Ntakirutimana v. Reno ( 1999 )

  •                              REVISED - August 23, 1999
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                      FIFTH CIRCUIT
                                           No. 98-41597
                  JANET RENO, Attorney General of the United
                  States; MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, Secretary of State
                  of the United States; JUAN GARZA, Sheriff of
                  Webb County, Texas,
                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Texas
                                         August 5, 1999
    Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
            Elizaphan Ntakirutimana appeals the district court’s denial of
    his habeas corpus petition that challenged the district court’s
    grant of a second request for surrender.                          He alleges that the
    district court erred because (1) the Constitution of the United
    States requires an Article II treaty for the surrender of a person
    to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR” or “Tribunal”),1
    (2) the request for surrender does not establish probable cause, (3) the United Nations (“U.N.”)
          The full name of the Tribunal is: International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
    Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
    Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
    Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States. See National Defense
    Authorization Act, Pub. L. 104-106, § 1342(c)(2), 110 Stat. 486 (1996).
    Charter does not authorize the Security Council to establish the ICTR, and (4) the ICTR is not
    capable of protecting fundamental rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and
    international law. We affirm.
           Rwanda has been the source of ongoing ethnic conflict between members of the majority Hutu
    and minority Tutsi tribes. In April 1994, President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda, a Hutu, was
    killed when his aircraft crashed due to an artillery attack. The crash triggered a wave of violence by
    the Hutus against the Tutsis, which resulted in the deaths of between 500,000 and one-million
    persons. Tutsi rebels triumphed over the Hutus, and the Tutsi-dominated government then requested
    the U.N. to create an international war crimes tribunal. An investigation by the U.N. established that
    the mass exterminations of the Tutsis—motivated by ethnic hatred—had been planned for months.
    The Security Council adopted Resolution 955, which created the ICTR to prosecute and to punish
    the individuals responsible for the violations in Rwanda and its neighboring states between January
    1 and December 31, 1994. The Resolution directed that “all States shall take any measures necessary
    under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute [of the
    ICTR].”2 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1-2 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
    1598, 1601 (1994).
           In 1995, the President of the United States entered int o an executive agreement with the
    ICTR, entitled the Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United States
    and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
    Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
    Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory
    of Neighboring States (“Agreement”). The Agreement provided that the United States “agrees to
    surrender to the Tribunal . . . persons . . . found in its territory whom the Tribunal has charged with
        The Statute of the ICTR, which is annexed to Resolution 955, and the Rules of Procedure and
    Evidence of the ICTR guide proceedings before the ICTR.
    or found guilty of a violation or violations within the competence of the Tribunal.” Agreement, art.
    1, cl. 1, Jan. 24, 1995, U.S.-Int’l Trib. Rwanda, 
    1996 WL 165484
    , at *1 (Treaty). In 1996, Congress
    enacted Public Law 104-106 to implement the Agreement. See National Defense Authorization Act,
    Pub. L. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996). Section 1342(a)(1) of this legislation provides that
    the federal extradition statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 et seq.) shall apply to the surrender of persons
    to the ICTR. Among the statutory provisions made applicable is 18 U.S.C. § 3184. This section
    authorizes a judicial officer to hold a hearing to consider a request for surrender. If the judicial officer
    finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the charges under the treaty or convention, then the officer
    certifies to the Secretary of State that the individual may be surrendered. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3186
    (conferring final authority on the Secretary of State to order a fugitive’s surrender where a judicial
    officer has ruled that the requirements for extradition have been met).
                 In June and September 1996, the ICTR returned two indictments against Pastor
    Ntakirutimana, charging him with the crimes of genocide, co mplicity in genocide, conspiracy to
    commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
    Conventions and of Additional Protocol II thereto. 3 At the time of the charges, Ntakirutimana, a
    Hutu, served as President of the Seventh Day Adventist Church for all of Rwanda. He was based in
    a church complex (the “Complex”) in Mugonero, Gishyita Commune, Kibuye Prefecture, Rwanda,4
    and was well known in the Complex and the community. The first indictment alleges that, following
    the beginning of the wave of violence in 1994, Ntakirutimana and other individuals prepared and
    executed a plan by which they encouraged large numbers of the local Tutsi population to seek refuge
    in the Complex. They separated the Hutus from the Tutsis and encouraged the Hutus to leave.
    Ntakirutimana then raised an armed mob of Hutus, led them to the Complex, and directed the
           Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTR provides that the ICTR has the power to prosecute
    genocide, including complicity in genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide. Article 3 provides
    the ICTR with the power to prosecute crimes against humanity. Article 4 provides the
    ICTR with the power to prosecute serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions
    and of Additional Protocol II thereto. See S.C. Res. 955, at 3-5.
               A “prefecture” is like a state, and a “commune” is like a county within a state.
    slaughter of the Tutsis who had sought shelter there. A Tribunal Judge confirmed the indictment and
    issued a warrant for Ntakirutimana’s arrest.
               The second indictment charges Ntakirutimana with conduct that occurred after the massacre
    at the Complex. The survivors of the attack fled to the Bisesero area of Kibuye Prefecture, Rwanda.
    The indictment alleges that Ntakirutimana drove armed Hutu soldiers into the Bisesero region, hunted
    for hiding Tutsis, and ordered the soldiers to kill them. A Tribunal Judge confirmed the second
    indictment and issued another warrant for Ntakirutimana’s arrest.
               Ntakirutimana has legally resided in Laredo, Texas since he left Rwanda in 1994. The ICTR
    requested that the United States extradite Ntakirutimana to the ICTR pursuant to the Agreement.
    In September 1996, the Government filed a request for Ntakirutimana’s surrender to the ICTR in the
    Southern District of Texas.       A Magistrate Judge, serving as the judicial officer, denied the
    Government’s request for surrender. He held that Public Law 104-106 is unconstitutional because,
    based on historical practice, extradition requires a treaty. See In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 
    988 F. Supp. 1038
    , 1042 (S.D. Tex. 1997). He held alternatively that the request for surrender, and the
    supporting documents, did not provide probable cause to support the charges. See id. at 1044.
               To address the evidentiary issues raised by the Magistrate Judge, the Government added two
    declarations, and filed another request for surrender in the same court.5 The district court certified
    the surrender to the ICTR.6 The court held that the Agreement and Public Law 104-106 provide a
    constitutional basis for the extradition of Ntakirutimana. Among other reasons, the court found that
    the Constitution sets forth no specific requirements for extradition, that the Supreme Court has
    indicated its approval of extraditions made in the absence of a treaty, and that there is precedent
          The government did not appeal the request, because extradition decisions are not appealable
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See In re Extradition of Howard, 
    996 F.2d 1320
    , 1325 (1st Cir. 1993)
    (explaining that the extradition judge is not acting in his capacity as an Article III judge, and thus the
    decision is not a decision of the “district court”). The government’s remedy is to file another request.
    See, e.g., id. at 1325; Gusikoff v. United States, 
    620 F.2d 459
    , 461 (5th Cir. 1980).
           The district court judge served as the judicial officer for the extradition proceeding. We
    recognize that the order issued by the judge is not an order of the “district court,” yet we refer to it
    as such for simplicity.
    wherein fugitives were extradited pursuant to statutes that “filled the gap” left by a treaty provision.
    See In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, No. CIV. A. L-98-43, 
    1998 WL 655708
    , at * 9, 17 (S.D. Tex.
    Aug. 6 1998). The court also held that the evidence sufficed to establish probable cause for the
    charges against Ntakirutimana. See id. at *30. Ntakirutimana filed a petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court denied the petition, and Ntakirutimana has timely
             The sco pe of habeas corpus review of the findings of a judicial officer that conducted an
    extradition hearing is extremely limited. See Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 
    450 F.2d 1189
    , 1191
    (5th Cir. 1971). We inquire only into (1) whether the committing court8 had jurisdiction, (2) whether
    the offense charged is within the treaty, and (3) whether the evidence shows a reasonable ground to
    believe the accused guilty. See Fernadez v. Phillips, 
    268 U.S. 311
    , 312, 
    45 S. Ct. 541
    , 542, 69 L.
    Ed. 970 (1925); Garcia-Guillern, 450 F.2d at 1191. A writ of habeas corpus in a case of extradition
    is not a means for rehearing the findings of the committing court. See Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312,
    45 S. Ct. at 542; Oteiza v. Jacobus, 
    136 U.S. 330
    , 334, 
    10 S. Ct. 1031
    , 1032, 
    34 L. Ed. 464
    Escobedo v. United States, 
    623 F.2d 1098
    , 1101 (5th Cir. 1980).
             Ntakirutimana alleges that Article II of the Constitution of the United States requires that an
    extradition occur pursuant to a treaty. It is unconstitutional, he claims, to extradite him to the ICTR
    pursuant to a statute in the absence of a treaty. Accordingly, he claims it is unconstitutional to
    extradite him on the basis of the Agreement and Pub. Law 104-106 (the “Congressional-Executive
           We granted a stay of extradition pending appeal.
         The judicial officer, whether state or federal, who is authorized to hold an extradition hearing
    pursuant to the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 is often referred to as a “magistrate” or as the “committing
    court.” See Sayne v. Shipley, 
    418 F.2d 679
    , 685 n.15 (5th Cir. 1969).
    Agreement”).9 The district court concluded that it is constitutional to surrender Ntakirutimana in the
    absence of an “extradition treaty,” because a statute authorized extradition. We review this legal
    issue de novo.10 See United States v. Luna, 
    165 F.3d 316
    , 319 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, __ U.S.
    119 S. Ct. 1783
    143 L. Ed. 2d 811
     (1999) (reviewing constitutionality of extradition statute de
             To determine whether a treaty is required to extradite Ntakirutimana, we turn to the text of
    the Constitution. Ntakirutimana contends that Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution
    requires a treaty to extradite. This Clause, which enumerates the President’s foreign relations power,
    provides in part that “[the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
    Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate,
    and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appo int Ambassadors, other public
    Ministers and Consuls . . . .” U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This provision does not refer either to
    extradition or to the necessity of a treaty to extradite. The Supreme Court has explained, however,
    that “[t]he power to surrender is clearly included within the treaty-making power and the
    corresponding power of appointing and receiving ambassadors and other public ministers.” Terlinden
    v. Ames, 
    184 U.S. 270
    , 289, 
    22 S. Ct. 484
    , 492, 
    46 L. Ed. 534
     (1902) (citation omitted).
             Yet, the Court has found that the Executive’s power to surrender fugitives is not unlimited.
    In Valentine v. United States, 
    299 U.S. 5
    57 S. Ct. 100
    81 L. Ed. 5
     (1936), the Supreme Court
    considered whether an exception clause11 in the United States’s extradition treaty with France
        See THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 303 cmt. e (1986) (describing
    Congressional-Executive agreements).
           We may review this issue because Ntakirutimana’s challenge to the constitutionality of the
    statute, pursuant to which the district court issued the certification of extraditability, represents a
    challenge to the committing court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Manrique Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F.
    Supp. 624, 629 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (construing constitutionality argument as a challenge to the
    committing court’s jurisdiction).
          The exception clause provided, “Neither of the contracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up
    its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this convention.” Valentine, 299 U.S. at 7, 57
    S. Ct. at 102 (citations omitted). Historically, “[w]here treaties have provided for the extradition of
    persons without exception, the United States has always construed its obligation as embracing its
    implicitly granted to the Executive the discret ionary power to surrender citizens. The Court first
    stated that the power to provide for extradition is a national power that “i s not confided to the
    Executive in the absence of treat y or legislative provision.” Id. at 8, 57 S. Ct. at 102. The Court
            [The power to extradite] rests upon the fundamental consideration that the Constitution
            creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual. Proceedings
            against him must be authorized by law. There is no executive discretion to surrender him to
            a foreign government, unless that discretion is granted by law. It necessarily follows that as
            the legal authority does not exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a
            treaty, it is not enough that the statute or treaty does not deny the power to surrender. It
            must be found that statute or treaty confers the power.
    Id. at 9, 57 S. Ct. at 102.
            The Court then considered whether any statute authorized the Executive’s discretion to
    extradite. The Court commented that:
            Whatever may be the power of the Congress to provide for extradition independent of treaty,
            that power has not been exercised save in relation to a foreign country or territory “occupied
            by or under the control of the United States.” Aside from that limited provision, the Act of
            Congress relating to extradition simply defines the procedure to carry out an existing
            extradition treaty or convention.
    Id. at 9, 57 S. Ct. at 102-03 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that no statutory basis
    conferred the power on the Executive to surrender a citizen to the foreign government. See id. at 10,
    57 S. Ct. at 103. The Court subsequently addressed whether the treaty conferred the power to
    surrender, and found that it did not. See id. at 18, 57 S. Ct. at 106. The Court concluded that, “we
    are constrained to hold that [the President’s] power, in the absence of statute conferring an
    independent power, must be found in the terms of the treaty and that, as the treaty with France fails
    to grant the necessary authority, the President is without the power to surrender the respondents.”
    Id. The Court added that the remedy for this lack of power “lies with the Congress, or with the
    treaty-making power wherever the parties are willing to provide for the surrender of citizens.” Id.
    citizens.” Id. (citation omitted). Exception clauses excuse a government from surrendering its own
            Valentine indicates that a court should look to whether a treaty or statute grants executive
    discretion to extradite. Hence, Valentine supports the constitutionality of using the Congressional-
    Executive Agreement to extradite Ntakirutimana. Ntakirutimana attempts to distinguish Valentine
    on the ground that the case dealt with a treaty between France and the United States. Yet, Valentine
    indicates that a statute suffices to confer authority on the President to surrender a fugitive. See id.
    Ntakirutimana suggests also that Valentine expressly challenged the power of Congress, independent
    of treaty, to provide for extradition. Valentine, however, did not place a limit on Congress’s power
    to provide for extradition. See id. at 9, 57 S. Ct. at 102 (“Whatever may be the power of the
    Congress to provide for extradition independent of treaty . . .”). Thus, although some authorization
    by law is necessary for the Executive to extradite, neither the Constitution’s text nor Valentine
    require that the authorization come in the form of a treaty.
            Notwithstanding the Constitution’s text or Valentine, Ntakirutimana argues that the intent
    of the drafters of the Constitution supports his interpretation. He alleges that the delegates to the
    Constitutional Convention intentionally placed the Treaty power exclusively in the President and the
    Senate. The delegates designed this arrangement because they wanted a single executive agent to
    negotiate agreements with foreign powers, and they wanted the senior House of Congress—the
    Senate—to review the agreements to serve as a check on the executive branch. Ntakirutimana also
    claims that the rejection of alternative proposals suggests that the framers believed that a treaty is the
    only means by which the United States can enter into a binding agreement with a foreign nation.12
            We are unpersuaded by Ntakirutimana’s extended discussion of the Constitution’s history.
    Ntakirutimana does not cite to any provision in the Constitution or any aspect of its history that
    requires a treaty to extradite. Ntakirutimana’s argument, which is not specific to extradition, is
    premised on the assumption that a treaty is required for an international agreement. To the contrary,
    “[t]he Constitution, while expounding procedural requirements for treaties alone, apparently
          For example, Madison proposed making two types of treaties: one made by the President with
    the concurrence of the Senate, and the other requiring the concurrence of the whole legislature.
    contemplates alternate modes of international agreements.” LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-5, at 228-29 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that Article 1, § 10 of the
    Constitution refers to other international devices that may be used by the federal government). “The
    Supreme Court has recognized t hat of necessity the President may enter into certain binding
    agreements with foreign nations not strictly congruent with the formalities required by the
    Constitution’s Treaty Clause.” United States v. Walczak, 
    783 F.2d 852
    , 855 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations
    omitted) (executive agreement). More specifically, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a
    treaty or statute may confer the power to extradite. See, e.g., Valentine, 299 U.S. at 18, 57 S. Ct.
    at 106; Grin v. Shine, 
    187 U.S. 181
    , 191, 
    23 S. Ct. 98
    , 102, 
    47 L. Ed. 130
     (1902) (“Congress has
    a perfect right to provide for the extradition of criminals in its own way, with or without a treaty to
    that effect, and to declare that foreign criminals shall be surrendered upon such proofs of criminality
    as it may judge sufficient.” (citation omitted)); Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 289, 22 S. Ct. at 492 (“In the
    United States, the general opinion and practice have been that extradition should be declined in the
    absence of a conventional or legislative provision.” (citation omitted)).
            Ntakirutimana next argues that historical practice establishes that a treaty is required to
    extradite. According to Ntakirutimana, the United St ates has never surrendered a person except
    pursuant to an Article II treaty, and the only involuntary transfers without an extradition treaty have
    been to “a foreign country or territory ‘occupied by or under the control of the United States.’”
    Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9, 57 S. Ct. at 102. This argument fails for numerous reasons. First,
    Valentine did not suggest that this “historical practice” limited Congress’s power. See id. at 9, 57
    S. Ct. at 102-03. Second, the Supreme Court’s statements that a statute may confer the power to
    extradite also reflect a historical understanding of the Constitution. See, e.g., id. at 18, 57 S. Ct. at
    106; Grin, 187 U.S. at 191, 23 S. Ct. at 102; Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 289, 22 S. Ct. at 492. Even if
    Congress has rarely exercised the power to extradite by statute, a historical understanding exists
    nonetheless that it may do so. Third, in some instances in which a fugitive would not have been
    extraditable under a treaty, a fugitive has been extradited pursuant to a statute that “filled the gap”
    in the treaty. See, e.g., Hilario v. United States, 
    854 F. Supp. 165
     (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding
    extradition pursuant to a post-Valentine statute that granted executive discretion to extradite). Thus,
    we are unconvinced that the President’s practice of usually submitting a negotiated treaty to the
    Senate reflects a historical understanding that a treaty is required to extradite.
            We are unpersuaded by Ntakirutimana’s other arguments. First, he asserts that the failure to
    require a treaty violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. He contends that if a treaty is not
    required, then “the President alone could make dangerous agreements with foreign governments” or
    “Congress could legislate foreign affairs.”        This argument is not relevant to an Executive-
    Congressional agreement, which involves neither the President acting unilaterally nor Congress
    negotiating with foreign countries. Second, Ntakirutimana argues that “statutes cannot usurp the
    Treaty making power of Article II.” The Supreme Court, however, has held that statutes can usurp
    a treaty. This is confirmed by the “last in time” rule that, if a statute and treaty are inconsistent, then
    the last in time will prevail. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 
    124 U.S. 190
    , 194, 
    8 S. Ct. 456
    , 458,
    31 L. Ed. 386
     (1888) (“if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other”). This
    rule explicitly contemplates that a statute and a treaty may at times cover the same subject matter.
    Third, Ntakirutimana contends that not requiring a treaty reads the treaty-making power out of the
    Constitution. Yet, the treaty-making power remains unaffected, because the President may still elect
    to submit a negotiated treaty to the Senate, instead of submitting legislation to Congress. See THE
    RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 303 cmt. e (1986) (“Which procedure should
    be used is a political judgment, made in the first instance by the President, subject to the possibility
    that the Senate might refuse to consider a joint resoluti on of Congress to approve an agreement,
    insisting that the President submit the agreement as a treaty.”). Thus, we conclude that it is not
    unconstitutional to surrender Ntakirutimana to the ICTR pursuant to the Executive-Congressional
            Ntakirutimana contends next that the district court erred in dismissing his habeas petition
    because the request for surrender fails to establish probable cause. The Agreement with the ICTR
    requires that the Tribunal present “information sufficient to establish that there is a reasonable basis
    to believe that the person sought has committed the violation or violations for which surrender is
    requested.” Agreement, art. 2, cl. 3, 
    1996 WL 165484
    , at *1. This requirement is designed to meet
    our constitutional “probable cause” st andard in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in
    extradition proceedings. In reviewing a request for surrender, the committing court must determine
    whether probable cause exists to sustain the charges against the accused. See Collins v. Loisel, 
    259 U.S. 309
    , 314-15, 
    42 S. Ct. 469
    , 471, 
    66 L. Ed. 956
     (1922); Escobedo, 623 F.2d at1102. Our
    function on habeas review “is to determine whether there is any competent evidence tending to show
    probable cause. The weight and sufficiency of that evidence is for the determination of the
    committing court.” Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1102 (quotations and citations omitted); cf. Quinn v.
    783 F.2d 776
    , 791 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Because the magistrate’s probable cause finding is thus
    not a finding of fact ‘in the sense that the court has weighed the evidence and resolved disputed
    factual issues,’ it must be upheld if there is any competent evidence in the record to support it.”
    (citations omitted)).
            The evidence at the extradition hearing consisted of several documents, all of which were
    admissible.13 Along with the first request for surrender, the Government included a declaration from
    Arjen Mostert, who served for six months as a Tribunal investigator. Mostert obtained the
    declarations of twelve witnesses, labeled A-L to protect their identities, who survived the Mugonero
    and Bisesero massacres. Mostert declared that the witnesses were ordinary citizens and did not
    receive consideration for their testimony.       The witnesses, all of whom were familiar with
    Ntakirutimana, described seeing him at the massacre or leading the soldiers in search of Tutsis at
          There is no dispute that all three declarations have been properly authenticated by either the
    Ambassador of the United States at Kigali, Rwanda (where the office of the Prosecutor for the
    Tribunal is located), or the Ambassador of the United States to the Netherlands (where the Tribunal’s
    Prosecutor is based). The authentication renders the documents admissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3190.
    See 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (authentication requirement).
    Bisesero.14 The witnesses’ statements corroborated one another, and many of the witnesses positively
    identified a photograph of Ntakirutimana. When the Magistrate Judge denied the first request for
    surrender, he found Mostert’s affidavit alone insufficient to provide probable cause to support the
                 In response to the Magistrate Judge’s concerns, the Government added a supplemental
    declaration of Mostert with its second request for surrender.15 The second request also included the
    declaration of Pierre-Richard Prosper, the assistant prosecutor for the ICTR. Prosper further clarified
    the information in Mostert’s initial declaration.16 The district court stated that the supplemental
             The first indictment is based on evidence from nine wit esses, fo ur o f whom knew
    Ntakirutimana personally. Witnesses B, C, H, and I saw Ntakirutimana among the armed attackers
    at the Complex massacre. Witness H heard Ntakirutimana say “kill them all” to an attacker. Witness
    I heard Ntakirutimana tell Tutsis at the Complex, “you are all condemned to die.”
            The second indictment, which involves the events following the Complex massacre, is based
    on evidence from five witnesses. Witness C saw Ntakirutimana arrive at a Complex where Tutsis
    were hiding, and he heard Ntakirutimana tell soldiers to “take off the roof from this church so it
    cannot be used anymore as a hiding place for these dogs.” Witness H corroborated Wi tness C’s
    recount. Witness I saw Ntakirutimana shoot at Tutsis.
            The Appendix to the district court’s opinion also pro vides summaries of the witnesses’
    statements. See Ntakirutimana, 
    1998 WL 655708
    , at *33-37.
          Mostert’s supplemental declaration explained that he used different interpreters for many of the
    interviews, and that he used the interpreters for a large number of other interviews. He stated that
    the interpreters appeared to interpret correctly based on several criteria. He also explained that the
    photograph identification was confirmatory in nature. Mostert showed the photograph of
    Ntakirutimana to many of the witnesses after they stated that they knew him and had provided a
    physical description that Mostert believed to be correct.
            Prosper provided the following clarifying information. First, many of the wit esses were
    interviewed several times, and the interviews initially were general and later became more focused.
    Second, the Office of the Prosecutor for the ICTR has a policy to read back the statement to the
    witness for accuracy, and all of the witnesses upon whom Mostert relied were
    subjected to this process. The witnesses all signed their statement and a Witness Acknowledgment
    Form affirming that the statement is true to the best of their recollection. Third, all witnesses spoke
    Kinyarwanda, except for Witness B who was interviewed in French by a French-speaking
    investigator. Prosper stated that the texts of the written statements were
    proficiently written, and that he personally knew all of the interpreters who performed the final
    interviews. For each interview, the interpreter signed a certification that he had translated the
    interview. Fourth, Prosper attested that, based on the information before him, he believed the
    witnesses to be reliable. He stated that the witnesses are ordinary citizen-victim-eyewitnesses who
    were speaking of their own personal experiences. They were not informants, their statements
    corroborated one another, and he had discovered no evidence that a witness had a reason to lie.
    Fifth, all the witnesses knew or were familiar with Ntakirutimana, who was a chief pastor in the
    Complex. Ten of the witnesses claimed Seventh Day Adventist as their religion. All of the witnesses
    declarations satisfactorily responded to the Magistrate Judge’s earlier objections. The district court
    concluded that probable cause existed to sustain the charges against Ntakirutimana.
            Ntakirutimana argues that the district court erred. He contends that the Tribunal has not
    presented evidence sufficient to show pro bable cause, because the allegations in Mostert’s
    declarations “lack probative force and are unreliable.”17 Ntakirutimana primarily raises credibility
    challenges to the evidence against him.18 Yet, the issue of credibility “is a matter committed to the
    magistrate and is not reviewable on habeas corpus.” Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1102 n.10 (citations
    omitted); see also Quinn, 783 F.2d at 815 (“The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be
    accorded their testimony is solely within the province of the extradition magistrate.” (citation
    omitted)); cf. Collins, 259 U.S. at 316, 42 S. Ct. at 472 (explaining that a petitioner can introduce
    evidence on probable cause, but cannot introduce evidence in defense, because otherwise the
    extradition proceeding will become a full hearing and trial of the case); Eain v. Wilkes, 
    641 F.2d 504
    511 (7th Cir. 1981) (“An accused in an extradition hearing has no right . . . to pose questions of
    credibility as in an ordinary trial, but only to offer evidence which explains or clarifies that proof”
    (citation omitted)); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 
    478 F.2d 894
    , 905 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that credibility
    conflict should await trial).
            Ntakirutimana asserts that the credibility of the witnesses was not known to the investigators
    or established by the Tribunal. According to Ntakirutimana, if the witnesses had ties to the Rwandan
    but one were Tutsi.
          Ntakirutimana argues initially that “it is rare for substantive criminal allegations in support of
    an extradition request to be presented solely in an investigator’s affidavit.” We deem this objection
    waived, because Ntakirutimana did not raise the objection at his extradition hearing. See Lo Duca
    v. United States, 
    93 F.3d 1100
    , 1111 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that extraditee waived non-jurisdictional
    objection by failing to raise the objection at the extradition hearing).
          Apart from his credibility challenges, Ntakirutimana briefly attempts to explain his actions. He
    asserts that, because churches were customary places of sanctuary, there would be nothing sinister
    for anyone to encourage Tutsis to congregate in the Complex. Yet, this explanation fails to explain
    most of the allegations against him. Further, Ntakirutimana conceded at the extradition hearing that,
    without respect to the reliability of the evidence (which has been resolved adversely
    to Ntakirutimana), the substance of what is reported in the affidavits constitutes probable cause.
    government, then the witnesses would have been under pressure to incriminate persons about whom
    they were questioned. The district court noted, however, that Ntakirutimana provided no specific
    reason to doubt the credibility of the witnesses. The court stated that the wi tnesses’ statements
    “enjoy several indicia of reliability,” such as the similarity of the witnesses’ statements. The court
    resolved the credibility challenge in the Government’s favor. We defer to this conclusion regarding
    the credibility of the witnesses.19 See Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1102 n.10.
           Ntakirutimana raises the issue of Mostert’s credibility, because the signature page of
    Mostert’s first declaration was typed with a different computer than the first twenty-four pages.
    Ntakirutimana asserts that Mostert could have signed the signature page, and that, after Mostert’s
    employment ended, the page could have been attached to any text. Thus, Ntakirutimana argues, all
    of Mostert’s declarations cannot be taken at face value. The district court rejected this credibility
    challenge, finding that Mostert’s supplemental declaration, in which he avowed that the first
    declaration was accurate and complete, answered this allegation. As explained previously, we will
    not revisit this credibility finding. See Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1102 n.10.
           Ntakirutimana also challenges the probable cause determination on the ground that the
    translators were unreliable. The investigators conducted most of their interviews through translators
    of English and French, the languages of the Tribunal. With the exception of one French-speaking
    witness, the witnesses spoke Kinyarwanda, Rwanda’s native language. Ntakirutimana argues that
    the translators were not certified or screened for competence or bias, that there was an enormous
    potential for distortion by the unscreened interpreters, and that there was no way to gauge the
    accuracy of the translations. The district court declined to address Ntakirutimana’s challenge to the
    reliability of the translations. The court stated that, as long as the evidence is authenticated in
         Ntakirutimana contends that eyewitness accounts of traumatic events are inherently unreliable,
    and that the witnesses’ statements are undermined by “Rwanda’s oral tradition in which Rwandans
    adopt and confuse what they have seen with what they have been told by others and consider it their
    personal experience.” Ntakirutimana waived this argument by failing to raise it
    below. See Lo Duca, 93 F.3d at 1111.
    accordance with § 3190,20 then it would not consider challenges to the reliability of the translation.
    We agree with the district court that we can presume that the transl ations are correct. See In re
    Extradition of David, 
    395 F. Supp. 803
    , 806 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (“The Court feels that the translations
    must be presumed to be correct unless David presents some convincing evidence otherwise.”). The
    extradition court need not independently inquire into the accuracy of the translations submitted with
    a formal extradition request, because “[s]uch a requirement would place an unbearable burden upon
    extradition courts and seriously impair the extradition process.” Tang Yee-Chun v. Immundi, 
    686 F. Supp. 1004
    , 1009 (S.D.N.Y 1987). Hence, we decline to address Ntakirutimana’s speculations
    regarding the reliability of the translations.
             In short, the district court resolved the credibility challenges adversely to Ntakirutimana, and
    we will not review those issues. We hold that, based on Mostert’s and Prosper’s declarations, there
    is competent evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that the evidence
    established probable cause to believe that Ntakirutimana committed the crimes charged.
             Finally, we turn to Ntakirutimana’s remaining arguments. Ntakirutimana argues that the U.N.
    Charter does not authorize the Security Council to establish the ICTR, and that the only method for
    the U.N. to create an international criminal tribunal is by a multinational treaty. This issue is beyond
    the scope of habeas review. See Garcia-Guillern, 450 F.2d at 1191 (outlining three issues for habeas
    review); cf. Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 289, 22 S. Ct. at 491-92 (stating that it would be impossible for
    the Executive Department to conduct foreign relations if every court in the country was authorized
    to inquire and decide whether the person who ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the
    power, by its Constitution and laws, to make the engagements into which he entered). Ntakirutimana
    contends additionally that the ICTR is incapable of protecting his rights under the United States
    Constitution and international law. He contends, for example, that the ICTR is incapable of
    protecting his due process rights and that the ICTR denies the right to be represented by the counsel
            See supra note 13.
    of one’s choice. Due to the limited scope of habeas review, we will not inquire into the procedures
    that await Ntakirutimana. See Garcia-Guillern, 450 F.2d at 1192; Gallina v. Fraser, 
    278 F.2d 77
    79 (2d Cir. 1960) (regarding as significant that the procedures that will occur in the demanding
    country are not listed within the scope of habeas review); see also In re Extradition of Manzi, 
    888 F.2d 204
    , 206 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining the rule of “non-inquiry”). “Such matters, so far as they may
    be pertinent, are left to the State Department, which ultimately will determine whether the appellant
    will be surrendered to the [ICTR].” Garcia-Guillern, 450 F.2d at 1192.
           For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court denying
    Ntakirutimana’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and LIFT the stay of extradition.
    ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge, writing separately, special
         Judge Garza has crafted for the panel a well-written opinion
    that faithfully adheres to controlling jurisprudence, and thereby
    has earned my concurrence.   I write separately and briefly to
    invite the Secretary to closely scrutinize the underlying
    evidence as she makes her decision regarding whether
    Ntakirutimana should be surrendered to the International Criminal
    Tribunal for Rwanda.   The evidence supporting the request is
    highly suspect.   Affidavits of unnamed Tutsi witnesses acquired
    during interviews utilizing questionable interpreters in a
    political environment that has all the earmarks of a campaign of
    tribal retribution raises serious questions regarding the truth
    of their content.
         It defies logic, and thereby places in question the
    credibility of the underlying evidence, that a man who has served
    his church faithfully for many years, who has never been accused
    of any law infraction, who has for his long life been a man of
    peace, and who is married to a Tutsi would somehow suddenly
    become a man of violence and commit the atrocities for which he
    stands accused.   I fully understand that the ultimate decision in
    this case may well be a political one that is driven by important
    considerations of State that transcend the question of guilt or
    innocence of any single individual.   I respect the political
    process that necessarily is implicated in this case, just as I
    respect the fact that adherence to precedent compels my
         To the extent that it may be relevant to the Secretary's
    decision, I merely add, based on all the information in this
    record, viewed from the perspective of a judge who has served
    fifteen years on the trial bench and five years on the court of
    appeals, that I am persuaded that it is more likely than not that
    Ntakirutimana is actually innocent.
    HAROLD R. DeMOSS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
         Our Constitution is the result of a deliberate plan for the
    separation of powers, designed to prevent both the arrogation of
    authority and the potential for tyranny.   Notwithstanding our
    nation’s moral duty to assist the cause of international justice,
    our nation’s actions taken in that regard must comport with the
    Constitution’s procedures and with respect for its allocation of
    powers.   That is why we claim to be a nation ruled by law rather
    than men.
         The Attorney General’s litigation position in this case has
    apparently been chosen for the purpose of validating a
    constitutional shortcut which would bypass the Treaty Clause.
    She stakes her case on the validity and enforceability of a
    warrant issued by the United Nations International Criminal
    Tribunal for Rwanda, which is a nonsovereign entity created by
    the United Nations Security Council, purporting to “DIRECT” the
    officials of our sovereign nation to surrender the accused.   In
    defense of this, the Attorney General relies exclusively on what
    my colleagues have termed a “Congressional-Executive Agreement” -
    - the coincidence of an “executive agreement” with the Tribunal,
    entered on behalf of the United States by an ambassador appointed
    by the President in the course of his duties to conduct foreign
    affairs, and a purported enabling act passed by simple majorities
    of both houses of Congress and signed into law by the President.
         A structural reading of the Constitution compels the
    conclusion that most international agreements must be ratified
    according to the Treaty Clause of Article II.    The history of
    national and international practice indicate that extradition
    agreements fall into this category.    Our Founding Fathers
    intended that the President have authority to negotiate such
    agreements, but also that they be ratified pursuant to a special
    process intended to set a higher standard of legislative
    agreement than that required for ordinary legislation.    The
    Constitution thus provides a plain procedure for entering into a
    treaty, which requires the assent of the President and two-thirds
    of the Senate.   That procedure was not followed with respect to
    the executive agreement to extradite fugitives to the
    International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the procedure is
    not satisfied by the combination of an executive agreement and
    ordinary legislation.   For this reason, I respectfully dissent
    from the majority’s conclusion that the Constitution permits the
    extradition of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana based upon a foreign
    warrant invoking an executive agreement and its implementing
         The Attorney General seeks to surrender Elizaphan
    Ntakirutimana to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
    based on three legal authorities.     The first of these authorities
    is an executive agreement, the “Agreement on Surrender of
    Persons” between the United States and the Tribunal (hereinafter,
    Surrender Agreement).21            The Surrender Agreement was signed on
    behalf of the United States by the American ambassador to The
    Netherlands, and it purports to satisfy “the obligation of the
    United States, pursuant to the Statute of the Tribunal adopted by
    United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 . . . to surrender
    accused or convicted persons to the Tribunal.”                         Surrender
    1996 WL 165484
    , at *1.                   United Nations Security
    Council Resolution 955 requires that “all States shall cooperate
    fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in
    accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the
    International Tribunal” and “all States shall take any measures
    necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of
    the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation
    of States to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued
    by a Trial Chamber under Article 28 of the Statute.”22
    Accordingly, the Surrender Agreement provides that:
                       The United States agrees to surrender to the
                  Tribunal, pursuant to the provisions of this
                  Agreement and the Statute, persons, including
                  United States citizens, found in its territory
                  whom the Tribunal has charged with or found guilty
                  of a violation or violations within the competence
                  of the Tribunal as defined in the Statute.
    Surrender Agreement, art. I, § 1, 
    1996 WL 165484
    , at *1.
            See Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United States
    and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
    Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
    Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the
    Territory Of Neighbouring States, Jan. 24, 1995, U.S.-ICTR, available in 
    1996 WL 165484
            Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994),
    available in ICTR - Resolutions of the Security Council (visited July 26, 1999)
            The second authority is an act of Congress, the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (the Act), Pub. L.
    No. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 186, 486.                    Section 1342 provides,
    in pertinent part:
                  [T]he provisions of chapter 209 of title 18,
                  United States Code [18 U.S.C. § 3181 et seq.],
                  relating to the extradition of persons to a
                  foreign country pursuant to a treaty or convention
                  for extradition between the United States and a
                  foreign government, shall apply in the same manner
                  and extent to the surrender of persons, including
                  United States citizens, to . . . (B) the
                  International Tribunal for Rwanda, pursuant to the
                  Agreement Between the United States and the
                  International Tribunal for Rwanda.
    Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342(a), 110 Stat. 186, 486 (1996),
    reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 3181 note at 214 (West Supp. 1999).
            Section 1342(a) has a curious history.                  First, the provision
    obviously bears no relation by subject matter to the general
    theme of the Act in which it was enacted, which was matters
    pertaining to the national defense.                  Predictably, then, no
    language bearing any relation to this provision can be found in
    the original bills proposed in the House of Representatives and
    Senate for the 104th Congress.23               The first suggestion about a
    provision permitting extradition to the International Criminal
    Tribunals came in the form of a floor amendment offered by
    Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania.                   The Specter Amendment,
            See S. 1026, 104th Cong. (1995); available in U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, GPO Access
    (hereinafter, GPO Access) (visited July 27, 1999)
    ; H.R. 1520, 104th Cong. (1995), available
    in GPO Access (visited July 27, 1999)
    No. 2081, supplied the language which was ultimately enacted as
    § 1342 of the Act.24            Senator Specter indicated that this
    amendment contained legislation which was being sought by the
    President,25 and with this assurance (and without further
    discussion), the leadership of the Senate accepted the
    amendment.26        In conference, the House receded to the Specter
    Amendment “with a technical amendment.”                        H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-
    450 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 238, 391.                               Subsection
    (a)(1) of the Specter Amendment (ultimately Pub. L. 104-106,
    § 1342(a)(1), the provision at issue in this appeal) was not
    altered.       The conference report was accepted by the Senate on a
    56-34 vote and by the House of Representatives on a 287-129 vote.
    Public Law 104-106 was subsequently signed by President Clinton,
    and the Specter Amendment thereby got slipped into law through
           See 142 Cong. Rec. S11218 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995), available in GPO Access (visited
    July 27, 1999) .
             See 141 Cong. Rec. S10316 (daily ed., July 19, 1995), available in GPO Access (visited
    July 27, 1999)
     (noting referral to the Committee on the Judiciary of a “communication from the
    Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, transmitting, a draft of proposed
    legislation to enable the United States to meet its obligations to surrender offenders and provide
    evidence to . . . the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
    Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
    Rwanda and Citizens Responsible for Genocide and other such Violations Committed in the
    Territory of Neighboring States”); 141 Cong. Rec. H7010 (daily ed., July 13, 1995), available in
    GPO Access (visited July 27, 1999)
           See 141 Cong. Rec. S11422 (Aug. 4, 1995), available in GPO Access (visited July 27,
    1999) .
    the back door, without any public discussion or debate about its
    substantive merits.
            Although it relates to foreign relations and performs a
    function historically performed by treaties, the Specter
    Amendment (§ 1342) did not originate in the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee,27 and no hearings or deliberations of any
    sort were ever held by that committee on the subject of
    extradition to the international criminal tribunals established
    by the United Nations Security Council.                      Likewise, although
    § 1342 relates to extradition procedures in United States courts,
    it was never considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee.28
    Most curiously, the provision does not purport to be an amendment
    to the existing statutes on extradition and it was not codified.
    It appears in the United States Code Annotated only as a
    “statutory note” -- a literal afterthought.                        If the ratification
    of an extradition agreement is a legislative function which our
    Founding Fathers intended to be performed under the Treaty
    Clause, the history of the passage of § 1342 stands in stark
    contrast to that heightened legislative standard.                           It was a
    parasite on the defense spending authorization bill, the ultimate
    passage of which never could have been questioned.                            Like one of
             The jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee includes, among other things,
    “[r]elations of the United States with foreign nations generally” and “[t]reaties and executive
    agreements.” Sen. Foreign Relations Committee Rule 1(a), available in GPO Access (visited July
    27, 1999) .
           The jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee includes, among other things, “[f]ederal courts
    and judges” and “[j]udicial proceedings, civil and criminal, generally.” U.S. Senate Judiciary
    Comm., Jurisdiction (visited July 27, 1998) .
    our B-2 stealth bombers, it slipped through the radar net of the
    legislative process without the public awareness, debate, and
    consideration normally given to legislation of this importance.
         The third authority invoked by the Attorney General is a
    warrant issued by the United Nations International Criminal
    Tribunal for Rwanda, located in Arusha, Tanzania.    The warrant
    reads, in pertinent part: “I, Judge William H. Sekule, Judge of
    the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda . . . HEREBY
    DIRECT the Authorities of the United States of America to search
    for, arrest and surrender to the International Criminal Tribunal
    for Rwanda: Elizaphan Ntakirutimana . . . .    [who is] currently
    believed to be in the United States of America.”     Prosecutor v.
    Ntakirutimana, No. ICTR-96-17-1 (U.N.I.C.T.R. Sept. 7, 1996)
    (warrant of arrest and order for surrender).   The Tribunal is not
    a sovereign nation.
         The “Congressional-Executive Agreement” method of ratifying
    the Surrender Agreement with the Tribunal runs afoul of the
    Constitution’s Treaty Clause, and § 1342 alone is
    constitutionally insufficient to ratify the Surrender Agreement
    which has been invoked to support the extradition.
         Article II, § 2 of the Constitution provides:
                   The President shall be Commander in Chief of
              the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
              Militia of the several States, when called into
              the actual Service of the United States; he may
              require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
              Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon
              any Subject relating to the Duties of their
              respective Offices, and he shall have Power to
              grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against
              the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
                   He shall have Power, by and with the Advice
              and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
              provided two thirds of the Senators present
              concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the
              Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
              Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
              Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
              Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
              are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
              shall be established by Law: but the Congress may
              by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
              Officers, as they think proper, in the President
              alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
                   The President shall have Power to fill up all
              Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of
              the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
              expire at the End of their next Session.
    U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.   The Congressional-Executive Agreement
    did not conform to this procedure.    Not only was ordinary
    legislation passed in lieu of the Senate’s advice and consent,
    but also the required threshold for passage in the Senate of
    approval by two-thirds was not achieved.
         The Constitution’s treaty procedure must be followed in
    order to ratify an extradition agreement which contractually
    binds our nation to respect obligations to another nation.     The
    intent of the framers could not be clearer on this point.     Our
    Founding Fathers were very concerned about the new nation
    becoming entangled in foreign alliances.    The possibility of
    giving the President full authority for foreign affairs was
    considered and rejected.   In The Federalist No. 75, Alexander
    Hamilton argued that it would be “utterly unsafe and improper” to
    completely entrust foreign affairs to a President, who is elected
    for only four years at a time.    The Founders were especially
    concerned with the possibility that, in the conduct of foreign
    policy, American officials might become seduced by their foreign
    counterparts or a President might actually betray the country.
    Thus, while primary responsibility for foreign affairs was given
    to the President, a significant restraint and “check” on the use
    of the treaty power was created by requiring for treaties the
    advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.    See The
    Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that this “check”
    is a major distinction between the presidency and England’s
    monarchy, in which the king was “the sole and absolute
    representative of the nation in all foreign transactions”).      The
    decision to require approval of two-thirds of Senators was
    controversial and hotly debated, but it was ultimately decided
    that sheer importance of the treaty power merited such a
    treatment.   Treaties cannot be accomplished by any means other
    than the Article II treaty ratification procedure.
         Of course, not all agreements with foreign countries require
    the full Article II “treaty” treatment in order to be effective.
    The Constitution implicitly recognizes a hierarchy of
    arrangements with foreign countries, of which treaties are the
    most sacrosanct.   Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No
    State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
    Confederation . . . .”), with U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3
    (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter
    into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
    foreign Power . . . .”).   The Attorney General’s primary argument
    in defense of the enforceability of the extradition agreement
    with the Tribunal follows this line of thought.    She has argued,
    and the majority echoes (see Majority Op. at 7), that the
    Constitution contains no explicit reference to extradition.
         But the fact of the matter is that while the Constitution
    has no provisions explicitly relating to extradition, it likewise
    has no provisions explicitly relating to executive agreements.
    It only mentions treaties.    Our national government is one of
    limited, enumerated powers.    See, e.g., United States v. Lopez,
    514 U.S. 549
    , 551, 
    115 S. Ct. 1624
    , 1626 (1995) (quoting The
    Federalist No. 45 (James Madison)); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
    Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).    All agree that the Surrender
    Agreement is not a treaty.    We are therefore left to read between
    the lines to ascertain whether the President and Congress have
    wrongfully attempted by ordinary legislative procedures, to
    exercise a power governed by the Treaty Clause or whether some
    source of power other than the Treaty Clause enables the
    President and Congress to bind the country to the Surrender
         Our inquiry is significantly informed by a demonstration of
    what specific powers are encompassed by the Treaty Clause.    “A
    treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a
    legislative act.”   Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
    (1829); see also Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 
    112 U.S. 580
    , 598-99, 
    5 S. Ct. 247
    , 254 (1884).   Alexander Hamilton
              The power of making treaties . . . relates neither
              to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to
              the enaction of new ones; and still less to an
              exertion of the common strength. Its objects are
              CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the
              force of law, but derive it from the obligations
              of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by
              the sovereign to the subject, but agreements
              between sovereign and sovereign.
    The Federalist No. 75.   It is precisely the position of the
    Attorney General that the Surrender Agreement is a valid contract
    with a foreign authority and that it has the force of law.     In
    Alexander’s day, an agreement with those characteristics was
    called a treaty.
         If the Treaty Clause is to have any meaning there is some
    variety of agreements which must be accomplished through the
    formal Article II process.   Otherwise, the heightened
    consideration dictated by Article II could be avoided by the
    President and a majority of Congress simply by substituting the
    label of “executive agreement” for that of “treaty.”     The Supreme
    Court has recognized this principle:
                   Express power is given to the President, by
              and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
              make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators
              present concur, and inasmuch as the power is
              given, in general terms, without any description
              of the objects intended to be embraced within its
              scope, it must be assumed that the framers of the
              Constitution intended that it should extend to all
              those objects which in the intercourse of nations
              had usually been regarded as the proper subjects
                   of negotiation and treaty, if not inconsistent
                   with the nature of our government and the relation
                   between the States and the United States.
    Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 242-43 (1872) (emphasis
            Plainly, an extradition agreement is a type of agreement
    historically found in a treaty and therefore governed by the
    Treaty Clause.          Extradition, which is defined as “the surrender
    by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of
    an offense outside of its own territory, and within the
    territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to
    try and to punish him, demands the surrender,” Terlinden v. Ames,
    184 U.S. 270
    , 289, 
    22 S. Ct. 484
    , 492 (1902), has usually been
    regarded as the proper subject of negotiation and treaty.
    Historically, the United States has not surrendered a person to a
    foreign authority (excluding countries or territories controlled
    by the United States) in the absence of a valid extradition
    treaty.29      Every extradition agreement ever entered into by the
    United States (before the advent of the new Tribunals) has been
    accomplished by treaty, including the Jay Treaty (1795) and the
    Webster Ashburton Treaty (1842).                   The original extradition
    statutes, enacted in 1848, required the existence of an
    extradition treaty, and there was no exception until § 1342 was
    passed to accommodate the Tribunals for Rwanda and the former
    Yugoslavia.        Furthermore, “the principles of international law
            The Attorney General cites only one historical example of such an extradition, but
    explicitly refrains from opining as to whether that extradition was validly accomplished.
    recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty.”     Factor v.
    290 U.S. 276
    , 287, 
    54 S. Ct. 191
    , 193 (1933).
         The insistence on the use of the treaty power for certain
    types of international agreements comports with the Founding
    Fathers’ intention that the President not have unfettered
    discretion to enter agreements with foreign nations.    See The
    Federalist No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).   Unless the Article II
    procedure is insisted upon, the President can exercise such
    plenary power simply by denominating his agreements as something
    other than “treaties.”   See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
    Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-form Method in
    Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1273 &
    n.179 (1995); cf. Freytag v. Commissioner, 
    501 U.S. 868
    , 880, 
    111 S. Ct. 2631
    , 2639 (1991) (“Neither Congress nor the Executive can
    agree to waive this structural protection [of the Appointments
    Clause] . . . .   The structural interests protected by the
    Appointments Clause are not those of any one Branch of government
    but of the entire Republic.”); Weiss v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 163
    , 189, 
    114 S. Ct. 752
    , 766 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)
         Notably, the United States has publicly declared to the
    entire world that it can only enter into an extradition agreement
    through a treaty.   In its fifth reservation to the Convention on
    the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
    1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, the United States proclaimed to the
    international diplomatic community that it "reserves the right to
    effect its participation in any such tribunal only by a treaty
    entered into specifically for that purpose with the advice and
    consent of the Senate.”30             There is no treaty which has been
    entered into “with the advice and consent of the Senate” which
    authorizes the participation in the Tribunal by the United
    States.      This reservation clearly evidences the intent and
    expectation of the United States that the only way its
    participation in the Tribunal could take place was by a duly
    negotiated and ratified treaty on that subject.                        A reading of the
    Treaty Clause of the Constitution which permits the semantic
    shenanigans suggested by the Attorney General is an insult to the
    intricate structure of the Constitution, which seeks to avoid
    tyranny and ensure democracy through a deliberate separation of
    power and a delicate system of checks and balances.                          See, e.g.,
    Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
    501 U.S. 452
    , 458, 
    111 S. Ct. 2395
    , 2400
    (1991); The Federalist No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton); The
    Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).                  In contrast, § 1342(a) came
    into being without hearings by any committee of the Congress,
    without a committee report from any committee of Congress, and
    without any debate on the floor of the Senate or the House of
    Representatives as to the substance of its provision.                           I
    therefore am compelled to conclude that Ntakirutimana may not be
           United States Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
    Crime of Genocide (Nov. 25, 1988), available in United Nations, United Nations Treaty
    Collection Web Site (visited July 27, 1999) .
    constitutionally surrendered because of the failure of the
    executive and legislative branches to comply with Article II.31
            The Attorney General and my colleagues in the majority place
    great reliance on Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker,
    299 U.S. 5
    57 S. Ct. 100
     (1936), in which the Court stated: “It
    cannot be doubted that the power to provide for extradition is a
    national power; it pertains to the national government and not to
    the states.         But, albeit a national power, it is not confided to
    the Executive in the absence of treaty or legislative provision.”
    299 U.S. at 8, 57 S. Ct. at 102 (internal citation omitted).
    Valentine was a case that did involve a treaty -- its stray
    reference to “legislative provision” is pure dicta, and certainly
    not a plain holding that extradition may be accomplished by the
    President simply on the basis of congressional approval.
    Likewise, in Terlinden v. Ames, 
    184 U.S. 270
    22 S. Ct. 484
    (1902), in which the Court noted that “[i]n the United States,
    the general opinion and practice have been that extradition
    should be declined in the absence of a conventional or
    legislative provision,” 184 U.S. at 289, 22 S. Ct. at 492, there
    was also a valid extradition treaty, and the reference to a
    “legislative provision” is again dicta.
           See Then v. Melendez, 
    92 F.3d 851
    , 853 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The advice and consent of the
    Senate is a constitutional prerequisite to a valid treaty, and the executive branch does not have the
    power to extradite alleged criminals absent a valid extradition treaty.”) (dicta); Gouveia v. Vokes,
    800 F. Supp. 241
     (E.D. Pa. 1992) (extradition must be authorized by a treaty).
            The Attorney General insists that the President has the
    power to unilaterally enter an extradition agreement with foreign
    nations, the only distinction between that variety of agreement
    and an Article II treaty being that only a treaty will impose
    upon the President a duty to extradite.                      In defense of this
    principle, the Attorney General points to Factor v. Laubenheimer,
    290 U.S. 276
    54 S. Ct. 191
     (1933), which states:
                   While a government may, if agreeable to its own
                   constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise the
                   power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the
                   country from which he had fled, and it has been
                   said that it is under a moral duty to do so, the
                   legal right to demand his extradition and the
                   correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding
                   country exist only when created by treaty.
    290 U.S. at 286, 54 S. Ct. at 192 (internal citation omitted);
    see also United States v. Rauscher, 
    119 U.S. 407
    7 S. Ct. 234
            But these cases do not support the Attorney General’s
    position.       The quoted passage stands for the unremarkable
    propositions that a sovereign nation can (and perhaps should), if
    consistent with its own laws, surrender to another sovereign
    nation one of the surrendering nation’s own citizens who is
    accused of crimes by that other sovereign nation, but that no
    such duty or legal obligation arises absent a treaty.                             Those
    propositions do not mean that the President, acting unilaterally,
    can enter non-binding executive agreements to extradite,32 or
    that Congress may ratify such an agreement.                        The Attorney General
           See Valentine, 299 U.S. at 17, 57 S. Ct. at 106; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
    Extradition: United States Law and Practice 67 (3d ed. 1996).
    does not purport to act pursuant to some sort of sovereign power
    to surrender Ntakirutimana; she has consciously premised her
    argument on the validity and enforceability of the Surrender
    Agreement.        This is plain from the briefs filed in this Court.33
    Given that the Surrender Agreement is the authority invoked by
    the Attorney General, it is the authority which we must consider.
            The executive and legislative branches of government
    erroneously disregarded their obligation to respect the structure
    provided by the Constitution when they purported to enter this
    extradition agreement.34              We should issue a writ of habeas
    corpus, and Ntakirutimana should not be surrendered.                              The
    extradition agreement in place between the United States and the
    Tribunal is unenforceable, as it has not been properly ratified.
    The agreement’s implementing legislation is unconstitutional
    insofar as it purports to ratify the Surrender Agreement by a
    means other than that prescribed by the Treaty Clause.                               The two
    acts seek impermissibly to evade the mandatory constitutional
            A recent news story made this point clear, reporting: “Federal prosecutors handling the
    [Ntakirutimana] case say the United States has a valid contract with the United Nations to enforce
    resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.” U.S. Appeals Court to Hear Extradition Case of
    Rwandan Pastor, AP, Mar. 11, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
            It is not true, as has been suggested in the media, that “[i]f Mr. Ntakirutimana’s
    constitutional argument prevails, it will diminish the ability of the United States to cooperate in
    international war crimes prosecutions.” War Crimes and Extradition, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1999,
    at A20, available in 
    1999 WL 2210242
    . All that is required for participation is conformance with
    the Constitution. If the President wishes to bind the United States to an agreement such as the
    Surrender Agreement, he must obtain the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate as
    provided in Article II.
    route for implementing such an agreement.35                         I therefore
    respectfully dissent.36
            Whether executive and legislative actions such as those giving rise to this case reflect, as
    political commentator George Will has suggested, a disturbing trend of “dilution of American
    democracy,” I leave for others to judge. George Will, See You in Congress . . ., Wash. Post, May
    20, 1999, at A29, available in 
    1999 WL 17003981
     and Sacramento Post, Sacbee Voices -
    George Will (visited July 27, 1999) .
            Ntakirutimana challenges the Tribunal itself as an ultra vires creation of the United
    Nations Security Council. His
    is not a novel argument -- the authority of the ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and the former
    Yugoslavia has been hotly debated in academia, see, e.g., Tara Sapru, Comment, Into the Heart
    of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security Council Tribunal into the Rwandan
    Crisis, 32 Tex. Int’l L.J. 329, 339 (1997), rejected by Rwanda’s neighbors who refuse to accept
    the ICTR’s process, and fully litigated in the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. To the extent
    that the viability of the Tribunal is a legitimate subject of foreign policy within the realm of the
    Executive, separation-of-powers concerns justify our Court in abstaining from the political
    question of the Tribunal’s authority. See Baker v. Carr, 
    369 U.S. 186
    , 210-11, 
    82 S. Ct. 691
    706 (1962); see generally 13 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3529
    (2d ed. 1984).