Campbell v. Miles ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-50814
Summary Calendar
WILLIAM WALLACE CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PRICILLA MILES, Etc.; ET AL.,
Defendants,
PRICILLA MILES, Chief Classification Officer,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-97-CV-692-TWP
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July 20, 2000
Before SMITH, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Pricilla Miles contends that the magistrate judge erred in
denying her renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The
motion was timely filed within 10 days after entry of the
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)
(computation of time); see also Gaia Tech. Inc. v. Recycled Prod.
Corp., 175 F.3d 365, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1999). By moving for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b),
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-50814
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Miles preserved her right to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence. Gaia, 175 F.3d at 374. The magistrate judge's order,
denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law in part, is
reviewed de novo. Id.Miles is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the
court determines that "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis" for the jury's decision. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); see
Gaia, 175 F.3d at 374. The question whether the evidence was
sufficient is examined under the standard announced in Boeing Co.
v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled on
other grounds, Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331,
336 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc):
Under Boeing, there must be a conflict in
substantial evidence to create a jury question.
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such
quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men
in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach
different conclusions. Consequently, a mere scintilla
of evidence is insufficient to present a question for
the jury. Even if the evidence is more than a
scintilla, Boeing assumes that some evidence may exist
to support a position which is yet so overwhelmed by
contrary proof as to yield to a motion for judgment as
a matter of law.
Gaia, 175 F.3d at 374-75 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted). This court considers "all of the evidence, drawing all
reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility
determinations in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party." Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (5th
Cir. May 5, 2000), 2000 WL 554537, *4.
The jury determined that Miles, a chief classification
officer, had acted with deliberate indifference to threats made
against Campbell by other prisoners, in violation of Campbell's
No. 99-50814
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right against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Campbell was awarded compensatory and punitive
damages.
"Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to
protect inmates from violence at the hands of other prisoners."
Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1995). "The
plaintiff prisoner must prove both that he is incarcerated under
conditions ‘posing a substantial risk of serious harm,’ and that
the prison official's state of mind is one of 'deliberate
indifference' to the prisoner's health or safety." Id. at 400-01
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1994)). To show
that Miles was deliberately indifferent to the risk that he would
be assaulted by other prisoners, Campbell had to prove that Miles
was "both 'aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of harm exists'" and that Miles actually
drew that inference. Horton, 70 F.3d at 401 (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837).
Miles contends that her response to Campbell's life-
endangerment complaint was objectively reasonable based upon the
information she possessed and in light of her limited role in the
classification system. "[P]rison officials who actually knew of
a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free
from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if
the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
This court has construed "Farmer's 'respond reasonably' and
'reasonable measures' language . . . to relate necessarily to
whether the first, or objective, component of an Eighth Amendment
No. 99-50814
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violation has been made out." Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74
F.3d 633, 649 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal citation
omitted).
"Objective reasonableness is a matter of law for the courts
to decide; not a matter for the jury." Williams v. Bramer, 180
F.3d 699, 702 (5th Cir.), clarified on reh'g, 186 F.3d 633, 634
(5th Cir. 1999); see Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430,
434-36 (5th Cir. 1993). A trial may be necessary, however, when
underlying historical facts are in dispute which are material to
the reasonableness determination. Williams, 180 F.3d at 703; see
Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1998). The
magistrate judge held that a reasonable jury could have held that
the "paucity" of Miles's investigation into Campbell's life-
endangerment complaint amounted to deliberate indifference.
Miles contends that she was involved in only one of a series
of investigations regarding life-endangerment complaints lodged
by Campbell and that most of the evidence presented by Campbell
concerned the actions of other individuals. Miles also contends
that she did not have decision-making authority over Campbell's
housing assignment. The magistrate judge's conclusions were
based upon evidence presented regarding Miles's individual acts
and omissions. The fact that Miles may have been following
prison policy or that other individuals may also have been at
fault does not undermine the magistrate judge's reasoning.
Miles argues that her actions were objectively reasonable in
light of the fact that prisoners attempt to manipulate the prison
system to their own advantage. Miles contends that it was her
No. 99-50814
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responsibility to determine whether the complaint was a sham.
The evidence did not show that Miles concluded that the complaint
was a sham, only that she concluded that it was unsubstantiated.
Miles argues that she did actually investigate Campbell's
complaint. Miles argues that she did not interview the persons
who were identified as a threat to Campbell because to do so
would have endangered Campbell. Miles argues that prison
administrators should be deferred to in the execution of prison
policies related to prison discipline and security. The jury was
instructed on this point of law; it was presented with this
defense and rejected it.
The magistrate judge's ruling was not predicated on Miles's
failure to interview the particular inmates who had been
identified as a threat to Campbell, but on her failure to
interview anyone in Section 1 of 4 Building and in relying
unreasonably on another inmate's statement that everyone in 4
Building knew of the threats. See Smith, 158 F.3d at 912(holding that question whether supervisor had responded
reasonably to life-endangerment complaint, in light of 6,000
complaint letters filed annually, presented a question for the
trier of fact which could not be addressed on interlocutory
appeal). Although Miles's arguments provide reasons why the jury
could have found in her favor, it did not. The jury's verdict
was supported by substantial evidence under the Boeing standard.
Miles argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
the award of punitive damages. "Under § 1983, punitive damages
may be awarded only if the official conduct is 'motivated by evil
No. 99-50814
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intent' or demonstrates 'reckless or callous indifference' to a
person's constitutional rights." Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d
187, 192 (5th Cir. 1994). The jury found that Miles "acted with
malice or willfulness or with callous and reckless indifference
to the safety or rights of the plaintiff." The magistrate judge
held, based upon his prior conclusion that the evidence was
sufficient to support the findings as to deliberate indifference,
that there was sufficient evidence showing that Miles acted with
reckless indifference. See Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 489
(5th Cir. 1999) ("It is . . . fair to say that acting or failing
to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly
disregarding that risk."), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000).
Miles has not shown that the magistrate judge erred in concluding
that the punitive damage award was supported by substantial
evidence.
Miles also argues for the first time on appeal that, because
she is no longer employed by the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice or by the state, punitive damages are inappropriate in
this case because they will not deter future constitutional
violations. This claim cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal because it does not involve a purely legal question.
Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); see
Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir.
1999).
Miles also argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury's award of compensatory damages. Because this
No. 99-50814
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issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it cannot be
reviewed. See Leverette, 183 F.3d at 342.
Miles contends that the magistrate judge erred in denying
her Rule 60(b) motion on grounds of juror bias. Under Rule
60(b)(6), the trial court may relieve a party from a final
judgment for any reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). "A court may grant
relief under [Rule] 60(b)(6) only under extraordinary
circumstances." Heirs of Guerra v. United States, 207 F.3d 763,
767 (5th Cir. 2000). The magistrate judge's order denying the
Rule 60(b)(6) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Maddox v. Runyon, 139 F.3d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998).
A letter written by the juror in question to a local
newspaper reflects the juror's state of mind after the trial and
does not show that the juror had an unfair bias against law
enforcement officials prior to the trial. There is no reason to
believe that the juror's animus toward a particular FDIC employee
in connection with a corporate bankruptcy would cause him to be
biased against a state corrections officer in an unrelated
failure-to-protect case. The juror's failure to respond to
another question posed by the magistrate judge on voir dire was
not dishonest.
In an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial,
this court has found no error in a direct criminal appeal raising
the question of juror misconduct under similar facts. See United
States v. Doke, 171 F.3d 240, 246-47 (5th Cir.) (criminal new
trial motion) (failure of one juror to disclose prior arrest and
No. 99-50814
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of two other jurors to disclose unrelated civil lawsuits did not
"raise a material question concerning actual or implied bias that
would necessitate a removal for cause"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
250 (1999)). Under the more narrow standard applicable to
appeals from orders denying Rule 60(b)(6) motions, there is no
basis for finding an abuse of discretion in this case. The
judgment is AFFIRMED.
Campbell has moved for dismissal of the appeal, arguing that
Miles failed to comply with the briefing schedule. The motion is
DENIED.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.