State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Matthew Medgyesy , 610 F. App'x 213 ( 2015 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-1570
    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MATTHEW MEDGYESY; KIMBERLY MEDGYESY,
    Defendants - Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Greenville.   Mary G. Lewis, District Judge.
    (6:12-cv-00044-MGL)
    Submitted:   February 27, 2015                     Decided:   May 5, 2015
    Before KEENAN    and   DIAZ,   Circuit   Judges,    and   DAVIS,   Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jeffrey A. Merriam, S. Brook Fowler, CARTER, SMITH, MERRIAM,
    ROGERS   &  TRAXLER,   PA,   Greenville,   South  Carolina,   for
    Appellants.    T. David Rheney, Stephanie G. Flynn, GALLIVAN,
    WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Matthew and Kimberly Medgyesy appeal the district court’s
    orders granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual
    Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) and denying their
    subsequent      postjudgment          motion.       “We    review    a     court’s        order
    granting summary judgment de novo.”                   Feldman v. Law Enforcement
    Assocs.      Corp.,     
    752 F.3d 339
    ,   348    (4th    Cir.    2014).             Summary
    judgment       should    be    granted     only     when    “there       is       no    genuine
    dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.”                     Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).                  “Only
    disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
    under    the    governing       law    will   properly      preclude       the         entry   of
    summary judgment.”             Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986).              With regard to the postjudgment motion, our
    review is for an abuse of discretion.                      Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n
    for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 
    674 F.3d 369
    , 378 (4th Cir.
    2012).    We affirm.
    The Medgyesys first argue that the district court erred by
    concluding State Farm was entitled to a conclusive presumption
    that    it     had    made     them    a   meaningful       offer     of      underinsured
    motorist (“UIM”) coverage.                 South Carolina requires automobile
    insurers to offer optional UIM coverage up to the limits of the
    insured’s       liability       coverage.          S.C.    Code     Ann.      §    38-77-160
    (2015).      Such an offer must be meaningful.                 Cohen v. Progressive
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    N. Ins. Co., 
    737 S.E.2d 869
    , 872 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013).                        If the
    insurer fails to make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage, a
    court will reform the policy to include that coverage up to the
    insured’s limits of liability coverage.                   
    Id. An insurer
    is
    entitled to a conclusive presumption that it made a meaningful
    offer of UIM coverage if the insured has signed a form that uses
    a     state-approved      offer      format    and    meets    certain     statutory
    requirements.       S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-350(B) (2015).
    The Medgyesys concede that the offer forms used by State
    Farm followed a state-approved format, were signed by Matthew,
    and satisfied all of the technical requirements in S.C. Code
    Ann. § 38-77-350(A) (2015).             They argue, however, that the offer
    forms contain ambiguities caused by the handwritten entries of a
    State    Farm    agent.     These      ambiguities,     the    Medgyesys      reason,
    should    have   precluded      a    finding   that    State     Farm   had   made    a
    meaningful offer under § 38-77-350.
    Under South Carolina law, insurance policies are subject to
    the    formalistic     rules    of    interpretation      that    are    applied     to
    contracts generally.           Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 
    757 S.E.2d 399
    , 406 (S.C. 2014).             “It is a question of law for the
    court     whether    the    language      of    a    contract     is     ambiguous.”
    Williams v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 
    762 S.E.2d 705
    , 710 (S.C.
    2014)    (internal     quotation       marks    omitted).         “A    contract     is
    ambiguous when it is capable of more than one meaning or when
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    its    meaning      is   unclear.”          N.    Am.    Rescue      Prods.,     Inc.   v.
    Richardson, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, 
    2015 WL 80900
    , at *3 (S.C. Jan.
    7, 2015).      “Whether a contract is ambiguous is to be determined
    from examining the entire contract, not by reviewing isolated
    portions of the contract.”              
    Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 710
    .                    The
    construction        that    reasonably           gives     effect      to     the   whole
    instrument and each of its parts will be adopted.                           Yarborough v.
    Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    225 S.E.2d 344
    , 349 (S.C. 1976).
    Only if the terms of the contract are ambiguous may the court
    look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.
    C.A.N. Enters., Inc. v. S.C. Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n,
    
    373 S.E.2d 584
    , 586 (S.C. 1988).
    We conclude that the offer forms were not ambiguous.                             The
    Medgyesys assert that the offer forms are susceptible to three
    meanings.        However,      the     offer       forms       are    only     reasonably
    susceptible to the meaning offered by State Farm because only
    that   meaning      gives   effect     to    each       part   of    the    offer   forms.
    
    Yarborough, 225 S.E.2d at 349
    .                   Accordingly, we conclude that
    any    error   in    the    district    court’s          failure     to     consider    the
    alleged ambiguity is necessarily harmless.
    Next, the Medgyesys claim that the district court erred by
    not considering whether its decision invites an absurd result,
    thereby defeating the purpose of South Carolina UIM statutes,
    and by granting summary judgment when a factual dispute remained
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    over the amount of UIM coverage to which the Medgyesys were
    entitled.     For both of these claims, the Medgyesys rest on the
    assumption that the offer forms contained ambiguities.                Because
    the offer forms did not contain ambiguities, any errors asserted
    by the Medgyesys on these grounds would be harmless.
    Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the district court.
    See United States v. Smith, 
    395 F.3d 516
    , 519 (4th Cir. 2005).
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument   because    the   facts   and   legal
    contentions     are   adequately   presented   in   the   materials     before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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