Noel v. Daybrook Fisheries ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 99-30385
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    WILLIAM NOEL, III,
    Plaintiff-Appellee-Appellant,
    versus
    JACQUELINE NOEL,
    Intervenor-Appellant,
    versus
    DAYBROOK FISHERIES, INC.; ET AL.,
    Defendants,
    DAYBROOK FISHERIES, INC.
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 97-CV-3985-F
    _________________________________________________________________
    April 12, 2000
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The issue presented by this appeal is whether the district
    court correctly entered a judgment as a matter of law for the
    defendant,     Daybrook    Fisheries,     Incorporated,   denying   the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    plaintiff’s,    William   Noel,   claim   for   maintenance   and   cure.1
    Finding no error on the part of the district court, we affirm.
    As an initial matter, Noel has failed to demonstrate that the
    district court abused its discretion in preventing him from arguing
    that the questions asked by Daybrook regarding his prior medical
    history ran afoul of the American with Disabilities Act.              See
    Flannery v. Carroll, 
    676 F.2d 126
    , 130 (5th Cir. 1982)(stating that
    “unless the [district] has abused its discretion, its ruling
    concerning the [pre-trial] order will not be disturbed on appeal”).
    The district court, holding that Noel had waived any claim of
    illegality pursuant to the ADA because such a claim was not
    included in the pre-trial order, stated:
    This business about the American with Disabilities Act is
    not an issue that has been raised properly. . . [The
    plaintiff’s] pretrial memorandum fails to raise it. . . .
    So if, indeed, there was an American with Disabilities
    Act issue, it has not been properly raised, it is not
    before this Court, and it has been waived.
    After reviewing the pre-trial order, it is apparent that Noel
    did not raise the issue of the legality of the questions asked by
    Daybrook.      As we have noted on numerous occasions: “Once the
    [pre-trial] order is entered, it controls the scope and course of
    the trial.     If a claim or issue is omitted from the order, it is
    1
    ”Maintenance and cure is a contractual form of compensation
    given by maritime law to a seaman who falls ill while in the
    service of his vessel. The shipowner’s obligation is deep-rooted
    in maritime law and is an incident or implied term of a contract
    for maritime employment.”    McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship
    Corp., 
    396 F.2d 547
    , 548 (5th Cir. 1968).
    2
    waived.”   
    Flannery, 676 F.2d at 129
    (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 16); see
    also Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 
    665 F.2d 689
    , 696 (5th
    Cir. 1982).   Thus, because Noel has failed to demonstrate that the
    district court abused its discretion in preventing him from raising
    the issue of the illegality of the questions asked by Daybrook, the
    judgment of the district court in this respect is affirmed.2
    Focusing on the merits of Noel’s maintenance and cure claim,
    it is clear that he has failed to demonstrate that the district
    court erred in granting a judgment as a matter of law for Daybrook.
    An employer may deny maintenance and cure if he can establish that:
    2
    It should be noted, that the district court, in its Order and
    Reasons denying Noel’s motion for a new trial, addressed and
    rejected Noel’s claim that the questions posed by Daybrook during
    the physical examination regarding his past medical history were
    forbidden by the ADA. The district court held:
    First, [Noel] has not shown that the questions asked were
    illegal under the ADA. The ADA expressly allows ‘pre-
    employment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to
    perform    job-related    functions.’       42   U.S.C.A.
    § 12112(d)(2)(B). It also allows an employer to require
    a medical examination after an offer of employment has
    been made, and allows inquire into medical history and
    possible disability, if the inquire is ‘job-related and
    consistent with business necessity.’         42 U.S.C.A.
    § 12112(d)(3),(4)(A).
    Thus, the district court concluded, “[t]he question at issue seems
    proper and necessary.”
    We find the reasoning of the district court to be sound and
    well reasoned in the light of 42 U.S.C. § 12112. See, e.g., EEOC
    v. Texas Bus Lines, 
    923 F. Supp. 965
    , 981 (S.D. Tex. 1996)(stating
    that “the basic medical inquiries made by Texas Bus Lines are
    reasonably related to the position of bus driver; . . . [thus,] the
    Court finds that Texas Bus Lines’ pre-offer, pre-employment medical
    inquiries do not constitute a per se violation of the ADA”). Thus,
    even if Noel had not waived the issue of the legality of the
    questions posed by Daybrook, his claim would nonetheless have
    failed.
    3
    (1)   the   seaman,   during   a   required   medical   examination,
    “intentionally misrepresents or conceals material medical facts,
    the disclosure of which is plainly desired”; (2) the undisclosed
    facts are material to the employer’s decision to hire the seaman;
    and (3) “there is a causal link between the pre-existing disability
    that was concealed and the disability incurred during the voyage.”
    
    McCorpen, 396 F.2d at 549
    ; see also Wactor v. Spartan Transp.
    Corp., 
    27 F.3d 347
    , 352 (8th Cir. 1994)(adopting McCorpen and
    stating that “the McCorpen standard had been adopted by the Fourth
    Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and by the Ninth Circuit”)(citations
    omitted).
    Turning to the facts of this case, Noel admits that he
    intentionally concealed from Daybook the fact that he suffered
    extensive injuries, including an injury to his L4-L5 disc, in 1992
    while working for AMPRO Fisheries.3     Noel argues, however, that
    Daybrook has failed to establish that this information was material
    because he argues that prior to accepting the job with Daybrook, he
    had fully recovered from these injuries. Additionally, Noel argues
    that Daybrook has failed to offer sufficient proof to establish
    that there is a causal connection between the prior injury and the
    injury that forms the basis of this claim.
    3
    Noel answered “No” to the following questions posed by
    Daybrook during his physical examination: “Do you now have or have
    you ever had at any time in the past: . . . Backache or Back Pain
    _________; Neck Pain ________ ;. . . Hospitalization________ . . ..
    Have you had any previous accidents or illnesses? If so, please
    explain________________________.”
    4
    Focusing on the issue of materiality, the district court held:
    All of the evidence in this case establishes without
    dispute and without contradiction that the job of a
    menhaden fisherman is dangerous.     It involves highly
    physical work.    Captain Ripley, whose testimony was
    extremely impressive, testified that he is the one who
    does the hiring and he is the one who reviews the
    applications and the paperwork and that he would not have
    hired Mr. Noel had the information been disclosed. The
    plaintiff’s physical condition was certainly material to
    the job for which he was applying. . . .
    After reviewing the record, it is clear that the district
    court’s conclusion on the issue of materiality is correct.                   The
    uncontested testimony of Captain Arnold Ripley established that
    Noel’s prior injury was material.                 Further, Noel’s own expert
    witness, Dr. Robert S. Roberts, admitted on cross-examination that
    given Noel’s medical history, he would not have recommended that
    Daybrook hire him to work as a fisherman.               Thus, the undisputed
    evidence    at   trial   established       that    Noel’s   prior   injury   was
    material.
    Finally, turning to the issue of the causal link between
    Noel’s prior injury and the injury sustained while working for
    Daybrook, the district court held:
    Again, the evidence is undisputed that the 1992 injury
    involved the same disk, L4-L5, as the injury presently
    complained of in this case. Moreover, the plaintiff’s
    own witness, vocational witness, Dr. Roberts, testified
    that a 25 pound lifting restriction would, indeed,
    prevent the plaintiff from doing the work that he did.
    Thus, the district court concluded that the evidence established
    that there was a “causal link” between the two injuries.
    5
    The undisputed facts in the record support the conclusion of
    the district court.        The injury sustained by Noel, which is the
    basis of this suit, was to the L4-L5 disc.                This is the same disc
    that Noel injured in 1992 while working as a fisherman for AMPRO
    Fisheries.    Further, the evidence at trial established that Noel
    has incurred the same pain and side effects for the present injury
    as he incurred as a result of the 1992 injury.                  Thus, the evidence
    clearly established a causal connection between the present injury
    and the injury that Noel suffered in 1992.                       See Guillory v.
    Northbank Towing Corp., 
    1994 A.M.C. 1971
    (W.D. La. 1993)(stating
    that “plaintiff’s claim for maintenance and cure benefits for
    continued medical attention to his back are for the exact same area
    of the back [as he received prior treatment for;]. . . therefore,
    there clearly is a causal connection and materiality between and of
    that which was concealed and his present medical condition”);
    Lancaster Towing, Inc. v. Davis, 
    681 F. Supp. 387
    , 389 (N.D. Miss.
    1988)(denying     the    plaintiff    maintenance         and    cure    because   he
    “intentionally      misrepresented         his    back     condition       [to     the
    defendant], the misrepresentation was material to the company’s
    decision     to   hire   him,   and    the       injury     complained       of    was
    substantially the same as the one he concealed”).
    In short, Noel has failed to point to any evidence in the
    record that supports his assertion that his prior injuries were
    immaterial to Daybrook’s decision to hire him.                          Further, the
    evidence adduced at trial clearly established a causal connection
    6
    between the injuries Noel suffered in 1992 while working for AMPRO
    Fisheries and the injuries he suffered while working for Daybrook.
    Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
    A F F I R M E D.4
    4
    The judgment of the district court dismissing Jacqueline
    Noel’s motion for intervention as a matter of law is likewise
    AFFIRMED. See Broussard v. Broussard, 
    340 So. 2d 1309
    , 1312 (La.
    1977)(stating that “[s]ince the [Louisiana] Code classifies as
    separate property actions for damages resulting from injuries to a
    husband, living separate from his wife by reason of her fault,
    La.C.C. art. 2334, it seems clearly intended that an unmarried man
    would be entitled to treat such an action for damages [under the
    Jones Act for injuries suffered prior to the marriage] as his
    separate property”).
    7