Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. ( 1994 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 92-5133.
John R. NICHOLS and Irene Nichols, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
PETROLEUM HELICOPTERS, INC., et al., Defendants.
Jimmie John MILLER, JR. and Jolain Miller, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PETROLEUM HELICOPTERS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
March 28, 1994.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge and GARWOOD, Circuit Judge, and PARKER*,
District Judge.
ROBERT M. PARKER, District Judge:
In this consolidated case arising in admiralty, Plaintiff-
Appellant Jimmie John Miller, Jr. (Miller) filed suit against
Defendant-Appellee Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. (PHI) for injuries
allegedly sustained in a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Mexico on
July 14, 1988. Following PHI's pre-trial stipulation of liability,
the only issue at trial was damages. The sole legal question was
whether Miller's wife (Jolain Miller) had a claim for loss of
consortium under general maritime law. The district court held
that damages for loss of consortium were not recoverable under
general maritime law, but awarded Miller $12,000 for general
*
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
1
damages and $2,569.13 for economic loss. The Millers appeal the
court's awards, the findings of fact upon which they were based,
and the court's holding that loss of consortium is not cognizable
under general maritime law. We AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
On July 14, 1988, Jimmie Miller, an employee of Forest Oil
Company, was enroute with other crew members to an oil platform in
the Gulf of Mexico, aboard a PHI helicopter. Upon takeoff from a
platform on which the helicopter stopped to drop off some of the
crew members, the helicopter crashed in Vermilion Block 255B, some
eighty miles off the shore of Louisiana, killing one of the eight
crew members on board. Six of the helicopter occupants filed
personal injury actions which were consolidated; only the present
action was litigated.
Prior to trial, PHI stipulated to liability and Miller waived
claims for punitive damages. The issue before the district court
was the amount of Miller's damages for physical and emotional
suffering, and for economic loss. Miller claimed the accident
caused two ruptured discs, which led to anterior lumbar fusion
surgery and which left him "permanently disabled" from heavy labor.
The district court's damage assessment was complicated by two
factors. First, Miller had been employed in an extremely heavy
manual labor occupation which had caused a history of physical
problems and had led to repeated medical treatments. Second, there
was evidence to show that, as early as 1983, "hereditary arthritic
changes had already begun ... and therefore were not caused by the
2
accident." As a result, the court was left to determine to what
degree the helicopter crash contributed to Miller's injuries.
Specifically, the threshold question was whether the helicopter
crash caused a herniated disc or whether it merely aggravated
pre-existing problems. The same analysis was necessary for the
emotional suffering claim as Miller had abused both drugs and
alcohol in the past.
The district court concluded that the preponderance of the
evidence did not show Miller had suffered a herniated disc as a
result of the accident. At worst, the crash merely caused a back
strain and pain due to a pre-existing osteoarthritic condition.
The court decided that the pain Miller had suffered would be
adequately compensated by $9,000.
The conclusion that the accident caused a mere back strain was
also dispositive of the district court's award for economic loss.
The court awarded one month's lost wages because it believed
Miller's long term physician, who seemed to have felt that Miller
could soon return to work. As the court noted, its evaluation was
substantiated by all but one of the orthopedists and neurologists
that examined Miller. The findings and awards were influenced by
the court's view of Miller's credibility as a witness.
As to Miller's claim of psychological damage, the district
court found that the evidence was again far from clear concerning
the cause of Miller's problems. The court noted Miller's
pre-accident substance abuse, beginning in high school and
continuing while he worked for Forest Oil, and his short stay in a
3
detoxification program after the accident. Although causation of
Miller's mental problems was tenuous, the court found that some
depression was independently caused by the accident. Accordingly,
the court awarded Miller $3,000 for his mental suffering.
DAMAGE FINDINGS
The standard of review to apply in our inquiry into all
findings of fact, including damage awards, is a clearly erroneous
standard. See Graham v. Milky Way Barge, Inc., 824 F.2d 376, 389,
reh'g den'd, 832 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.1987). Damage awards will not
be disturbed unless "we are convinced that an error has been
committed." Id. at 389-90.1 Furthermore, "[m]ere disagreement
with the district court's analysis of the record is insufficient,
and we will not reverse ... [a finding] "although there is evidence
to support it, [unless] the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.' " Graham v. Milky Way Barge, Inc., 824 F.2d at
388 (citing United States v. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395, 68 S.Ct. at
542) (emphasis added).
The district court concluded that Miller was not credible in
any of his assertions, whether to the court or to the doctors.
Miller implies by his laundry list of factual discrepancies or
"omissions" that the court would not have reached this credibility
assessment but for its pervasive errors in findings. As we have
1
See United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68
S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746, reh'g den'd, 333 U.S. 869, 68 S.Ct.
788, 92 L.Ed. 1147 (1948) (holding that fact findings are
reversed only where "clearly erroneous").
4
said before, "this Court should be wary of attempting to second
guess the district court, which has the decided advantage of first
hand experience concerning the testimony and evidence presented at
trial." Graham v. Milky Way Barge, Inc., 824 F.2d at 388.
Following this sound advice and upon review of the record, this
Court cannot say that it has a "definite and firm conviction" that
error has been committed. The district court was under no
obligation to accept Miller's justifications and explanations once
it concluded that Miller was not credible. The evidence does not
show that either this assessment or the fact findings were clearly
erroneous. As a result, the damage awards which were predicated
upon these findings cannot be an abuse of discretion.
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
The recoverability of damages for loss of consortium is a
legal question that is subject to de novo review. Pullman-Standard
v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66(1982); Michel v. Total Transp., Inc., 957 F.2d 186, 191 (5th
Cir.1992).
Miller contends that the district court erred in finding that
general maritime law precludes his claim for loss of consortium.
Although Miller recognizes that Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.2
prevents such a claim in a seaman's wrongful death suit, he argues
2
498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). This
rule has been extended by this Court to apply to a seaman's
personal injury suit as well. See Michel v. Total Transp., Inc.,
957 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir.1992); and Murray v. Anthony J.
Bertucci Const. Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 127, 131-32 (5th Cir.1992),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 190, 121 L.Ed.2d 134(1992).
5
that in a case involving a non-seaman, or longshoreman such as
himself, recovery for loss of consortium, established in Sea-Land
Services, Inc. v. Gaudet3, has not been limited. Miller contends
that the purpose in disallowing seamen a remedy for loss of
consortium in Miles was to bring uniformity between the remedies
available under general maritime law, the Jones Act, and the Death
on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Miller argues, however, that because
neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applies to longshoremen, the
uniformity purpose has no effect. Therefore, any limitations
imposed by the Supreme Court's decision in Miles have no effect on
a longshoreman's loss of consortium claim.
In Gaudet, the Supreme Court held that the decedent's wife
could recover for loss of consortium in a maritime wrongful death
action involving a longshoreman.4 Four years later, the Court
limited its holding in Gaudet to deaths occurring in territorial
waters. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct.
2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978). The Court concluded that in actions
involving death on the high seas, recoverable damages were
specifically limited to pecuniary losses under DOHSA. Thus, a
dependent cannot recover loss of consortium. This decision in
Higginbotham created an inconsistency between deaths in territorial
waters, where loss of consortium was available under Gaudet, and
3
414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), reh'g
den'd, 415 U.S. 986, 94 S.Ct. 1582, 39 L.Ed.2d 883 (1974).
4
Although the Supreme Court characterized the plaintiff's
claim in Gaudet as a loss of society, this Court interprets a
claim for loss of society to be substantially the same as a claim
for loss of consortium.
6
deaths on the high seas.
Only two years later, in American Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez5, the Supreme Court held that an injured harbor worker's wife
could recover for loss of consortium under general maritime law.
The Court relied on Gaudet in extending the recovery that was
already available to the dependents of longshoremen who were killed
within the scope of employment to injured longshoremen's
dependents. American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. at 281,
100 S.Ct. at 1677.
The Supreme Court attempted to remedy the anomaly it had
created between Gaudet and Higginbotham through its decision in
Miles by restoring "a uniform rule applicable to all actions for
the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act,
or general maritime law." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. at
32, 111 S.Ct. at 326. In addition, the Court specifically limited
Gaudet to its facts. The Court found that the "holding of Gaudet
applies only in territorial waters, and it applies only to
longshoremen." Miles, 498 U.S. at 31, 111 S.Ct. at 325; see also
Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Const. Co., Inc., 958 F.2d at 130.
This Court later held that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles
also extended the restrictions placed on Gaudet to the holding in
Alvez. See Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Const. Co., Inc., 958
F.2d at 130.
The Supreme Court's explicit limitation of Gaudet to its
facts, as well as its implicit limitation of Alvez to its facts as
5
446 U.S. 274, 100 S.Ct. 1673, 64 L.Ed.2d 284 (1980).
7
interpreted by this Court, indicates that the Supreme Court did not
intend to overrule Gaudet or Alvez. As a result, we are unable to
extend the uniformity rule of Miles to longshoremen killed or
injured in territorial waters. Therefore, an inconsistency remains
between deaths and injuries of longshoremen in territorial waters,
where loss of consortium is available under Gaudet and Alvez, and
death and injuries of longshoremen on the high seas. Until such
time as the Supreme Court resolves this inconsistency with regard
to longshoremen, we must apply the law as it exists today.
In applying the law to the facts in this case, it is
uncontested that the injuries of which Miller complains were the
result of a casualty occurring some eighty (80) miles off the
Louisiana coast, outside territorial waters.6 Because Miller's
injuries occurred outside territorial waters, Miller's claim fails
to satisfy one of the two equally important requirements of Gaudet
and Alvez as limited by Miles; and it must, therefore, fail.
CONCLUSION
We therefore find that the district court was not clearly
erroneous in its findings on damages or in its decision to dismiss
the loss of consortium claim. We also find no abuse of discretion
in the damage awards. We AFFIRM.
6
Miller testified in trial that the helicopter crashed upon
takeoff from Vermillion 255B, approximately eighty miles
offshore.
8