United States v. Rangel ( 2001 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-20083
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT RANGEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-99-CR-176-11
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January 3, 2001
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Robert Rangel appeals his conviction following a jury trial
for possession of, and conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute, cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. We have reviewed
the record and the briefs of the parties, and we find no
reversible error.
Rangel contends that the “trial court erred in losing the
written jury verdict signed by the jury foreman.” He argues that
the case should be returned to the trial court “for a hearing to
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-20083
-2-
determine if the loss of the written jury verdict violated [his]
constitutional right to due process.”
Rangel’s argument is not supported by the record. The trial
transcript clearly indicates that the jury unanimously found
Rangel guilty on the two criminal counts at issue. The trial
transcript also indicates that the jury foreperson signed the
verdict form and that all members of the jury confirmed that this
was their verdict. That the signed form does not appear in the
record, for whatever reasons, is irrelevant to any relief he
seeks on appeal.
Rangel argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
the jury’s verdict finding him guilty on the conspiracy count.
Although Rangel is correct that one cannot conspire with a
government informant, see United States v. Goff, 847 F.2d 149,
173 (5th Cir. 1988), the evidence here showed that Rangel merely
sold the crack cocaine to the informant, but that he conspired
with, at a minimum, codefendants Munoz and Malatek to procure the
cocaine for delivery. Additionally, Rangel’s sufficiency
challenge to the conspiracy conviction based on the assertion
that he was involved in only one transaction also fails. Based
on the evidence presented concerning the interactions between
Rangel and his codefendants, a reasonable jury could have found
that the specific transaction at issue here was part of a larger
narcotics conspiracy. See United States Greenwood, 974 F.2d
1449, 1459 (5th Cir. 1992).
AFFIRMED.