Box v. Birmingham Southeast ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-60067
Summary Calendar
JIMMY BOX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
BIRMINGHAM SOUTHEAST, LLC, doing business as Birmingham Southeast
Scrap Yard; INTERNATIONAL MILL SERVICES , INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
SARAH NELL BOX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
BIRMINGHAM SOUTHEAST SCRAP YARD; INTERNATIONAL MILL SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:99-CV-551)
October 19, 2000
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
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Plaintiffs Jimmy Box and Sarah Nell Box appeal the district
court’s order denying their Motion for New Trial and to Correct
Judgment. Mr. and Mrs. Box argue that the jury reached a
compromise verdict and awarded inadequate damages in their
negligence suit against the defendants. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.
I.
On May 6, 1998, Jimmy Box delivered a load of scrap metal to
Birmingham Southeast’s scrap yard. Mr. Box parked his tractor-
trailer alongside several railway cars, and the crane operator
unloaded the scrap from Mr. Box’s trailer. During the course of
the operation, several new railway cars began moving into position
for unloading. At the same time, Mr. Box moved his tractor-trailer
in the way of the oncoming railway cars. Although the railway cars
were moving only two miles-per-hour, the scrap yard employees could
not bring the cars to a complete stop before the cars hit Mr. Box’s
truck on the passenger side.
At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence as to
their respective liability. Mr. Box claimed that the scrap yard
employees instructed him to move his trailer. Birmingham Southeast
claimed that he moved his truck on his own volition. Furthermore,
Mr. Box claimed that he received extensive injuries to his
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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shoulder as a result of the accident. Birmingham Southeast
presented testimony that the train’s impact with the truck was
minimal and that Mr. Box got out of his truck after the accident
and appeared to be unharmed. The parties also disputed the extent
of Mr. Box’s damages resulting from the accident.
The jury verdict did not apportion liability to either party,
but awarded $100 to Mr. Box and nothing to Mrs. Box for her alleged
loss of consortium. The plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial on
the issue of damages pursuant to Federal Rule 59(a), claiming that
the damage award was grossly inadequate and that the award stemmed
from a compromise verdict. The district judge denied plaintiffs’
motion, and the plaintiffs appealed.
II. Discussion
We review a district court’s order denying a motion for new
trial under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hidden Oaks
Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1051 (5th Cir. 1998).
“[O]ur review is more narrow when a new trial is denied than when
one is granted.” Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1998). However, the limits of the trial judge’s discretion
depend on the type of claims raised by the appellants. See
Yarbrough v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 964 F.2d 376, 379 (5th Cir.
1992) (applying a totality of the circumstances test to a
compromise verdict claim); Hidden Oaks Ltd., 138 F.3d at 1051
(holding that a jury verdict will support damages unless there is
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an absolute absence of evidence that could form the basis of the
award).
A. Compromise Verdict
If the record demonstrates that the jury’s assessment of
liability or damages stemmed from a compromise, the aggrieved party
is entitled to a new trial. See Yarbrough, 964 F.2d at 379. “[W]e
examine the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and consider any
indicia of compromise from the record . . . that may have caused a
verdict for damages that would be inadequate if the jury actually
found liability.” Id. (citing Pagan, 931 F.2d at 339).2 If the
jury disregarded uncontested damages or the record demonstrates
that the jury was confused on issues of contributory negligence,
then an award of nominal damages raises the suspicion of a
compromise verdict. See id. at 339 n.2 (citing National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Koch Indus., 701 F.2d 108, 110 (10th Cir.
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We have considered factors such as (1) whether the issue of
liability was strongly contested, (2) whether the jury was confused
concerning contributory negligence, (3) whether either party urged
the trial court to accept the verdict finally rendered, (4) how
long the jury deliberated, (5) whether the jury requested
additional instructions, and (6) whether the jury attempted to
qualify its award in any way. See Pagan, 931 F.2d at 339; Hatfield
v. Seaboard A.L.R. Co., 396 F.2d 721, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1968);
Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir. 1983).
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1983)). “However, a nominal or inadequate finding of damages alone
does not automatically mandate the conclusion that a compromise
verdict produced the award.” Pagan, 931 F.2d at 339.
The appellants argue that the $100 damage award represents
less than one percent of the $2,450 that appellants claim is the
amount of damages to which the parties stipulated at trial.
Because the damage award suggests that Birmingham Southeast was
less than one percent liable, the appellants argue that the jury
either (1) disregarded the stipulated evidence of damages or (2)
was confused concerning contributory negligence. Therefore, the
appellants argue that the jury compromised in reaching its verdict.
The appellants’ claim is without merit. First, the jury did
not ignore stipulated damages. The defendants’ attorney agreed
that the plaintiff’s income was $1,450 lower after the accident.
However, the parties never agreed that the decline in Mr. Box’s
earnings stemmed from his alleged injury. Tr. at 20. The
defendants conceded that, at the very most, Mr. Box was entitled to
$1,000 in insurance deductibles. Tr. at 16. However, the
defendants argued that this amount could be reduced by Mr. Box’s
own negligence. Tr. at 584.
Second, there is no indicia to support a finding that the jury
was confused concerning contributory negligence. There was ample
evidence throughout the record to support the jury’s assessment of
damages. For example, the defendants claimed that Mr. Box
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fabricated his injury and was capable of performing the same work
as before his alleged injury occurred. To support their position,
the defendants offered a videotape of Mr. Box working on his bass
boat and using the same arm he claimed was painful to move. Tr. at
22-24. Therefore, the jury could have disregarded any evidence of
Mr. Box’s medical expenses and loss of earning capacity. In
addition, the defendants’ attorney asked the jury to consider only
the $1,000 insurance deductible as possible damages, reduced by the
portion of Mr. Box’s own negligence. Tr. at 584. The $100 in
damages awarded by the jury is ten percent of the $1,000
deductible. In light of the testimony presented at trial, the jury
could reasonably find Birmingham Southeast only ten percent liable
for the damage to Mr. Box’s tractor-trailer. Therefore, the record
does not show that the jury was confused concerning contributory
negligence. Furthermore, the appellants have not argued and the
record does not demonstrate any other basis on which we could
conclude that the jury compromised in reaching its verdict.
B. Adequacy of Damages
In reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion
in denying appellants’ motion for new trial because of inadequate
damages, we determine whether there is an absolute absence of
evidence to support the jury’s verdict. See Hidden Oaks Ltd., 138
F.3d at 1051. “In addition, we will interfere with the
factfinder’s award of damages only in extreme and exceptional cases
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where the award is so gross . . . as to be contrary to right
reason.” Young v. City of New Orleans, 751 F.2d 794 (5th Cir.
1985) (quoting Baily v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1385,
1390 (5th Cir. 1980).
Sarah Nell Box claimed that she suffered damages from loss of
consortium because of her husband’s alleged injury. However, the
defendants, through cross-examination of Mrs. Box, demonstrated
that Mrs. Box could not attribute her marital problems to her
husband’s injury. Tr. at 336-42. She also testified that the
reason she filed the lawsuit was to secure an interest in the
litigation because of her pending divorce proceeding against her
husband. Tr. at 335-36. Therefore, the jury’s verdict is supported
by evidence that Mrs. Box did not suffer damages from loss of
consortium. This is clearly not the type of exceptional case where
the award is so inadequate as to be contrary to right reason. In
fact, testimony at trial supports the verdict.
Because the record fails to show that the jury reached a
compromise verdict or that the jury assessed inadequate damages, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion for new trial.
AFFIRM
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