United States v. Slanina ( 2004 )


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  •                                                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         January 28, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-20181 c/w
    03-20447
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    WESLEY JOSEPH SLANINA, also known as Wesley J. Slanina,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-00-CR-75-1
    --------------------
    Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Wesley Joseph Slanina appeals the district court’s order on
    remand to consider the impact of Ashcroft v. Free Speech
    Coalition, 
    535 U.S. 234
    (2002).   The district court held that the
    general verdict finding Slanina guilty of two counts of
    possession of child pornography was based on the validated
    portions of the Child Pornography Act of 1996 and that the
    evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the images
    downloaded by Slanina were images of real children.    Slanina
    argues that on remand, the Government did not present any
    No. 03-20181
    -2-
    additional evidence, in particular expert testimony, to show that
    the images downloaded by Slanina depicted real children and,
    therefore, the Government failed to meet its burden of proof to
    establish that the images depicted real children.    Slanina does
    not argue that any of the images that he downloaded were virtual
    children, and not real children.
    Free Speech Coalition did not establish a broad requirement
    that the Government must present expert testimony to establish
    that the unlawful image depicts a real child.   Three circuits
    that have considered this issue take the same position.     See
    United States v. Kimler, 
    335 F.3d 1132
    , 1142 (10th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    72 U.S.L.W. 3392
    (U.S. Dec. 8, 2003)(No. 03-7285); United
    States v. Deaton, 
    328 F.3d 454
    , 455 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
    (citing United States v. Vig, 
    167 F.3d 443
    , 449-50 (8th Cir.
    1999)); United States v. Hall, 
    312 F.3d 1250
    , 1260 (11th Cir.
    2002), cert. denied, 
    123 S. Ct. 1646
    (2003).    “Juries are still
    capable of distinguishing between real and virtual images; and
    admissibility remains within the province of the sound discretion
    of the trial judge.”   
    Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1142
    .    Therefore, the
    Government was not required to present any additional evidence or
    expert testimony to meet its burden of proof to show that the
    images downloaded by Slanina depicted real children, and not
    virtual children.   The district court, as the trier of fact in
    this case, was capable of reviewing the evidence to determine
    No. 03-20181
    -3-
    whether the Government met its burden to show that the images
    depicted real children.   See 
    id. Slanina argues
    that the district court erred in denying his
    motion to correct the written judgment to strike the conditions
    that the district court did not orally pronounce at sentencing
    pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    Rule 36 provides that “the court may at any time correct a
    clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record,
    or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or
    omission.”   FED. R. CRIM. P. 36.   Slanina has not shown that the
    discrepancy between the orally imposed sentence and the written
    judgment is a clerical mistake or oversight which the district
    court may correct pursuant to Rule 36.      See United States v.
    Steen, 
    55 F.3d 1022
    , 1025-26 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995)(clerical error
    under Rule 36 is limited to “‘mindless and mechanistic mistakes’”
    and “‘minor shifting of facts.’”).     Therefore, he has not shown
    that the district court erred in denying his Rule 36 motion.
    Slanina argues that the district court erred in denying his
    motion to suppress the evidence obtained through a warrantless
    search of his office computer.      Slanina concedes that the issue
    is foreclosed because it was raised and decided in his original
    direct appeal, but states that he is raising it to preserve it
    for possible Supreme Court review.     “Under the law of the case
    doctrine, an issue of law or fact decided on appeal may not be
    reexamined either by the district court on remand or by the
    No. 03-20181
    -4-
    appellate court on a subsequent appeal.”     United States v.
    Becerra, 
    155 F.3d 740
    , 752 (5th Cir. 1998).    “[A] prior decision
    of this court will be followed without re-examination” unless,
    inter alia, “the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a
    manifest injustice.”    
    Id. at 752-53.
      “To be clearly erroneous, a
    decision must strike [the court] as more than just maybe or
    probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.”     Hopwood v. Texas, 
    236 F.3d 256
    , 272-73 (5th Cir. 2000).   Because Slanina has not shown
    that the court’s previous decision affirming the denial of his
    motion to suppress was “dead wrong,” this court will not
    reexamine this issue.   See 
    id. AFFIRMED.