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual,
Supplement to Appendix C, Amendment 581 (1998) that “the
21
obstructive conduct must occur during the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the defendant’s offensive
conviction.” I just cannot fathom why that should be!
The plain language of § 3C1.1 clearly does not command such
a bizarre result under any known rules of interpretation. Whether
examined under legal canons of statutory interpretation or plain
English rules of syntax, the phrase “during the investigation”
should be read to modify the immediately preceding phrase,
“administration of justice,” not the more remote clause (“the
defendant willfully... attempted to obstruct or impede”). When §
3C1.1 is given such a faithful reading, Clayton’s warning to his
deputies immediately after the completion of his criminal conduct
was obviously and specifically intended to obstruct or impede the
facet of the administration of justice that would take place
during the investigation of his offense (and likely during
prosecution and sentencing as well). Indeed, if the subject
Guideline were meant to be applied as the Sentencing Commission
now instructs through its 1998 amendments, why was it not
originally written to read:
If the defendant, during the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense, willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice, increase the
offense level by 2 levels.
22
22
Such a rearrangement of the various clauses and phrases of this
directive would dispel any doubt and justify the inclusion of a
“temporal element.” As it stands, though, the plain wording of
the Guideline should make the enhancement applicable to Clayton.
Still, I concede that the 1998 amendments condemn the actual
language of § 3C1.1 to the dustbin of careless drafting (or
careless reading) by construing that wording to innoculate the
obstructer’s sentence from being enhanced when his obstructive
conduct precedes the commencement of an investigation.
Inasmuch as I am aware of nothing in the legislative history
of this Guideline that reflects an intent of Congress to exempt
obstructive conduct like Clayton’s solely on the basis of timing
vis-a-vis the commencement of an investigation, I urge that the
Sentencing Commission, or the Congress itself, either fix the
problem or explain this aberration for the benefit of sentencing
courts and those of us who must review their work on appeal.
Please enlighten us all: Is the panel’s analysis in the foregoing
opinion simply wrong? If not, what policy dictates the Sentencing
Commissions’s interpretation which, I submit, produces such an
anomalous result?
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