United States v. Urquidi , 172 F. App'x 42 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                 March 21, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-50271
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ESTEBAN URQUIDI,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:04-CR-944-ALL
    --------------------
    Before KING, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Esteban Urquidi appeals his conviction for possession of
    more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute.
    He argues that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he
    knowingly possessed marijuana.
    Urquidi failed to renew his motion for a judgment of
    acquittal at the close of the evidence.     When defense counsel
    fails to renew a motion for a judgment of acquittal, this court
    reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 05-50271
    -2-
    determine whether affirming the conviction would result in a
    manifest miscarriage of justice.     See United States v. McIntosh,
    
    280 F.3d 479
    , 483 (5th Cir. 2002).    This court will find a
    manifest miscarriage of justice only where the record is devoid
    of evidence pointing to guilt or contains evidence on a key
    element of the offense that is so tenuous that a conviction would
    be shocking.   
    Id.
    Urquidi, a commercial driver, was apprehended after Border
    Patrol agents discovered 1,854 pounds of marijuana with an
    estimated value of $1,400,000 in the trailer that he was hauling.
    Since the evidence does not establish that the marijuana was
    clearly visible or readily accessible, Urquidi’s control of the
    trailer alone is insufficient to establish knowledge.       United
    States v. Pennington, 
    20 F.3d 593
    , 598-99 (1994).      “[A]dditional
    circumstantial evidence that is suspicious in nature or
    demonstrates guilty knowledge is required.”      United States v.
    Jones, 
    185 F.3d 459
    , 464 (5th Cir. 1999).      Such evidence “may
    include nervousness, conflicting statements to law enforcement
    officials, and an implausible story.”    
    Id.
    Circumstantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.      The
    substantial value of the marijuana being transported by Urquidi,
    approximately $1,400,000, is circumstantial evidence that is
    probative of Urquidi’s knowledge.    See United States v.
    Villarreal, 
    324 F.3d 319
    , 324 (5th Cir. 2003).      The jury
    reasonably could have inferred that Urquidi would not have been
    No. 05-50271
    -3-
    entrusted with such valuable cargo if he was not part of the
    trafficking scheme.    Villarreal, 
    324 F.3d at 324
    .
    There also was evidence that the bill of lading Urquidi
    provided to Border Patrol agents had been altered and that the
    seal recovered from Urquidi’s trailer was not placed on the
    trailer by the company that shipped the windshields, the company
    from which Urquidi took possession of the trailer, or government
    officials.   The jury reasonably could have determined that the
    marijuana was placed into the trailer, that the trailer was
    sealed, and that the bill of lading was altered after the trailer
    was in Urquidi’s possession.    United States v. Resio-Trejo, 
    45 F.3d 907
    , 911 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasonable inferences are to be
    resolved in favor of the verdict).
    Other testimony provides further circumstantial evidence of
    Urquidi’s knowledge.   There was evidence that Urquidi took
    possession of the trailer at 8:10 p.m. on April 13, 2004.
    However, he did not arrive at the Border Patrol checkpoint until
    12:20 a.m. on April 14, 2004.    It should have only taken one-and-
    one-half hours to travel the approximately 90 miles between these
    points.   Although Urquidi’s former employer suggested a
    legitimate reason for this delay, the jury reasonably could have
    discredited this testimony.     United States v. Ortega Reyna, 
    148 F.3d 540
    , 544 (5th Cir. 1998) (it is not necessary that every
    reasonable hypothesis of innocence be excluded).
    No. 05-50271
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    Finally, Border Patrol Agent Joe Navarro indicated that
    Urquidi was nervous when first stopped and when standing at the
    back of the trailer.   Given the other circumstantial evidence,
    the jury reasonably could have interpreted his nervousness as
    another indication that he knew the marijuana was in the trailer.
    Ortega Reyna, 
    148 F.3d at 544
    .
    Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury reasonably could
    have inferred that Urquidi knowingly possessed marijuana.      See,
    e.g., Pennington, 
    20 F.3d at 598-99
     (issue is whether jury made a
    rational decision to convict or acquit based on the evidence).
    Therefore, the evidence of Urquidi’s knowledge is not so tenuous
    that his conviction is shocking, and affirming his conviction
    would not result in a manifest miscarriage of justice.   See
    McIntosh, 
    280 F.3d at 483
    .
    For the foregoing reasons, Mendoza’s conviction is AFFIRMED.